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TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1312 OF 19 SEPTEMBER
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON PARIS
INFO ROUTINE MOD DS11

Prime Minister^②
20.9.80

MJ

YOUR TELNO 680: SOUTH AFRICA: ARMS EMBARGO COMMITTEE.

1. THE COMMITTEE COMPLETED ITS WORK ON THE REPORT TODAY (19 SEPTEMBER) AT A FURTHER SESSION TO MEET THE PORTUGUESE REQUEST FOR 24 HOURS TO CONSIDER THE NEW AMERICAN WORDING FOR PARA 7.
2. THE WORDING FINALLY AGREED FOR PARA 7 WAS QUOTE THE TERM QUOTE ARMS AND RELATED MATERIEL OF ALL TYPES UNQUOTE, REFERRED TO IN RESOLUTION 418 (1977), SHOULD BE CLEARLY DEFINED TO INCLUDE ALL EQUIPMENT INTENDED FOR THE MILITARY AND POLICE FORCES OF SOUTH AFRICA. UNQUOTE.
3. FRANCE MAINTAINED ITS RESERVATION ON PARA 7.
4. PARAS 1 AND 2 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE: THE FRENCH HERE SAY THAT THEY DO NOT SHARE OUR OBJECTIONS TO PARA 2 SINCE THEY CONSIDER IT SIMPLY AS EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 418. THEY HAVE ALREADY STOPPED EXPORTS OF SPARE PARTS THOUGH ORIGINALLY THIS WAS DIFFICULT FOR THEM. THEY ALSO SAY THAT THEY HAVE NO PROBLEM OF CONTROLLING EXPORTS BY REFERENCE TO END-USERS RATHER THAN CATEGORY. THEIR LICENSING SYSTEM PROHIBITS ONWARD SALE TO THIRD COUNTRIES EVEN IN PRIVATE CONTRACTS. BUT THIS APPLIES ONLY TO ARMS AND THEIR PRECISE LIST OF WHAT CONSTITUTES ARMS.
5. PARA 3 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. PLEASE SEE THE PARENTHESIS IN PARA 2 OF MY TELNO 1283. OBJECTIONS ALSO RELATE TO THE FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AS WELL AS TO PERSONNEL DIFFICULTIES.
6. FURTHER TO MY TELNO 1305, LUSAKA (ZAMBIA) TOLD US THAT CLARK (NIGERIA) AS CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE AGAINST APARTHEID WOULD BE STEERING THE DEBATE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE TIMING OF THE DEBATE MAY SLIP A LITTLE WHICH IS THE REASON THE LETTER REQUESTING A MEETING HAS NOT YET GONE IN. THIS IS BECAUSE THE AFRICANS ARE VAGUE ABOUT THE TIMING OF THEIR FOREIGN MINISTERS VISITS TO NEW YORK AND THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE GENERAL DEBATE. THUS, IT MAY NOT START UNTIL THE WEEK BEGINNING SEPTEMBER 29.

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7. THE AMERICANS BELIEVE THAT ANY NEGOTIATIONS ON A DRAFT RESOLUTION MAY LAST TWO OR THREE WEEKS (AS HAPPENED IN 1977 IN THE NEGOTIATIONS OVER 418). THEY THINK THAT THEY CAN NEGOTIATE WORDING TO MEET THEIR RESERVATIONS ON RECOMMENDATIONS 5, 6, 10 AND 15. THEY SAY THEIR REAL STICKING POINTS, EVEN TO THE POINT OF A VETO, WOULD BE A NUCLEAR OR OIL EMBARGO.

8. ALTHOUGH THE OIL EMBARGO HAS BEEN DROPPED FROM THE ARMS EMBARGO COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATIONS, MUTUKWA (ZAMBIA) TOLD US THAT HE EXPECTED THE AFRICAN GROUP, FOLLOWING THE DECISIONS OF THE OAU FREETOWN SUMMIT, WILL INSIST THAT AN OIL EMBARGO FORMS PART OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION. CLARK (NIGERIA) IS PARTICULARLY KEEN ON ONE. THE FRENCH HAVE HEARD FROM THEIR AFRICAN CONTACTS THAT THE AFRICANS AT PRESENT INTEND TO EMPLOY SALAMI TACTICS: THE AFRICANS WILL PUT FORWARD A FIRST DRAFT RESOLUTION IN VERY STRONG TERMS (NOW BEING DRAFTED BY THE ANC). WHEN THEY MEET RESISTANCE FROM THE WEST A QUOTE MODERATE UNQUOTE AFRICAN WILL THEN APPROACH US AND AGREE TO NEGOTIATE A SO-CALLED Milder DRAFT.

9. THE FRENCH THINK, AS DO WE, THAT THE AFRICANS WILL NEGOTIATE FIRST WITH THE AMERICANS WHO WILL BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT MUCH MORE THAN WE OR THE FRENCH AND THEREAFTER PICK US OFF. FRENCH INSTRUCTIONS ARE TO STICK CLOSELY WITH US AND NOT TO MAKE PROBLEMS FOR US.

PARSONS

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