

**Margaret Thatcher**  
*Memoir of the Falklands War*

**Written at Chequers over Easter 1983**

**This transcript presents side-by-side the original 1983 handwritten text of the memoir and a transcript made for publication in 2015.**

**The transcript also draws on a photocopy of the 1983 text made in March 1992 (available on this site) to show where MT made later changes. She evidently re-read and amended the original a number of times after 1992.**

**MT added many underlinings in these later read-throughs, as can be seen. For sake of clarity the transcript omits them. Underlinings in the transcript were present in the original text as first seen in March 1992.**

**A few editorial footnotes have been added, in grey text.**

**Christopher Collins**

**Margaret Thatcher Foundation  
June 2015**

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Notes on the Emergency Cabinet-Committee

1. I set this up following the advice of Harold Macmillan who soon after the weekend of the invasion came to see me to offer his support as the senior Prime Minister. Alec D-It had been going to come with him but was unable to do so because of the recurrence of his old back trouble.

H.M. advised strongly that a small emergency committee be set up for the conduct of the Falklands campaign and that if necessary a separate economic committee should be covered. He said it would be fatal to mix the two.

He also asked if we had reinforced Admittan, made arrangements for "wounded ships" and suggested S. Price may be approached if necessary, and asked about Argentine and nuclear weapons.

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<sup>1</sup> Alec Douglas-Home

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The campaign completely separate. The Kennedy Committee therefore consisted of the Home Secretary, the Foreign Secretary, Defence Secretary and Chancellor of the Duchy (Lord Penton) as well as myself. The Chief of Defence Staff, Tony Levin and the Permanent Secretary of the Foreign Office Sir Anthony Adcock attended regularly. Within a few meetings it became necessary for the Attorney-General to join as we constantly had to consider what actions came within the inherent rights of self-defence and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

Realising that the longer term problems of the Falklands required someone whole time, I asked Sir Michael Palliser if he would undertake this task which he did and he regularly attended the meetings too. In practice his contribution and expertise were constantly applied to the diplomatic side of our work especially in advising on contacts, consultation and information with other countries.

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<sup>2</sup> Willie Whitelaw

<sup>3</sup> Francis Pym

<sup>4</sup> John Nott

<sup>5</sup> Sic: Sir *Antony* Acland

<sup>6</sup> Sir Michael Havers

<sup>7</sup> Acland's predecessor as official head of the Foreign Office

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Sir Robert Mansbury headed the Secretariat, and absolutely outstanding for his far-sightedness, vigour and diligence was Robert Wade-Gery who regretfully left before our work was finally complete because he had been appointed High Commissioner in Delhi.

The terms of reference of this sub-committee of the Overseas & Defence Policy Committee (called Sub-committee on the South Atlantic and the Falkland Islands - or OD(SA) for short) were

"To keep under review political and military developments relating to the South Atlantic and the Falklands and to report as necessary to OD"

It was set up formally on the Tuesday following the invasion the previous Friday.

The agenda usually consisted of  
First - all military matters i.e. (i) report on last 24 hours (ii) immediate decisions  
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Second. Diplomatic matters - which were of course particularly important while the Task Force was in passage to the Falklands and the several sets of negotiations were in progress.

and towards the end

Third - preparations for the "post-invasion" period and the longer term.

By the time of our first meeting (7<sup>th</sup> April) the Task Force had already been despatched with a speed and willpower which astounded the world and made us feel very proud and very British. The decision had been taken by Cabinet on the evening of the day of the invasion (Friday). The main carrier force and accompanying ships left port on Monday ~~supported~~ fully and properly equipped. Also we had secured the passage of the Sanctions Security Council Resolution 502

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through the superlative performance of our representative at the United Nations (it was superlative throughout the entire campaign) and the unremitting diplomatic effort of the F.O.

Now by the time of our first meeting Peter Langford has resigned at his own insistence in spite of herculean efforts on the part of Willie Whitehead and myself to persuade him to stay. John North had offered his resignation ~~which~~ which I could not possibly accept when the Turk home was on the ocean. Thank goodness I didn't accept it - John was splendid throughout the campaign.

Our first meeting was taken up with a message from Al Hay that he wanted to come to London that day. But we had a debate in the House and couldn't receive him. He agreed to come the following

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Alas by the time of our first meeting Peter Carrington had resigned at his own insistence in spite of herculean efforts on the part of Willie Whitelaw and myself to persuade him to stay. John Nott had offered his resignation which I could not possibly accept when the Task Force was on the ocean. Thank goodness I didn't accept it - John was splendid throughout the campaign.

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<sup>8</sup> Sir Anthony Parsons

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day (Monday Thursday). We made it clear that he was coming as a friend and not as a mediator.

2) We discussed the next military steps especially as our SSN's were due in the area within the next few days. We were not able to decide immediately on whether to set up a 200 mile exclusion zone for ships round the Falklands because of arguments about the effect on traffic etc but agreed to meet at about 7 p.m. that same evening in my room at the House to decide whether the Defence Sec. is winding up the debate should announce such a zone. Unusually for him, John had had an extremely difficult time winding up the previous Saturday and it was vital for his own confidence that he should do well that day. We had extended the debate for an hour (to end at 11 p.m.) which gave us

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I had seen the Governor, (Peter Hunt) and the two Naval Commanders on their return. I had spoken to him on Saturday when he landed in Montevideo, - the first time we knew for sure the time and location of the invasion. When he and the two Navies saw me in No 10, I asked him - "were you aware that an invasion was in the offing?" and he replied 'No - I thought it was just another alarm of the kind we had had

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Previously. He told me that when he had received our message on the previous Wednesday - he had contacted one of the Argentine representatives (I believe of the air-line) on the island who assured him that as far as he knew, nothing was afoot. Also in retrospect it appears that there were a number of other Argentines who had been reporting on every movement of our men.

