

GRS 1600A

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FM MOSCOW 031815Z JUL 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO (DESKBY 040800Z)

TELEGRAM NR 824 OF 3 JUL 84

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, MODUK,  
UKDEL VIENNA, UKDIS GENEVA, UKDEL CSCE STOCKHOLM.  
INFO PRIORITY OTHER NATO POSTS, EAST EUROPEAN POSTS, TOKYO.  
SAVING TO ULAN BATOR, PEKING, TEL AVIV, JEDDA, BEIRUT,  
DAMASCUS, AMMAN, BAGHDAD, BIS TEHRAN, CAIRO, ALGIERS,  
LUANDA, AND PRETORIA.

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

MY TELNO 81-1: SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT: SECOND

SESSION OF TALKS WITH GROMYKO: 3 JULY

SUMMARY

1. A WIDE-RANGING AGENDA, WITH MORE REAL DISCUSSION THAN ON  
2 JULY, COVERING ARMS CONTROL, MIDDLE EAST AND OTHER  
REGIONAL QUESTIONS, AND BILATERAL MATTERS. MOST  
INTERESTING ITEM WAS EXCHANGES ON WEAPONS IN SPACE. GROMYKO  
INSISTED, IN TEETH OF SECRETARY OF STATE'S EVIDENCE,  
FOLLOWING CONTACTS WITH WASHINGTON OVERNIGHT,  
THAT THE US ATTACHED UNACCEPTABLE PRE-CONDITIONS TO THEIR  
ACCEPTANCE OF PROPOSED TALKS. SECRETARY OF STATE STRONGLY  
ENCOURAGED HIM TO PURSUE WITH WASHINGTON THROUGH DIPLOMATIC  
CHANNEL. ON ARAB/ISRAEL, SECRETARY OF STATE ADVISED GROMYKO  
TO ENCOURAGE SYRIA NOT TO SPOIL ANY OPPORTUNITIES ARISING AFTER  
ISRAELI ELECTIONS. GROMYKO RESTED ON THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR AN  
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. NOTHING NEW ON SOUTHERN AFRICA.  
GROMYKO DID NOT RESPOND DIRECTLY TO SECRETARY OF STATE'S  
REMARKS ON AFGHANISTAN, CHOOSING INSTEAD TO CRITICISE AT  
LENGTH US POLICIES IN CARIBBEAN AND CENTRAL AMERICA. GROMYKO  
GAVE QUALIFIED ACCEPTANCE IN PRINCIPLE TO INVITATION TO VISIT  
UK, BUT LEFT TIMING OPEN. FOR DETAILS OF DISCUSSION ON  
BILATERAL QUESTIONS, SEE MY IFT.

DETAIL

ARMS CONTROL

2. ON MBFR, GROMYKO SAID THE WEST WAS MERELY KILLING TIME AND  
THAT WITHOUT CHANGES IN THE WESTERN POSITION, THE PROSPECTS  
FOR PROGRESS WERE SLIM. THE WEU'S LIFTING OF RESTRICTIONS ON

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CERTAIN FRG CONVENTIONAL ARMS PRODUCTION SHOWED THAT WESTERN IDEAS RAN COUNTER TO ARMS LIMITATION. THE SECRETARY OF STATE EXPLAINED THE BACKGROUND TO WEU TREATY CHANGES AND SAID THAT THE SOVIET SIDE SHOULD GIVE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO THE LATEST WESTERN PROPOSALS ON M.B.F.R. WHICH TOOK ACCOUNT OF EASTERN PREOCCUPATIONS.

3. ON CDE STOCKHOLM, GROMYKO SAID HOPES RAISED AT THE OUTSET HAD NOT YET BEEN JUSTIFIED. SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR NOFUN AND NOFUF WERE SURELY WELCOME TO WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION. BUT THE ATTEMPT, ON GROUNDS OF VERIFICATION, TO OPEN UP SOVIET TERRITORY TO ESPIONAGE, WHILE EXEMPTING US TERRITORY, WAS 'BOGUS'. BUT HE DID NOT REJECT THE POSSIBILITY OF AGREEMENT ON 'CERTAIN MILITARY TECHNICAL STEPS', PROVIDED THEY WERE NEGOTIATED ALONGSIDE NOFUN AND NOFUF. THE SECRETARY OF STATE RECALLED THAT THE AGREED MANDATE EXCLUDED US TERRITORY. NOFUN WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE BUT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO RE-CONFIRM EXISTING OBLIGATIONS ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE.

