



PM/82/5

PRIME MINISTERPoland

You will wish to know where we stand before the follow up meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 23 January to discuss measures to be taken against the Soviet Union and Poland. I / enclose a steering brief for the meeting which has been agreed interdepartmentally among officials.

The Americans are continuing to exert pressure for their allies to declare and announce decisions on 23 January. I think there is a danger that the meeting might go seriously wrong and end in acrimony if they feel that they are not getting the support they were led to expect at the meeting on 11 January. This would be a major setback to alliance unity and send the wrong signals both to the Russians and to Western public opinion.

In all exercises of this nature the burden-sharing aspect is uppermost in everybody's mind. From that, in my view, flow the following consequences. The first is that the US should be prepared ← ① to exempt existing contracts from the application of the draft legislation they have published. The second is that our allies ② should be prepared to take broadly comparable measures.

While I think it is unlikely that both these conditions will be met on 23 January, I believe nevertheless we should be prepared for that contingency. In that case I would hope that it can be agreed that the UK representative should state that we are prepared to take the measures concerning Poland set out in paragraph 11(a), (c) (d) and (e) and (g). As far as the Soviet Union is concerned he would have authority to say that we were

/prepared




prepared to take the measures set out in paragraph 12 (a) (b) (d) (h) and (i). As to Community matters, he would indicate our willingness to pursue actively in the Community the possibility of other measures such as those in paragraph 11 (e) and 12 (c) and (g).

Even if the two conditions in para 3 above are not specifically met, I hope it can be agreed that our representatives should have authority, without committing us finally, to describe on 23 January the areas in which we might be prepared to take decisions.

At the same meeting on 23 January we would urge that decisions should be finally taken at a single further NATO meeting to be held as soon as possible after the Foreign Affairs Council on 25-26 January.

In the meantime we are taking action to reduce American expectations of Saturday's meeting, which at the moment seem to be excessive, and to put into their minds the 'reverse linkage' idea described in your Private Secretary's letter of 19 January.

I am copying this minute to the Chancellor of the Exchequer and to the Secretaries of State for Industry, Trade, Agriculture, Environment, Energy and Health, and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

  
(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office, SW1  
20 January 1982

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MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL ON 23 JANUARY: POLAND  
STEERING BRIEF

INTRODUCTION

1. The North Atlantic Council will meet on 23 January together with senior officials from capitals to consider how to implement the Ministerial Declaration of 11 January (text at Annex A). This steering brief contains general guidance for our representatives; they should also draw on the papers prepared by MISC 64, especially the record of the meeting held on 14 January.

OBJECTIVES

2. Our broad objectives are the following:-

- (a) To assemble a credible package of measures to be implemented by NATO members as a demonstration of our strong disapproval of events in Poland and to bring about real political change. We wish to show that Soviet involvement is unacceptable and that further (especially military) intervention would have the gravest consequences. We also wish to stress our desire to maintain Alliance cohesion. Measures taken by each member state should be broadly comparable but need not be identical. Their economic cost to the West should not be excessive and should be fairly shared.
- (b) To ensure that the measures already taken by the United States are not applied in such a manner as to frustrate existing contracts undertaken by European firms, if necessary by linking progress on national measures to a solution of this problem.

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- (c) To make suitable arrangements for ensuring that non-Alliance members, particularly the Japanese, keep in step and that there are effective arrangements to monitor our partners' performance.
- (d) To minimise the risks of retaliation by the Soviet Union.

TACTICS

3. In the interest of the Alliance, we wish to encourage our partners to assemble a convincing package rather than to settle for the lowest common factor. The Delegation should therefore give an early indication of our willingness to take some or all of the measures outlined below as part of a NATO response to which all partners would make a comparable contribution. They should include a suitable reference to the problem of existing contracts. They should encourage others to make a similarly positive statement.
4. Final decisions should be reserved for Ministers who will wish to assess the contributions by other governments before making commitments. So far as possible, we should ensure that measures chosen are reversible if there is an improvement in the Polish situation. Sufficient measures should be kept in reserve to deter the Soviet Union from military intervention in Poland and to constitute an effective Alliance response should she nonetheless intervene by force.
5. The outcome is likely to depend on reaching a balance between American willingness to interpret their own measures with sufficient flexibility to permit existing European contracts (especially for the Siberian gas pipeline) to continue, and European willingness to participate in a plausible package

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of measures. The Delegation should therefore, after demonstrating our own willingness to act, concentrate on probing the position of other governments, especially the United States and the FRG.

