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PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister

You will wish to see this before your meeting with Mr. Vance tomorrow.

Talk with Dr. Brzezinski

*BM
22/5*

During my visit to Washington I had an hour and a half alone with Dr. Brzezinski, and you may like to have this account of the main points covered.

New British Government

2. He said that I must have been having an exciting time and told me that Chancellor Schmidt had told President Carter that he had been most impressed during his recent visit to London. I spoke a bit about your overall objectives and in particular your determination to turn the economy round on which incidentally depended our ability to play an effective role in the world.

TNF

3. He asked me whether the new British Government were ready to address their minds to this difficult problem. I said yes. He then asked whether you had discussed it with Schmidt, and whether the latter had been more constructive than he had been at Guadeloupe. I said that the answer was yes to both questions. I did not give him details of your talks with Schmidt but said that he clearly envisaged the deployment of new systems in Germany provided another non-nuclear weapon state also took a step of this kind. Furthermore while sticking firmly to the point that the FRG could not act alone over the deployment of new systems which could hit Moscow since this would create great political difficulties for him and might be thought by some people to be a half-way house towards Germany becoming a nuclear power, he did not seem to have a closed mind on precisely what other countries would have to do. For example, at one point he had referred briefly to ships with port facilities in other countries. Schmidt had also been anxious to raise the matter to the political level and to reach decisions this year. Brzezinski welcomed this and said that United States thinking was now moving towards Pershing IIs rather than GLCMs. I reminded him that, for political reasons, the Germans were anxious that TNF and arms



SECRET

control should march hand in hand, and that we accepted this: but we also agreed that we must know where we stood on TNF before taking any decisions on future arms control negotiations.

Brezhnev/Carter Summit

4. I said that I had noticed that three days had been allowed for this. Was this because of Brezhnev's health or because of the amount of business to be transacted? He replied that Giscard had given Carter a worrying account of Brezhnev's health but that in fact Brezhnev had proposed a heavy work programme for the Summit. On the first day there would be a three-hour session in the morning, followed by a two-hour session in the afternoon and then a dinner. On the second day there would be two two-hour working sessions and then a working dinner. On the third day there would be a three-hour morning session followed in the afternoon by the Treaty signing and Press conference. The first day would be devoted to disarmament (SALT II and III, MBFR, ASAD, etc.). On the second day they would survey the international situation and crisis points - Vietnam, Africa, Middle East, etc. The third morning would be devoted to bilateral questions. I pressed him on what exactly the Americans expected to cover on SALT. He said that almost certainly there would remain a few loose ends to tie up on SALT II: but there would certainly be discussions on the scope of SALT III. I said "Such as?" He thought Carter would want to aim at acceptance of a target for further mutual reductions in SALT III. Brezhnev might not agree to this but it might still be possible to make progress on defining the scope of SALT III. I asked about the question of Grey Areas and reminded him of the very close British and European interests. He saw no scope for discussion of this at the forthcoming Summit. The Russians were not going to reduce or remove the SS 20s simply because Carter asked them to do so. This problem could only be tackled, if at all, after decisions had been taken on TNF. I repeated that, whatever view was taken on SALT II, the British Government would want to be closely involved in SALT III. Did he foresee any possibility of a situation arising where Carter might have to consult us very urgently, either before or during the course of his talks with Brezhnev, about what might be said on SALT III? He said No: and I added, speaking personally and as a friend, that I thought a new British Government would



SECRET

be placed in an intolerable position if something emerged from the Summit which appeared to affect our interests and about which we had not been consulted. He fully agreed and repeated the assurance which President Carter had given at Guadeloupe that anything said to Brezhnev at this Summit about SALT III would be in a strict United States/USSR strategic context, and would not get into the Grey Areas.