One of the Puerto commanders sketched out the shape of the operation, which he said had been very well planned with the first wave of troops coming from the landward side. They would not come out and fight but waited until overwhelming armour and force had arrived. Then, he told me, the local Argentine commander knew almost every one of the names of the reinforcement men who had been there only four days. Our two commanders were very anxious to go back. One of them was very familiar with the terrain having been on a tour of duty for

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Several months. They were soon flown to Ascension and joined the main Force. It was they who finally took the surrender at Government House when Port Stanley fell. The Governor was of great help to us in London - frequently broadcasting on kindred themes to the Falklands assuring them 'his bags were packed' to return as soon as he could.

The media commentators were constantly questioning him about whether he really expected to return and he never flattered. He retorted that I had said in the House that our objective was the restoration of British Sovereignty and the return of British administration and he was sure that was what I meant.

There were of course to be many times in the coming negotiations when we wondered whether we should be able to

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Scene of return of Res. Board.

But to return to 7<sup>th</sup> April. We soon heard that Mr Hay would come on Easter Thursday and we met accordingly at 7<sup>th</sup> that evening. We had a long argument. Francis was absolutely against announcing a Navigational Resolution in Zone that evening. He thought it would upset Hay coming the next day and we could wait longer before deciding. John Nott fought strongly for the zone and eventually through patient persistence the rest of us managed to overcome Francis's objections. It was a pattern to be repeated many times. The decision was the right one. John did a speech winding up speech announcing the establishment of the zone. Not a voice was raised against it and Jim Callaghan was heard say "absolutely right". And so the zone took effect from midnight 11/12 April - i.e. came into effect in the early hours of Easter Monday morning. It is

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But to return to 7th April. We soon heard that Al Haig would come on Easter Thursday and we met accordingly at 7pm that evening. We had a long argument. Francis was absolutely against announcing a Maritime Exclusion Zone that evening. He thought it would upset Haig coming the next day and we could wait longer before deciding. John Nott fought strongly for the zone and eventually through patient persistence the rest of us managed to overcome Francis's objections. It was a pattern to be repeated many times. The decision was the right one. John did a superb winding up speech announcing the establishment of the zone. Not a voice was raised against it and Jim Callaghan was heard to say "absolutely right". And so the zone took effect from midnight 11/12 April - i.e came into effect in the early hours of Easter Monday morning. It is

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worth noting that at no time during the Falklands operation did we say we would take action until we were in a position to do it. By the time the Met commenced an SSR was there and others arriving very shortly indeed. I was determined that we should never put ourselves in a position where "bluff" could be called. And we never did.

Hay was also informed of the zone a while in advance of the announcement. When I met him the next day he said it was an absolutely right decision.

3rd Meeting - We met briefly before Hay arrived and approved the Rules of Engagement for the SSR's in the <sup>Patrol</sup> Exclusion Zone - the first line for most of us there. Many more R.O.K.'s were to follow and we learned the importance of grouping them online - i.e. before any possible embarrassing occasion could arise and of getting them right.

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We discussed how to handle the Haig talks. But my mind and decisions were already totally committed - Argentine must withdraw, British administration must be restored.

I'm afraid the firmness of this approach came as something of a shock to Mr Haig and his advisers who included General Walker, Mr. Lindsay and Ed Sheator from the U.S. Embassy in London (The Ambassador was away). It soon became clear that mediation was his purpose but at least - he came to see us first to be clear about our position before going to Buenos Aires. Again again we stated - all Argentine forces out, British ~~administration~~ <sup>administration</sup> restored (by the time we had realised that British Sovereignty at law had not been ~~affected~~ changed by the fact of invasion) - then we would negotiate with Argentina on the basis that the islanders' wishes were paramount. Mr Haig really wanted to issue an agreed statement before he

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left recognizing that there may have to be an intermediate phase between Argentine withdrawal and the restoration of British Sovereignty - but I was not prepared to do so. At the time, General Waller said to me that "you certainly live up to your name as the Iron Lady". It hadn't really occurred to me to look at it that way - to me the position was clear-cut and that was that.

I had previously asked General Waller whether going back over their intelligence, there had been any signs of an impending invasion - knowing that the information we had put together from our intelligence on the Wed. before the invasion had come as a shock to them when Niko Henderson told him as a matter of urgency. But the fact is that the U.S. were no more aware than we were and they had their eyes on Central America rather more than South America. At the time the T.V. cameras

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When he left Mr. Harj was absolutely fair (I always found he was fair - throughout the whole negotiations - tough, indeed a very tough negotiator but fair in his dealings with us and with the press. When we disagreed with any part of a statement he wanted to make, he would take it out.)

He took off for B.A. The Task Force continued and the military planning proceeded apace and with enthusiasm and concentration. None of us knew whether it would need to be used, but we thought that the nearer the Task Force got, the more chance there may be that the Argentines would withdraw.

I confess that for the while I never really believed that a military force could withdraw. The scenes in the square in B.A. (Bolshevik scenes to the crowd below messes and chertops) were of such jubilation that I could see the Tinto pulling

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I confess that from the outset I never really believed that a military government could withdraw. The scenes in the square in B.A. (balcony scenes to the crowd below massed and chanting) were of such jubilation that I couldn't see the junta pulling

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I'm afraid that Mr had a very  
difficult time in B.A. Again words were  
cheating in the main square although General  
Waller told me afterwards that the words  
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First Guthrie, then the rest of the judges, then  
the military (50 or so) behind the hunts.

Over that hunts weekend, Richard  
Fool officially asked for the recall of  
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out ~~except~~ unless they were granted sovereignty as the price of withdrawal. This I had spent patient hours explaining to Haig that they couldn't have. I remember asking him whether if a burglar had taken all his possessions he would consider that he had to negotiate with the burglar as to how much he was 'entitled' to keep.

