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DESKBY 261300Z BONN  
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TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 114 OF 26 JANUARY  
AND TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 261300Z BONN  
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, PARIS, UKREP BRUSSELS PRIORITY MOSCOW,  
WARSAW, ROME, ROUTINE, OTHER NATO POSTS  
YOUR TELNO 206 : POLAND, THE USA AND THE ALLIANCE

1. WE WERE MOST GRATEFUL FOR THIS ANALYSIS AND YOUR OTHER RECENT REPORTS. OUR PRESENT VIEWS ON VARIOUS US ATTITUDES DESCRIBED IN YOUR TELEGRAM ARE BELOW. THERE ARE ALSO SOME RELEVANT POINTS IN MIFT, WHICH CONTAINS A SELECTIVE COMMENTARY ON KISSINGER'S TWO ARTICLES. SIR J TAYLOR MAY DRAW ON BOTH TELEGRAMS IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH VON STADEN TODAY. SITUATION IN POLAND
2. THIS MAY NOT ACTUALLY BE DETERIORATING IN TERMS OF VIOLENCE. BUT, AS MORE NEWS COMES IN ABOUT THE SYSTEMATIC REPRESSION OF SOLIDARITY, THE CHANCES THAT JARUZELSKI CAN LIVE UP TO HIS ASSURANCES MUST DIMINISH. THE IMPRESSION IS GROWING THAT PASSIVE RESISTANCE AND POPULAR RESENTMENT ARE WIDESPREAD AND WILL NOT DIE DOWN QUICKLY. JARUZELSKI'S SPEECH OF 25 JANUARY IMPLIES THAT ANY EARLY CHANGES IN THE MEANS OF REPRESSION ARE LIKELY TO BE COSMETIC OR MINOR: THE ESSENTIAL MACHINERY WILL STAY IN PLACE FOR MONTHS. WHILE THE CLAMPDOWN HAS SO FAR GONE WELL FOR JARUZELSKI AND THE RUSSIANS, AND MAY CONTINUE TO DO SO, THE POSSIBILITY OF A BREAKDOWN IN PUBLIC ORDER AND THEN SOVIET INTERVENTION IS NOT EXCLUDED.
3. YET POLAND IN 1982 IS NOT CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN 1968. NATIONAL TEMPERAMENT AND THE CONTINUED ACTIVITY OF THE CHURCH ARE THE PRINCIPAL FACTORS WHICH ENSURE THIS. AND THE STRENGTH OF PUBLIC FEELING MAY ENSURE THAT THE TRADES UNIONS IN POLAND MAY EMERGE FROM MARTIAL LAW WITH VESTIGES OF AN INDEPENDENT STATUS, ALBEIT ONES WHICH MAKE THEM CLOSER TO OFFICIAL TRADES UNIONS

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ELSEWHERE IN THE WARSAW PACT THAN TO SOLIDARITY IN ITS HEYDAY.

ALLIED CONSULTATIONS

4. THERE HAS BEEN A GREAT DEAL OF TRANSATLANTIC CONTACT ABOUT THE CRISIS, MOST OF IT INITIATED BY THE US, AND WE HAVE BEEN VERY GRATEFUL FOR THIS. BUT THE AMERICANS HAVE NOT CONSULTED THE EUROPEANS PROPERLY ABOUT THE BIGGEST STEPS, ABOVE ALL THE US MEASURES AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. MESSAGES FROM WASHINGTON HAVE SOMETIMES NOT MENTIONED WHAT WAS ABOUT TO HAPPEN, EG MOST RECENTLY THE REDUCTION FROM TWO DAYS TO ONE OF HAIG'S MEETING WITH GROMYKO AND THE DECISION NOT TO PROPOSE AT THAT MEETING A DATE TO BEGIN THE START TALKS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE AMERICANS HAVE BEEN FLEXIBLE IN THE DISCUSSION OF EUROPEAN MEASURES TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION: BEFORE THE NATO MEETINGS OF 11 AND 23 JANUARY, THEY WERE ASKING FOR MUCH MORE THAN, IN THE EVENT, THEY SETTLED FOR. WHILE THIS HAS BEEN HELPFUL TO US, WE CANNOT BUT WONDER WHETHER IT COULD WEAKEN HAIG IN THE POLICY DEBATE IN WASHINGTON.

