



Foreign
Policy (2)

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister.

These are the papers for
your meeting on policy
towards Afghanistan on
Tuesday morning.

My minute of 2
Ray gives the background.

A letter to Prof.
Thomas is in your
signature folder.

mb.

Paul
19/5/80.

WESTERN STRATEGY IN THE WAKE OF AFGHANISTAN

A REPORT TO THE PRIME MINISTER BY
PROFESSORS MICHAEL HOWARD, ELIE KEDOURIE,
LEONARD SCHAPIRO AND HUGH THOMAS

my

CONTENTS

I	THE WEST ... para. 1
II	THE 'THIRD WORLD' ... para. 3
III	THE SOVIET THREAT ... para. 6
IV	SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH ... para. 18
V	'DETENTE' ... para. 22
VI	THE SOVIET UNION AND OIL ... para. 25
VII	AFGHANISTAN : CONSEQUENCES AND RESPONSES ... para. 26
VIII	WESTERN POLICY ... para. 36
	(a) General ... para. 36
	(b) The Alliance ... para. 42
	(c) Political warfare ... para. 49
	(d) Propaganda ... para. 50
	(e) Military preparedness ... para. 61
	(f) Contacts with the Soviet Union & East Europe ... para. 64
	(g) Aid ... para. 69
	(h) 'Militant Islam' ... para. 70
	(i) Arms Control ... para. 71
	(j) South Africa ... para. 72
	(k) China ... para. 73
IX	BRITISH DEFENCE ... para. 74
X	WESTERN INITIATIVES ... para. 78
	(a) General Appreciation ... para. 78
	(b) The Persian Gulf ... para. 83
	(c) Angola; Sahara; OPEC; the Caribbean ... para. 88
	CONCLUSION ... para. 94
	SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
	APPENDIX WHY THE FOREIGN OFFICE MUST CONTROL AID

I : THE WEST

1. The West constitutes a group of sovereign states whose principles are summed up in the preamble to the NATO Treaty: 'democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law'. By 'democracy' we understand 'representative democracy'; by individual liberty, we understand free enterprise as well as freedom of conscience. We think of 'the West' as synonymous with 'the Free World', which is in some ways a superior formulation, for it enables us to rank free countries of the East (Australia, Japan) as being associated with the old states of Christendom.

2. There is no institutional link between the countries of the West. (Unlike the institutions which connect many other groups of nations: such as NATO itself, the Commonwealth, the 'Non-Aligned' countries, the Organisation of American States, the Warsaw Pact, COMECON, the European Economic Community, etc.) There might be advantage in exploring the benefits of some such organisation.

II : THE 'THIRD WORLD'

3. The countries of the West have been the principal activators and beneficiaries of the industrial and scientific transformations of the past two centuries. They were enabled, during the nineteenth century, to extend political dominance over more backward societies throughout the world. That dominance has now been surrendered. But memories of imperial subordination, continuing racial enmities and a consciousness of economic inequalities have created in the 'Third World' an antagonism to Western societies and institutions which can easily be exploited by radical or Marxist agitators. This is the more serious because of Western dependence on the raw materials controlled by the 'Third World'. We were not asked to advise on 'North-South' relations, but the importance of these attitudes must constantly be borne in mind when dealing with those of East versus West. The Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan makes this more important than ever. If the Soviet Union were to succeed in establishing a 'hegemonial' control over the states of the Third World, we should probably have 'lost'.

4. Many countries in Africa, the Middle East and Asia are not states in the European sense of the world (nor, indeed, in the Latin American sense). Traditions of continuity of government as of law are weak there. The rulers of the states concerned often recognise that they lack legitimacy. Their economies are unstable. The rulers seek protection not from the most generous, but from the strongest, power. Those rulers are more likely to be impressed by military capability than by aid. It is difficult enough to devise policies towards each of them individually, but impossible to find a policy to treat all the poorer countries together. There is a dangerously emotive content in the term 'Third World' in the way that it is usually used in public rhetoric: we use it in this paper simply as a label.

WJH to
use it

5. We face too in this 'Third World' a problem of radicalism compounded by racial tensions which could have ugly consequences for our own societies. This radicalism is in many cases channelled into various forms, or perversions, of Marxist ideology, and commands some sympathy within the West. Even if it may be unrealistic to see this in the form of a 'global conspiracy', it would be foolish to ignore the extent to which its various branches are linked by common ideological perceptions, even when national interests diverge. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union has made persistent and often successful attempts to penetrate all these radical activities.

III : THE SOVIET THREAT

6. The Bolsheviks (later called Communists) seized power in 1917 after a coup d'etat in the expectation that that act would trigger the revolutionary conquest of the world. That did not then occur. But 'the complete and final victory of Communism on a world scale' remains the main aim of Soviet policy. Most of the institutions and dispositions of the Russian Government are arranged to serve that end.

7. Three other aims of Soviet international politics in increasing order of ambition are:

(i) The preservation of the Soviet homeland and its ring of satellites, particularly those in Eastern Europe;

(ii) A state of affairs whereby the Soviet Union would automatically be a party to the resolution of all matters 'of any significance' - the definition of 'significance' to be up to the Soviet leaders. Mr. Gromyko, in a well-known speech at the 24th party congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in 1971 (echoing Mr. Brezhnev, the previous year), claimed that this aim had already been achieved;

(iii) 'World hegemony', a state of affairs in which, though the Soviet Union would not be responsible for the government of the entire globe, no state would be able, or wish, to do things which the Soviet Union did not want; all states would give the Soviet Union such favourable terms, in economic, cultural and military matters, as would be demanded; that is, world 'Finlandisation'.

8. In all these roles, the Soviet leaders see Russia as the 'vanguard' of the world revolution. 'Leninist principles of proletarian internationalism' are the justification for Soviet (or Cuban, or East German) subversion of poor peoples and rich ones alike. Marxist-Leninist ideology is a decisive preoccupation in the minds of every Soviet leader. Even if this does not give the Soviet leaders a chart, it always gives them a compass. Soviet leaders have a picture of the sort of world which they would like to see, even if they may not have a precise timetable to achieve it. They are sustained by the sense that they are themselves subordinate to a scientific system whose future victories are pre-ordained, and every aspect of their policy, in their minds (from trade deals to chess tournaments), is subordinated to the ultimate goal. This ideological motive outweighs, if it does not quite extinguish, the link between revolutionary Marxism and the expansionist foreign policy of Tsarist days.