I'm afraid that Al had a very difficult time in B.A. Again crowds were chanting in the main square although General Walters told me afterwards that the crowds stopped abruptly at the exits from the square. It was difficult for our American friends to know with whom they were negotiating. First Galtieri, then the rest of the junta, then the military (50 or so) behind the junta.

Over that Easter weekend, Michael Foot officially asked for the recall of Parliament to report on Haig's visit. His



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talks in B.A. took much longer than expected.

Eventually our own group met again at No. 10 on Sunday evening because there were some decisions that we had to take over the Task Force. We agreed that Parliament should be recalled on the Wednesday, which would give time should anything come out of Aja's visit to B.A.

We renewed the position and response for other countries, the old Commonwealth especially Bob Muldoon, and also Nelson Manu was majority. The OTC had come up trumps with President Witter and (who was staunch throughout) and Helmut Schmitt who was also firm in the lead. All had agreed to take positive action on amendments suspension and to stop inputs for the Argentine. We decided that

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Francis and I, together with John would meet Mr. Blair on Monday morning to resume talks. When we had heard what he had to say we would adjourn and call in Whitehead for consultation.

Thus began in earnest the long series of negotiations. When we had been discussing in Cabinet whether to send the Task Force - or rather the pro's men, for there was never much doubt that it would have to go - we had been very worried about the time it would take to get there and how we should deal with public opinion in the intervening period. We knew that the Argentines would probably pile nuclear material into the islands (which they did) and we weren't quite sure how we were going to occupy opinion at home. We needed, however

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Worried about that particular matter - ships were constantly being chartered, and there was a shuttle service of negotiations which kept the media very busy. We had also decided to put defence correspondents on the ships and they reported during the long journey.

Never shall I forget that first "round". Again General Walker and Sanders were with Haig.

He began by giving an oral account of some proposals he was putting forward and which ~~was~~ <sup>we</sup> understood had been discussed in D.A. and ~~was~~ which could have agreement - to withdraw.

There were several points and I made a careful note

1. On basis SO2 - we ~~should~~ <sup>are</sup> ~~to~~ <sup>to</sup> ~~be~~ <sup>be</sup> ~~seen~~ <sup>seen</sup> ~~together~~ <sup>together</sup>

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He began by giving an oral account of some proposals he was putting forward and which ~~were~~ we understood had been discussed in Buenos Aires and which could secure agreement to withdraw.

There were *[gap in text - perhaps MT intended to add a number here]* general points and I made a careful note:

1 . On basis 502 - we and Argentine agree follow *[sic]* steps which should be seen altogether.

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2. All security forces to be withdrawn from islands & zones within 2 weeks.

3. No further forces to be introduced. The withdrawn forces would go back to normal operating areas.

4. There should be a commission in place of the Governor consisting of

one U.K., one U.K. or Argentine who would act together (voted by majority or majority was not specified) but

their first duty was to supervise withdrawal. For that purpose they would

need each to have observers. Each member of the commission could fly his flag at headquarters.

5. The traditional local administration

i.e. Gov. & J. Councils would continue

but each would have one Argentine rep. added to them.

6. Travel & trade and communication would be promoted by the Commission - but they could only act by making recommendations to the U.K. & Argentine representatives who

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5. The traditional local administrators i.e Exec. & Leg. [*Executive & Legislative*] councils would continue but each would have one Argentine representative added to them.

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[p20 begins]

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  - and a commission that looked pretty powerless except to achieve withdrawal.

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- b) one Argentine rep on each  
Council and we would have to ensure  
that he had been resident on the islands  
(both of them) and was not someone from  
Argentina nominated by the junta and  
c) an Argentine flag flown alongside the  
others at headquarters.

There was obviously a lot more to it,  
because (i) there was no security for the  
islanders after the interim period.

The U.S. would have to be asked to  
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- b) one Argentine rep [*representative*] on each Council and we would have to ensure that he had been resident on the islands (both of them) and was not someone from Argentina nominated by the junta and
- c) an Argentine flag flown alongside others at headquarters.

There was obviously a lot more to it because

- i) there was no security for the islanders after the interim period. The U.S would have to be asked to secure the islands from renewed invasion;
- ii) we were concerned that we the aggrieved party seemed to have no right to defend our own people. Even worse – what did deploying to normal areas mean. Surely we could now say that the South Atlantic was a normal area. We must have the right to

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be at least close to the Falklands or the Argentine Forces.

(iii) There was nothing to make it clear

that the islanders wishes were paramount in the final negotiations

(iv) There must be no possibility of steadily putting more and more Argentines on to the island during the interim period so that by some kind of erosion they would soon be in the majority and our people would then probably leave.

We went back for further discussion and it was soon clear that we had not got the full story. I then waited the Park Free to turn back the moment an agreement was signed. We argued for nearly two hours on this point alone until I said I just would be prepared to accept it. The Park Free would continue. If an agreement were signed it would not enter the exclusion

[p22 begins]

be at least as close to the Falklands as the Argentine forces;

- iii) there was nothing to make it clear that the islanders' wishes were paramount in the final negotiations;
- iv) there must be no possibility of steadily putting more and more Argentines on to the island during the interim period so that by some kind of osmosis they would soon be in the majority and our people would then probably leave.

We went back for further discussions and it was soon clear that we had not got the full story.

1. Galtieri wanted the Task Force to turn back the moment an agreement was signed. We argued for nearly two hours on the point alone until I said I just wasn't prepared to accept it. The Task Force would continue. If an agreement were signed it would not enter the exclusion

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Zones which were defined as 150 nautical miles round Falklands, South Georgia, South Sandwich.

[Note - we rejected proposals that we had ever put South Georgia into the first proposals. But at the time there was a possibility of getting the Argentines off without a battle.

