



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

*Mr Fraser's office have  
 writing to say that he has a number of weighty issues to discuss.*

27 July 1981

*I assumed there that you had a full hour available for the meeting. They were cancelled.*

*Dear Michael,*

*Phil - 28/7*

Prime Minister's Meeting with Australian  
 Prime Minister 5.00 pm Thursday 30 July

Mr Fraser asked the High Commissioner in Canberra to extend his sympathy over the recent disturbances in the UK, and said he would do so in person when he met the Prime Minister.

Mr Fraser will naturally have the Melbourne CHGM very much in mind, and will, during his visit to London, be sounding out the views of other Commonwealth leaders coming here. A separate brief has been sent to you on CHGM and associated issues.

Mr Fraser would, no doubt, welcome the Prime Minister's own impressions of the Ottawa Summit.

I attach a brief on other topics relevant to Mr Fraser's meeting with the Prime Minister. Professor Harries, adviser to Mr Fraser, has told us that Mr Fraser may wish to "take the Prime Minister's mind" on his proposed "Melbourne declaration" (para 10 of Essential Facts). The Prime Minister may herself wish to raise the point (Point to Make 5) that we hope it will prove possible for the Royal Australian Navy to buy one of our Invincible Class carriers, and are confident that we can produce a competitive package. She may also wish to endorse the point (Point to Make 2) that aggressive action by the Australians threatening retaliation against the EC could be counter-productive.

Mr Fraser will probably be accompanied at the meeting by the Australian High Commissioner (The Hon Mr R V Garland), and Sir Geoffrey Yeend, Secretary to the Cabinet.

*Yours PLM  
 Rodric Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
 10 Downing Street

## VISIT OF AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER, 25 JULY TO 2 AUGUST

TOPICS COVERED IN BRIEFS FOR THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE  
SECRETARY OF STATE

<u>Item</u>	<u>Topic</u>	<u>Classification</u>
A	EC/Australia	Confidential
B	Defence Relations	Secret
C	Poland: Contingency Plans (if raised)	Secret
D	North - South	Confidential
E	New World Information and Communication Order	Confidential
F	Middle East	Confidential
G	Cambodia (if raised)	Confidential
H	Namibia (if raised)	Confidential
I	Zimbabwe	Confidential
J	Northern Ireland (if raised)	Unclassified
K	Bilateral Issues (if raised)	Confidential

RASER, THE RT HON (JOHN) MALCOLM, CH MP

Prime Minister since November 1975.

Born Melbourne 1930. Only son of a well off grazier. Spent boyhood on father's Riverina (New South Wales) property. Educated at Melbourne Grammar and Magdalen, Oxford (PPE, 1948-52). Liberal Member for Wannon, Victoria, since 1955. Minister for the Army 1966-68. Minister for Education and Science 1968-69 and 1971-72. Minister for Defence 1969-71. Opposition spokesman on Labour and Public Service matters 1972-75. Leader of the Opposition March-November 1975. Appointed Prime Minister of a caretaker Government in November 1975 when Sir John Kerr dismissed Mr Whitlam. Won December 1975, December 1977 and October 1980 elections decisively, the first with a record majority.

Has been whole-heartedly involved in politics ever since his return from Oxford about which he says little. Failed to secure preferment under Sir Robert Menzies, partly because of reputation even then for patrician arrogance. His interest in defence matters led to appointment as Minister for the Army under Mr Hold. Early-won reputation for vigorous clashes with senior officials, but handled a testing portfolio well. Promoted to Cabinet by Mr Gorton in 1968 as Minister for Education and Science. Minister for Defence in November 1969 after Federal election. He fell out with Mr Gorton and his challenging resignation in March 1971 precipitated a leadership crisis which brought down Mr Gorton. He stayed on backbenches until appointed to Ministry of Education and Science by Mr McMahon. In Opposition, formidable operator, arousing the wrath and respect of his opponents. Failed to unseat Mr Snedden from the Leadership in November 1974 but succeeded in March 1975 after Mr Snedden had been constantly out-manoeuvred, especially in Parliament, by Mr Whitlam. His ruthless ambition and determination, which had deterred many on his own side, became a great asset when the Liberal Party was looking for a leader strong enough to take on Mr Whitlam. Made astute political use of Whitlam Government's overseas loans affairs and used L-NCP Senate majority to delay the 1975 Appropriation Bills. Appointed caretaker Prime Minister on 11 November 1975 when Sir John Kerr ousted Mr Whitlam.

