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DESKBY FCO 081430Z

FM ATHENS 081215Z JAN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO DESKBY 091430Z

TELEGRAM U/N OF 8 JANUARY

RPTD IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PARIS BONN WARSAW MOSCOW UKDEL NATO

AND SAVING TO OTHER NATO POSTS AND DUBLIN.

MY TELS NOS 6 AND 8

POLAND

MEETING OF NATO FOREIGN MINISTER.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER ADDRESSED TO ME ON 8 JANUARY BY HARALAMBOPOULOS SETTING OUT THE GREEK GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS ON POLAND. SIMILAR LETTERS ARE BEING DELIVERED TO OTHER NATO AMBASSADORS IN ATHENS.

BEGINS.

IN VIEW OF THE DISCUSSIONS TO TAKE PLACE NEXT MONDAY JANUARY 11, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS' CONFERENCE CONCERNING THE DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND, I WISH TO DRAW YOUR ATTENTION ON THE BASIC VIEWS OF THE GREEK GOVERNMENT.

1. OUR COUNTRY CONDEMNS THE MARTIAL LAW IMPOSED, THE RESTRICTION OF INALIENABLE HUMAN RIGHTS AND SYNDICALIST FREEDOMS, MASS ARRESTS AS WELL AS THE BREAK-OFF OF THE DIALOGUE AIMING TO RENEWAL AND REFORMS IN POLAND. AS YOU MIGHT KNOW, THIS POSITION HAS BEEN STATED IN AN OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT COMMUNIQUE OF DECEMBER 18, 1981, AS WELL AS IN TWO DECLARATIONS OF THE TEN COMPILED WITH THE CONTRIBUTION OF GREECE.

2. THOUGH WE AGREE THAT THE USSR EXERCISED PRESSURE AND HAS BEEN INFORMED ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS, WE CONSIDER THAT NO DIRECT INTERVENTION OF HERS CAN BE PRESUMED FROM THE LEGAL POINT OF VIEW UP TO THE MOMENT. HOWEVER, WE HOLD WITH THE PRINCIPLES STATED IN THE FINAL ACT OF HELSINKI AND NATURALLY OPPOSE ANY VIOLATION OF SAID PRINCIPLES - IN PARTICULAR ANY DIRECT INTERVENTION IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF ANY OTHER COUNTRY WHEN SUCH AN EVENT TAKES PLACE.

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3. SINCE INDICATIONS EXIST AT PRESENT OF THE PROBABILITY THAT THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF POLAND PROCEEDS TO NORMALIZING THE SITUATION ACCORDING TO ITS PROMISES, WE CONSIDER THAT TAKING RESTRICTIVE MEASURES OF IMPOSING SANCTIONS - ECONOMIC OR OTHER - AT THE PRESENT STAGE AGAINST POLAND AND THE OTHER EASTERN COUNTRIES WOULD NOT HELP TO RESOLVING THE CRISIS SEMI-COLON ON THE CONTRARY, IT COULD LEAD TO UNDESIRABLE DEVELOPMENTS AND

UNDERMINE ATTEMPTS AIMING TO DETENTE, DISARMAMENT AND IN PARTICULAR THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS.

4. MOVEROVER, TAKING SUCH MEASURES OR SANCTIONS COULD VERY SERIOUSLY AFFECT THE ECONOMIES OF THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, WHICH ALREADY FACE A PERIOD OF DIFFICULTIES, MORE ESPECIALLY THOSE OF SMALL COUNTRIES AS IS GREECE.

5. FINALLY, WE WISH TO REMIND YOU OF THE FACT THAT, AS IT HAS BEEN INITIALLY STRESSED, WE DO NOT CONSIDER NATO AS BEING THE APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR UNDERTAKING DISCUSSIONS AGAINST THE MILITARY REGIME IN POLAND GIVEN THE FACT THAT A MEMBER OF THE ALLIANCE IS UNDER A MILITARY REGIME WITH ALL COMMON CHARACTERISTICS.

