Security

Note for file.

The report by the Thames Valley Police entitled "Enquiry into incident at Chequers Court, Buckinghamshire on 13 December 1972" is held in the Security Co-ordinator's security container.

(The incident concerned letters addressed to the Prime Minister being pinned to the exterior doors of Chequers.)

T.S. Joce.
16. Oct. 1982.

From: Squadron Leader K Chapman RAF

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING, WHITEHALL, LONDON, S.W.1

TELEPHONE 01-930 7022

PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DEFENCE FOR THE ROYAL AIR FORCE

USofS(RAF)/1/3 15 March 1974

Dear Group Captain Williams

LOW FLYING OVER CHEQUERS - 28 FEB 74

1. Further to our telephone conversation ... of this afternoon, I am enclosing a copy of the official RAF investigation into the low flying incident at Chequers last month.

2. You will note that the report is protected under a privacy marking of "Staff in Confidence" and I would therefore be grateful if you could ensure that its contents are not disclosed to any unauthorised person.

Yours sincerely
Keith Chap

K CHAPMAN
Personal Air Secretary

Group Captain Williams
10 Downing Street
London
SW 1

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

PSS/204/256/74/SIS

LOW FLYING COMPLAINT - CHEQUERS
28 FEBRUARY 74

References:

A. FCC Memorandum L170/74 dated 28 Feb 74
B. OS Map Great Britain Scale 1" to 1 mile Sheet 159
C. F3956B Serial No 13/74

INTRODUCTION

1. Investigators. Flt Lt T A McGlinchey, Sgt P H McVeigh, Special Investigation Section, Headquarters Provost and Security Services (United Kingdom).

2. Case History. Reference A referred to a complaint by the Civil Police that on 28 Feb 74, a helicopter had overflown the Prime Ministers residence at Chequers, at a low altitude. A field investigation was requested.

INVESTIGATION

3. Location of the Complaint. The Prime Minister's residence at Chequers is situated at GR 843056 (Sheet 159) of OS Map of Great Britain scale 1" to 1 mile (Ref B). It is outside the UK Low Flying System and therefore should not be overflown at less than, 2000' AGL by fixed wing aircraft and 500' AGL by helicopters. The house is approximately 60' high and faces south towards Victory Gate at the southern perimeter of the estate. A fairly wide made up road runs from this Gate to the front of the house, where a landing area for helicopters is situated. To the east at a distance of about 400 yards and immediately outside the estate an unclassified road runs parallel with the internal road. The entire estate is situated in a partially wooded valley and the terrain of the East and West slopes, rises to 847' AMSL and 813' AMSL respectively.

The Complaint

4. PC Wells, Thames Valley Constabulary, Aylesbury, in a recorded statement (Annex A) stated that on 28 Feb 74 he was on duty at Chequers. At about 0935 hours he was in the duty room, (GR 844056, spot height 611' AMSL) when he looked out of the window and saw a camouflaged helicopter flying from South to North at what he thought was a low altitude. It was coming from the direction of Victory Gate, and seemed to be above the internal road leading to the main house. As he watched it appeared to fly lower to avoid a snow cloud which was over the valley. He then lost sight of it as it flew behind some trees which obscured his actual view of the house. He estimated that the helicopter was at a height of approximately 100' above the ground and he thought that its side door was open. He radioed PC Drake who was on duty at the rear of the main house and telephoned a report to Aylesbury Police Station.

5. PC Drake in a recorded statement (Annex B) stated that at about 0935 hours he was on duty at the rear of Chequers standing close to the house. He simultaneously heard the noise of the helicopter as he received the radio message from PC Wells. The helicopter appeared directly over the house flying from South to North and he moved away from the building in order to see it more clearly. He estimated that it was about 100' AGL and he thought

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

that the side door of the aircraft was open. He described it as being jungle green in colour but could not see any markings. He added that it was flying very slowly and watched it until it disappeared behind trees about 600 yards to the North.

6. Investigators Comment. Both Police Constables were closely questioned regarding the height of the helicopter above the ground and agreed that they could not be certain about their estimates of its height except to say that to them it appeared to be very low. PC Wells added that when he first saw it coming from the South, he thought that it was coming into land. Official helicopters land frequently at Chequers and it was at about the same height and following the same track as those which do land in front of the house.