His career shows a genius for political timing, astute political judgement, considerable courage and ruthlessness. He has now come to dominate his Party, his Government and the Parliament, especially since Mr Whitlam's decline and resignation. Without rival or obvious successor as Prime Minister. His style is tough and demanding, even abrasive, although he has begun to mellow somewhat in office. He sets high standards for himself and his colleagues, working long hours, expecting Ministers to attend frequent consultations at short notice and distancing himself from colleagues who run into trouble. Likes to operate by Cabinet consensus, although it is unusual for him not to get his own way. His aloofness, apparent lack of warmth, patrician manner and hard-headed ambition have won him respect rather than friends, even among his Ministerial colleagues. He listens to a number of private influential advisers on his personal staff. Not a good speaker, but handles question and answer sessions and unscripted interviews well, showing his command of his brief and his single-mindedness in getting points over. Infuriates Opposition in Parliament by answering only questions he wants to. Tends to allow one issue to dominate his thinking, eg Soviet naval presence in Indian Ocean (1976); Australia as a bridge between North and South (1977-78); and entry for Australian agricultural produce into the EEC (1978). More pragmatic and progressive, especially on international and racial (eg African) issues than his reputation or his party. An admirer of the German and Japanese economic miracles, and of the free enterprise system. Not particularly enthusiastic about Britain; unusually, he did not visit the UK as PM until eighteen months after taking office. But he has come to value his personal contacts with

/the

the Prime Minister and is a notable convert to the worth and significance of the Commonwealth. He has also been helpful and easy of access to this High Commission, surprisingly willing to hear an argument and straightforward in making up his mind. Has accepted an invitation to visit the UK in 1981.

Married 1956 Tamara ("Tamie") Begg, a charming lady with a splendidly irreverent sense of humour. She comes from another rich grazier family in Western Victoria; 2 sons, 2 daughters.

Recreations: fishing, photography, fast cars and motor bikes. Owns valuable grazing property (Nareen) in Western Victoria.

VISIT OF AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER, 25 JULY TO 2 AUGUST

POINTS TO MAKE

A: EC/AUSTRALIA

1. Hope Mr Fraser will bear in mind continuing political sensitivity of UK membership of EC when he is making public statements in UK. And important for developed Commonwealth countries to avoid criticism of each others' trade policies at CHGM.

2. UK shares Australian concern about present operation of CAP and will be pressing for change. However, feel that Australian threats of aggressive action strengthen position of EC states unsympathetic to Australia.

Sugar (if raised)

3. UK pressing for Community membership of International Sugar Agreement as a priority for our Presidency. Community now agreed to discussion in GATT of recent changes to sugar regime.

Australian Safeguard Action under GATT Article XIX (if raised)

4. Glad Australia has cleared up earlier misunderstanding. Hope this issue can now be resolved by negotiation.

B: DEFENCE RELATIONS

ASW Carrier for Royal Australian Navy (RAN)

5. Hope it will prove possible for RAN to buy one of our Invincible class ASW carriers. Confident we can produce competitive package, including timing. MOD experts ready to travel to Canberra for technical discussions whenever you wish.

*TEMPORARILY RETAINED. J. Gray 5/11/2014*

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS  
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)  
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

SECRET

C : POLAND: CONTINGENCY PLANS (If raised)

7. Value Australian participation in NATO planning, agree consultations with NATO should be full as possible. But points you have raised with NATO are ones on which it is difficult to secure Alliance consensus. We have tried to expedite response but real fear in NATO that pressing for answers now could lead to unravelling of existing package.