4. ON ARMS IN SPACE, REVERTING TO DISCUSSION ON 2 JULY (MY TELNO 811 PARA 4), THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT OVERNIGHT HE HAD RE-CHECKED THE WHITE HOUSE POSITION. HE READ OUT THE RELEVANT PASSAGE FROM PARA 1 OF WASHINGTON TELNO 2 TO MOSCOW. THE US POSITION WAS THAT THERE WERE NO AMERICAN PRE-CONDITIONS. THEY WERE READY TO TALK ABOUT THE SOVIET AGENDA AND FOR THEIR PART WANTED TO TALK ABOUT THE US AGENDA. BUT THEY SET NO PRE-CONDITIONS. THE SOVIET REACTION - REFUSING TO TAKE YES FOR AN ANSWER - WAS DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND. HE URGED THE RUSSIANS TO PURSUE THE QUESTION THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. GROMYKO PERSISTED IN ARGUING THAT THERE WERE AMERICAN PRE-CONDITIONS, AND THAT THE AMERICANS THEMSELVES RECOGNISED THAT THEIR REPLY HAD BEEN DELIBERATELY FRAMED TO COURT A SOVIET REJECTION. THE SOVIET UNION WAS INTERESTED ONLY IN 'SERIOUS AND HONEST' NEGOTIATIONS, NOT PROPAGANDA. THE SECRETARY OF STATE BROUGHT THE DISCUSSION TO A CLOSE BY RECOMMENDING THE RUSSIANS TO CLARIFY THE POSITION THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE COULD NOT RECOGNISE THE SOVIET PICTURE OF WESTERN, ESPECIALLY AMERICA, INTENTIONS PAINTED IN GROMYKO'S SPEECH ON 2 JULY. THE SOVIET ANALYSIS WAS NOT CONVINCING AND TOOK INADEQUATE ACCOUNT OF THE ASSESSMENTS OF INDEPENDENT WESTERN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS. THERE COULD BE NO DOUBT ABOUT WESTERN SINCERITY AND THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD 'GIVE PEACE A CHANCE'. GROMYKO SAID THE SOVIET VIEWS ON THE NECESSARY PRE-CONDITIONS FOR A RESUMPTION OF TALKS HAD AGAIN BEEN MADE CLEAR BY CHERNENKO. NO FURTHER STATEMENT WAS NEEDED.

#### REGIONAL QUESTIONS

6. ARAB/ISRAEL: THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT, AFTER THE FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS IN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES, THERE COULD BE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A RESUMPTION OF DIALOGUE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES. BUT HE FEARED THAT IN THAT EVENT THE

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ARAB WORLD MIGHT NOT BE UNITED ENOUGH TO TAKE ADVANTAGE. HE PUT IT TO GROMYKO (AND REPEATED THE POINT LATER IN THE DISCUSSION) THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD STRESS TO THE SYRIANS, WHO SEEMED TO TAKE A LESS URGENT VIEW, THE NEED FOR ARAB UNITY. GROMYKO DID NOT RESPOND TO THIS SUGGESTION, BUT SPOKE, IN GENERAL TERMS, OF SOVIET CONDEMNATION OF ARAB EXTREMISM AND SUPPORT FOR PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS, NON-INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF MIDDLE EAST STATES, AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN TROOPS FROM ARAB STATES UNLESS THEY WERE THERE WITH THE CONSENT OF THOSE STATES THEMSELVES. HE COMMENDED THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A MIDDLE EASTERN CONFERENCE, WHICH WAS WORTH TRYING, GIVEN THE FAILURE OF OTHER ATTEMPTS TO REACH A SOLUTION. ISRAELI AGGRESSION AGAINST NEIGHBOURING STATES, AND ILLEGAL SETTLEMENT OF THE WEST BANK, COULD NOT EXIST WITHOUT US AND OTHER WESTERN SUPPORT. THE SECRETARY OF STATE RECALLED OUR RESERVATIONS AT PRESENT ABOUT A CONFERENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST. HE AGAIN URGED THAT SYRIA SHOULD NOT BLOCK ARAB UNITY. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE UK AND THE SOVIET UNION COULD USEFULLY MAINTAIN CONTACT ON THIS QUESTION.