9. The distinction sometimes made between the 'defensive' and 'offensive' intentions of the Soviet Union does not appear to us to be a valid one. Empires seldom grow as a matter of settled policy. As often as not they expand reluctantly and piecemeal, with repeated and occasionally sincere disclaimers of predatory intent. Weak states on their borders are said to need to be 'protected' against the designs of potential adversaries; protection gradually turns into occupation. A process of this sort is likely to be the more rapid if fired by a sense of cultural superiority and by missionary zeal; it commonly continues until it meets firm resistance backed by military force.

10. We are, therefore, unimpressed by the argument that Russia's expansion is due to its sense of insecurity and the consequent requirement for 'buffer states'. Russia's bad communications, low population density, and depth of defence, have always made it a difficult country to conquer. Today's buffer states have a way of becoming tomorrow's homeland which in turn demands new buffers to protect it.

11. Nuclear weapons may have altered the tactics of Soviet governments since 1945 but, however many excursions into 'détente' or 'pacts' with enemies there may have to be, the Soviet Government is still of the view that there can be no permanent peace between communist and 'bourgeois' countries.

12. In order to carry out these aims, the Soviet Union have used the following methods:

(a) Open political methods such as:

- (i) organising local Communist parties for the 'peaceful' capture of parliaments;
- (ii) indirect support of other parties or movements, e.g., those led by Colonel Nasser or President de Gaulle which may temporarily seem to serve Soviet foreign policy.
- (iii) organising Communist-dominated trade unions.

(b) Propaganda

Typically this has been conducted by campaigns to support the Soviet Union's line on e.g. 'foreign bases', the 'neutron bomb', the consequences of nuclear war, nuclear energy, détente, China, etc. These campaigns have been waged by:

(i) press, radio, films, television and other technical means; and

(ii) front organisations.

(c) Subversion, such as the organisation of

(i) direct espionage - by either the KGB or GRU - of long-term or immediate benefit to the Soviet Union.*

(ii) secret communist parties whose aims are clandestinely to penetrate institutions - particularly police and security services, but also the Church, Civil Service or trade unions;

(iii) training and backing for terrorist and/or guerilla movements - often performed by surrogates; and

(iv) the penetration of international organisations.

(d) Military Methods

(i) the use of surrogate forces belonging to states friendly to the Soviet Union and trained for the purpose (North Korea, Vietnam, East Germany, Cuba, perhaps Yemen). The PLO may come into this category;

(ii) the deployment of military force by the Soviet armed forces;

(iii) the threat of military force by the Soviet armed forces.

* It is fair to suppose that at least a quarter of Russian diplomats abroad are members of the KGB, while Soviet Ambassadors and Embassies have always played a part in Soviet subversion: e.g. Zorin (Prague 1948); Solod (Egypt, 1953; Guinea, 1966).

(e) Economic Warfare

13. At his 'open' speech at the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, Mr. Khrushchev said that Communist parties 'should increase and deepen the contradictions in capitalist countries and that capitalist countries could be severely hindered by the Communist penetration of overseas markets and sources of raw materials'. The recession following the oil crisis of 1973 cannot be attributed to Russia but the effects of that event have placed her in a position where she can weaken the mechanism of international trade when it suits her.

14. The Soviet leaders would probably not like to see an immediate collapse of the Western economic system. This fact may explain certain inconsistencies in Soviet behaviour. The Soviet Union presumably hopes to use Western technology until such time as it stands on its own feet. It has, after all, been the consistent policy of the Soviet Union to rely on our technology and economic support ever since 1920.

15. The oil crisis tests the West severely: but it bankrupts many poor countries which do not have oil. Those countries finance themselves by borrowing from Western banks, above all dollars, whose outflow further damages the US. Soviet treatment of such countries (if they are of strategic, or other, interest to them, see paragraph 80 below) is to offer them a soft loan, at a lower rate than might be available from the World Bank. The country uses the credit to buy Soviet goods. The Soviet Union accepts repayment in the form of imports from the country concerned. The administration of the loan will allow Soviet technicians to go to the country; if this does not lead to Soviet domination of the economy, it will probably at least cause the abandonment of Western defence agreements.

16. The Soviet Union has also been active in establishing itself as a major supplier of fuel (oil, natural gas and some uranium for Western reactors) to West Germany and Italy. One result could be to establish conditions of economic dependence which could be politically exploited.

17. Other economic tactics, since 1971, have been to pursue foreign loans and technology for the Soviet Union herself. However striking an admission of failure that change of policy was, there have been many benefits to Russia: for example, assistance to meet home demand for consumer goods and the interest of some Western governments and banks to support the Soviet economy - at least to enable them to service their loans.

IV: SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH

18. The Soviet Union has never distinguished, as has the West, between a 'deterrent' and a war-fighting capability. Their military leaders believe that the best way to deter a war is to have the evident capacity to win it, whether it 'goes nuclear' or not. As a result, they have built up forces, nuclear and conventional, which at every level challenge, and increasingly surpass, those of the West. In the last resort, the Soviet strength is no doubt intended to compel the West to withdraw in a battle of wills. Should that fail, the Russians are determined to go on and win the consequent war, nuclear or not, and to keep their system going. But one effect of this military investment is to produce those 'foreign policy benefits'* mentioned by Dr. Kissinger in his speech at Brussels in September 1979. In the short run, therefore, the armaments can be used to intimidate and to threaten, in however vague a way, any country from which the Soviet Union wants something which it does not want to give.

19. We do not necessarily endorse the belief, current in some American circles that, at some time in the 1980s, the United States may be unable, because of the vulnerability of her land-based missiles, to deter the threat of a Soviet nuclear attack by a credible second-strike capability; and may, therefore, have to surrender. But the perception that this might be true could have a formidable effect on the overall balance of power and enable the Soviet Union confidently to take the initiative in disputes anywhere in the world.

* "Never in history has it happened that a nation achieved superiority in all significant weapons categories without seeking to put it into some foreign policy benefits."

20. The Soviet leaders are men who grew up in a world of violence. They are indoctrinated in the belief both of the inevitability of struggle and of the legitimacy of using force as an instrument in that struggle. They do not have (as did the Nazis) an inclination to war for its own sake: the experience of the Second World War, if nothing else, will have inclined them to pursue their aims by means other than war wherever possible and to ensure that war, should it come, would be fought on the territories of their adversaries rather than theirs. The threat to Russian territory in a nuclear war, on however limited a scale, is likely to remain a dissuasion against military adventure, save in circumstances where they are certain of victory.