D: NORTH - SOUTH

8. Hope Mr Fraser will ensure at CHGM that there is practical discussion of economic issues, not North/South confrontation. We spoke up for Australia's inclusion at Cancun but list of participants now closed at 22.

E: NEW WORLD INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION ORDER (NWICO)

9. UK been working for Western coordination against this. Keen to cooperate closely with Australia as well.

10. For CHGM support Australian idea of building on report of Commonwealth Committee on Communication and Media. We need to avoid confrontation with supporters of non-aligned stance.

F: MIDDLE-EAST

Arab- Israel

11. Are Australians in a position to endorse Venice?

Sinai peace-keeping force

12. UK not asked to participate and not likely to be. Appreciate Australian difficulty, but no wish to discourage Australian participation.

G: CAMBODIA

UN Conference and UNGA : Credentials (if raised)

13. Has Conference changed likely Australian attitude to Cambodian credentials at UNGA? No. UK decision yet, but position has not in our view changed from 1980.

SECRET

/ H.

SECRET

H: NAMIBIA (if raised)

14. No guarantee of obvious progress before CHGM. Hope, nonetheless, that CHGM will not be bogged down over Namibia at expense of other issues.

I: ZIMBABWE

15. North Korean military assistance worrying but we will have to live with it. BMATT will continue to play major rôle. Would welcome Australian assistance in training Zimbabwe's army.

16. Australian teachers in Zimbabwe very effective form of aid.

J: NORTHERN IRELAND (If raised)

17. Grateful for helpful Government statement in Australian Senate on 13 May.

K: BILATERAL ISSUES (If raised)

18. Pleased that progress continuing between Commonwealth and States on resolving problems of Australia's residual constitutional links with UK. We will do all we properly can to help implement any consensus reached in Australia. Expect the Australians will keep Palace closely informed.

SECRET

## VISIT OF AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER - 25 JULY to 2 AUGUST

## ESSENTIAL FACTS

## A. EC/AUSTRALIA

1. Australians strongly criticise EC barriers to agricultural imports and payment of export subsidies by EC in order to dispose of high cost CAP surpluses on world markets, where they compete with Australian produce. Australians have recently threatened trade retaliation against EC suppliers over a whole series of issues including sheepmeat and manufacturing beef. If there were retaliation UK would stand to lose more than other EC member states. We have tried to convince Australians that their aggressive line is counter-productive. However, Mr Anthony, Deputy Prime Minister and Trade Minister, continues to make belligerent noises.

GATT

2. Australia is pursuing a number of CAP-related complaints against EC in GATT, though GATT however permits subsidisation of agricultural exports providing this does not give exporting country a 'more than equitable share' of those markets. <sup>Australians have</sup> obtained a GATT ruling on sugar, but an inconclusive one, <sup>GATT council has agreed</sup> to keep the issue under review. Meanwhile new EC sugar regime should transfer burden of financing surplus disposal from EC Budget to producers themselves.

3. Australia has also taken safeguard action under GATT on footwear, cars and forklift trucks. EC has GATT right to demand compensating package and, if this is not agreed, to retaliate. So far no compensatory package agreed, but EC has refrained from retaliation and has agreed to successive prolongations of the 90-day consultation period. But in June the Australians oddly refused to agree any further extension. So, to protect its position, EC had to submit to GATT a list of products for possible retaliation. Commission wanted to include canned fruit (sensitive for Australia) but UK, with German and Dutch support, blocked this. Australians subsequently changed their position, claiming a 'misunderstanding' and have agreed to further extension. They have also now told the Commission informally that they hope in

/September



SECRET

September to offer a compensatory package.