2 The Argentines starting from the Commission's agreement of 1971 wanted Argentines to have the same rights to residence, property, business etc as the Falkland Islanders. They wanted the Commission to try to promote that and to decide it. We feared that one down on the grounds that the principle of the administration must not change the nature of the life on the islands. The laws and administration there before must continue.

3 The Argentines wanted several U.N. Assembly resolutions mentioned by name and that negotiations on the long-term future were to be conducted in the spirit of those texts. They were all resolutions the gist of which was that Argentina had

[p23 begins]

zones which were defined as 150 nautical miles round Falklands, South Georgia, South Sandwich. (Note - we regretted afterwards that we had ever put South Georgia into the first proposals. But at the time there was a possibility of getting the Argentines off without a battle.) *[closing bracket accidentally omitted]*

2. the Argentines starting from the Communications Agreement of 1971 wanted Argentines to have the same rights to residence, property, business etc as the Falkland Islanders. They wanted the Commission +vely *[positively]* to promote that and to decide it. We fought that one down on the grounds that the period of the administration must not change the nature of the life on the islands. The laws & administration there before must continue.
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## 10 DOWNING STREET

talk to the Islands and that it was time  
Western colonialism was ended! No mention  
of self-determination! We looked carefully  
at the resolutions and at the charter. The  
battle on self-determination is between  
those who believe that "interests" can be  
paramount (in which case governments can decide  
what is in the best interests of the people) and  
those who say that the peoples expressed  
wishes are the proper guide to their interests  
and the proper yardstick for self-determination.

We argued through the evening until  
quite late into the night but finally came  
to a compromise that we would pursue  
further negotiations on a somewhat woolly  
text - but there were some conditions which  
were crystal clear - the outer channel zones, that  
the one representative per council must be local  
and that they must have the same qualifying  
period for voting rights as the Falklanders.

[p24 begins]

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We argued through the evening until quite late into the night but finally came to a compromise that we would pursue further negotiations on a somewhat woolly text - but there were some conditions which were crystal clear - the withdrawal zones, that one Argentine per council must be local and that they must have the same qualifying period for voting rights as the Falklanders.

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We were to meet again the following morning. The American team had had a direct secure line from No 10 to the White House and had pursued their own enquiries while we were adjourned. It is possible they had been in touch with B.A. but we do not know.

So ended Easter Monday.

By the following morning events had moved further. Like the previous night (on time) Haig had received a message from B.A. Apparently as he left B.A. to return to London, Costa Renda had thrust a document with 5 demands on it into Haig's hand saying they were his (C.N.'s) five points which were essential. During the night of Easter Monday a message was received saying that the five demands were absolute. I cannot remember them at

[p25 begins]

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10 DOWNING STREET

but the main features were

- 1) Sovereignty must belong to the Argentines
- 2) The Argentine Governor must stay
- 3) . . . flag must be flown

etc.

I need go no further. It seemed as if our previous day had been wasted - and yet - wasn't this really what we expected of a Junta. The condition for withdrawal was that they keep the spirit of invasion?

At Harp & General Walker Sr. & others were very depressed and began to work on B.A. Later in the day he reported that the Junta was not too hard persisting with the 5 points but were being difficult about the terms of reference for the negotiations on the 'final' status. We of course persisted with the parameters of the landed wishes and pointed out that we were working for the restoration of British administration. We

[p26 begins]

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Al Haig & General Walters & Mr. Enders were very depressed and began to work on B.A. [*Buenos Aires*]. Later in the day he reported that the junta was not now persisting with the 5 points, but were being difficult about the terms of reference for the negotiations on the 'final' status. We of course persisted with the paramountcy of the Islanders' wishes and pointed out that we were working for the restoration of British administration. We

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decided to prepare our draft of the relevant part about what would be acceptable to us.

We realised that we could go no further unless some of us were worried that we had already gone too far in ~~evening~~ considering the Special Commission. The withdrawal - or agreement that we would not enter the exclusion zone if the Argentines withdrew. We knew that we must get a guarantee of the islanders' security from the U.S. But if the Argentines would totally withdraw, could we be persuaded from returning - would there be concessions worth making?

They decided to return to Washington over B.A. He asked us not to reveal the details of the discussion - quite right. One last rejection in public summarily.

[p27 begins]

decided to prepare our draft of the relevant paragraph about what would be acceptable to us.

We realised that we could go no further indeed some of us were worried that we had already gone too far in evening [*sic: even*] considering the Special Commission, the withdrawal - or agreement that we would not enter the exclusion zones if the Argentines withdrew. We knew that we must get a guarantee of the islanders' security from the US. But if the Argentines would totally withdraw, and could be prevented from returning -weren't these concessions worth making?

Having decided to return to Washington & not B.A. he asked us not to reveal the details of the discussions – quite right. One can't negotiate in public successfully.



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We had to report to Parliament the following day

Leah 1983 - written in retrospect from now.

Parliament was understanding that day - and in other debates. That we couldn't reveal the details of the negotiations.

Shortly after the opening speeches Mr. Haig was on the telephone. He had been having trouble from B.A. that the U.S. was not being "even handed" as between

Argentina & Britain. He was going to have to make a statement if he was ever to be able to return to B.A. to continue the negotiations. Problems arose over the use of Ascension Island. We were having to put an enormous amount of equipment, planes & ships through there which required extra staff, stores and fuel. In practice the U.S.

[p28 begins]

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10 DOWNING STREET

was being splendidly helpful but B.A. was complaining and it was suggested that the statement would include a passage to the effect that only 'normal' facilities were being permitted. This would have made life impossible for us and I had to insist that although the base was American the Islands were British sovereign territory and we must like them as much as we wish. Fortunately Mr Haig was very co-operative and the matter of Ascension was not mentioned in the statement.