SALT II and the United Kingdom

5. Brzezinski said that Carter had initially been disturbed by an apparent discrepancy between the first reactions of the United Kingdom and the FRG to the news that agreement had been reached on SALT II, but that he had much appreciated what had subsequently been said in London. I said that I would again like to speak frankly and on a personal basis. I knew that you would do nothing to weaken the position of the President: and for that reason you had said that you hoped that SALT II would be ratified. Privately however you remained to be convinced whether SALT II was a good agreement or not. I then said that there was a genuine problem here. The United States had kept us closely in touch throughout the negotiations over several years: and he knew that we had taken the view that SALT II looked like being a good agreement and certainly better than no agreement. The fact remained however that we had not got a copy of it: and it was unreasonable to expect the new British Administration to pronounce on something they could not say that they had seen. Ministers had however showed solidarity with the President by saying that they hoped the agreement would be ratified. At this point I reminded him of the problem we had had over the word "necessarily" in their interpretative statement on the non-circumvention clause and said that our new Ministers would shortly be considering a paper on this (this is coming to the Restricted Group this week). In reply he made two points:-

- (i) Although constitutionally they could not give us an actual copy of the treaty before it went to the Senate, they would be very ready to give British Ministers the fullest possible briefing with every detail including charts, etc. He hoped that you would not hesitate to put any questions frankly to Mr. Vance who had all the details at his fingertips: and if there



SECRET

was insufficient time for this he or one of his staff would be ready to fly over to London to give new Ministers a detailed briefing if this would be welcomed.

- (ii) As regards "necessarily" he hoped we had appreciated the significance of President Carter's message to Mr. Callaghan of 27th April. Although they could not agree to drop the word "necessarily", Carter's message to Mr. Callaghan had deliberately used the precise wording which we had ourselves used in explaining our anxieties. He did not see how the President could have given us a more forthcoming reply.

Rhodesia

6. He raised this saying that Muzorewa would be coming to Washington soon. I said that our position was clear. The Government intended to recognise and to lift sanctions, but it wanted to do this in a considered and sophisticated way in order to limit any damage, e.g. in relation to the Commonwealth or over Nigerian oil. Muzorewa could help by giving his Government as African an appearance as possible. Brzezinski replied that Carter was very concerned about the attitude of the Front Line Presidents but inevitably had now to take account of the Senate vote also. We agreed that there was no point in pursuing this subject further since the Foreign Secretary and Mr. Vance would be discussing it in detail on Monday.

British Nuclear Deterrent

7. I said that you would soon be discussing with the Ministers directly concerned the question of a successor system for Polaris. I had not much doubt what the outcome would be and you would then probably send a message to President Carter asking that a small high level team of officials should visit Washington. This was because we had taken our studies as far as we could without talking to the Americans about some aspects of technology. (To avoid any misunderstanding I told him that Mr. Callaghan had authorised me to tell you about his recent exchange of messages with President Carter concerning a possible visit of this kind.) Brzezinski then asked me whether we would be going for a successor to Polaris or SLCM. I said that since Ministers had not yet considered the matter I could not give him any answer: clearly there were attractions in Trident though cost considerations would also come into play.




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Reconfirmation of nuclear agreements

8. I said that since you would not be seeing the President before the Tokyo Summit, when there would be little time for bilateral discussion of such matters, you had authorised me to say that you were ready to reaffirm the various agreements and would like the necessary action set in train. I said that most of the texts (which were in any case straightforward and would require no change of substance) could be settled between him and our Embassy in Washington. There was however one agreement of which knowledge had been confined to the White House at his end and to No. 10 and the Cabinet Office in London: and I would have to deal directly with him on this. He said that he would prefer to deal directly with me on all the reconfirmations so that they could be looked at together. I agreed to send him a sealed envelope with drafts via the Embassy: if he saw no difficulty they could then be submitted formally to you and the President, and the various letters could be prepared for signature and exchange.

Tokyo Summit

9. We also briefly discussed the preparations for the Tokyo Summit.


(John Hunt)

21st May, 1979

