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TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 881 OF 22 SEPTEMBER 1981

INFO NICOSIA, ATHENS, ANKARA, WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, ROME.

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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH UN SECRETARY GENERAL 21 SEPTEMBER:  
CYPRUS.

1. REFERRING TO HIS RECENT DISCUSSION WITH THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER AND TO THE FORTHCOMING GREEK ELECTIONS, LORD CARRINGTON STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF EARLY ACTION BY THE UN. BOTH SIDES HAD TABLED INADEQUATE PROPOSALS. HE HOPED THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD DO SOMETHING TO PUSH THE MATTER FORWARD.
2. WALDHEIM SAID HE WAS STILL INCLINED TO BE CAUTIOUS. HE WAS WORRIED THAT REJECTION OF PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD BY THE UN BY ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER WOULD KILL OFF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MEDIATION. LAST WEEK DENKTASH HAD URGED HIM NOT TO PUT FORWARD FORMAL PROPOSALS YET. KYPRIANOU HAD SUBSEQUENTLY TELEPHONED TO SAY THAT HE WOULD STOP IN NEW YORK ON 12 OCTOBER ON HIS WAY HOME FROM THE CHGM AND TO ASK THAT GOBBI'S PROPOSALS SHOULD NOT BE UNVEILED BEFORE THIS DISCUSSION. WALDHEIM AGREED THAT HE OUGHT TO DO SOMETHING. HE WOULD HAVE TO TRY TO FIND A COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE TWO POSITIONS. BUT THE ESSENTIAL QUESTION WAS ONE OF TIMING. WAS IT BETTER TO GO AHEAD AND RISK A BLAST FROM ONE OR OTHER PARTY, OR TO WAIT FOR KYPRIANOU'S VISIT TO NEW YORK? ALTHOUGH HE WAS ALWAYS ACCUSED OF DRAGGING HIS FEET, WALDHEIM WAS READY TO ACT. HE ASKED FOR LORD CARRINGTON'S VIEW.
3. LORD CARRINGTON THOUGHT THAT KYPRIANOU WAS PLAYING FOR TIME AND DID NOT WANT A SETTLEMENT. THE SAME WAS PROBABLY TRUE OF DENKTASH, BUT TURKMEN COULD TWIST HIS ARM - AND HAD SHOWN BY HIS ATTITUDE IN LONDON THAT HE WAS FULLY PREPARED TO DO SO. LORD CARRINGTON WAS INCLINED TO FEEL THAT WALDHEIM SHOULD FORCE THE PACE. TIME WAS VERY SHORT BEFORE THE GREEK ELECTION. THERE WAS OF COURSE A RISK THAT HIS PROPOSALS WOULD BE REJECTED: BUT THIS RISK WOULD REMAIN EVEN IF THEY WERE DELAYED.
4. WALDHEIM ADMITTED THAT PROPOSALS FROM THE UN WOULD PUT KYPRIANOU ON THE SPOT. HE THOUGHT THE MANNER OF PRESENTATION WOULD BE VERY IMPORTANT. THEY SHOULD NOT BE FORMAL PROPOSALS BUT SHOULD BE EMBODIED IN A WORKING PAPER FROM GOBBI. URQUHART SAID THAT GOBBI HAD ALREADY PREPARED A MEMORANDUM ON POINTS OF AGREEMENT AND POINTS OF EQUIDISTANCE. HE WOULD HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT HIS PROPOSALS AT THE MEETING ON 7 OR 14 OCTOBER. THE LATTER DATE WOULD BE TOO CLOSE TO THE GREEK ELECTION.

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5. WALDHEIM SAID THAT HAIG HAD ALSO PRESSED FOR EARLY ACTION.  
HE SEEMED INCLINED TO ACCEPT THAT THIS WOULD BE DESIRABLE,  
AS ALSO DID URQUHART.

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ADDITIONAL DISTN  
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**THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED**

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