The Committee met again on Easter Thursday morning - not in Noto but in the M.O.D. We had to send more hoops to join the Task Force, to agree the new draft about the vessel 'interim

[p29 begins]

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## 10 DOWNING STREET

Revised" clause and to agree a message  
to the U.S. stressing the need for the U.S.  
to play an important role in enforcing the  
agreement during the interim period and  
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did not attempt another invasion. I'm  
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the Americans in either of these ways.

We had met at M.O. 1) so that  
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[p30 begins]

period" and to agree a message to the U.S. stressing the need for the U.S. to play an important role in enforcing the agreement during the interim period and ensuring that after it terminated the Argentinians did not attempt another invasion. I'm afraid we never got very far in involving the Americans in either of these ways.

We had met at M.O.D so that the whole Committee could have a thorough military briefing. It was important that we knew precisely the forces ranged against us, their capability, the effects of the Antarctic winter and the options available. At the time many people had the idea that if the negotiations were not successful, the Task Force could blockade [*sic: blockade*] the Falklands and

## 10 DOWNING STREET

mount several Commando type raids. Anyone who had harboured such ideas was soon disabused of them. Quite apart from the losses of aircraft which could be expected (and the loss aircraft carriers only had 20 Hurricanes) the difficulties of maintaining them in stormy seas were enormous. It was clear that we had a period of 2-3 weeks in May during which we should have to land, if such a landing were feasible without terrible casualties. We were faced almost immediately with problems of how much more equipment, troops, and aircraft to send - how to deal with P.O.W's what to do about George and when. There was to be no respite at all. Decisions must be made quickly. I looked from the Chief of Staff to the Committee. It was a lot for them to take and I realised they were

[p31 begins]

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## 10 DOWNING STREET

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The M.O.D. were magnificent at  
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Our main task on the Friday

[p32 begins]

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Our main task on the Friday

## 10 DOWNING STREET

Was to consider and approve the Rules of Engagement for transit, for within the 200 mile zone round South Georgia, and for repositioning of South Georgia.

It was the first time any of us had had the awesome responsibility of ensuring that our Armed Forces had the right instructions, that they were clear and that we had covered all possible contingencies. At no time must they ever be in difficulty because of our lack of foresight. We questioned the Chief of Staff carefully and after a long discussion and close examination we approved them. Many others were to follow as each new phase of the operation had to be considered.

We had other things to consider. Vulcan bombs had been converted to air-fight refuelling and one of the newspapers had found out. Would they

[p33 begins]

was to consider and approve the Rules of Engagement for transit, for within the 200 mile zone round South Georgia, and for repossession of South Georgia.

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## 10 DOWNING STREET

run a scare story that we could therefore reach the Argentine mainland - which we had no intention of doing. We decided there was nothing we could do to prevent any such report. I had also received a report from President Reagan saying that Galtieri was anxious to avoid conflict!! There was no difficulty in replying to that one! Al Haig had the unenviable task of returning to P.A. with our modified proposals.

He was having a very difficult time with the junta. I was at Chequers over the weekend and had to return to No. 10 on Saturday evening to receive a telephone call from President Reagan. For some reason the direct telephone line was not working well so

[p34 begins]

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Chequers. B.A. apparently was wanting further concessions from us - even though they were the aggressors. I said we could go no further and President Reagan agreed that it would not be reasonable to ask us to move further.

On Monday we wanted to know exactly where things stood on the negotiations and what was the latest then being discussed in B.A. Later that day further details arrived. They did not meet our requirements especially on the paramountcy of the wishes of the Islanders. It was clear that Argentina was trying to keep what she had taken by force. We agreed with Haig that he should go to Washington from B.A. and not come on to London. We would let him have a detailed commentary on his latest proposals.

We also authorized the operation to

[p35 begins]

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## 10 DOWNING STREET

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a Force 4 gale which lasted for several  
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The following day, having received  
a message from Haij, we agreed that  
Francis should go to Washington with our  
Counter-proposals to Haij's latest D.A. proposals  
They were dreadful - even Haij admitted that  
they were a significant step backwards from  
the London text in each of the areas of  
greatest importance - the long term negotiations -  
the interim administration and withdrawal.  
Our flight was to start off at 1750 and within  
15 days was to redeploy to usual operating bases  
on areas. The arrangements for interim administration

[p36 begins]

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The following day, having received a message from Haig, we agreed that Francis should go to Washington with our counter-proposals to Haig's latest BA proposals. They were dreadful - even Haig admitted that they were a significant step backwards from the London text in each of the areas of greatest importance - the long term negotiations, the interim administration and withdrawal. Our fleet was to stand off at 1750nm [*nautical miles*] and within 15 days was to redeploy to usual operating bases or areas. The arrangements for interim administration

10 DOWNING STREET

Would have given the Argentines 2 reps. on each council. Residence, ownership, disposition of property should all be promoted & facilitated between the Islands & Argentina. There would be

Proposals for compensation of islanders who did not wish to remain etc. It was of

course a complete take-over within the interim period. And having got the British Forces out

of the way the Argentines could have returned at any time. Mc Harg was not going to

publish the text, but merely say he had finished that phase of his efforts.

We agreed that Francis in his discussions should be guided by our counter-proposals and should request an American guarantee on the security of the islands.

[p37 begins]

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## 10 DOWNING STREET

On Saturday the 24<sup>th</sup> April, Francis returned from Washington. This was to be one of the most crucial days in the Falklands story and a critical one for me personally.

Early on Saturday morning Francis came to my study in No 10 to tell me the results of his efforts. The document he brought back was a complete sell-out. It differed infinitesimally from the D.A. text. In one respect it was worse - our naval forces would have to be 2000 nm or more away by the end of the seventh day after agreement.

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[p38 begins]

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## 10 DOWNING STREET

anyone the other side of the table must  
stand up to him and not give ground.

I told Francis that the terms  
he had returned with were totally  
unacceptable. They would rob the Falklanders  
of their freedom and Britain of her honour  
and respect.