7. Aircraft Tracing. Enquiries established that Whirlwind Helicopter c/s Ascot 883 of 21 Squadron RAF Benson was the only one that was in the area of Chequers at 0935 hours on 28 Feb 74.

8. 1st Interview of Pilot. On 1 Mar 74 Flt Lt J Law was interviewed at RAF Benson. In a recorded statement under caution (Annex C) he said that on 28 Feb 74 he was tasked to fly from Benson, to High Wycombe and then to North Luffenham with 3 passengers. The aircraft was airborne at 0933 hours from High Wycombe and climbed to 1200' on London Regional Setting, taking a track of 015° for North Luffenham. Approximately 3 miles along track a snow storm was encountered and he deviated right from track to a road near Brockwell Farm, rejoining the original track at Terrick. Flt Lt Law added that he maintained the 1200' setting but this would give varying heights over the terrain. He was adamant that the passenger cabin door remained closed at all times during the flight.

9. Investigators Comment. As the information supplied by Flt Lt Law indicated that he did not think that he overflew Chequers but followed a track which took him along the unclassified road adjacent to the estate, further enquiries were made in the locality of Chequers. Additionally the passengers in the helicopter were asked about the flight. The passengers agreed with the pilot's statement that the cabin door remained closed for the duration of the flight. No one really paid any particular attention to locations en route or of height during the journey although they did say they flew fairly low owing to weather. It is worthy of note that the darker patches of the camouflage when seen during flight, gives the impression of an open door and could have misled the witnesses.

Further Enquiries in the Locality of Chequers

10. Mr T G Hannaford, a dairy herdsman of Longdown Farm, Cadsden in a recorded statement (Annex D) said that on 28 Feb 74 at about 0935 hours he was working in the farm yard when he heard the noise of a helicopter. He looked upwards and saw a dark green helicopter flying at approximately 240' AGL towards Brockwell Farm.

11. Mr R P Morris, a forestry contractor, of Amersham in a recorded statement (Annex E) said that on 28 Feb 74 at about 0930 hours he was working on the edge of Chequers estate at GR 848050. He heard the noise of a helicopter and on looking up he saw it flying from South to North at approximately 200' AGL. The track which it was flying took it over or alongside the road leading from Victory Gate to the House and it continued over where he knew the house to be, although it was obscured from his view by a clump of trees. He added that the weather was overcast at the time and there was a large snow cloud centred over the Southern end of the estate. He did not notice if the cabin door of the aircraft was open or closed.

12. 2nd Interview of Pilot. On 7 Mar 74 Flt Lt Law was re-interviewed and advised of the content of the additional statements. He said that after consulting his navigator Flt Lt Barnard and re-examining the relevant maps there was a possibility that he had overflown Chequers. He believed that he might have mistaken the road leading to Chequers inside the estate as the unclassified road running parallel to it outside the grounds. If he had overflown the house it was entirely due to the prevailing weather conditions.

13. Investigators Comment. From the available information there is no doubt that the helicopter flown by Flt Lt Law was the one seen by the various witnesses. There can also be little doubt that this aircraft overflew Chequers House. However, what cannot be accurately established is the height of the helicopter above the ground. The pilot has said that he maintained the regional setting of 1200' indicated which over Chequers would put the aircraft at about 600' AGL. However the witnesses have estimated that it was between 100'-240' AGL and one of the PCs said that the helicopter appeared to descend slightly to avoid the snow cloud and looked as if it was going to land in the grounds of Chequers. It may be considered that the helicopter was lower than that stated by the pilot but probably higher than that estimated by the witnesses and possibly was flying at about 400'-500' AGL.

14. Map Fragment. A fragment of OS Map of Great Britain Sheet 159, has been prepared showing the relevant information obtained during this enquiry. (Annex F).

CONCLUSIONS

15. It is concluded that on 28 Feb 74 at 0935 hours Whirlwind helicopter c/s Ascot 883 of 21 Sqn RAF Benson overflew the Prime Minister's residence at Chequers only because of the prevailing weather conditions which forced him to deviate from his planned route.

16. It is probable that the aircraft flew below 500' AGL but it was impossible to confirm its actual height. Although this would vary due to the terrain below track. Enquiries have established beyond reasonable doubt the passenger cabin door remained closed during flight, although the camouflage pattern could have misled witnesses.

