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*Cyprus*

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 010303Z APR 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 208 OF 31 MARCH 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT NICOSIA CBFC MODUK DS11

INFO ROUTINE ATHENS ANKARA WASHINGTON

YOUR TELNO 69 TO ANKARA (NOT TO ALL): **CYPRUS: ARMENIAN TERRORISM**

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1. WE SPOKE TO SHERRY WHO WAS GRATEFUL FOR THIS RESPONSE.
2. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT IN VIEW OF THE MORE TENSE SITUATION, GENERAL GREINDL HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN TO THE SECRETARIAT AT THE CONTINUED ABSENCE FROM UNFICYP OF THE SCOUT CAR SQUADRON IN BEIRUT. THE GENERAL HAD SAID THAT WITHOUT THE SQUADRON THE FORCE HAD LOST A LARGE PART OF ITS FLEXIBILITY INCLUDING ITS MOBILE RESERVE FOR AN EMERGENCY. HE FELT IT IMPORTANT IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT THE FORCE SHOULD BE UP TO STRENGTH AND FULLY OPERATIONAL. GREINDL HAD ASKED THAT THE SECRETARIAT SHOULD SEEK OUR AGREEMENT THAT THE BEIRUT SQUADRON SHOULD BE RETURNED TO UNFICYP BY THE 'PLANNED AND PROMISED DATE OF 10 MAY'. SHERRY ASKED IF WE COULD CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF DOING THIS.
3. WE SUBSEQUENTLY CHECKED THE ABOVE WITH URQUHART. HE SAID THAT HE RECOGNISED HOW DIFFICULT IT MIGHT BE FOR US TO WITHDRAW THE SQUADRON FROM BEIRUT AT THIS JUNCTURE. HE ENDORSED GREINDL'S JUDGEMENT. BUT THE UN'S REQUIREMENTS WOULD BE MET IF WE COULD PROVIDE AN EQUIVALENT UNIT FROM SOME OTHER SOURCE. THE IMPORTANT THING WAS TO RESTORE UNFICYP'S MOBILE RESERVE AT THIS JUMPY TIME. HE RECALLED THAT IN DECEMBER I HAD TOLD HIM THAT EMERGENCY REINFORCEMENTS WOULD BE AVAILABLE FROM THE SBAS IF REQUIRED (MY TELNO 2124 OF 1982).
4. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW WE SHOULD REPLY TO THIS UNWELCOME REQUEST. URQUHART SAID THAT THERE WAS NO GREAT HURRY. BUT HE WOULD CLEARLY LIKE TO BE ABLE TO REASSURE GREINDL SOON.

THOMSON

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