7. IRAN/IRAQ: THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAW SOME SHARED OBJECTIVES: NO ESCALATION OF THE CONFLICT, NO IRANIAN VICTORY, AND NO INTERRUPTION OF FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION. THE UK WAS NEUTRAL. WE HAD SUPPLIED NO LETHAL ARMS TO EITHER SIDE. THE RIGHT WAY TO PRESERVE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION WAS BY DIPLOMATIC ACTION. IF OBLIGED TO RESORT TO OTHER MEANS, WE WOULD CONSULT THE SOVIET UNION. OUR ACTION WOULD NOT BE DIRECTED AGAINST SOVIET INTERESTS. GROMYKO AGREED ON THE NEED FOR AN END TO HOSTILITIES: IRAQ WAS READY BUT NOT YET IRAN.

8. AFGHANISTAN: THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THE KEY TO SOLUTION WAS THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS, WHICH WOULD BE WIDELY WELCOMED AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH SOVIET INTERESTS. GROMYKO DID NOT RESPOND.

9. CARIBBEAN AND CENTRAL AMERICA: IN A LENGTHY INTERVENTION, GROMYKO CONDEMNED 'AGGRESSIVE' US POLICIES AND 'TERRORISM' IN THE AREA, IN FAMILIAR TERMS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE REBUTTED THESE ALLEGATIONS, AND GROMYKO CONCLUDED THAT OUR POSITIONS WERE 'POLES APART'.

10. FAR EAST: GROMYKO EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT NEW TRENDS TOWARDS MILITARISM IN JAPAN, EGGED ON BY WASHINGTON. THE SECRETARY OF STATE REFUTED THIS AND SPOKE OF JAPANESE CONCERN FOR THEIR SECURITY, FOLLOWING DEPLOYMENT OF SS 20S IN THE SOVIET FAR EAST.

11. SOUTHERN AFRICA: IN A RELATIVELY RESTRAINED INTERVENTION, GROMYKO URGED THAT A FIRMER BRITISH VOICE AGAINST SOUTH AFRICAN AGGRESSION IN ANGOLA WOULD HAVE WEIGHT IN PRETORIA. LIKEWISE, ON NAMIBIA, WESTERN EFFORTS IN 'A SELF-APPOINTED GROUP,' NOW DEFUNCT, HAD LED TO NOTHING BECAUSE IT HAD HAD NO SERIOUS INTENTION TO PROMOTE NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE. THOUGH IT WOULD CONTINUE TO ASSIST ANGOLA AGAINST SOUTH AFRICAN AGGRESSION, THE SOVIET UNION'S INTENTIONS IN THE AREA WERE PEACEFUL. THE SECRETARY OF STATE COUNTERED THAT WE SHARED THE AIM OF EARLY

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INDEPENDENCE FOR NAMIBIA, AND IN RECENT HIGH-LEVEL EXCHANGES HAD SPOKEN FIRMLY TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS. THERE WAS NO ROOM FOR MISUNDERSTANDING OUR POSITION. THE CUBAN ROLE WAS ALSO A FACTOR. BUT NEGOTIATIONS AIMED AT INDEPENDENCE FOR NAMIBIA AND SECURITY FOR ANGOLA COULD RESOLVE THE PROBLEM. GROMYKO AGREED THAT RECENT OFFICIAL TALKS HAD BEEN USEFUL AND THAT CONTACTS SHOULD BE MAINTAINED.

12. CONCLUSION: GROMYKO SAID THAT IN HIS VIEW THESE DISCUSSIONS HAD BEEN USEFUL. THERE WERE SOME QUESTIONS ON WHICH WE DIFFERED, IN SOME CASES BEING POLES APART. BUT WE SHOULD TRY TO BUILD ON THE POINTS OF CONVERGENCE. WHILE NOT MINIMISING OUR DIFFERENCES, WE SHOULD ALL WORK FOR PEACE AND DETENTE, EVEN THOUGH SOME NOW FOUND THIS LATTER WORD HARD TO SAY. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUED EXCHANGES.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES

CCN READ = MY TELNO 811: SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT ETC

SUTHERLAND  
FCO WHITEHALL (PALACE)  
SOV.D.

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

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