PURPOSES OF WESTERN MEASURES

5. FOR THE UK, THE OVERRIDING PURPOSE IN CONSIDERING MEASURES IS TO PRESERVE AN ADEQUATE DEGREE OF WESTERN UNITY AND PREVENT THE CRISIS FACING THE SOVIET UNION IN POLAND FROM BECOMING AS MUCH OR MORE OF A CRISIS FOR THE WESTERN ALLIES. THE POSSIBILITY YOU MENTION OF RESURGENT MANSFIELDISM, AND A SUPERPOWER DIALOGUE WITHOUT REGARD TO WESTERN EUROPEAN VIEWS, UNDERLINES THE DANGERS OF DISUNITY. A SECOND PURPOSE IS TO RESPOND TO OUR OWN PUBLIC OPINION AND ITS DISAPPROVAL OF THE CLAMPDOWN IN POLAND AND THE SOVIET INVOLVEMENT.

6. THE QUESTION HOW WESTERN MEASURES CAN AFFECT EVENTS IN POLAND IS MORE DEBATABLE. WESTERN MEASURES TOWARDS POLAND CAN GIVE JARUZELSKI ADDITIONAL MOTIVES FOR RELAXING THE REPRESSION AS SOON AS HE THINKS IT SAFE TO DO SO, ALTHOUGH NOT BEFORE. WITHHOLDING OF NEW CREDITS IS OUR BEST INSTRUMENT FOR THIS. THE MEASURES TAKEN SO FAR TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION ARE BOUND TO BE LESS DIRECT IN THEIR EFFECT. BUT THE ARGUMENTS IN MOSCOW FOR ALLOWING RELAXATION OF THE REPRESSION IN POLAND CAN PERHAPS BE SLIGHTLY INCREASED BY WESTERN MEASURES: AND THE

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ARGUMENTS FOR EXERCISING RESTRAINT IN FUTURE CRISES MAY ALSO BE INCREASED. WHEREAS NO POSSIBLE WESTERN PACKAGE OF MEASURES COULD FORCE THE RUSSIANS TO CALL OFF MARTIAL LAW, LIMITED MEASURES IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES CAN SHOW THEM THAT WORSE MAY HAPPEN IF THEY BECOME MORE INVOLVED IN POLAND. WE ALSO SEE FORCE IN THE ARGUMENT, DEPLOYED IN MORE AMBITIOUS TERMS BY THE AMERICANS, THAT WESTERN CALLS FOR SOVIET RESTRAINT WILL LOOK FEEBLE UNLESS SOME MEASURES ARE TAKEN WHEN THE SOVIET UNION FAILS TO EXERCISE SUFFICIENT RESTRAINT.

7. THE WEST HAS BEEN RIGHT IN STATING IN GENERAL TERMS THE THREE THINGS WHICH IT WANTS JARUZELSKI TO DO. WE HAVE THUS KEPT FOR OURSELVES THE RIGHT TO SAY WHETHER HIS FUTURE ACTIONS MEET OUR REQUIREMENTS. THIS MIGHT BECOME VERY RELEVANT, FOR INSTANCE IF THE FORM BUT NOT THE REALITY OF MARTIAL LAW WERE LIFTED.

8. ANOTHER IMPORTANT PRINCIPLE IS THAT MEASURES TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION AND POLAND SHOULD NOT HURT US MORE THAN THEM. INVOCATION OF THE QUOTE TANK CLAUSE UNQUOTE IN THE 1981 DEBT RESCHEDULING AGREEMENT COULD WELL DO THAT. AN EXTENSION OF US MEASURES TO COVER SUBSIDIARY COMPANIES IN EUROPE WOULD CAUSE ADDITIONAL TRANSATLANTIC PROBLEMS. AN AMERICAN EMBARGO ON ALL EXPORTS TO THE SOVIET UNION, IF IT AFFECTED EXISTING EUROPEAN CONTRACTS, WOULD CAUSE A TRANSATLANTIC ROW FAR GREATER THAN THE DIFFERENCES EXPERIENCED HITHERTO.

ARMS CONTROL AND PUBLIC OPINION

9. SIMILARLY DISRUPTION OF ARMS CONTROL WOULD NOT SERVE WESTERN INTERESTS AND MIGHT GIVE A BOOST TO ANTI-NUCLEAR AND ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT IN EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION. THE US STANCE ON ARMS CONTROL SEEMED UNTIL JUST RECENTLY TO BE TAKING THIS POINT FULLY INTO ACCOUNT. THE DECISION NOT TO PROPOSE THIS WEEK AN OPENING DATE FOR START TALKS MAY NOT AROUSE EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION, WHICH IS MUCH IMPRESSED BY POLAND. BUT WE DO NOT SUPPORT THESE AND OTHER NEGOTIATIONS TO DO THE USSR A FAVOUR. HAVING ON THE WHOLE HAD MUCH OF THE BEST OF THE CONTEST AT MADRID, WE MUST BE CAREFUL NOT TO MISHANDLE THE END-GAME. AND IT IS DISTURBING THAT RIGHTWING US CRITICISM OF THE ADMINISTRA-

TION'S POLICIES OVER POLAND SHOULD HAVE FOCUSSED ON EAST-WEST POLITICAL CONTACTS AND NEGOTIATIONS, THE VERY THINGS THAT EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION WOULD PROBABLY WISH TO REMAIN UNAFFECTED BY WESTERN SANCTIONS.