**ATTITUDES OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS**

6. The German position will be crucial. So far, they have indicated that they can do no more than enter into positive consultations on how to avoid undermining the American measures.

7. The French have been more robust in tone. They attach particular importance to acting within international law as well as maintaining existing contractual commitments. They are, however, willing to redress the balance in areas (such as their air services and maritime agreements) where the Russians gained undue advantage during the détente period. In the longer term, they say they favour a fundamental review of relations with the Soviet Union.

8. The Japanese are lying low. They have been asked by the Americans not to circumvent their measures but their basis for action is different since they are not committed to the Helsinki Final Act. Their broad intention is to keep in step with the Europeans, by administrative rather than legislative action. They have stated publicly that they will 'pay due attention not to undermine the measures taken by other Western countries'.

**EUROPEAN COMMUNITY**

9. A number of issues are also being discussed in the European Community:-

- (a) subsidised food supplies and EC humanitarian aid for Poland; there is growing support for our preference for

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the latter. (Brief No 3)

- (b) restrictions on imports from Soviet Union; Foreign Affairs Council will consider on 25/26 January on the basis of a neutrally drafted 'annotated catalogue' provided by the Commission. (Brief No 7)
- (c) non-circumvention of US measures; Foreign Affairs Council are expected to instruct officials to carry out further work; a relatively slow tempo in the Community is satisfactory while the main discussion is pursued in NATO. (Brief No 11)
- (d) export credit. The question whether the Community should adopt a position in favour of up-grading the Soviet Union to the category of relatively rich countries may come before the Council. (Brief No 9)

Decisions on (a), (b), and (d) will have to be taken in the Community before we can enter into detailed discussion of them in NATO.

WEST SIBERIAN GAS PIPELINE

10. This project is a particular, but important, case of the general difficulty surrounding existing contracts. The Department of Trade have produced a paper on the industrial and other implications (Brief No 11). This will be the basis for consultation with those countries most directly concerned in the project (France, Germany and Italy). These consultations will be distinct from the more general Community discussions referred to in paragraph 8 above.

MEASURES CONCERNING POLAND

11. This paragraph takes the measures in the order they are mentioned in the Communiqué; they will be discussed in this order.

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- (a) Restrictions on Diplomats (paragraph 11(A) and Brief No 1(a))

We are prepared to impose travel restrictions on Polish diplomats and official representatives in the UK.

- (b) Scientific Exchange Agreements (paragraph 11(B))

No action contemplated.

- (c) Future Commercial Credits (paragraph 13 and Brief No 2(b))

The UK has placed undrawn officially guaranteed credits in suspense, except where legal or administrative difficulties prevent us from doing so. No new credits will be offered in present circumstances.

- (d) Rescheduling (paragraph 13 and Brief No 2(a))

The Group of Western creditor governments has agreed that negotiations on rescheduling Poland's official debts in 1982 should be postponed for the time being.

- (e) Humanitarian Aid (paragraph 13 and Brief No 3)

We shall act as the Communiqué suggests. Humanitarian aid is also being considered in the EC.

- (f) Food Sales (paragraph 13 and Brief No 4)

We have stopped our government credit for food sales to Poland. We are discouraging the Community from further specially subsidised food sales and hope that finance can be diverted to providing some food in the context of humanitarian aid.

- (g) Tightening COCOM Restrictions (Brief No 5)

This is not included in the Communiqué nor would we wish it to be in the public arena. However, we are prepared to support in COCOM the extension to Poland of the 'no general exceptions policy' applied to the Soviet Union after Afghanistan.

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MEASURES AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION

12. The following summarises our reaction to the measures proposed against the Soviet Union.

- (a) Restrictions on Diplomats (paragraph 11(A) and Brief No 6(a))

We would reduce the free travel area from 35 to 25 miles.

- (b) Scientific Exchange Agreements (paragraph 11(B) and Brief 6(b))

We are prepared to reduce activity under the four Anglo-Soviet agreements. None of these come up for early renewal but nevertheless prepared to consider possibility of termination. Levels of activity are already low.