B: DEFENCE RELATIONS

Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Carrier for RAN

4. Mr Nott suggested to Australian Defence Secretary, Mr Killen, on 28 May that the Australians might acquire one of the three Invincible class ASW carriers being built for the RN, to replace the Australian aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne. The High Commissioner in Canberra has subsequently followed this up with Mr Killen. The Australians are interested but are also considering an American Iwo Jima class carrier. MOD has prepared a detailed paper for the Australians and has also offered to send a team of experts to Canberra for technical discussions. MOD are confident that they can produce a competitive package soon enough to enable Australians to dispense with planned refit of HMAS Melbourne in 1986. Both we and Australians have emphasised need for secrecy.

Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA)

5. All partners understand (but regret) financial and practical obstacles to regular UK participation. However, Company group of Gurkhas (130 strong) will take part in Exercise PLATYPUS in Australia from 25 July to 5 August.

6. Singapore's Second Deputy Prime Minister (Mr Rajarathnam, the former Foreign Minister) said on recent visit to Australia that the FPDA was not designed to cope with the power play now seen in the area and a rethink of defence arrangements was necessary, with the US as linchpin and involving Japan, ASEAN and China. Mr Fraser may comment on this.

C: NATO CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR SOVIET INTERVENTION IN POLAND

7. Australians have been particularly keen to be fully consulted during the drawing up of NATO's plans so as to ensure themselves an opportunity of influencing decisions they would help implement. The Secretary of State told Mr Street on 12 June that we would do what we could to expedite a NATO reply to these queries. But it is

/ now

SECRET

SECRET

now clear that the issues involved are highly contentious. Consensus is that these issues would be more easily resolved under the impetus of a crisis.

8. Mr Fraser may well have been given much the same message when he visited Washington on 30 June.

D: NORTH - SOUTH

9. Mr Fraser's interest in 'North/South' issues will dominate his approach to the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting. In a recent public speech he has argued that the industrialised countries should regard the 'South' as a solid political grouping.

10. He is personally working on a draft 'Melbourne Declaration' on international economic issues. Australian officials say that in its final form the Declaration is likely to be in neutral terms. The Prime Minister saw a leaked early draft of the Declaration; the Australians have learnt of this and are reportedly upset.

11. Australia is disappointed at not being invited to the Cancun Summit.

E: NWICO

12. Australian proposal of building on report of Commonwealth Committee on Communications and Media is to (a) study needs and resources for communication development and (b) hold a seminar of government and media to discuss the problem.

F: MIDDLE EAST

Arab-Israel

13. Australians have not endorsed Palestinian self-determination or acknowledged that the PLO should have a rôle. We know Australian DFA officials have recommended that Australia should align with the Ten, but that Mr Fraser and Mr Street are reluctant to do so. There is a small but politically active Jewish community in Australia.

/Sinai

SECRET

SECRET

Sinai peacekeeping

14. Australians (together with New Zealanders and Canadians) have been asked to provide a contingent to the Multinational Sinai peacekeeping force. The request gives them difficulty. They have supported Camp David and are reluctant to disappoint their US allies. But Australian Labour Party have violently opposed participation, recalling the Australian experience in Vietnam, and the government themselves are worried about the impact on their relations with the Arabs, particularly on dairy exports. Mr Fraser wants more Western cover if Australia is to participate and is anxious that the UK should also participate or perhaps provide a commander for the force. We have not been asked to participate and have been told by the Americans that there is no question of our being asked. We have tried to deter Mr Fraser from linking Australian participation to ours.

G: CAMBODIA

UN Conference

15. The Australian Foreign Minister, Mr Street, attended the New York Conference (13 - 17 July). Conference adopted by consensus a Resolution (setting up a Committee) and a Declaration. The Declaration calls for an independent and neutral Cambodia. The texts were the result of hard bargaining between the Chinese, who wished to maintain a privileged position for the Khmer Rouge after Vietnamese withdrawal, and ASEAN. The texts finally adopted preserve the essence of the ASEAN (and Western) position.