21. The prestige of the Soviet armed forces has never been higher than it is today. But it would be a mistake to suppose that Soviet policy is determined by its military establishment or that there are clashes between the military leaders and the civilians, in which the former pursue the more aggressive line. All the evidence which we have studied leads us to believe that, while the military leaders may have an important voice in the process of formulating policy, decisions rest squarely with the party leaders. Everything suggests that this state of affairs is fully accepted by the military men.

V: DÉTENTE

22. Détente is an ambiguous word. We want to point out firmly that there is no point in saying that such-and-such a measure would take us back to the "height of the cold war". The fact is that, during the years 1945-55 (the years to which reference is presumably made), the West's position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union was better than it is now. Throughout the years of peaceful co-existence (1955-1964) or détente (say 1967-1979), the Soviet Union was developing one missile after another, and extending its areas of operation in many ways.

23. There have been some gains to the West from the last few years of peaceful co-existence:

- (i) a heightening of the dispute with China, which has not wished to be left out in what has seemed like a partition of the world between two 'super powers';
- (ii) to say that the 'cold war is over' must raise questions in Russia as to why the repression (justified in the past by the need to fight spies and traitors) needs to go on;
- (iii) the Germany question has been stabilised;
- (iv) the opening up of contacts with East Europe, particularly the DDR, has been a most significant gain to the West. The increasing freedom of communication between the two halves of Europe following the Helsinki agreements may result in the gradual 'Westernisation' of the DDR, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, not only easing the strains on those unfortunate countries but adding to the difficulties of the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet leadership must be aware that East Europe is the area of their greatest vulnerability.
24. On the other hand, détente has
- (a) helped to make Communism seem respectable again in left-wing circles in the West;
 - (b) secured for the Soviet Union a legitimisation of their military control over Eastern Europe;
 - (c) afforded the Soviet Union loans and economic and technical assistance (as noticed earlier);
 - (d) above all, given the impression in the West that the Soviet Union is just one more state in the world; hence the nature of the Soviet threat has been concealed; while the size and momentum of the threat has grown - particularly in Africa and Asia. The consequence is a lack of preparedness which contrasts with the resolve so characteristic of the West between 1945 and 1953.

VI: THE SOVIET UNION AND OIL

25. The interest of the Soviet Union in the question of oil has three sides to it:

- (i) the possibility that, at some stage in the course of the 1980s, the Soviet Union's own sources of this fuel will fall short of their domestic requirements, and the probability that they will not have enough to export to their satellites (including Cuba);
- (ii) The Soviet need for Western specialised technology to gain oil from the more inaccessible fields in their country;
- (iii) the chance that Soviet control over the sources of Western oil in the Middle East would assist them to browbeat the West generally. This point needs to be distinguished from the economic considerations in (i) above. It would be a great victory for the Soviet Union to be able to lay their hand over the tap which produces oil for the West. It is true that Britain would be able to survive such calamity more easily than would the continent of Western Europe or Japan. But the whole of international commerce would be affected, and through it ourselves. 'Global Finlandisation' (see paragraph 7(iii)) would be close.

VII AFGHANISTAN

VII: AFGHANISTAN

26. The background to the Soviet decision to intervene forcefully in Afghanistan will probably remain unclear for many years. We attach no more importance to the rumours of major divisions in Soviet opinion before this invasion than we do to similar rumours concerning the invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Evidently some (or all) of the following reasons may have been prevailing:

- (i) The alternative to action would have been the collapse of a pro-Soviet regime;
- (ii) The Russian military mission already in Afghanistan was inadequate; to withdraw was unthinkable; the effect on internal Russian politics might have been considerable, and not only in Central Asia; therefore, as usually occurs in Russian affairs, a large scale military response seemed essential;
- (iii) Concern about the effect of a rebellion in Afghanistan may have been heightened by the flight of Sheikh Mohseni of Kandahar to Qom where he had begun to publicise the cause of the Afghan rebels. Russia has always been reluctant to stir up as much trouble as she might do in Islamic states on her border for fear of the consequences within Russia. The establishment of an Iranian base for an anti-Soviet religious cause would have been unwelcome.
- (iv) The Russians had no reason, on the basis of US behaviour over, for example, Angola, Ethiopia and even Iran, to suppose that their action in Afghanistan would provoke the unfavourable reaction which did follow;
- (v) The Soviet Union may have felt that the countries of the Middle East which they wish to influence were ripe to be overawed by a display of force and brutality;

/(vi) After

(vi) After the subjection of Afghanistan, Russia would be in an improved position versus Pakistan (and hence China). Pressure on Pakistan has already led to better Western links with that country and that in turn has brought India closer to Russia. Soviet control of Afghanistan would make it easier to intimidate an unstable Iran or to support a pro-Soviet regime there. The South-West part of Afghanistan and the Straits of Hormuz are separated by barely 300 miles. Even if the roads in that region are bad, Russian short-range aircraft would be in a better position than before to catch the Persian Gulf in one part of a pincer (the other part being in Soviet-controlled South Yemen, slightly further to the South West). The assistance of the always turbulent Baluchis - not too difficult to obtain - might assure Soviet control of the coastline between Karachi and the Straits of Hormuz.

27. If the conquest of Afghanistan were to be completed, some of the above things would have been achieved. Soviet leaders would then be expected to embark on a new "peace offensive", with hopes of further dividing the Western alliance. They might perhaps divert the Muslim world with a new initiative, and would presumably continue high-lighting in propaganda broadcasts the general impotence of the U.S. in the Middle East.

28. The Soviet Government has admittedly suffered some setbacks over Afghanistan by:

- (i) The UN vote of 14 January deploring the invasion, with the unprecedented support of thirty-four Muslim nations;
- (ii) The Cuban withdrawal from the contest for the Latin-American seat in the Security Council;

- (iii) The loss of prestige, in the face of the Soviet people, from the international campaign for the boycott of the Olympics;
- (iv) The apparent revival, in the minds of the Western nations, of a realistic appreciation of the Soviet threat. If this can be maintained, the tragedy of Afghanistan will seem a turning point. In particular, it was encouraging to see (but see paragraph 71 below) that at long last SALT II was being linked to general questions of Soviet behaviour.

29. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is unlikely to be completed for some time. But we think it an illusion to suppose that it could become anything in the nature of a 'Soviet Vietnam', since there are large Soviet forces at hand for the task of pacification, and public opinion in the Soviet Union presents no problem.

30. The US response was stated by President Carter on January 4. Measures proposed included:

- (i) a deferral of further debate on the SALT II treaty;
- (ii) a deferral of several cultural exchanges as well as statements leading to the US boycott of the Moscow Olympics;
- (iii) a curtailment of fishing privileges for the Soviet Union in US waters;
- (iv) a ban on certain sales of grain and of 'high technology' to the Soviet Union.