- (c) Imports from the Soviet Union (paragraph 14 and Brief No 7)

To be considered by EC.

- (d) Maritime Agreements (paragraph 14 and Brief No 8)

Willing to give notice of termination as part of a suitable package.

- (e) Air Services Agreement (paragraph 14)

Not, in our view, a suitable field for action.

- (f) Reduction of Commercial Representation (paragraph 14 and Brief No 6(c))

We have no plans to reduce Soviet commercial representation which is already controlled by ceilings (such a measure would be more appropriate to a general trade embargo).

- (g) Export Credits (paragraph 14 and Brief No 9)

We are prepared to give positive consideration in the Community, and later in the OECD consensus forum, to the possibility that Soviet Union might be reclassified as a relatively rich country.

- (h) High Technology (paragraph 16 and Brief No 10)

Willing to examine carefully any US proposals in COCOM (see paragraph 12 below).

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(i) Factory Fishing (paragraph 16)

We intend to introduce, probably from 1 February, a licencing system. This will enable us to discriminate against Soviet factory ships.

(j) Longer Term Issues (paragraph 16 and Brief No 12)

The Delegation should argue that these matters should be addressed later.

COCOM

13. We accept that, in current circumstances, there is scope for some action in COCOM. But we believe that COCOM machinery should be essentially addressed to longer term strategic and technical considerations. It should also be kept as confidential as possible. A High Level Meeting of officials will take place in Paris on 19/20 January. Its result should be available to the meeting.

TIMETABLE FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS

14. We hope that EC Foreign Affairs Council on 25/26 January will make progress on the matters contained in paragraph 8 above. Thereafter, we envisage a further meeting or meetings of the North Atlantic Council. We should seek a final meeting in the series as soon as possible. At this meeting, governments would inform each other of the decisions they had taken or intended to take. It is likely that several allies will insist that announcements should be made subsequently on a national basis; the timing of these announcements should be co-ordinated.

THE PRESS

15. We share the American view that we should try to keep this first meeting out of the limelight. But we wish to ensure that the press gain the impression that effective and substantial work is being urgently undertaken and that Alliance unity is being maintained.

# Verbatim Service



PRESS SERVICE

VERBATIM SERVICE 004/82

TUESDAY

12TH JANUARY 1982

## NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL : POLAND.

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE DECLARATION ON EVENTS IN POLAND ISSUED FOLLOWING MEETING OF THE COUNCIL AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL ON 11 (ELEVEN) JANUARY 1982 (NINETEENEIGHTYTWO).

QUOTE:

1. THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS CONDEMN THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND AND DENOUNCE THE MASSIVE VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SUPPRESSION OF FUNDAMENTAL CIVIL LIBERTIES IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE FINAL ACT OF HELSINKI.
2. THE PROCESS OF RENEWAL AND REFORM WHICH BEGAN IN POLAND IN AUGUST 1980 (NINETEENEIGHTY) WAS WATCHED WITH SYMPATHY AND HOPE BY ALL WHO BELIEVE IN FREEDOM AND SELF-DETERMINATION: IT RESULTED FROM A GENUINE EFFORT BY THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF THE POLISH PEOPLE TO ACHIEVE A MORE OPEN SOCIETY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF THE FINAL ACT OF HELSINKI.
3. THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW, THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST POLISH WORKERS, WITH THE THOUSANDS OF INTERNMENTS, THE HARSH PRISON SENTENCES AND THE DEATHS THAT FOLLOWED, HAVE DEPRIVED THE POLISH PEOPLE OF THEIR RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS., IN PARTICULAR IN THE FIELD OF TRADE UNIONS. THESE ACTS THREATEN TO DESTROY THE BASIS FOR RECONCILIATION AND COMPROMISE WHICH ARE NECESSARY TO PROGRESS AND STABILITY IN POLAND. THEY ARE IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF POLISH COMMITMENTS UNDER THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, PARTICULARLY THE PRINCIPLE RELATING TO RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS. DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND DEMONSTRATE ONCE AGAIN THE RIGIDITY OF THE WARSAW PACT REGIMES WITH RESPECT TO THOSE CHANGES NECESSARY TO MEET THE LEGITIMATE ASPIRATIONS OF THEIR PEOPLES. THIS ENDANGERS PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN CO-OPERATION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST AND SERIOUSLY AFFECTS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.
4. THE ALLIES DEPLORE THE SUSTAINED CAMPAIGN MOUNTED BY THE SOVIET UNION AGAINST EFFORTS BY THE POLISH PEOPLE FOR NATIONAL RENEWAL AND REFORM, AND ITS ACTIVE SUPPORT FOR THE SUBSEQUENT SYSTEMATIC SUPPRESSION OF THOSE EFFORTS IN POLAND. THESE ACTS CANNOT BE RECONCILED WITH THE SOVIET UNION'S INTERNATIONAL UNDERTAKINGS, AND IN PARTICULAR WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF THE FINAL ACT OF HELSINKI, ESPECIALLY THOSE DEALING WITH SOVEREIGNTY, NON-INTERVENTION, THREAT OF FORCE, AND SELF-DETERMINATION. THE SOVIET UNION HAS NO RIGHT TO DETERMINE THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF POLAND.
5. THE ALLIES CALL UPON THE POLISH LEADERSHIP TO LIVE UP TO ITS DECLARED INTENTION TO RE-ESTABLISH CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE PROCESS OF REFORM. THEY URGE THE POLISH AUTHORITIES TO END THE STATE OF MARTIAL LAW, TO RELEASE THOSE ARRESTED, AND TO RESTORE IMMEDIATELY A DIALOGUE WITH THE CHURCH AND SOLIDARITY. ONLY WITH RECONCILIATION AND GENUINE NEGOTIATION CAN THE BASIC RIGHTS OF THE POLISH PEOPLE AND WORKERS BE PROTECTED, AND THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS OF THE COUNTRY BE SECURED. POLAND COULD THEN

EXPECT TO ENJOY FULLY THE BENEFITS OF STABILITY IN EUROPE AND OF CONSTRUCTIVE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE WEST.

6. THE ALLIES CALL UPON THE SOVIET UNIGC TO RESPECT POLAND'S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO SOLVE ITS OWN PROBLEMS FREE FROM FOREIGN INTERFERENCE AND TO RESPECT THE CLEAR DESIRE OF THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF THE POLISH PEOPLE FOR NATIONAL RENEWAL AND REFORM. SOVIET PRESSURE, DIRECT OR INDIRECT, AIMED AT FRUSTRATING THAT DESIRE, MUST CEASE. THE ALLIES ALSO WARN THAT IF AN OUTSIDE ARMED INTERVENTION WERE TO TAKE PLACE IT WOULD HAVE THE MOST PROFOUND CONSEQUENCES FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

7. IN THEIR COMMUNIQUE OF 11TH (ELEVENTH) DECEMBER, 1981 (NINETEENEIGHTYONE), NATO MINISTERS REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO WORK FOR A CLIMATE OF CONFIDENCE AND MUTUAL RESTRAINT IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS: WHAT HAS SINCE HAPPENED IN POLAND HAS GREAT SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE. THE PERSISTENCE OF REPRESSION IN POLAND IS ERODING THE POLITICAL FOUNDATION FOR PROGRESS ON THE FULL AGENDA OF ISSUES WHICH DIVIDE EAST AND WEST.

8. THE ALLIES REMAIN COMMITTED TO THE POLICIES OF EFFECTIVE DETERRENCE AND THE PURSUIT OF ARMS CONTROL AND IN PARTICULAR HAVE WELCOMED THE INITIATIVES CONTAINED IN PRESIDENT REAGAN'S 18TH (EIGHTEENTH) NOVEMBER SPEECH. THE SOVIET UNION WILL BEAR FULL RESPONSIBILITY IF ITS ACTIONS WITH REGARD TO POLAND AND ITS FAILURE TO LIVE UP TO EXISTING INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS DAMAGE THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS. A RETURN TO THE PROCESS OF REAL REFORMS AND DIALOGUE IN POLAND WOULD HELP CREATE THE ATMOSPHERE OF MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND RESTRAINT REQUIRED FOR PROGRESS IN NEGOTIATIONS IN THE FIELD OF ARMS CONTROL AND LIMITATIONS, INCLUDING THE GENEVA TALKS ON INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES DUE TO RESUME ON 12TH (TWELFTH) JANUARY.