Credentials

16. Cambodian credentials became a domestic political issue in Australia when the former Foreign Minister, Mr Peacock, used them as an example of his differences with Mr Fraser. In May, Australia announced that it would have abstained on this question at the World Health Assembly (there was in the event no vote). This implies an Australian abstention in September at the UNGA, but there is some flexibility in Australian statements, and ASEAN hope that they can persuade Australia to continue to support Democratic Kampuchea. (UK voted for DK in 1980).

/ H

SECRET

SECRET

H: NAMIBIA

Australian Policy Towards Namibia

17. Australia has always supported Five's efforts to achieve negotiated settlement, but lays the blame for the delay squarely on the South African Government. Abstained on resolutions calling for sanctions in the General Assembly debate, 2 - 6 March. Mr Fraser claimed on 14 July that he was relieved by America's attitude to Namibia, believing that they were putting great pressure on the South African Government.

US Still Taking Lead in Negotiations

18. The Five agreed in May to allow the US, as the Government with most leverage on South Africa, to take the lead. Following discussions by the Five Foreign Ministers, in margins of Ottawa summit, a meeting of senior officials in Paris on 30 July will discuss the outcome of the US/South African contacts. The Americans consider that there are grounds for some optimism. [Not to be revealed: But South Africa (and US) insistence on linkage with a Cuba withdrawal from Angola causes practical and presentational problems. We and the rest of the Five consider that explicit linkage will unnecessarily complicate the negotiations.]

19. As hosts, Australia will not want the CHGM marred by attacks on the UK and Canada, the Commonwealth members of the contact group. Unless substantive progress can be made before September, which seems unlikely, African feelings will run high. They may be further inflamed by a special session of the General Assembly on Namibia planned also for September.

I: ZIMBABWE

North Korean Military Assistance

20. The North Koreans are to provide military equipment free of charge for a brigade of 5,000 men, plus about 100 instructors for which Zimbabwe must pay. We and the Americans tried unsuccessfully to persuade Mr Mugabe to refuse the North Korean offer. He argued that it was important politically for him to demonstrate his non-aligned credentials. We are inclined to accept his insistence that this does not herald a fundamental shift of policy against Western interests. And he has given an assurance that the

/Koreans

SECRET

SECRET

Koreans will not interfere with BMATT.

21. Mr Fraser has recently heard of the North Korean offer and has asked whether Australian aid could replace it. We believe Mr Mugabe's decision on the Koreans is final. However we would welcome Australian support, undertaking some of the important training tasks which are beyond the means of BMATT.

J: NORTHERN IRELAND

22. Hunger strike has attracted interest among the Irish-Australian community. There have been low-key demonstrations against posts and the Prime Minister and Northern Ireland Secretary have received letters generally critical of HMG. But the Australian media have given generally balanced coverage. Copy of Australian Senate discussions attached.

K: BILATERAL ISSUES

Constitutional Links

23. Australia has complex constitutional arrangements including residual colonial relation of States to British Government. Power jealousies between the (Australian) Commonwealth and its states have so far prevented rationalisation. However reform proposals have been drawn up by Australian Attorneys General and may be discussed at next Premiers' conference in September.

24. We have repeatedly said that if UK assistance (eg legislation) was necessary to implement any agreement reached by Australians, we would do all we properly can to expedite it. [Not to be revealed: the final package would need to be constitutionally satisfactory eg in relation to the position of Her Majesty The Queen.]

General

25. Bilateral relations are excellent. However the Australians are conscious of their own relative isolation: we gain from efforts to involve them on an official and political level in our own councils.

26. UK exports to Australia, 1980 (provisional figures): £815 million. (Mostly chemicals, vehicles. We have 10% of Australian

/market

SECRET

market). Imports: £484 million. We have very substantial investments there - nearly a fifth of our total overseas investment.

SECRET

#### NORTHERN IRELAND

Senator KEEFFE I preface my question, which is directed to the Minister representing the Prime Minister, by stating that it is not complementary to the one that was asked a short while ago by Senator Puplick but is in line with a question that I asked a couple of weeks ago. I ask: Now that the second Irish hunger striker, Frankie Hughes, has died, will the Minister reconsider the suggestion I put forward previously, that this Government approach the British Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher, in an effort to save the lives of the remaining three hunger strikers. If this suggestion is considered to be unacceptable, will the Government approach the United Nations with a view to examining the possibility of having the British troops repatriated and their role taken over by a United Nations peacekeeping force?