17. There being no avoidance criteria for Chequers and the pilot only acting in the interests of flight safety, no offence has been disclosed.

P H McVEIGH
Sergeant
Special Investigation Section
HQ Provost & Security Services (UK)

Acton
11 Mar 74

RECOMMENDATIONS

18. No offence has been disclosed and the pilot only acted in the interests of flight safety when he overflew Chequers, therefore no action should be taken against him.

19. With Chequers being guarded so closely and orders existing to raise the alarm in the event of any helicopter overflights it might be considered necessary to advise pilots to avoid the area where possible. However, when overflights occur as in this case due to weather, the police authorities should be advised immediately to forestall alarm procedures being set in motion or to minimise the effects if already raised.

T A McGLINCHEY
Flight Lieutenant
Special Investigations
HQ Provost & Security Services (UK)

Acton
11 Mar 74

Annexes

A - Statement of PC Wells
B - Statement of PC Drake
C - Voluntary Statement of Flt Lt Law
D - Statement of Mr J G Hannaford
E - Statement of Mr R P Morris
F - Map Fragment

Distribution

RAF Benson - 1 copy
MOD S4f - 1 copy ✓

Internal

FCC - 1 copy
File - 2 copies

Shd it at Chaks
Sec Def
5/7

Grp Captain
Williams

I agree
M Frank
Rees
5 vii

Mr Armstrong

I attach, for your information, the police report on the recent "flap" at Chequers when armed men were seen in its vicinity.

You will remember that police inquiries revealed that a Territorial Army exercise was probably there but that no warning had been given to the police.

The Superintendent of the Aylesbury Division of Thames Valley has been in touch with the local Territorial Commanding Officer. The latter has undertaken that there will be no recurrence of this rather undesirable exercise.

I recommend no further action by us - we have got the report I asked for

2 July 1973.

M. D. Williams

Telephone:
KIDLINGTON 4343 (S.T.D. 08675)
Telex: 83401 - 2

My Ref: TVP/SB/3167(34)
Your Ref:

THAMES VALLEY POLICE,
CHIEF CONSTABLE'S OFFICE,
KIDLINGTON,
OXFORD, OX5 2NX.

28 June 1973

Group Captain M.S.D. Williams,
C.B.E., D.S.O. (R.A.F. Retired),
10, Downing Street,
LONDON, SW1.

Dear Group Captain Williams,

Territorial Army Exercise
near Chequers

I enclose copy of a Police report in respect of the incident at Chequers on Tuesday, 26 June 1973, for your information.

Yours sincerely,

B. Haight D/Supt.

Assistant Chief Constable (Crime)

Enc:

CONFIDENTIAL

Telephone:
KIDLINGTON 4343 (S.T.D. 08675)

Telex: 83401 - 2

My Ref: TVP/SB/3167(34)

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THAMES VALLEY POLICE,
CHIEF CONSTABLE'S OFFICE,
KIDLINGTON,
OXFORD, OX5 2NX.

28 June 1973

Group Captain M.S.D. Williams,
C.B.E., D.S.O. (R.A.F. Retired),
10, Downing Street,
LONDON, SW1.

Assistant Chief Constable (Crime)

Sir,

Territorial Army Exercise
near Chequers

1. At 2100 hours on Tuesday, 26 June 1973 the Thames Valley Police at Aylesbury received information from a local resident that a military type Landrover had been seen at the rear of Chequers Home Farm, which is situated on the Butlers Cross to Great Missenden Road, approximately 50 yards from the entrance to the Bothy at Chequers.

2. The initial information received was that two men in battledress type uniform had left the vehicle and both men were carrying rifles. Immediately, Police were deployed and Headquarters Control at Kidlington were informed of the incident. The Curator at Chequers, Miss Vera THOMAS was also informed and the house at Chequers was made secure.

3. The Duty Inspector at Aylesbury arrived at Chequers Home Farm and he saw at the rear entrance to the farm, which leads to woods, and parked on an embankment an Army Landrover bearing the Index Number 50 EN 39; the vehicle was unattended. It was soon discovered after a thorough check of the vehicle that the Landrover was allocated to The Royal Greenjackets, Territorial Army Unit, Oxford Road, Aylesbury, Buckinghamshire.