Clearly Haig had got at him with  
the argument that as hostilities were close,  
this was the last chance of a political  
solution. He <sup>(Haig)</sup> suggested that if we did not  
agree a deal that Haig could put to the  
Argentinians then we might be on our own.  
He was sceptical about our capacity to achieve  
a satisfactory military solution and thought  
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[p39 begins]

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10 DOWNING STREET

Haig replied on final comments and  
answer to his letter by Sat. evening Washington  
time.

I reported to Francis that we could  
not accept them. They were a total retreat  
from our fundamental position. He said he  
thought we should accept them. We were  
at loggerheads.

We had arranged a meeting for  
6.15 p.m. Saturday evening. The rest of that  
day I spent comparing the four letters  
that we had considered over the whole of  
the negotiations demonstrating how far our  
position had deteriorated and how the  
Falkland Islanders were being betrayed. I asked  
for the A-6 to come to No. 10, as soon as he  
could be found. The message went asking the

[p40 begins]

Haig required our final comments and answer to his text by Sat. evening Washington time.

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went to the F.O. less than an hour before  
the meeting the mistake was discovered & he  
came to No 10 only to contain all my words  
clear. Nevertheless, and despite my  
clear views expressed that morning, Francis  
had put in a paper to the committee  
recommending acceptance of the Hays terms.  
His paper admitted that there were obvious  
objections of principle but notwithstanding  
those and the difficulties they would create  
with Parliament and public opinion he  
recommended that we accept the draft on  
the grounds that the arrangement offered  
the best chance of a peaceful solution and  
was clearly preferable to the military  
alternative. A former Deputy Secretary &  
present Foreign Secretary of Britain recommending

[p41 begins]

went to the F.O. [*Foreign Office*]. Less than an hour before the meeting the mistake was discovered & he came to No.10 only to confirm all my worst fears. Nevertheless, and despite my clear views expressed that morning, Francis had put in a paper to the Committee recommending acceptance of the Haig terms. His paper admitted that there were obvious objections of principle but notwithstanding those and the difficulties they would create with Parliament and public opinion he recommended that we accept the draft on the grounds that the arrangement offered the best chance of a peaceful solution and was clearly preferable to the military alternative. A former Defence Secretary & present Foreign Secretary of Britain recommending

## 10 DOWNING STREET

Place at that time. Had it fore  
through the committee I could not have  
stayed.

Shortly before 6 p.m. people were  
assembling outside the cabinet room. And  
Francis was trying to get their support. I  
asked Willie Whitehead to come over and  
told him I could not accept these terms  
and gave him my reasons. As always, he  
backed my judgment.

The meeting began. The Foreign  
Secretary put his paper & recommended that  
we concur in the plan. But I showed  
preparation on my <sup>part</sup> had not been wanted.  
I went through the text clause by clause  
asking what it meant - how come we had  
now accepted what had been rejected, why had we  
not insisted as a minimum on self-determination

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peace at that price. Had it gone through the Committee I could not have stayed.

Shortly before 6 p.m people were assembling outside the cabinet room. And Francis was trying to get their support. I asked Willie Whitelaw to come & see me and told him I could not accept these terms and gave him my reasons. As always, he backed my judgment.

The meeting began, the Foreign Secretary put his paper & recommended that we concur in the plan. But 5 hours preparation on my part<sup>9</sup> had not been wasted. I went through the text clause by clause asking what it meant - how come we had now accepted what had been rejected, why had we not insisted as a minimum on self-determination

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<sup>9</sup> MT originally wrote 'point' then altered it to 'part'.

## 10 DOWNING STREET

how had he come to accept - ultimately  
unlimited Argentine immigration and acquisition  
of properties on an equal basis. That was  
based up my interpretation, Cecil was  
very suspicious of the agreement and disliked  
it. But John Wolf found the proposed  
way through because he didn't like it either  
and agreed we could not accept it. His  
proposal was that we should make no  
comment on the draft but tell Hay to put  
it to the Argentines. If they accepted it we  
should undoubtedly be put in a difficult  
position but we could then put the matter  
to Parliament in the light of that acceptance.  
If they rejected it (and we thought they would  
<sup>(the Junta)</sup>  
because it is virtually impossible for a subway  
Junta to withdraw) then we could urge the  
U.S. to come down on our side as  
Hay had indicated he would provided we did not

[p43 begins]

how had he come to accept virtually unlimited Argentine immigration and acquisition of property on an equal basis. Michael Havers backed up my interpretation. Cecil was very sceptical of the agreement and disliked it. But John Nott found the procedural way through because he didn't like it either and agreed we could not accept it. His proposal was that we should make no comment on the draft but tell Haig to put it to the Argentinians. If they accepted it we should undoubtedly be put in a difficult position but we could then put the matter to Parliament in the light of that acceptance. If they (the Junta) rejected it (and we thought they would because it is virtually impossible for a military junta to withdraw) then we could urge the US to come down on our side as Haig had indicated he would provided we did not



## 10 DOWNING STREET

break the negotiations. So it was decided. We sent a message at the appointed time indicating that as the Argentines had started the aggression, and our purpose had been to ensure their early withdrawal in accordance with the Security Council resolution, we thought the next step was for Haig to put his ideas to them urgently and in the hope of what they said, we would then consider them in Cabinet.

So the "crisis" passed, the crisis of Britain's honour.

Other things had been happening that week. On the Thursday, Galtieri had visited the Falklands and his visit was marked across on T.V. screens.

[p44 begins]

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Other things had been happening that week. On Thursday, Galtieri had visited the Falklands and his visit was splashed across our TV screens.

## 10 DOWNING STREET

But there had been another matter which had made the decision on the Saturday evening one of very deep feeling.