31. In a State of the Union address on January 23, President Carter added that:

- (i) US intelligence would be allowed to operate more effectively;

/(ii)

(ii) a military and economic assistance programme for Pakistan would be begun;

(iii) a search would be made for modest military facilities in the Persian Gulf or South Asia.

32. We understand that some other help may have gone to the Afghans from the West.

33. The President has also said that he would regard any outside attempt to intervene in the free flow of oil from the Middle East as an 'assault on the vital interests of the US' to be resisted by all means necessary, including military force.

34. The tone of these and other statements in January by President Carter was vigorous. The President said, for example, that the moment constituted one of 'the most serious challenges in the history of the nation', and that the Soviet Union had built 'a war machine far beyond any reasonable requirements for their own defence and security'. He pledged 'equivalence' in the face of the consequent threat; he recognised that the U.S. had to 'pursue a global foreign policy', and he recalled that 'aggression unopposed becomes a contagious disease'.

35. Those remarks seemed encouraging. Five points, however, need to be made:

(i) all these categorical statements by President Carter may lead him into difficulties. No provision can at present be made for any action if, say, a coup d'état in the Persian Gulf were to turn one or other of the States there, or even Saudi Arabia come to that, into a 'revolutionary Islamic' government. (See paras. 83-87 for further discussion of this matter);

/ (ii)

- (ii) the search for military facilities in South Asia or the Persian Gulf seems not to have been successful. Recent statements by Mr. Harold Brown, the Secretary of Defense, raise doubts about the will of the U.S. really to do very much even if the Persian Gulf were threatened by a Soviet armoured thrust either from Azerbaijan or Afghanistan; further, though some of the new defence plans of the U.S. are admirable in themselves, they may (like the new ships for the Marine Corps) take four or five years to be fulfilled;
- (iii) save for the immediate support of the U.S. by Great Britain, the reaction of the European and other allies was divided;
- (iv) it still seems necessary for the Administration to put all its ideas for 'covert warfare' to several Senate Committees before approval. That denies the possibility of an effective U.S. reply to the Soviet Union in the field of subversion;
- (v) past experience suggests the strong reaction in the West will lose its impetus and that the Soviet Union will accompany any final pacification of Afghanistan by an international peace offensive for which we have be ill-prepared.

VIII: WESTERN POLICY

(a) General

36. Our first concern should be to ensure that the invasion of Afghanistan is used as an occasion to reaffirm that our relations with the Soviet Union cannot be those of one like-minded state with another. The Soviet Union, we repeat, is not a normal state. Its aims are not normal aims. Something like a new rallying call is needed, such as was issued by Winston Churchill at Fulton in 1947. It is of the greatest importance to resolve to oppose the general

policy of the Soviet Union, and to make that resolve known, both to the Russians and to our own people. This should be the frame for our policies.

37. We take it as self-evident that all policies to oppose the Soviet Union, though often carried into effect by diplomacy, propaganda or 'political warfare', must in the end be backed by military force adequately deployed.

38. We must resolve to counter each of the Soviet methods noticed in paragraphs 12 and 13 at its own level and to work out detailed plans to do so.

39. We should explore how far it may be possible to divide Marxist states, capitalising on the differences which already exist between Russia and China and doing all possible to find other gaps between them.

40. We should not always take Marxist rhetoric in the 'Third World' at its face value. Sometimes it conceals opportunism. We should deal with the leaders of these new states as human beings with human weaknesses, who do not always act in support of the ideologies they proclaim.

41. The West's economic strength is far greater than that of the Soviet Union. It should be used to benefit us as a political tool in order to extend our influence, especially in the 'Third World'.

(b) The Alliance

42. We recognise that the U.S. sees itself as requiring a direct relation to the U.S.S.R. to which Britain, like the other Europeans, is not immediately privy. West Germany has its own relations with the U.S.S.R. and so does France. All the same, it is important that there should be confidence, and swift exchange of information between the U.S. and her allies about their separate relations with the U.S.S.R..

The Alliance could not survive easily continuous bids for approaches to the USSR of which the other partners were unaware till they had been launched.

43. The role of Britain within the Alliance is considered in detail in para. 74-77 below, but here we recognise that Britain is the best interpreter of the US to the Western European continent, as it is of the continent to the US. The British Government is in a good position to strengthen the resolve of the US through both public and private initiatives.

44. It is necessary to distinguish between two aspects of European co-operation in resistance to the Soviet Union:

- (a) the strengthening of the defences of Western Europe in order to permit the United States to re-deploy its forces at crisis-points elsewhere; and
- (b) Europe's own co-operation in military activities in other parts of the world.

45. NATO is the appropriate forum for European discussions on defence questions of all kinds. The reluctance of some of its members to concern themselves at the moment with extra-European activities render it difficult for NATO to extend its formal area of responsibilities. The best contribution that such countries can make may anyway be to strengthen their commitment to the defence of Western Europe, in order to enable Britain, Australia, France and the United States to deploy forces (preferably jointly) in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean regions. French action in Zaire, Tunisia and elsewhere has been of benefit to the Western cause and such undertakings are to be encouraged, if not imitated.

46. One country, Ireland, is a member of the EEC, but is not a member of NATO. We think it would be desirable at least to raise and perhaps even press the question of Irish membership of the Alliance - as indeed of other European countries which enjoy the benefits of the Alliance without bearing any of the burdens.

47. Among these other countries is Spain, which has applied to join the EEC and whose present government has pronounced in favour of joining NATO. It is, however, hesitant about making formal application till after the next European Security Conference in Madrid (which we understand will still be held) in September 1980. We should nevertheless do all we can to encourage Spain to take this important step as soon as possible. The Soviet Union will probably use that Conference to make propaganda to persuade the Spaniards to keep out of NATO and is probably undertaking other measures to secure this aim. Spanish Governments can fall, and the Spanish Socialist Party, like the Communists, are at the moment hostile to Spanish membership of NATO. A neutralist attitude in Spain is as possible as it would be undesirable. In making this proposal, NATO is not asking Spain to impose a burden on herself, but is helping Spain to preserve her new freedoms.

48. Bearing in mind both that the common ideals named in para. 1 are shared by many countries and that a common threat is posed at them all, we believe that it may be desirable to explore whether some kind of trans-oceanic alliance - Europe/North America/Japan/Australia - could be instigated. The low level of Japanese defence spending is anyway scarcely in keeping with her dependence on world trade (and oil imports) to maintain her great prosperity. There are in the world rich democratic states such as Venezuela which make no serious contribution to the preservation of the freedom of which they are proud.