Senator CARRICK The latter situation would be, of course, in defiance of the whole question of natural sovereignty. The United Nations would not consider it. There is no question at all about the sovereignty of Northern Ireland. It is in general well accepted that the internal affairs of a country are sovereign matters for that country. The British Government has a direct and sovereign responsibility for peacekeeping in Northern Ireland, and in fact Northern Ireland is part of its democratic responsibility. I do not want to inflame this matter in any way. I have said that here previously. The British Government has taken the view—I believe the correct view—that the persons who have been gaoled have been gaoled for criminal offences and not for political offences. That is the first thing. They have been gaoled for acts of armed aggression. I think Bobby Sands was gaoled for armed robbery and subsequently for being in possession of arms. These are crimes in this country, as they are in any democratic country. The ordinary processes of law take place and then the ordinary course of punishment takes place.

2) What is happening—it is a lamentable situation—is that a number of people are seeking to make a political point by committing suicide. One deplores that, but that is their choice. I said that I would refer a previous question to the Minister in another place. I will do so. I acted before in such a reference. The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom has made the intentions of her sovereign Government quite clear. Her Government has set a standard for the world in observing the rule of law. I am utterly sure that it will observe the rule of law there as it does elsewhere.

BRIEF FOR GENERAL USE WITH COMMONWEALTH VISITORS (INCLUDING THOSE FROM AUSTRALIA, BARBADOS, CYPRUS, GUYANA, INDIA, MALAWI, NIGERIA, SINGAPORE, SRI LANKA AND ZAMBIA) DURING ROYAL WEDDING

COMMONWEALTH MATTERS

POINTS TO MAKE

COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING (CHGM)

1. Looking forward to CHGM. Hope you/your head of government will be present. Relief to have a CHGM no longer dominated by Rhodesian problem. Could be very useful meeting.

COMMONWEALTH FINANCE MINISTERS MEETING (CFMM) (IF RAISED)

2. Regret disruption of Commonwealth business. Sympathise with New Zealand government who did all they believe they properly could to persuade those concerned to call off tour. Saw no justification for a change in venue of CFMM but, in interests of Commonwealth harmony, we shall attend Nassau.

GLENEAGLES AGREEMENT AND SPORTING CONTACTS WITH SOUTH AFRICA (IF RAISED)

3. Hope Commonwealth will not allow consideration of Gleneagles Agreement to become over intrusive at CHGM. Do not think Agreement's modification warranted. Hope discussion of it can be reserved for informal consideration during (Canberra) weekend retreat.

FOR USE WITH AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER ONLY:

4. Share Australia's concern that CHGM should be a success. Particularly hope that it will not be dominated by Southern African issues.

5. Prime Minister enjoyed previous visits to Australia and much regrets unable to accept invitation to stay on in Australia for a few days after meeting.

FOR USE WITH PRESIDENT OF CYPRUS ONLY:

6. (If raised) Inappropriate to convene Commonwealth Committee on Cyprus at a time when it might cut across inter-communal talks.

FOR USE WITH PRESIDENT OF INDIA ONLY:

7. Would be delighted if 1983 CHGM were held in Delhi. India has obvious claim.

/8. (If raised)



8. (If raised) Pakistan's renewed Commonwealth membership a matter for Commonwealth as a whole. We for our part would welcome it, but are conscious of Indian caution; we would not wish to see issue promoted in circumstances that could lead to controversy within Commonwealth.

FOR USE WITH PRESIDENT OF MALAWI ONLY

9. Very sorry to hear President Banda will not be attending this year's CHGM.

FOR USE WITH PRIME MINISTER OF SINGAPORE ONLY:

10. Look forward to hearing your views at CHGM on international economic issues. Always welcome element of rationality which Singapore customarily injects into such discussions.