On that Thursday evening (22<sup>nd</sup> April) the CDS and John Wolf came to see me urgently. Our Speed Foxes had landed on a glacier in South Georgia to carry out a reconnaissance. There was a <sup>crucial</sup> cruel wind which blew all the snow from the glacier and there was no way they could dig in and keep warm. They sent a message to Mrs Antini asking for helicopters to take them off. The first helicopter came in - it crashed, the snow blindness was so bad. The same thing had happened to the second. We didn't know whether all lives had been lost or not. It was a terrible start to the campaign. Was the weather going to break

[p45 begins]

But there had been another matter which had made the decision on the Saturday evening one of very deep feeling.

On that Thursday evening (22nd April) the CDS [*Admiral Lewin*] and John Nott came to see me urgently. Our Special Forces had landed on a glacier in South Georgia to carry out a reconnaissance. There was a cruel wind which blew all the snow from the glacier and there was no way they could dig in and keep warm. They sent a message to HMS Antrim asking for helicopters to take them off. The first helicopter came in - it crashed, the snowblindness was so bad. The same thing had happened to the second. We didn't know whether all lives had been lost or not. It was a terrible start to the campaign. Was the weather going to beat

## 10 DOWNING STREET

Our courage and bravery. And right at the beginning had we lost not only 2 helicopters but 16 or 17 SAS and helicopter crews.

My heart was heavy as I charged to go to a dinner at the Nassau Home to support the Civic Trust, and to speak. I

wondered how I could conceal my feelings, whether this was an omen and was there work to come. Was the task we had set ourselves impossible. Just as I reached

the bottom of the staircase Clive came rushing out of the office - a third helicopter (a Wessex) had landed on the glacier picked up all the men safely and the other two helicopter crews. I went out walking on air. Nothing else in the world mattered - the men were safe. What a marvellous piece.

[p46 begins]

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My heart was heavy as I changed to go to a dinner at the Mansion House to support the Civic Trust, and to speak. I wondered how I could conceal my feelings, whether this was an omen and was there worse to come. Was the task we had set ourselves impossible. Just as I reached the bottom of the staircase Clive [*Whitmore*] came rushing out of the office - a third helicopter (a Wessex) had landed on the glacier picked up all the men safely and the other two helicopter crews. I went out walking on air. Nothing else in the world mattered - the men were safe. What a marvellous pilot.

## 10 DOWNING STREET

North's letter - when I was in the Falklands,  
Jan. 1983 - I met him on HMS Antares.

A wonderful person but so modest and  
quietly professional. He said he had never had  
so many people in his helicopter. But through  
his supreme skill and courage and calm,  
all was well. We detected another ship

HMS Brilliant to go from the main task  
force to South Georgia to make up the  
helicopter force and fuel support.

After that, and following the  
difficult and decisive Saturday, things began  
to go well in South Georgia. Our forces  
landed on Sunday and took Argentina. Then  
one of our sailors spotted an Argentine <sup>(Santa Fe)</sup> submarine  
on the surface but about to submerge and  
it was successfully captured. Atlix - an

[p47 begins]

Months later - when I was in the Falklands, January 1983, I met him on HMS Antrim. A wonderful person but so modest and quietly professional. He said he had never had so many people in his helicopter. But through his supreme skill and courage and calm, all was well. We detached another ship HMS Brilliant to go from the main task force to South Georgia to make up the helicopter force and give support.

After that, and following the difficult and decisive Saturday, things began to go well in South Georgia. Our forces landed on Sunday and took Grytviken. Then one of our sailors spotted an Argentine submarine (Santa Fe) on the surface but about to submerge and it was successfully captured. Astiz - an



## 10 DOWNING STREET

Argentinian soldier wanted by both France & Sweden for alleged murder was in charge of the garrison at Grytsten and surrendered. His capture was to give us problems, as the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War didn't permit us to hand him over to France or Sweden. He had to be returned to the Argentine.

I leaved the news late afternoon at Chequers, and went over to see the Queen at Windsor. It was wonderful to be able personally to give her the news that one of her islands had been restored to her.

I returned to Chequers Downing Street awaiting the release of the news and the confirmation of the signal. I felt that John No. 9 should

[p48 begins]

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## 10 DOWNING STREET

have the privilege of announcing it to  
join him along to No. 10. Mr. Macdonald  
(mess officer for M.O.) joined us & together  
we drafted the press release. We went  
out to announce the good news to the  
assembled career crews. As it took  
days & days to get photographs back - that  
was one of our problems throughout the  
campaign.

The recapture of South Georgia  
gave the Falkland Islands great heart.  
But the press assured that it would only  
be a matter of days before we took the  
Falklands. There were many more arduous  
days weeks before that happened.

[p49 begins]

have the privilege of announcing it so got him along to No.10. Mr Macdonald (Press Officer from the M.O.D) joined us & together we drafted the press release. We went out to announce the good news to the assembled camera crews. Alas it took days and days to get photographs back - that was one of our problems throughout the campaign.

The recapture of South Georgia gave the Falkland Islanders great heart. But the press assumed that it would only be a matter of days before we retook the Falklands. There were many more anxious days and weeks before that happened.

## 10 DOWNING STREET

It had indeed been an eventful weekend. One went from near despair to confident reassurance. On the Sunday I had asked not only the Emergency Committee to Chequers but all the chiefs of staff including Admiral Fieldhouse and Major-General Moore. After lunch we had a meeting to discuss both the military and political problems. It was important that those responsible for each should understand the other. There was still a lot of planning to do and we were desperately worried about American submarines and the carrier groups - the "21<sup>st</sup> of May". They represented a real threat to any landing. We also

[p50 begins]

It had indeed been an eventful weekend. One went from near despair to confident reassurance. On the Sunday I had asked not only the Emergency Committee to Chequers but all the Chiefs of Staff including Admiral Fieldhouse and Major-General Moore. After lunch we had a meeting to discuss both the military and political problems. It was important that those responsible for each should understand the other. There was still a lot of planning to do and we were desperately worried about Argentine submarines and the carrier group – the "25th of May". They represented a real threat to any landing. We also

10 DOWNING STREET

heard from Haig that he had received  
one Saturday message and would be  
putting his ideas to the Argentine Govt.