4. At 2135 hours the same day Police stopped and checked a similar Landrover and as a result of information received from the driver, it was discovered that the unattended Landrover belonged to the Territorial Army, which was carrying out a training exercise in the vicinity.

5. At 2150 hours the driver of the unattended Landrover, Corporal SCOTT of the Territorial Army returned with four other soldiers. The Duty Inspector satisfied himself with regard to their identities and subsequently confirmed that the soldiers were on an evening exercise in the area. The soldiers were carrying rifles, but did not have any ammunition in their possession.

6. The officer in charge of the training programme at this time was Captain JACKSON. The unit involved are members of D Company, 4th Volunteer Battalion, The Royal Greenjackets, whose Headquarters are at 56, Davis Street, London, SW1 (Telephone Number: 01-628-9611). The officer Commanding is Major TISDALL.

cont'd/...

CONFIDENTIAL

7. The incident was soon discovered to be a false alarm and was adequately dealt with under the existing Operation Order, in respect of Chequers.

8. Full-scale road checks were not necessitated, because the officer in charge was satisfied with regard to the identity of the soldiers.

9. I respectfully suggest a copy of this report be forwarded to Group Captain M.S.D. WILLIAMS, C.B.E., D.S.O. (R.A.F. Retired), 10, Downing Street, London, SW1., for his information.

Detective Sergeant 1782
Special Branch

Submitted

Detective Chief Inspector
Special Branch

4

10 Downing Street
Whitehall

January 13, 1967

SECRET

Dear Penruddock

I enclose a copy of the note of the security survey carried out recently at Chequers. You will notice that it has been classified SECRET by the Security Service and this fact makes it imperative that it be kept under secure conditions (e.g. in your safe) and that only you should see it in your office.

As you will have heard from Mr. Ranson of the Security Service, he is calling a meeting at Chequers next Thursday, January 19, at 2 p.m. to discuss this note in order that a final agreed report may be completed. I suggest that having read the note you should bring it with you to the meeting and give it to Williams at its conclusion.

Yours ever
John Hewitt

C.F. Penruddock, Esq., C.B.E.

CONFIDENTIAL

MR. HALLS

Security at Chequers

The Security Service have convened a meeting to be held at Chequers at 11.00 a.m. on Friday, December 16, to examine this problem. The meeting will be attended by representatives of the Security Service, the Metropolitan Police, the Buckinghamshire Police, the Diplomatic Technical Maintenance Service and this office (i.e. myself).

December 9, 1966.

October 25, 1966

Confidential

Dear Ronnie,

Chequers

Following the recent break-in at Chequers the Security Service have made the following recommendations:-

(i) That bars be fitted to the four windows in the office which can be opened. Bars to be not more than 5" apart, and at least ⅜" in diameter.

(ii) That the security of the Prime Minister's study should be improved by fitting security locks to the windows (e.g. Chubb lock No. 8012), and a precision made 5-lever mortice lock to the door. In this connection, you will remember that you made similar arrangements for the office, at the request of David Stephens, in August 1959.

(iii) That further consideration should be given to the installation of an Intruder Detection System for the office and possibly the study - the system being operated in conjunction with the local police.

Mrs. Hill has already implemented recommendation (i) although it did not prove possible to instal the bars "not more than 5" apart". Following the arrangements made in 1959 I assume that you would be willing to put in hand the recommendations under (ii) above?

We are seeking the advice of the Security Service in regard to the installation of an Intruder Alarm system. In this connection I am taking up with the Treasury the question whether this expenditure could properly be borne by Public Funds.

Yours sincerely

JPH

C.F. Penruddock, Esq., C.B.E.

SECRET

PAYMASTER GENERAL

Break-in at Chequers - September 28

You told me that you had asked Group Captain Williams to deal with a number of questions which arose on the report of the Security Service dated October 7 about the break-in at Chequers on September 28. I now attach a copy of Group Captain Williams' answers in detail.

2. As Group Captain Williams points out, the classified material found by the Security Service in the office cupboard was an outdated manual entitled "Operating Instructions for Pickwick". I have personally spoken to Colonel Rogers who informs me that even had this manual been stolen it would not have enabled anyone to break down a Pickwick conversation. Nevertheless, the manual ought not to have been there.