(c) Political Warfare

49. The use of clandestine activities is the most likely general approach of the Soviet Union in all ex-imperial countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. In countering this, we think it likely that Britain, with her long experience of "political warfare", her skilful creation, during World War II, of such organisations as SOE, and MI9, and her known capacity for discretion, might play a large part. The security services of the U.S. such as the CIA have been weakened; as earlier noticed, there is no evidence that President Carter's suggestions that their efficiency should be renewed have been followed up. The willingness of Britain to make a substantial contribution in this sphere might enable her to offer something to the U.S. in order to compensate for the inevitably small scale of our military effort.

/ (d)

(d) Propaganda

50. The Soviet Union has enjoyed major advantages in the battle for minds in the 'Third World'. She is not associated with a colonialist past in Africa and South Asia, nor with economic dominance in Latin America and the Caribbean. She enjoys a primacy even among those Marxists who dissent from her policies as the first revolutionary state. She shares the ideological perceptions of many leaders of the 'Third World'. More important than any of these points, however, is the organised effort she makes to exploit these advantages. We have good cause, for example, to suppose that the status of 'agitprop' in the Communist world is at every stage higher than, better connected than, and more centrally linked than it is in the West.

51. Western propaganda should always be so organised as to be directed at specific targets; in particular, our own people; the growing literate classes of the Third World; and public opinion behind the Iron Curtain.

52. Because of the widespread use of English and the desire of so many to learn it, Britain has in this sphere too a role potentially greater than that of our continental partners. We think that this might be developed further by:

(i) a more purposeful use of the British Council;

(ii) an even greater use of the external services of the BBC. Already one of the few trump cards in British hands, it might be improved at modest cost, in comparison with the cost of weapons, by:

(a) longer hours of broadcasting;

(b) larger transmitters; and

(c) better co-operation with the Voice of America and other allied radio services.

53. Political parties in most democracies nowadays have recourse to professional advice in the presentation of policies. We think that there may be a case for integrating into the foreign services of Western Governments special advisers who

- (a) are familiar with public relations;
- (b) are fully informed about, and expert in, the nature of the ideological struggle; and
- (c) have carefully explored the recent history of Western propaganda successes and failures.

54. The assets which are possessed by the Soviet Union, and which were outlined in paragraph 50 above, are waning ones. We should do all we can to cause them to wane faster. Soviet activities as an interventionist power should, for example, be constantly exposed and pilloried. There could, for example, be

- (i) a determined attempt in the Middle East to demonstrate that the Soviet threat is a greater menace to the Muslim world than is Israel;
- (ii) more emphasis on the known link between terrorism and the Soviet Union, Cuba and East Germany.
- (iii) lavish illustrations of the racial discrimination against blacks among students in the Soviet Union;
- (iv) illustration of the failure of Russian aid programmes which have concentrated on weapons, showpiece projects, guaranteed purchase of cash crops, and direct currency subventions (e.g. to Cuba). (Russian goods have often gone wrong because of bad quality, lack of durability, delay in shipment and bullying at the point of delivery);

(v) the relative failure of Khrushchev's plans for modernisation of the Soviet economy and the greater reliance on the technology and money of the West since 1971 could be shown;

(vi) the persecution of religions, including Islam.

55. The boycott of the Olympics is a continuing act of propaganda which will certainly bring home to the Soviet public the extent of international hostility to the system.

56. The UN is now primarily a place for the exchange of propaganda. Whenever the USSR or its allies commit an act of aggression, the issue should instantly be raised, as a matter of course, at the Security Council. We look on the failure to put the issue of Angola or Ethiopia on the agenda as having been quite mistaken.

57. After the Second World War, recourse was often had to UN special committees for the discussion of specific themes. The UN Special Committee for the Balkans (1946), for example, kept the essential facts of the Greek civil war before the public eye and the objective and persistent dissemination of truth helped to neutralise the communist propaganda about that struggle. This method could be revived for Afghanistan.

58. In propaganda, we should not forget that it is success that counts. It was not the brutality of the Italians in Libya between 1912 and 1940 which impressed the Arab world but their defeat by Britain. The Germans were also popular until their defeat at El Alamein. Success by the Russians in Afghanistan will be compared with failure by the U.S. in Iran.

59. The long term benefits of receiving in the West students from remote and poor countries must be considerable. Like Aid (see para. 69) this should be looked upon as a matter of foreign policy; it should not be relegated to economic, administrative or educational argument, so that foreign students have to compete for scarce resources with nursery schools. Whatever is decided, the decisions should be taken on grounds of foreign policy.

60. Necessary measures of economy in higher education should not be allowed seriously to curtail the study of the Soviet Union nor of Communism in our universities.

(e) Military Preparedness

61. In the case of military force, which the Russians commonly use only reluctantly and as a last resort, it should not be necessary to counter them at every point with equivalent military force. It is, however, desirable to make clear to them that the commitment of their own armed forces anywhere in the world is likely to involve them in a shooting war with those of the West, with all the gruesome escalatory consequences^{to} which this could lead.

62. No doubt it was apprehension of a response of that nature which led the Soviet Union to invest so much in the securing and the training of surrogate forces. An approach to this problem is considered in para. 88 and 89 below.

63. We think it just possible that if the Russians had known that the modest measures which have been taken would be taken, they might not have moved into Afghanistan.

(f) Contacts with the Soviet Union and East Europe

64. We do not under any circumstances, short of open war, advocate a complete break in all relations with the Soviet Union. The benefits from visits to Russia, commercial and diplomatic relations, and personal appreciations of Soviet leaders are considerable from the point of view both of countering Soviet plans and of preserving peace. But greater effort should be spent in trying to ensure that there is contact between peoples and not just between governments.

65. We are not encouraged by the idea of imposing economic sanctions on Russia after Afghanistan, nor indeed on any country, as an alternative to war. Not only have sanctions never worked but they have strengthened the state allegedly under attack (Italy, 1936; Spain, 1946-47; Cuba, 1961 onwards; Rhodesia, 1968). Anything like full economic sanctions against the Soviet Union by the USA would, to be effective, have to cover the US's allies and the USSR's. We, therefore, do not think that much will come of the plans to cut the sale to the USSR of grain, butter, etc., indefinitely.

66. On the other hand, we believe that we should insist on a strict ban, in all Western countries, on the sale to the Soviet Union of all material (including especially technology) which could be in any way useful for waging an aggressive war. There is, of course, difficulty in deciding what such material is: but the subject has been successfully dealt with before. Entrepreneurs and businessmen may be asked to make sacrifices as a result but, if governments give them a lead, and make certain that the reason for them is known, we believe that most people concerned will agree to help. We recognise that this may have repercussions for national economic policy but, as Adam Smith wrote, 'defence is of much more importance than opulence'. (The Wealth of Nations, Book IV, Chapter II.)