9. IN VIEW OF THE GRAVE DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND, WHICH CONSTITUTE A SERIOUS VIOLATION OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, THE ALLIES AGREED THAT THE MADRID CONFERENCE SHOULD DEAL WITH THE SITUATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AT THE LEVEL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS.

10. THE ALLIES WILL ALSO INTENSIFY THEIR EFFORTS TO BRING TO THE ATTENTION OF WORLD PUBLIC OPINION AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS INCLUDING THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS SPECIALIZED AGENCIES SUCH AS THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION: THE VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND ACTS OF VIOLENCE IN POLAND.

11. EACH ALLY WILL IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS OWN SITUATION AND LEGISLATION IDENTIFY APPROPRIATE NATIONAL POSSIBILITIES FOR ACTION IN THE FOLLOWING FIELDS:

(A) FURTHER RESTRICTIONS ON THE MOVEMENTS OF SOVIET AND POLISH DIPLOMATS, AND OTHER RESTRICTIONS ON SOVIET AND POLISH DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS:

(B) REDUCTION OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL ACTIVITIES OR NON-RENEWAL OF EXCHANGE AGREEMENTS:

MEANWHILE THE ALLIES EMPHASIZE:

-THEIR DETERMINATION TO DO WHAT LIES IN THEIR POWER TO ENSURE

THAT THE TRUTH ABOUT EVENTS IN POLAND CONTINUES TO REACH THE POLISH PEOPLE DESPITE THE OBSTACLES CREATED BY THE AUTHORITIES IN WARSAW AND MOSCOW IN DIRECT CONTRAVENTION OF THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT:

-THEIR RESOLVE THAT THE EQUALITY OF THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE MILITARY REGIME IN POLAND SHOULD REFLECT THE ABNORMAL NATURE OF THE PRESENT SITUATION AND THEIR REFUSAL TO ACCEPT IT AS PERMANENT:

-THEIR WILLINGNESS TO CONTRIBUTE, WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS, TO THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF POLISH CITIZENS NOW ABROAD AND UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO RETURN TO THEIR OWN COUNTRY.

12. THE ALLIES RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMIC MEASURES TO PERSUADE THE POLISH AUTHORITIES AND THE SOVIET UNION OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF WESTERN CONCERN OVER DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND, AND STRESS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MEASURES ALREADY ANNOUNCED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN.

13. REGARDING ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH POLAND, THE ALLIES:

-NOTED THAT FUTURE COMMERCIAL CREDITS FOR GOODS OTHER THAN FOODS WILL BE PLACED IN ABEYANCE:

-NOTED THAT THE QUESTION OF HOLDING NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT THE PAYMENTS DUE IN 1982 (NINETEENEIGHTYTWO) ON POLAND'S OFFICIAL DEPTS SHOULD, FOR THE TIME BEING, BE HELD IN SUSPENSE:

-AFFIRMED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE AND INCREASE HUMANITARIAN AID TO THE POLISH PEOPLE FOR DISTRIBUTION AND MONITORING BY NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS TO ENSURE THAT IT REACHES THE PEOPLE FOR WHOM IT IS INTENDED:

-NOTED THAT THOSE ALLIES WHICH SELL FOOD TO POLAND WILL SEEK THE CLEARST POSSIBLE POLISH COMMITMENTS WITH REGARD TO THE USE OF THE FOOD.

14. IN THE CURRENT SITUATION IN POLAND, RELATIONS WITH POLAND AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE BOUND TO BE AFFECTED. SOVIET ACTIONS TOWARDS POLAND MAKE IT NECESSARY FOR THE ALLIES TO EXAMINE THE COURSE OF FUTURE ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. RECOGNISING THAT EACH OF THE ALLIES WILL ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS OWN SITUATION AND LAWS, THEY WILL EXAMINE MEASURES WHICH COULD INVOLVE ARRANGEMENTS REGARDING IMPORTS FROM THE SOVIET UNION, MARITIME AGREEMENTS, AIR SERVICES AGREEMENT, THE SIZE OF SOVIET COMMERCIAL REPRESENTATION AND THE CONDITIONS SURROUNDING EXPORT CREDITS.