3. As regards the general security of documents at Chequers, it is a standing (though unwritten) rule that the Garden Room girl on duty does not leave any classified material in the combination-locked cupboard or indeed in the office. In fact, papers are kept in Ministerial boxes which are themselves locked in the cupboard when she is not in the room. I have however asked Group Captain Williams to issue written instructions about the security of documents at Chequers and to require

the Garden Room girl to check before she leaves that no documents are left in the cupboard. I have also asked him to carry out periodic checks to ensure that these instructions are implemented.

4. In your minute of September 29 to the Prime Minister you suggested that the Metropolitan Police should take over responsibility for Chequers and the Prime Minister has asked me to pursue this which is now being done. We are also asking that an Intruder Detection system should be provided at Chequers.

A.N.H.

October 13, 1966

SECRET

MR. HALLS

The Paymaster General, to whom I sent a copy of the attached Security Service report about the "break-in" at Chequers on the night of September 27/28, 1966, has asked me, through Mr. McKenna, to comment on those parts of the report which he has underlined. My comments are as follows:-

Paragraph 2

Mr. Ranson says in his letter that the Security Service advised that an Intruder Detection system was unnecessary only on the understanding that all classified material would be removed from the office. This is not correct. We have papers in this office to show that the Security Service agreed to the retention, in the combination lock cupboard in the office, of Pickwick key settings which are classified Top Secret. (Incidentally, I stopped this practice about four years ago because I did not approve of it.) The Security Service recommendations of 1959 were made in connection with the problems arising from the installation of Pickwick in the office at Chequers. These recommendations (the fitting of security locks to the windows and the fitting of a security lock to the door) were quickly implemented by us in conjunction with the Secretary of the Chequers Trust.

In regard to other classified papers taken to Chequers for a Prime Minister's visit, it has been standard practice for all to be returned to No. 10 on completion of the visit. This having been the practice over the years I have not considered it necessary to issue written instructions on the subject.

Paragraph 3

Although the Paymaster General has not commented on this paragraph I fully support the Security Service recommendation that an Intruder Detection system should be provided for at least the office at Chequers. I should therefore welcome your approval for an examination of the problem to be carried out - this would involve the Security Service, the Ministry of Public Building and Works, the Buckinghamshire police, the Chequers Trust, and, of course, ourselves. I consider that the Treasury should bear the cost of an installation affecting our office and we shall doubtless have to

get financial approval from them. I appreciate that the provision of an I.D. system for the office only would leave the rest of the building, with its valuable contents, as vulnerable as it is now and the Chequers Trust ought to give consideration to this point.

Paragraph 4

When I visited Chequers on the day of the break-in the Police Inspector from Wendover (Inspector Brough) continually stressed his shortage of manpower. You are aware that a police officer is only on duty at Chequers when the Prime Minister is in residence (the officer being inside the building from 11 p.m. until 6 a.m. and outside at all other times). When the Prime Minister is not in residence a local police patrol car visits Chequers once every night but I am sure that no really useful purpose is served by these visits as the police officer involved is not in the habit of making a patrol on foot around the building. Detective Superintendent Barker of Aylesbury, who was present, undertook to arrange for more frequent and more comprehensive patrols by bringing in police from Aylesbury to supplement the Wendover patrols. I agree with Mr. Ranson that the provision of an I.D. system would obviate the need for these patrols as far as the office is concerned. However, they are vitally necessary for the protection of the rest of the house.

Paragraph 6

Recommendations (1) and (3) have been implemented and (2) is under way now.

Paragraph 7

The classified material we found in the combination cupboard was an outdated manual of Pickwick operating instructions marked SECRET which should in fact have been destroyed in 1963 when it was superseded by a manual which is only taken to Chequers for a Prime Minister's visit and which is returned to No. 10 at the completion of the visit. I have discussed the question of the manual, which was found by us in the safe, with a member of the Communications Electronics Security Department (Colonel Rogers). He was not worried about it at all and said that its current security classification could not be higher than Confidential - if as high as that.

This manual was found mixed up with a mass of stationery. I think it highly unlikely, from my enquiries, and from the fact that the standard accepted practice is for all papers to be brought back to No. 10 at the end of a visit, that any other classified material was present at the time of the break-in.

I am sending a copy of this minute to Mr. Hewitt.