#### GAS PIPELINE

10. THE AMERICANS HAVE BEEN MAKING CLEAR FOR MANY MONTHS THEIR OBJECTIONS TO THE PROJECT. BUT THEY HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO CONVINCED THE FRENCH AND THE GERMANS. SOVIET OIL SUPPLIES WILL DIMINISH, SO THAT, AFTER THE GAS PIPELINE IS BUILT, OVERALL WEST EUROPEAN DEPENDENCE ON SOVIET ENERGY SUPPLIES WILL BE SLIGHTLY LESS THAN NOW. IT IS DEBATABLE WHETHER THE RUSSIANS, FOR TECHNICAL REASONS AND BECAUSE OF FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS, WOULD FEEL ABLE TO CUT OFF THE GAS IN A CRISIS. THE REAL RISK MAY BE THAT SOME WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY GERMANY, MIGHT BECOME EVEN MORE RELUCTANT THAN NOW, BECAUSE OF SUBJECTIVE FEARS OF SOVIET INTERRUPTION OF GAS OR DEMANDS FOR HIGHER PRICES, TO ADOPT FIRM POLICIES TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION, ESPECIALLY IN CRISIS PERIODS. BUT THE GERMANS HAVE SET AN UPPER LIMIT OF 30 PER CENT FOR THE PROPORTION OF THEIR GAS SUPPLIES THAT MAY COME FROM THE USSR (WHEREAS, ACCORDING TO PUBLISHED DATA, THE FIGURE FOR FRANCE IN 1990 MAY BE 32-40 PER CENT). PERSUASION HAVING FAILED, IT IS QUESTIONABLE FOR THE AMERICANS TO BLOCK UNILATERALLY A PROJECT OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO THE EUROPEANS IN THE GUISE OF AN ALLIANCE REACTION OVER POLAND.

#### CONCLUSION

11. WHAT WE NEED TO DO NOW IS TO WORK FLAT OUT FOR A REASONABLE ARRAY OF WEST EUROPEAN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MEASURES TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION AND A REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF THE US MEASURES ON EXISTING EUROPEAN CONTRACTS. UNLESS THIS IS ACHIEVED, THERE IS ALMOST CERTAIN TO BE A SERIOUS PUBLIC ROW BETWEEN THE US AND ITS MAJOR EUROPEAN ALLIES, WITH LASTING CONSEQUENCES WHICH WOULD BE VERY DAMAGING FOR NATO AND FOR WESTERN SECURITY. IT IS MORE IMPORTANT THAT THE WEST SHOULD AGREE (AND THERE IS STARTING TO BE INTEREST HERE IN WHAT SPAIN, JAPAN, AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND MAY BE WILLING TO DO) THAN THAT EVERY DETAIL OF THE PACKAGE SHOULD BE AS THE US WOULD LIKE.

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IF THE AMERICANS UP THE ANTE BY ANNOUNCING A SECOND, MORE FAR-REACHING SET OF MEASURES IN THE NEXT TEN DAYS, THE CHANCES OF UNITY ON THE BASIS OF THE NATO DECLARATION OF 11 JANUARY MAY BE LOST. THE NEED FOR FURTHER WESTERN MEASURES BEYOND THOSE DISCUSSED IN NATO ON 23 JANUARY WILL DEPEND ON EVENTS IN POLAND AND WE SEE NO NEED TO BE PRECIPITATE ON THIS SCORE. WE HOPE THAT THE NEW PRESSURES FROM THE RIGHT ON US POLICY WILL NOT OUTWEIGH THESE ARGUMENTS FOR SECURING UNITY BEFORE MOVING ON TO THE NEXT PHASE.

12. WE SHOULD WELCOME ANY FURTHER SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS YOU MAY HAVE. FOR EXAMPLE, DO YOU THINK THAT VERY FIRM STATEMENTS DEPLORING EVENTS IN POLAND BY SEVERAL WEST EUROPEAN LEADERS IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS WOULD HELP HAIG IN RESISTING THE RIGHTWING CRITICISM? SHOULD HE BE INVITED TO STOP OVER IN EUROPE ON HIS WAY BACK FROM THE MIDDLE EAST?

CARRINGTON

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STANDARD

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