15. THE ALLIES WILL MAINTAIN CLOSE CONSULTATIONS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THEIR RESOLVE NOT TO UNDERMINE THE EFFECT OF EACH OTHER'S MEASURES.

16. IN ADDITION TO AGREEING TO CONSULT ON STEPS TO BE TAKEN IN THE NEAR FUTURE, THE ALLIES WILL ALSO REFLECT ON LONGER-TERM EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS, PARTICULARLY ENERGY, AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES AND OTHER GOODS, AND THE EXPORT OF TECHNOLOGY, IN LIGHT OF THE CHANGED SITUATION AND OF THE NEED TO PROTECT THEIR COMPETITIVE POSITION IN THE FIELD OF MILITARY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES, UNQUOTE.

ENDS VS QQ4/82 L.P.S.



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Poland

MB

The Foreign Secretary may also refer to the attached minute at his meeting with you on Thursday.

2. It looks uncontroversial in Whitehall terms but it has only just been circulated to other Ministers. We should give them a chance to comment. I will submit further advice to you on Thursday night.

A.F.C.

Ref: B06383

Prime Minister

Agree that I should write  
in the terms proposed?

MR COLES

c Sir Robert Armstrong

Agreed  
not

A.J.C. 21/1

Poland

You sought advice on the response which the Prime Minister might make to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute of 20th January.

2. As Lord Carrington explained, the attachment to his minute is the inter-departmentally agreed steering brief for the NATO meeting. Each of the measures in it is therefore in principle acceptable to the Ministers concerned. But hitherto Ministers, and in particular the Secretary of State for Trade, have taken the line that they would wish to have a collective consideration of the package of measures to be taken by the United Kingdom, before agreeing to them, in order to be sure that we were not taking on a disproportionate burden. The effect of the proposal in the fourth paragraph of Lord Carrington's minute is that the official leading our delegation to the NATO meeting on Saturday should be authorised to make that judgement on the Government's behalf. The Secretary of State for Trade's officials are confident that he would not think it appropriate for any <sup>one</sup> other than Ministers to make such a highly political judgement; and that he would if necessary be willing to minute the Prime Minister to that effect. I have advised that he need not do so, since the Foreign and Commonwealth Office accept the point and would be content if you replied to them on the lines of the attached draft (which would also satisfy the Department of Trade).

3. In fact, as Lord Carrington notes, the conditions for making an immediate decision are unlikely to be satisfied. It is most improbable in any case that the officials of our European allies will have authority to commit their governments. Our representatives are much more likely to find themselves in the situation, catered for in Lord Carrington's fifth paragraph, where they will want to describe, without commitment, the areas in which the Government might be prepared to take decisions. Lord Carrington's proposal that the delegation should be authorised to go that far is entirely acceptable to other Ministers; as is the proposal (in his sixth paragraph) for a single further NATO meeting, as soon as possible, to make the final decisions.



4. The message from Mr Haig in Foreign and Commonwealth Office telegram no. 76 to Washington has arrived since the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute was written. But the FCO remain content to proceed as proposed by Lord Carrington, subject to the modification suggested in my draft.

(message attached).

21st January 1982

R L WADE-GERY



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MS

Draft Letter to Mr F N Richards, FCO, from Mr Coles

Poland

The Prime Minister has seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute PM/82/5 of 20th January. She agrees with the conditions set out in its third paragraph. She also agrees that they are unlikely to be satisfied at the NATO meeting on 23rd January. Even if they were, however, she would not think it right for officials to make the political judgement of what constituted broadly comparable measures by our allies. She considers it essential therefore that Ministers should be consulted before any firm commitment is made (as <sup>was</sup> suggested in the Secretary of State for Trade's Private Secretary's letter to me of 18th January). But she is content with the proposal in the fifth paragraph of Lord Carrington's minute, and also with the tactics suggested in his sixth paragraph.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Secretary of State for Trade, the Secretary of State for Industry, Trade, Agriculture, Environment, Energy and Health and to the Robot Authority.

MS 22/1