67. The West have been persuaded since the 1950s to refrain from supporting Russian dissident or minority groups. There is good reason for this. Counter-revolutionary activities sustained by foreign arms and money have seldom been successful in the past;

they have usually enabled the 'revolutionary' forces to identify themselves with the cause of national independence. Most dissident Soviet groups are easily penetrated by the KGB, and material Western support for them does the KGB's work for it. Nor is any service done to the minorities concerned by encouraging them to prolong a heroic but hopeless resistance, only to abandon them in the last ditch - as was done in Hungary in 1956. But such groups should always be made to feel that they have friends in the West who will help and encourage them within the bounds of political possibility. Dissident critics within the Soviet Empire help to tarnish the Soviet reputation, particularly in Western left-wing circles. We should recognise that in giving such dissidents all the moral and political support which we can and, by publicising their protests, we are not merely acting from humanitarian principles, but are conducting effective political warfare against the Soviet Union.

68. We regard the strengthening of relations with Eastern Europe (in many ways the Achilles heel of the Soviet Empire) as one of the highest priorities of Western, especially West-European, policy. This is something for which our continental allies are particularly well fitted, but Britain should play an encouraging role. In extending friendly relations with Eastern European powers, we should be guided by them in deciding how far we can go, since they will normally be the best judges of the limits to which they can go without provoking Soviet military intervention.

(g) Aid

69. We are pleased that programmes of overseas aid by Britain are now administered from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Aid should be given with political and strategic considerations in mind. What happens if aid is not so considered is well illustrated by recent events in the Seychelles. We read with interest a recent letter in The Sunday Times from the ex-Prime Minister of that country. Absit omen. (See Appendix)

/ (h)

(h) 'Militant Islam'

70. The divisions and subdivisions within Islam are such that for that reason alone the concept of 'militant Islam' is a disconcerting and inadequate one. We do not think that there can be a single policy towards it. There are in Islam thousands of contrasting currents.

(i) Arms Control

71. The Western, especially American, belief that negotiations on arms control could be isolated from general political events has proved as wrong as the contrary assumption, that arms control agreements could provide the main instrument for East-West detente. We hold differing views as to the value of the SALT II treaty, but we are in agreement that the Russians must earn by their good behaviour elsewhere the right to be treated as an interlocuteur valable in all talks on arms control. We thought the suspension by the US Government of the ratification of the SALT II treaty an entirely appropriate measure and we would not press the United States Administration to be in any hurry to resume negotiations. If and when negotiations for SALT III begin, Britain must work closely with her continental allies to ensure that nothing is done to derogate from her own security.

(j) South Africa

72. It seems possible that South Africa should be placed in para. 80 below, as a country likely to receive attention from the Soviet Union. In the long run that is certain because of (a) the strategic and commercial importance of South Africa, with its ports on the hinge between two great oceans; (b) its mineral resources; (c) the dependence of the West on those resources; and (d) the embarrassment which the Western world has in having (and having to have) close economic relations in consequence. It is, therefore, particularly easy to link South Africa with troubles fomented in Europe (particularly Britain) or the US. It seems essential to work out as soon as possible a coherent and realistic plan which will ensure the stability of South Africa.

(k) China

73. The value of China as an ally to the West rests on
- (a) its capacity to impose a major regional restraint on Soviet expansion; and
 - (b) its divisive effect within the Marxist camp.

For these two reasons, all possible should be done in order to encourage China to oppose Soviet initiatives within the Communist community. A Western alliance with China is, of course, no less a mariage de convenance than was that with the Soviet Union in 1941-45, but such marriages have to be made, and they are effective so long as too much is not expected of them. Any long term alliance with a Communist country would, of course, be inherently unstable.

IX : BRITISH DEFENCE POLICY

74. The threat from the Soviet Union is in the last resort a military one which needs to be countered by a strong and evident capacity to meet force with effective force and so to deter the Russians from using it anywhere in the world as an instrument of their policy. The main responsibility for this rests with the United States. But the more that we can share that burden, the greater our influence will be both with the United States and with the Alliance as a whole.

75. We assume that our economic position will render any increase in our defence expenditure beyond the promised 3% impracticable. Even that increase is likely to be absorbed by rising costs of manpower and equipment. It will not be easy to maintain our full commitment to the Central Front, our maritime capability as well as our strategic nuclear forces without an erosion in the efficiency of all three. To abandon any of them, however, would not only have a bad effect on our allies but would be seen as a weakening in the defensive capacity of the West as a whole. The maintenance of defence expenditure at a level to sustain them must, therefore, be given the highest priority as must the need for this to be made clear to the British people.

76. The main danger of Soviet aggression lies outside Europe. As earlier noted, it is in Europe that we have allies best fitted, geographically and economically, to assume an increasing share of the defence of their own territories. A British presence on the Central Front, like a US one, remains essential to the cohesion of the Alliance. But in helping to check Soviet expansion outside Europe, the US looks, in the first place, to its British allies, and it is outside Europe that we should do our best to help them. We should, therefore, strengthen our maritime forces to the greatest possible extent, both to give greater help to the US Navy in protecting the waters of the North Atlantic, and to provide contingents to 'show the flag', as we did in Korea, in cooperation with the United States anywhere in the world. The exclusive preoccupation with the European theatre which has marked our policy for the past twelve years needs to be modified.

77. We should do everything necessary to help the United States to maintain both the strategic and the theatre nuclear balance. The provision of bases in this country for US theatre nuclear forces is an essential contribution to this. It must, however, be accompanied by significant and well-publicised measures of civil defence, which should be seen not only as prudent provision for an emergency but as an intrinsic part of our defence posture. We welcome the evidence of increasing governmental interest in this matter.

X : WESTERN INITIATIVES

78. (a) General appreciation

The Western position would be enhanced by some positive initiative designed both to reverse the Soviet tide and be seen to do so. The Russians had many setbacks between 1945 and 1975 but none to speak of since the fall of Saigon (April 1975) except, perhaps, the Russian failure to confirm its psychological dominance in the North Pacific (which led to the Japanese-Chinese Treaty, specifically against the idea of Soviet hegemony in 1978). We think it should be possible and desirable deliberately to seek an instance where a Soviet position could be reversed.

