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*from Munich Africa*  
*for...*  
*ms*

FM WASHINGTON 161655Z MAY 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1522 OF 16 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE PRETORIA, UKMIS NEW YORK, PRIORITY PARIS, BONN,  
OTTAWA, LUANDA, LAGOS, LUSAKA, SALISBURY, GABORONE, DAR ES SALAAM,  
INFO SAVING ADDIS ABABA.

FOR RESIDENT CLERK: PLEASE INFORM BARDER (SAFD)

PIK BOTHA'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON

1. CROCKER BRIEFED THE WASHINGTON CONTACT GROUP ON 15 MAY ABOUT  
PIK BOTHA'S TALKS HERE. THE AMERICANS THOUGHT THESE HAD GONE REAS-  
ONABLY WELL.

2. NAMIBIA. IN 3 HOURS OF MEETINGS WITH BOTHA, HAIG MADE IT CLEAR  
THAT THE US WANTED TO TREAT ITS RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA IN A  
MORE POSITIVE SPIRIT. BUT THIS HAD TO BE RECIPROCATED: PARTICULARLY  
OVER NAMIBIA. THE SOUTH AFRICANS MUST GENUINELY COMMIT THEMSELVES  
TO A SEARCH FOR AN INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT:  
THE US WOULD NOT INVOLVE ITSELF IN FURTHER FRUITLESS NEGOTIATIONS.  
HAIG INSISTED THAT PIK BOTHA MUST OBTAIN HIS CABINET'S CLEAR COMMIT-  
MENT TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ON THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES. PIK BOTHA  
WAS OPTIMISTIC THAT SUCH A COMMITMENT WOULD BE FORTHCOMING: HE  
ACCEPTED THAT THE BALL WAS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN COURT.

3. BOTHA SAID THAT SOUTH AFRICA WOULD NOT ACCEPT A MARXIST GOVERN-  
MENT IN WINDHOEK: (CROCKER ADDED THAT THE US SHARED THIS VIEW).  
HOWEVER HE HAD NOT RULED OUT SOUTH AFRICAN ACQUIESCENCE IN A SWAPO  
VICTORY, SUBJECT TO SATISFACTORY CONSTITUTIONAL ASSURANCES, GUARANT-  
EES OF NEUTRALITY AND A FAIR TRANSITION.

4. ON THE TRANSITION, THE SOUTH AFRICANS MAINTAINED THAT IN ITS  
PRESENT FORM UNTAG WAS UNACCEPTABLE. THEY ARGUED THAT THE FORCE  
SHOULD NOT WEAR A UN UNIFORM: (COMMENT: IN REPLY TO OUR QUESTIONS  
ON THIS, IT APPEARS THAT THE AMERICANS HAD NOT DISCOVERED WHETHER  
THE SOUTH AFRICANS WANTED A WHOLLY CIVILIAN UNTAG OR COULD ACCEPT  
A MILITARY TRANSITION FORCE DISTANCED FROM THE UN).

5. ON GUARANTEES, BOTHA ACCEPTED THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR  
SOUTH AFRICA TO BECOME A FORMAL GUARANTOR IN THE SENSE THAT IT WOULD  
HAVE A LEGAL RIGHT OF INTERVENTION AND ENFORCEMENT IN NAMIBIA. HE  
THOUGHT THAT SOUTH AFRICA'S CONTROL OF WALVIS BAY, OF COMMUNICATIONS,  
ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY ETC. WOULD ENABLE SOUTH AFRICA IN PRACTICE  
TO ENSURE NAMIBIAN GOOD BEHAVIOUR SIMPLY BY ITS WITH-HOLDING POWER,  
BUT HE WANTED SOME FORM OF INTERNATIONAL APPROVAL FOR THE EXERCISE  
OF THIS WITH-HOLDING POWER.

6. BOTHA HAD BEEN RELAXED ON THE QUESTION OF HOW FAR THE CONSTITUT-  
ION SHOULD BE WORKED OUT IN FINE DETAIL. HE ACCEPTED THE US ARGUM-  
ENT THAT THE CONSTITUTION MUST NOT RESEMBLE TOO CLOSELY THE MULTI-  
LAYERED TURNHALLE ARRANGEMENTS. HE SAID THAT SOUTH AFRICA WAS  
MORE CONCERNED ABOUT ENSURING COMPLIANCE (IE GUARANTEES) THAN  
ABOUT THE FINE PRINT.