M.A.D. Williams

October 12, 1966

SECRET

Correspondence to this address must be under *double* cover.
The *outer* envelope should be addressed to:—
THE SECRETARY, BOX 500, PARLIAMENT STREET B.O., LONDON, S.W.1.
and *not* to any individual.

Telephone Nos. REGENT 6050 Ext. 852
WHITEHALL 6789 Ext.....

BOX No. 500,
PARLIAMENT STREET B.O.,
LONDON, S.W.1.

Our Ref.: BM 524a to POL.F.53-12-170/C4/DWR

Your Ref.:

7th October, 1966.

Dear Group Captain Lillicrap,

Incident at Chequers - 28th September

After our visit to Chequers on 28th September, we discussed ways in which the physical security of the office there could be improved. I agreed in due course to let you have a note of our suggestions.

2. As you know, we recommended certain security measures for the office in 1959 which were implemented and which were intended to protect classified material against surreptitious attack on those occasions when the Prime Minister was in residence. In making these recommendations, we took account of the fact that when the Prime Minister is in residence a police officer is on duty in the vicinity of the office. We understood that when the Prime Minister's staff were not in residence all classified material would be removed. It was on this understanding that we advised that an Intruder Detection system was not necessary to protect the office.

3. Now, however, that a break-in has occurred and in view of the fact that the intruders are unidentified and may conceivably attempt a further entry, we feel that further consideration should be given to the installation of an I.D. system in the office and we would be in favour of installing such a system which would be operated in conjunction with the local police force. If you accept this suggestion, we would be pleased to give advice on the type of system to be installed.

4. The Buckinghamshire police have offered in the immediate future to increase the effectiveness of their night patrols which are carried out when the Prime Minister is not in residence. Shortage of manpower will, however, make this an onerous task and they will not be able to make more than occasional visits. The use of an I.D. system in the office will obviate the need for these patrols as far as the protection of the office is concerned.

5. As you know, we have asked D.T.M.S. to carry out an inspection at Chequers, concentrating on the office and the Prime Minister's study, but also giving attention to the Hawtrey Room, the Long Gallery and certain bedrooms. Of the rooms inspected, we would recommend that the office and the Prime Minister's study should be kept physically secure. If this is to be done, the door to the study will have to be fitted with a secure lock and the windows with window locks such as the Chubb no. 8012.

/6.

SECRET

SECRET

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Telephone Nos. REGENT 6050 Ext.....
WHITEHALL 6789 Ext.....

BOX No. 500,
PARLIAMENT STREET B.O.,
LONDON, S.W.1.

Our Ref.:

Your Ref.:

6. We also discussed the following security measures and understand that steps have already been taken to implement them.

(1) The two 5' x 2' office cupboards damaged by the intruders to be replaced. I believe this has already been done.

(2) Steel bars to be fitted to the four windows in the office which are capable of being opened. The bars should be not more than 5" apart and at least $\frac{5}{8}$" diameter.

(3) Stronger barrel bolts should be fitted to the office door intercommunicating with the Prime Minister's drawing room.

7. It is, of course, possible that in addition to the classified material which we found in the 5' x 2' office cupboard, other classified material was there at the time of the break-in. We understand, however, that enquiries you have made have not revealed that any further classified material was present. We suggest that in future it should be made the duty of a particular member of the Prime Minister's staff at the conclusion of the Prime Minister's visits to Chequers to carry out an inspection of the office, to ensure that no classified material is left there and that the ALVIS and PICKWICK equipments are not left "set up".

8. We have kept in touch with the Buckinghamshire police since the incident and I have passed to you such information as has been available. It does not seem likely that at the moment the intruders will be positively identified. The police are no longer at all certain that the two students whom they suspected originally were responsible. If the students were not responsible the most likely explanation is that the break-in was the work of members of a subversive group, though we have no evidence of this. The possibility that it was the work of a hostile Intelligence service cannot be entirely ruled out but from our experience of their methods this is an unlikely explanation.

9. If we can be of any further assistance or give any further advice over security measures at Chequers, please do not hesitate to let me know.

Yours sincerely

David Ranson

D. W. Ranson

Group-Captain M. F. D. Williams,
C.B.E., D.S.O.,
Office of the Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
Whitehall,
London. S.W.1.

DWR/LRR

SECRET