79. Exposed nerves in the Soviet Empire where the Russians are already the defenders would seem to include:

- (i) Angola (including Cabinda);
- (ii) Guinea;
- (iii) Congo (Brazzaville); and, perhaps,
- (iv) Cuba

80. We should also look carefully at places where the Soviet Union might be expected to "strike next". Apart from the obvious instances of Pakistan, the Persian Gulf, and Iran (and, perhaps, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe), possibilities would seem to be quite numerous: e.g.*

- (i) Turkey (strategy);
- (ii) Morocco-Sahara (phosphates, strategy);
- (iii) Thailand (strategy);
- (iv) Yugoslavia (strategy);
- (v) The Basque country (strategy);
- (vi) Puerto Rico (referendum in 1981)(strategy);
- (vii) Jamaica (bauxite, strategy);
- (viii) Belize (strategy);
- (ix) El Salvador (strategy);
- (x) Namibia (minerals, strategy);
- (xi) Zaire (again)(chrome);
- (xii) Oman (strategy); and
- (xiii) Yemen (strategy)

81. The Soviet Union may also try and exploit further the advantages which she already has in OPEC. Soviet emissaries could very easily secure what they want from that organisation by the threat of military intervention or of subversion. That policy could be repeated with other international cartels such as the International Bauxite Association.

82. The Western reply to these or other challenges should be guided by a careful assessment of the balance of social and political forces inside the countries concerned; an assesment

/ at least as

* The reasons for possible Soviet interest are noted in parenthesis.

at least as careful and expert as that which will be made by our adversaries. Our main weapons are economic and technological as well as military and clandestine, and the first two of these must be used as tools for sustaining or regaining political influence. No general guidelines can be laid down: all depends on expert knowledge of each area, acute political analysis, and - perhaps most important of all - skilful conduct of personal relations with the key actors: the fact that many African leaders of the present time are nearing death may present us with opportunities as well as risks.

83. (b) The Persian Gulf

The importance of the oil on either side of the Persian Gulf to the industrialised nations makes this region and its access to the sea at Hormuz now the most critical one in the world. Resistance to Soviet pressure would in ideal circumstances be the responsibility of the inhabitants of that area itself. But these are not ideal circumstances. We are sceptical whether the rulers in a majority of the States there accept or understand such notions as 'responsibility'. They hanker for protection. Most of them are caught between fear of the USSR and scepticism about the Western will to defend them.

84. Saudi Arabia in particular is in a difficult position since much of her population is potentially disloyal, and she has a political system in which few have faith. She has an unconditional Soviet satellite to her South (South Yemen), a state with an ambiguous future on the South West (North Yemen) and states even more unsure of themselves than is Saudi Arabia herself in the East. The establishment of a Palestinian State under any rulers likely to emerge would not assuage this dangerous state of affairs.

85. Accordingly, we think it necessary to make clear to the states concerned the will and the capacity of the West to bring them rapid and effective help. Military aid should be given so as not to contribute to the destabilisation of the society concerned, as occurred in Iran. The establishment of Western bases is naturally in this area, or any other, a matter of

political delicacy. Even so, our readiness to establish anew such bases, and our capacity to provide forces for intervention, must be made crystal-clear. It is possible that the British links severed so short a time ago in the area may make it easier for us to take the lead than the United States; but only the United States possess mobile forces in sufficient quantity to take advantage of any such bases.

86. If as a result of continuing troubles in Iran, an invitation were to be received from, say, secessionary forces in that country, it should be seriously considered. A substantial Western presence in the region of the Iranian oil wells could betoken the rebirth of the West's reputation in that whole area. Great diplomatic skill and subtlety would no doubt be necessary to secure the acceptance of Iraq and the other states bordering on the Gulf for such an action. But no other course would, on the one hand, serve so well the long term economic interests of the West and, on the other hand, make possible the protection of the West's allies in the zone. The fall of the Shah should have taught us that we cannot expect any ally in the Middle East to be dependable when our own physical remoteness from the scene makes us undependable for them. Thus, if Iran were to remain unstable, we should explore very carefully whether an invitation of the type described might not be forthcoming.

87. We must naturally be aware of the danger that the Soviet Union, alarmed by a new Western presence near its border, might undertake warlike counter measures, in the form either of a formidable conventional intervention against the Western forces concerned or even of a nuclear threat against the territory of the US. This would present the West with the alternative either of a humiliating withdrawal, or of hostilities rapidly escalating to the nuclear level. So the measure suggested in para. 86 could only be put into effect if, first, public opinion in the West were to be persuaded of an urgent danger to its vital interests in the Gulf; and second, if this conviction were forcibly conveyed to the Soviet Union through all possible channels. The first of these two provisions could not, of course, be achieved overnight.

88. (c) Angola, Sahara, OPEC

Certain factors incline some of us to believe that the West could recoup some of its losses in Angola. These factors include:

- (i) the unpopularity of the new government of Eduardo Santos;
- (ii) the unpopularity of the Cubans;
- (iii) the availability of well entrenched guerilla forces, now apparently on the Western side;
- (iv) the contiguity of Namibia; and,
- (v) the exposed position of Angola in the South Atlantic.

Any victory in Angola would be worthwhile because:-

- (i) it would defeat the 'myth of Cuba';
- (ii) it would, therefore, have disruptive effects elsewhere where the Cubans are acting as the Russians' surrogates;
- (iii) it would have a destructive effect in Cuba itself and perhaps weaken or even help to dislodge the communist government there - an event much to be desired and one which would have the most salutary effect in Latin America, perhaps leading to a general halt to the slide in the Caribbean;
- (iv) it would help the emergence of a democratic Namibia;
- (v) it would guarantee the Angolans' oil to the West. Gulf Oil get what they want at the moment. But that tap could be turned off.

89. A Western victory in Angola could be followed by taking up the suggestion of Lord Home in the House of Lords that the UN should be required to call on Cuba to withdraw from Africa.

90. We recognise, however, that such an attempt, if it failed, might lead to a prolongation of Soviet-Cuban activities in Africa and the inflammation, rather than the appeasement, of the situation in Namibia. The problem demands more intensive study than we have the time or expertise to give it.

91. It also seems important to us to ensure a Moroccan victory in what used to be Spanish Sahara. That region is not only of strategic importance but, along with Morocco itself, Sahara has a large proportion of the world's exports of phosphates, whose significance is almost as important for Western agriculture as is oil for its industry. Every assistance, therefore, should be given to Morocco whose present government is anyway one of the West's best allies. At the moment, the rebel Polisario's excellent public relations enable them to appear much more successful than they actually are.

92. We feel that OPEC as now constituted presents so grave a threat to the West (since it may become a major political issue between the West and the USSR) that ways and means should be explored to secure its disintegration.