FOR USE WITH PRESIDENT OF SRI LANKA

11. Understand Sri Lanka Exhibition (at Commonwealth Institute) is great success.

COMMONWEALTH MATTERS

ESSENTIAL FACTS

COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING (CHGM)

1. In Melbourne 30 September-7 October with weekend retreat in Canberra. Replies due mid-July to Commonwealth Secretary-General's circular letter on agenda. We have recommended that Prime Minister's reply indicate general agreement with Mr Ramphal's ideas and make no substantive new proposals. Next step (probably early August) is circulation by Mr Ramphal of annotated agenda.

COMMONWEALTH FINANCE MINISTERS MEETING (CFMM)

2. Next meeting of Commonwealth Finance Ministers (CFMM) (22-23 September) will take place in Nassau, Bahamas, following discussion at two meetings (10 and 21 July) of Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa (CCSA) of Nigerian proposal that venue be moved from Auckland if Springbok tour of New Zealand which began 19 July, went ahead. Final decision taken (on 21 July) despite New Zealand Government appeal, which we supported, for its postponement until after Mr Muldoon's arrival in London on 27 July (for Royal Wedding). New Zealand Government will almost certainly not be represented at Nassau, but we shall attend in interests of Commonwealth harmony.

GLENEAGLES AGREEMENT

A 3. Copy annexed: certain to be discussed at CHGM. Four Caribbean Governments (including Barbados) have already indicated their intention of raising it there with a view to securing its more effective implementation; and Nigeria may produce a new draft agreement for consideration. We had hoped that this subject could be reserved for informal discussion by heads of government at weekend retreat, but the furore over the change in CFMM venue, and Mr Muldoon's resulting bitterness, now make this unlikely.

AUSTRALIA

4. CHGM hosts. Immensely keen to make meeting a success and eg

/have

have sent delegations (led by Ministers and senior back-benchers) to all Commonwealth countries attending. Australian Foreign Minister visited UK 10-14 June and had talks with Prime Minister on 12 June when he delivered invitation from Mr Fraser to stay on in Australia for a few days after Meeting (Prime Minister has declined because of Conservative Party Conference, at which Mr Fraser has agreed to speak). On agenda Australians share Pacific, Caribbean (and UK) concern that Southern African issues should not loom too large.

BARBADOS

5. Mr Adams attended last CHGM (Lusaka 1979) where he exhibited a special interest in Belize and world economic questions.

CYPRUS

6. Commonwealth Committee on Cyprus set up at 1975 CHGM (in Jamaica) a propaganda machine for the Greek Cypriots and, thankfully, dormant since 1977. But communique issued at 1979 CHGM (in Lusaka) included decision (in response to Cypriot pressure) to ask Commonwealth Secretary General to convene Committee at Ministerial level whenever appropriate. Ramphal has however told President Kyprianou that he does not intend to convene Committee unless so requested by President himself. Latter has not since done so.

GUYANA

7. Was represented at 1979 CHGM (in Lusaka) by Guyanese Minister of Foreign Affairs.

INDIA

8. Mr Ramphal has suggested to Mrs Gandhi that India host next (1983) CHGM. Mrs Gandhi responded positively but apparently worried whether offer would be welcome to other heads of government. It will be South Asia's turn in 1983 to host a CHGM. Three possible candidates: Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and India. Latter is regionally the most significant, has the most suitable capital and, as the last

/Commonwealth,

Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional Meeting (CHGRM)'s successful host, has good claim.

9. President Zia would like to see Pakistan rejoin Commonwealth. Pakistan's readmission in British, Pakistani and Commonwealth interests. Until recently informal soundings have met with strong Indian objections suggesting little prospect of movement before CHGM, but in wake of Indian Foreign Ministers's recent visit to Pakistan and expectation of some improvement in their bilateral relations, Pakistan now seems to be contemplating some form of initiative. Agha Shahi recently approached Secretary of State on matter in New York. Difficult as yet to know likely Indian reaction, which is key. At the least, CHGM could see useful discussion of matter in corridors.

