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TELEGRAM NUMBER 5183 OF 25 NOVEMBER 1980

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FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

MS *Rather less gloomy than*
*Michalides.***SECRETARY OF STATE'S TALK WITH THE CYPRUS FOREIGN MINISTER**

1. LORD CARRINGTON MET MR ROLANDIS IN THE MARGINS OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL HERE TODAY.
2. ROLANDIS SAID THAT THE EC/CYPRUS AGREEMENT WAS NOT EXACTLY WHAT HE HAD WANTED, BUT THE MOVEMENT FROM STAGE 1 TO STAGE 2 A QUOTE POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL BREAK-THROUGH UNQUOTE. STRONG LEFTIST PRESSURE HAD BEEN GROWING IN CYPRUS TO RE-ORIENT ECONOMIC POLICY, EG BY ECONOMIC MISSIONS TO EASTERN EUROPE. THE PRESIDENT WOULD HAVE LOST CREDIBILITY IF THIS AGREEMENT HAD NOT BEEN REACHED, AND KYPRIANOU HAD BEEN VERY GRATIFIED BY THE RESULTS WHEN ROLANDIS HAD INFORMED HIM YESTERDAY EVENING. ROLANDIS REALISED THAT IT WOULD BE A LONG AND HARD ROAD TO A FULL CUSTOMS UNION, AND HOPED HE COULD RELY ON BRITISH HELP. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT WE WOULD TRY TO HELP TO GET BETTER TERMS IN 1982-3.
3. ROLANDIS SAID THAT RELATIONS WITH THE COMMUNITY WOULD BE INFLUENCED BY EVENTS IN CYPRUS ITSELF. THE CLIMATE OF THE INTER-COMMUNAL TALKS WAS VERY GOOD. NOBODY HAD EXPECTED AN EARLY BREAK-THROUGH, BUT THERE WERE SIGNS OF SOME MOVEMENT HERE AND THERE. ABOVE ALL THE DIALOGUE HAD IMPROVED THE ATMOSPHERE BETWEEN THE TWO COMMUNITIES. THE IDEA OF MOVING THE TALKS TO NEW YORK (WHICH HE DID NOT THINK HAD COME FROM WALDHEIM HIMSELF) WOULD HAVE BEEN DISASTROUS. WALDHEIM HAD ALWAYS RECOGNISED THAT PATIENCE ABOVE ALL WAS NEEDED. ROLANDIS HAD GONE OUT OF HIS WAY TO ENSURE THAT REFERENCE TO CYPRUS AT THIS YEAR'S GENERAL ASSEMBLY WOULD BE CONFINED TO A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT SAYING THAT THERE WOULD BE NO DISCUSSION THIS YEAR BECAUSE OF THE INTER-COMMUNAL TALKS, AND INSCRIBING THE ITEM ON NEXT YEAR'S AGENDA. HE HIMSELF MIGHT GO TO NEW YORK IN THE CONTEXT OF THE STATUS OF THE FORCES DISCUSSION IN DECEMBER TO ENSURE THAT WALDHEIM DID NOT REVERT TO THE IDEA OF MOVING THE TALKS.
4. ROLANDIS AGREED WITH LORD CARRINGTON THAT TURKMEN WAS A MODERATE. HE WAS MAKING POSITIVE NOISES, AND EVREN LISTENED TO HIM. IF HE CONTINUED AS AT PRESENT, THERE COULD BE SOME RESULTS. THE TALKS THEMSELVES WERE CONCENTRATING ON THE PRELIMINARY ISSUES OF VAROSHA, FAMAGUSTA AND CBMS. BUT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO KEEP ONE'S EYE ON THE OVERALL PACKAGE WHENEVER THIS RISKED PRE-EMPTING POSITIONS ON THE

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WIDER CONSTITUTIONAL AND TERRITORIAL ISSUES. THE CYPRIOTS INTENDED TO USE THE CHRISTMAS BREAK IN THE TALKS TO COLLECT THEIR IDEAS. THE TALKS SHOULD CONTINUE SLOWLY, BUT NOT TOO SLOWLY. THE MOST POSITIVE SIGN WAS THAT THE TURKS WERE SOUNDING OUT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS INFORMALLY (EG DURING THE COFFEE BREAKS WHICH WERE MORE PRODUCTIVE THAN THE MEETINGS THEMSELVES) ABOUT WHAT MIGHT SATISFY THE GREEK CYPRIOTS TERRITORIALY. THE TURKISH MILITARY WERE NATURALLY INTERESTED HOWEVER IN ENSURING THAT THEY RETAINED A SUFFICIENT HINTERLAND.

5. ON CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS, ROLANDIS SAID THAT THE TURKS WERE STILL DEMANDING EQUALITY, BUT QUOTE EQUALITY BETWEEN TWO UNEQUAL COMMUNITIES PRODUCES INEQUALITY UNQUOTE. GREEK-CYPRIOT CONSTITUTIONAL THINKING WAS ON THE THRESHOLD BETWEEN THE FEDERAL AND THE UNITARY STATE. THE TURKS WERE THINKING ALONG CONFEDERAL LINES. HE DID NOT EXCLUDE A COMPROMISE, IF THE TURKS WERE PREPARED TO MOVE. THE IMPLICATIONS OF A FAILURE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE APPALLING: THE DIALOGUE WOULD STOP, AND THEY WOULD BE IN A VACUUM.

6. LORD CARRINGTON SUGGESTED THAT A TIME MIGHT COME WHEN BOTH SIDES NEEDED A BROKER. HE RECALLED THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR, BESIDES HAVING DEALT WITH CYPRUS BEFORE, HAD BEEN REMARKABLY OBJECTIVE AS A UN OBSERVER IN ZIMBABWE. THE POSSIBILITY OF THE COMMUNITY POLITICAL COOPERATION MACHINERY HELPING, EG BY PRODUCING A DUTCH MEDIATOR DURING THE DUTCH PRESIDENCY, WAS DISCUSSED, THOUGH IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT LEFT-WING SUSPICIONS OF THE COMMUNITY MIGHT DAMAGE SUCH A MEDIATOR'S PROSPECTS.

7. LORD CARRINGTON STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE PRESENT CONJUNCTURE IN TURKISH POLITICS. THE MILITARY THERE WERE WELL PLACED TO TAKE DECISIONS, AND HAD SHOWED THEMSELVES SENSIBLE SO FAR, EG OVER THE AEGEAN. ROLANDIS AGREED. THE MILITARY WERE ALSO MORE OPEN TO ADVICE FROM THE WEST. THE MAIN INGREDIENTS FOR PROGRESS WERE THERE, AND HE HAD HEARD THAT EVREN'S PRIORITIES WERE: A. THE AEGEAN; B. CYPRUS; AND C. GREEK-TURKISH BILATERAL RELATIONS. HENCE EVREN'S PRESENT FOCUS ON CYPRUS. LORD CARRINGTON WONDERED WHETHER THE GREEK ATTITUDE MIGHT SOUR IF PAPANDREOU WON THE ELECTION. ROLANDIS THOUGHT THAT PAPANDREOU WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL ON CYPRUS, AND MIGHT FEEL BOUND TO DO SOMETHING ON NATO.

8. FINALLY ROLANDIS SAID THAT HE WOULD PROBABLY ACCOMPANY KYPRIANOU (WHOSE HEALTH WAS MUCH BETTER) TO LONDON. HE HOPED THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD AGREE TO RECEIVE THE PRESIDENT IN DECEMBER. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT THIS WAS BEING CONSIDERED AT THE MOMENT. (I GATHER NOW THAT A CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER HAS BEEN FIXED ON 19 DECEMBER.)

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