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NOTE OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER, THE FEDERAL GERMAN CHANCELLOR, TOGETHER WITH THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY AND THE GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER, IN BONN AT 1100 HOURS ON 29 OCTOBER

Present:

Prime Minister
Mr. Coles

Chancellor Kohl
Mr. Genscher

Chancellor Kohl invited Mr. Genscher to give the Prime Minister an account of his recent contacts in respect of Poland. Mr. Genscher said that he had put through an intermediary the idea that he should have a meeting with Archbishop Glemp. The proposal had been accepted and he had had a secret meeting with the Archbishop in a building in the Vatican. He would be most grateful if the fact of the meeting, and what transpired, could be kept completely confidential.

It was clear from the meeting that Archbishop Glemp viewed the future with great concern. He was very depressed. His attitude towards Jaruzelski had been surprising. He had taken the line that we should try to keep Jaruzelski in power because whoever followed him would be worse. He was the lesser evil. This did not mean that the Archbishop agreed with Jaruzelski.

Archbishop Glemp was particularly concerned about the economic situation. He was very critical of the American attitude and could not understand why the United States imposed sanctions against Poland while sending wheat to the Soviet Union. It remained to be seen whether there would be a general strike in Poland. Glemp felt that street demonstrations could not be ruled out and that these could lead to bloodshed. The Polish church advised against street demonstrations because of their unpredictability.

Glemp advanced two possible explanations for the legislation against Solidarity. It might have been due to strong Soviet pressure.

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Alternatively, Jaruzelski might have to step down fairly soon and might therefore wish to accomplish as much as possible before he did so.

The Archbishop identified four main groups in Poland - the totally desperate, those who co-operated with the regime, those who were prepared to fight and those who wished to create their own independent structures. The latter were the most interesting and the most deserving of help. They included the three million independent farmers and also large numbers of craftsmen. Glemp sought help from the West for these people.

He (Mr. Genscher) had asked the Archbishop whether the Polish Government was at a loss to deal with its problems. Glemp had replied affirmatively. Until the summer, the Church had been ready to help with a dialogue. But the Government had rejected all its proposals, and by June it was clear that the views of Government and Church could not be reconciled.

He had asked Glemp for his view of Jaruzelski as a man. The reply had been that he was very difficult to assess. Jaruzelski wanted a strong state with peace and order and thought he could achieve this by forcing decisions on Poland. He would resist any return to earlier conditions. But on the other hand, he would do anything he could to avoid Soviet intervention. No one knew whether his main aim was to avoid this contingency or to please the Soviet Union. Perhaps both.

The Archbishop was worried that Poland might again become a cause of war. In this content, he was alarmed that the United States even considered the possibility of limited nuclear war. He had reiterated that it was worth regarding Jaruzelski as a man who should be supported because whoever followed him would be worse.

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Glomp had made a plea for help and investment for small businesses so that areas of "social freedom" could be created. He had described draft legislation that would make that possible and was discussing with the Polish Government a larger aid programme for the private sector. But his mind was now turning to more modest help which would take the form of investments in small companies by western groups or individuals. He (Genscher) had told the Archbishop that he would discuss these ideas with appropriate German organisations to see how they would help. All this would be raised with President Reagan when the Chancellor went to Washington in November.

The Prime Minister said that this was a most helpful account. It would be easier to take action if differences over the Siberian Pipeline could be cleared up.

Mr. Genscher said that he was not sure that the Archbishop fully appreciated what economic conditions were necessary for private investment. Investors needed profits. Glomp appeared to be a very sincere, honest man who was heavily burdened by his responsibilities. He felt the shadow of his great predecessor.

Chancellor Kohl said that Glomp only became Primate because it was the personal wish of Cardinal Wyszynski. Other sources in the Church thought Glomp was too pessimistic about the spirit of the resistance. It was clear that the Pope would like him to be more dynamic, and it was evident that Glomp did not understand economics.

Nevertheless, we should find practical ways of helping Poland. The Government would not welcome it, but would probably tolerate it. The idea of giving practical help to farmers and small businessmen was good. They needed simple things like seed grain. Germany was working together with farming organisations in Germany and other European countries, on an initiative, to meet their needs. A small

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effort could have a big effect. If the private sector could be made interested in these ideas, it might not be necessary for Governments to be involved at all. The matter could be left to the Churches and to farming organisations.

The Prime Minister agreed that it should be possible to do something on the practical side. There would be a need anyway for an early discussion of Poland. There was still the question of debt re-scheduling and there was certainly a need to discuss food supplies.

The discussion ended at 1130.

A.S.C.

1 November, 1982.

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