#### MALAWI

10. President Banda has let it be known that he will not attend this year's CHGM. In no way surprising: he appeared only for opening day of Lusaka CHGM.

#### NIGERIA

11. Nigerian delegation to 1979 CHGM was led by (then) Minister for External Affairs.

12. Nigerian Government hold very strong views on issue of sporting contacts with South Africa (see paragraphs 2 and 3 above).

#### SINGAPORE

13. Long standing bilateral tension between Singapore and Australia over latter's protectionism may lead Lee Kuan Yew to take a critical (and thus moderating) view of any Australian rhetoric at CHGM on world economic matters.

#### SRI LANKA

14. As part of their celebrations of 50 years of universal franchise Sri Lanka is mounting major exhibition at Commonwealth Institute

/17 July

CONFIDENTIAL

17 July-13 September depicting aspects of Sri Lanka's history and culture, and of its social political and economic life. The Queen opened Exhibition on 16 July.

15. The Queen has accepted invitation from President Jayawardene to pay state visit to Sri Lanka on her way back from CHGM in October 1981.

ZAMBIA

16. Hosted 1979 CHGM and President Kaunda apparently regards himself as Chairman of the Commonwealth (no such office) until next CHGM.

## COMMONWEALTH STATEMENT ON APARTHEID IN SPORT

The member countries of the Commonwealth, embracing peoples of diverse races, colours, languages and faiths, have long recognised racial prejudice and discrimination as a dangerous sickness and an unmitigated evil and are pledged to use all their efforts to foster human dignity everywhere. At their London Meeting, Heads of Government reaffirmed that apartheid in sports, as in other fields, is an abomination and runs directly counter to the Declaration of Commonwealth Principles which they made at Singapore on 22 January 1971.

They were conscious that sport is an important means of developing and fostering understanding between the people, and especially between the young people, of all countries. But, they were also aware that, quite apart from other factors, sporting contacts between their nationals and the nationals of countries practising apartheid in sport tend to encourage the belief (however unwarranted) that they are prepared to condone this abhorrent policy or are less than totally committed to the Principles embodied in their Singapore Declaration. Regretting past misunderstandings and difficulties and recognising that these were partly the result of inadequate inter-governmental consultations, they agreed that they would seek to remedy this situation in the context of the increased level of understanding now achieved.

They reaffirmed their full support for the international campaign against apartheid and welcomed the efforts of the United Nations to reach universally accepted approaches to the question of sporting contacts within the framework of that campaign.

Mindful of these and other considerations, they accepted it as the urgent duty of each of their Governments vigorously to combat the evil of apartheid by withholding any form of support for, and by taking every practical step to discourage contact or competition by their nationals with sporting organisations, teams or sportsmen from South Africa or from any other country where sports are organised on the basis of race, colour or ethnic origin.

They fully acknowledged that it was for each Government to determine in accordance with its laws the methods by which it might best discharge these commitments. But they recognised that the effective fulfilment of their commitments was essential to the harmonious development of Commonwealth sport hereafter.

They acknowledged also that the full realisation of their objectives involved the understanding, support and active participation of the nationals of their countries and of their national sporting organisations and authorities. As they drew a curtain across the past they issued a collective call for that understanding, support and participation with a view to ensuring that in this matter the peoples and Government of the Commonwealth might help to give a lead to the world. Heads of Government specially welcomed the belief, unanimously expressed at their Meeting, that in the light of their consultations and accord there were unlikely to be future sporting contacts of any significance between Commonwealth countries or their nationals and South Africa while that country continues to pursue the detestable policy of apartheid. On that basis, and having regard to their commitments, they looked forward with satisfaction to the holding of the Commonwealth Games in Edmonton and to the continued strengthening of Commonwealth sport generally.

*London, June 15 1977.*