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7. THE SOUTH AFRICAN CABINET IS DUE TO MEET EARLY NEXT WEEK (BEGINNING 19 MAY) TO CONSIDER BOTHA'S REPORT. THE AMERICANS TOLD HIM THAT THEY WOULD EXPECT A COMMITMENT TO ACHIEVING A NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT AND A FIRM UNDERTAKING THAT SOUTH AFRICA WOULD ALLOW THE INDEPENDENCE PROCESS TO GO AHEAD ONCE ITS SPECIFIED CONCERNS HAD BEEN MET. THE AMERICANS WOULD WANT THESE CONCERNS SPELLED OUT AND THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF ADDING TO THEM.

8. ZIMBABWE, AT OUR SUGGESTION, HAIG HAD RAISED THE DETERIORATING RELATIONS BETWEEN ZIMBABWE AND SOUTH AFRICA. THE US VALUED ITS RELATIONS WITH ZIMBABWE AND WAS UNHAPPY AT THE HOSTILITY BETWEEN PRETORIA AND SALISBURY. BOTHA SHRUGGED THIS OFF - HIS GOVERNMENT WAS NO LONGER ESCALATING ITS HOSTILE RHETORIC, WHICH HE SAID HAD TO SOME EXTENT REFLECTED DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONCERNS, FUELLED BY WHITE EMIGRANTS FROM ZIMBABWE.

9. ANGOLA. THE AMERICANS AND SOUTH AFRICANS AGREED THAT THERE WAS AN EMPIRICIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PROBLEMS OF NAMIBIA AND ANGOLA SAVIMBI MUST NOT BE SACRIFICED IN ANY NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT. BUT BOTH SIDES ACCEPTED THAT THE NAMIBIAN EFFORT MUST BE PRESSED AHEAD FIRST ON ITS OWN MERITS. THEY ALSO AGREED THAT PUBLIC COMMENTS SUGGESTING A FORMAL LINKAGE BETWEEN CUBAN WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA AND A NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT WOULD BE UNHELPFUL. (COMMENT: AN UNNAMED ADMINISTRATION SOURCE WAS REPORTED IN THE WASHINGTON STAR OF 15 MAY AS HAVING REFERRED TO THAT PRECISE LINKAGE.)

10. BOTHA HAD A 30 MINUTE MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, MOST OF WHICH WAS GIVEN UP TO A REPEAT OF BOTHA'S WELL-REHEARSED QUOTE AFRICA IS DYING UNQUOTE ACT. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT THE US WANTED A NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT AND WOULD ALSO SUPPORT FURTHER POLITICAL CHANGES INSIDE SOUTH AFRICA ITSELF.

11. COMMENT. IT IS NOT IMMEDIATELY CLEAR TO WHAT EXTENT BOTHA WAS CONVINCED THAT SOUTH AFRICAN CO-OPERATION OVER NAMIBIA MAY BE A PREREQUISITE FOR IMPROVED BILATERAL RELATIONS. BUT IT IS OBVIOUSLY HELPFUL THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS SHOULD HAVE BEEN TOLD AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL THAT US/SOUTH AFRICAN FRIENDSHIP IS A TWO-WAY STREET, AND WHEN THE CABINET MEETS NEXT WEEK, IT SHOULD AT LEAST HAVE A CLEARER VIEW OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S REFUSAL AUTOMATICALLY TO SUPPORT WHATEVER COURSE SOUTH AFRICA DECIDES UPON. WHETHER THIS WILL BE ENOUGH TO EXTRACT A MORE CO-OPERATIVE APPROACH FROM PRETORIA REMAINS UNCERTAIN, AND BOTHA'S REMARKS ABOUT THE COMPOSITION OF UNTAG SUGGEST THAT THE PRESSURES AGAINST A REASONABLE SETTLEMENT REMAIN STRONG.

FCO PASS SAVING ADDIS ABABA

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HENDERSON

[PASSED AS REQUESTED]

SOUTHERN AFRICA STANDARD

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