I HOPE THAT THE ABOVE STATED VIEWS WILL REACH UNDERSTANDING FROM YOUR GOVERNMENT SO THAT IT BECOMES POSSIBLE TO ATTAIN A COMMON POSITION IN NEXT MONDAY'S DISCUSSIONS IN BRUSSELS.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 10 OF 8 JANUARY 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE ATHENS, WASHINGTON, PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, UKREP
BRUSSELS

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ATHENS TELNO 6: GREEK ATTITUDE TOWARDS POLAND.

1. A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GREEK DELEGATION HAS SAT IN ON THE SPC DISCUSSIONS ON THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE TO BE ISSUED AFTER THE FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING ON 11 JANUARY. HIS SOLE CONTRIBUTION AT YESTERDAY'S MEETING HOWEVER WAS TO SAY THAT HE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS BUT SENSED TROUBLE. I UNDERSTAND FROM MY GREEK COLLEAGUE THAT HARALAMBOPOULOS WILL ATTEND THE MEETING ON 11 JANUARY, BUT WILL HAVE FIRM INSTRUCTIONS TO RESIST THE INCLUSION IN THE COMMUNIQUE OF ANYTHING WHICH INVOLVES CONDEMNATION OF THE RUSSIANS. SEKERIS, WHO MAKES LITTLE ATTEMPT TO DISGUISE HIS PERSONAL DISAGREEMENT WITH THIS LINE (AND IS BEING TRANSFERRED, THIS TIME TO LISBON, ON 15 JANUARY) ASKED HOW I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE RECEIVED. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, I SAID IT WOULD BE RECEIVED BADLY. HOWEVER IMPORTANT IT WAS TO DEMONSTRATE ALLIANCE UNANIMITY, THERE WAS A LIMIT TO THE EXTENT TO WHICH WE WOULD BE ABLE TO COMPROMISE IN ORDER TO ACCOMMODATE THE VIEWS OF ONE MEMBER WHICH WERE SO CLEARLY OUT OF LINE WITH THOSE OF THE REST.

2. WE NEED TO CONSIDER WHAT LINE WE SHOULD TAKE OVER THE COMMUNIQUE. THERE ARE TWO

POSSIBILITIES:- EITHER THE GREEKS MAY REFUSE TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH ANYTHING IN IT SEMI COLON OR THEY MAY DISSOCIATE THEMSELVES FROM SPECIFIC PARAGRAPHS.

3. IN THE FORMER CASE, WE HAVE THREE OPTIONS:-

(i) NOT TO ISSUE A COMMUNIQUE, AS IN THE CASE OF THE DPC LAST MONTH. THIS IS CLEARLY OUT OF THE QUESTION.

(ii) TO IGNORE GREECE AND TO ISSUE A COMMUNIQUE ON BEHALF OF THE 14. THIS WOULD SET AN UNDESIRABLE PRECEDENT AND SHOULD BE AVOIDED IF AT ALL POSSIBLE.

(iii) TO ISSUE A COMMUNIQUE ON BEHALF OF ALL 15, BUT TO INCLUDE A SENTENCE IN EITHER THE FIRST OR LAST PARAGRAPH TO THE EFFECT THAT GREECE, WHO WAS AT THE MEETING, DISSOCIATED HERSELF FROM IT.

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MY PREFERENCE WOULD BE FOR (III), WITH (II) AS A FALL-BACK. IN EITHER CASE THE SPOT LIGHT WOULD BE ON GREECE AS THE ODD MAN OUT IN THE ALLIANCE AND THE ESSENTIAL OBJECTIVE OF DEMONSTRATING THE SOLIDARITY OF THE REST WOULD BE ACHIEVED.

4. IF HOWEVER THE GREEKS WERE TO DISSOCIATE THEMSELVES FROM CERTAIN PARAGRAPHS AND WE CANNOT FIND AN ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE WHICH THEY ARE ABLE TO SUPPORT, WE SHOULD IN MY VIEW INCORPORATE THEIR RESERVATION IN THE PARAGRAPH CONCERNED. BUT WE SHOULD NOT ALLOW THEM TO DISGUISE THEIR RESERVATION UNDER THE CLOAK OF ANONYMITY (E.G. QUOTE ONE MEMBER WISHED TO BE DISSOCIATED FROM THIS POSITION UNQUOTE) OR TO ENJOY THE LUXURY OF A STATEMENT OF THEIR REASONS.

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