93. The Caribbean also needs a careful examination. Although plainly a US zone of influence, Britain still has residual responsibilities and interests. The US has not conducted its policies there with the necessary tact, knowledge and determination. The West's most reliable friend in the region is Venezuela. Everything should be done to assist and encourage that country to play a part in opposing the influence of Cuba both in the Caribbean islands and on the mainland of Central America - perhaps in collaboration with the US's new Caribbean Task Force, perhaps independently.

/ CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION

94. The principle which should guide our policy towards the Soviet Union, in this present age of competitive co-existence, should be the realisation that that power normally avoids military moves which it has reason to believe may lead to a serious clash with the West, with the risk of escalation. The invasions of Hungary in 1956 and of Czechoslovakia in 1968 were operations which they knew they could carry out without such a clash occurring. Even more instructive was the Soviet decision in 1973 to cancel an imminent military intervention in the Middle East in response to a nuclear alert ordered by the US. We believe, on the evidence of the facts which we have studied, that the invasion of Afghanistan falls into the same category too, and that (as we have earlier stated) the Soviet Union did not, indeed had no valid reason to, anticipate anything like the full extent of the retaliatory US reaction. The only real deterrent against further Soviet expansion is, therefore, warning of retaliation - provided such warning is both effective and credible. Our main aim, in cooperation with the United States and our European allies, should be to ensure by our activities in the military, political and economic fields, that our warnings to the Russians are both effective and credible.

95. To ensure this credibility among our own people, an increased level of hostility may be necessary, along with a deliberate attempt to ensure both greater public awareness of the nature of the threat, and public readiness to accept a higher proportion of governmental expenditure to be spent on defence. We must also prevent the Soviet Union from making impossible the growth of good relations between us and the 'Third World'. For this it is necessary both to maintain an effective military deterrent against any Soviet use of force as an instrument of their policy; and to counter Soviet

/ subversion

subversion wherever it occurs. While making our warnings clear, we should always be ready for negotiations, and for trade and other exchanges which we consider to be beneficial to ourselves and which do not strengthen the military potential of the Soviet Union.

96. In the course of this paper we have tried to put forward a number of specific proposals aimed at countering Soviet expansion. We have listed them at the conclusion of the text. We realise that not all of them are easy to achieve. We also appreciate that many contingencies will arise in the future which we have not foreseen and which will alter the basis of our analysis. But there is one factor which will remain constant: the implacable and determined enmity of the Soviet Union. We in the West are faced with an enemy whose avowed aim ultimately is to create a communist world which looks towards Moscow as its directing centre. It has never weakened in this since 1917, but has only recently acquired the military means to make possible the attempt. This threat is the over-riding issue, in the light of which all other considerations must be judged. Though resolute and implacable, the enemy has many weaknesses: and we have the superior moral and economic strength. The victories of our enemy in the past have mainly been due to our own failure of will to resist him and to his constant and alert readiness to exploit this failure. No action or series of actions will in the end stem Soviet advance unless we in the West possess this will: on the other hand, if we do display, and display credibly, our determination to resist communist expansion and to defend our way of life and essential interests, we thereby close the open doors through which alone the Soviet enemy in the past has sought to push. The West has been repeatedly deceived and misled about Soviet intentions: this must not happen again.

Michael Howard

Elio Sestouni
Leonard Solazito
Hugh Thomas

14 March 1980

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Consider a worldwide association of democratic states (para.2)
2. Issue a 'rallying call' (para.36) for a new public awareness (para.95).
3. Secure harmony of allied contacts with USSR (para.42).
4. Complete NATO membership (para.46).
5. Consider a wider alliance (para.48).
6. Reinvigorate our capacity for political warfare (para.49).
7. Aim Westernpropaganda precisely (para.51).
8. Develop further the BBC, British Council, etc. as weapons in the ideological struggle (para.52).
9. Ensure real professionalism in international propaganda (para. 53).
10. Re-examine themes for effective propaganda (para.54).
11. Look at some parts of higher education from a strategic angle (para.59-60).
12. Think through every level of military preparedness (para.61-63).
13. Persevere in the search for East-West contacts between peoples, not governments (para.64).
14. Forget sanctions as a weapon (para.65).
15. Ban all sales of technology useful for aggression (para.66).
16. Ensure wise attitudes to Russian and East European dissidents (para.67-69)
17. Secure that aid is determined by strategic considerations (para 69) and Appendix .
18. Devise plans to ensure South African stability (para.72).
19. Define the nature of the West's association with China (para.73).
20. Consider the appropriate emphasis in British defence (para.74-77).
21. Achieve a Western "success" (para.78) by realistic policies in the Persian Gulf (para.83-86) or/and imaginative ones in Angola (para.88).
22. Secure Morocco (para.91).
23. Devise the demise of OPEC (para.92).

Appendix

Why FO must control aid

I READ with interest your article on Britain's aid to developing countries (page 8, last week). As a former leader of a third world country who has had considerable experience with the previous state of affairs, I regard the decision of the British government to put the Ministry of Overseas Development under the control of the Foreign Office and to tie down aid to "political, industrial and commercial considerations" as a most enlightened one.

After winning three popular elections to get the Seychelles integrated with Britain, when the British government of the day decided to pull out East of Suez, Whitehall suddenly brought pressure on me to change for a policy of independence. I agreed, on one condition, that the British government would, before independence, help us build an intelli-

gence unit to monitor local and regional intelligence and develop a para-military capability to deter the possibility of an internal insurrection.

The Foreign Office categorically agreed. But when it came to deliver the goods, the Foreign Office was unable to do so. Dame Judith Hart, whose Ministry of Overseas Development controlled the way British aid was to be spent, repeatedly argued that her sole concern was "social welfare development." And it appeared that there was nobody in a position to overrule her.

As a result my pro-British government was toppled less than one year after independence by a few people trained in Tanzania—a country with a record for receiving British aid. And since my overthrow, more than 1,000 Tanzanian soldiers

have been stationed in Seychelles and despite the fact that on February 15 the Seychelles government signed a Maritime Agreement with the Soviet Union, British aid to the Islands and to Tanzania still flows without the least protest.

Dame Judith Hart's "social welfare" concept was ill-conceived and out of touch with the reality of this world. I remember one year she allotted

some £25m to India for social development purposes—and only a few weeks later the same India gave to Mauritius, a country where the per capita living standard was at least twice higher than her own, about £10m for purely political consideration.

James R Mancham
Former President,
Republic of Seychelles
London SW1

Sunday Times, Mar. 2 1980