

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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Don John

*f.a.
ML 1/1*

Poland: Contacts with
Independent Experts

I mentioned to you some recent contacts which the Planning Staff had had with outside experts. You may wish to glance for your own information at this brief summary, which has been submitted to Lord Carrington.

*Yours ever,
John*

(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Secretary of State has seen
I have informed Miles for
his background.

2 copy to FR

2. BF/ Secretary of State

8/15/81

Private Secretary

PS/PUS

cc Mr. Bullard
Mr. Foy
Mr. Bicknell

POLAND : CONTACTS WITH INDEPENDENT EXPERTS

1. You may wish to have a note of some of our recent contacts.
2. In the past 18 months we have had many contacts with outside experts. In October 1981, we sent a draft planning paper about policy towards Eastern Europe to 12 experts including Professor Peter Wiles and Mr Philip Windsor at LSE, Professor Alec Nove at Glasgow University and Professor W Brus of Oxford (a Polish emigré). We then brought these experts together for a one-day seminar to discuss the paper. Among the points in the paper were:
 - (a) The Polish Renewal was fundamentally unacceptable to the Soviet Union.
 - (b) If it lasted, the endemic tendencies towards change and self-expression in Eastern Europe would be encouraged.
 - (c) Soviet military intervention remained possible. A clamp-down by the Polish leadership, for instance in the form of martial law, was also possible. But it might lead to a break-down in public order and thus to Soviet intervention; or, alternatively, a limited clamp-down might leave some of the reforms in place.


The outside experts agreed with the analysis and views about policy in the paper, including the point at (c) about intervention and clamp-down. The main point which aroused controversy was an implication in the paper that economic decentralisation in Eastern Europe was likely to encourage aspirations for political change.

3. At about the same time, we also consulted Professor Leonard Shapiro of LSE, Professor Richard Portes of London University and Mr Michael Kaser of Oxford. They too did not seem to dissent from our general views. Professor Portes argued for a special scheme to provide aid to Poland in order to increase the Renewal's chances of enduring.
4. Since the clamp-down in Poland, I have had meetings on 7 and 8 January with Professor Shapiro and Mr Brian Crozier (among others). Neither of them thought that military rule, such as has been introduced in Poland, was a new tactic which the Soviet Union might apply in other cases. Nor was a military takeover a prospect in the Soviet Union itself. Mr Crozier pointed out, rightly, that Jaruzelski has a long history of

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Party as well as military activity. Messrs Shapiro and Crozier agreed that the Soviet Union and Jaruzelski must jointly have planned the clamp-down and that the Soviet Union was clearly co-responsible. Indeed, Mr Crozier was inclined to see the Soviet Union as having played by far the more important role in the clamp-down. Professor Shapiro agreed with our expectation that martial law would be lifted in due course in Poland and authority returned to a purged Party leadership. The vestiges of reform that might then remain would probably be minimal. Messrs Shapiro and Crozier were both enthusiastic about President Reagan's reactions to the Polish crisis and critical of the early reactions of the Europeans. They agreed that transatlantic differences about Poland seemed to have been reduced by the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Ten on 4 January. They hoped that the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting on 11 January would agree on a united response and some concrete measures.



C L G Mallaby
Planning Staff

12 January 1982

The Secretary of State asked about this. I think he will wish to see Mr. Maloney's minutes.

Michael Parsons
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