The following day we agreed  
the announcement of a Total Exclusion  
Zone and the R.O.E. It applied to  
all aircraft as well as ships. It meant that  
we had to do everything possible to close the  
airport at Port Stanley.

Mr Haig was at an OAS  
conference that day and he made a  
full and forthright speech. OAS  
insisted that S.C.R. 502 be observed  
but recognized Argentine sovereignty.

[p51 begins]

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Al Haig was at an OAS Conference that day and he made a full and forthright speech. OAS insisted that S.C.R 502 be observed but recognised Argentine sovereignty.



Written on

10 DOWNING STREET

Later Sunday

1983 - a year after.

We were all aware that the negotiations could not go on indefinitely; that soon we should have to make critical decisions about a landing. I knew of the work going on in MOI about the detailed planning and the possible choice of landing areas. There was at this time a feeling of discomfort on our benches that we might be giving up too much in the negotiations. But in part of the Home the view that we must go on & on negotiating and not make any until negotiations failed prevailed. This was especially so of Michael Foot. Some of his party. Knowing the type military limitations I had to say in the House over & over again that no military steps were being held up because of negotiations. And they never were.

[p52 begins]

*[MT changes to black felt tip pen]*

Written on Easter Sunday 1983 - a year after. *[Sunday 3 April 1983]*

We were all aware that the negotiations could not go on indefinitely; that soon we should have to make critical decisions about a landing. I knew of the work going on in MOD about the detailed planning and the possible choice of landing areas. There was at this time a feeling of discomfort on our backbenches that we might be giving up too much in the negotiations. But in part of the House the view that we must go on & on negotiating and not use force until negotiations failed prevailed. This was especially so of Michael Foot and some of his party. Knowing the tight military timetable I had to say in the House over and over again that no military steps were being held up because of negotiations. And they never were.

10 DOWNING STREET

About this time I received a message indirectly from the President of Peru through a personal messenger that although he did not wish to be involved taking sides in the dispute - he would gladly provide a venue for a meeting between those concerned if it would be helpful. This message coincided with the OAS meeting and convinced Harj to suggest that a much simpler formula could be launched at that meeting if the Peruvians were prepared to put it. But Harj turned down the suggestion and I doubt whether the Peruvians would in fact have proposed it. Instead Harj passed his letter to the Argentines on Sunday <sup>(27 April)</sup> requesting a reply by midnight (P.A. time) on 27/28 April. We had of course by this time returned South Georgia but we were still expected under his letter to withdraw half our forces within 7 days.

[p53 begins]

About this time I received a message indirectly from the President of Mexico through a personal messenger that although he did not wish to be involved taking sides in the dispute - he would gladly provide a venue for a meeting between those concerned if it would be helpful. This message coincided with the OAS meeting and we contacted Haig to suggest that a much simpler formula could be launched at that meeting if the Mexicans were prepared to put it. But Haig turned down the suggestion and I doubt whether the Mexicans would in fact have proposed it. Instead Haig passed his text to the Argentinians on Tuesday (27 April) requesting a reply by midnight (B.A. time) on 27/28 April. We had of course by this time retaken South Georgia but we were still expected under his text to withdraw half our forces within 7 days.

10 DOWNING STREET

We could never have accepted the  
Haig formula. He was however quite tough  
in the way he put it to the Turks - no  
amendments were permissible and he imposed the  
1000-man limit referred to. He also added that  
if the Delegation did not respond positively  
to that approach he would regard the proposals  
as being lulled down. At our meeting  
that day (Tuesday 27<sup>th</sup> April) we thought we  
had not long to wait before a definitive  
reply was received. In the meantime we  
went on to other business sorting out the military  
decisions that would need to be taken on the  
morning so that we had a little time to  
think about them - for example, should we venture  
the use of refuelled Valentias to bomb the  
Pratsentay airfield when the Turks force arrived:  
whether the considerable ambitions for that  
was being held off Amersham should proceed.

[p54 begins]

We could never have accepted the Haig formula. He was however quite tough in the way he put it to the Junta - no amendments were permissible and he imposed the strict time limit referred to. He also added that if the Argentinians did not respond positively to that approach he would regard the proposals as being turned down. At our meeting that day (Tuesday 27th April) we thought we had not long to wait before a definitive reply was received. In the meantime we went on to the other business sorting out the military decisions that would need to be taken on the morrow so that we had a little time to think about them - for example should we venture the use of refuelled Vulcans to bomb the Port Stanley airfield when the Task Force arrived: whether the considerable amphibious force that was being held off Ascension should proceed.

10 DOWNING STREET

The merchant fleet that had been chartered had reached considerable proportions and the risk at which the necessary conversions had been carried out - to e.g. the Tanbena and the Uganda was a superlative achievement for what Britain could do. Someone everyone, the whole population was involved in this campaign and nothing was too much trouble. We of course had many anxieties to bear - Our great armada of ships was well within the possibility of attack for <sup>Argentinian</sup> their aircraft carrier submarines and the prospect of losing a ship carrying large numbers of troops was terrible. So we did not want the amphibious unit to sail south before it was necessary. That day we did authorize the Vulcan ~~or~~ <sup>considered</sup> Hercules aircraft to go to America in case they were needed.

[p55 begins]

The merchant fleet that had been chartered had reached considerable proportions and the rate at which the necessary conversions had been carried out to e.g. the Canberra and the Uganda was a superlative advertisement for what Britain could do. Someone everyone, [sic] the whole population was involved in this campaign and nothing was too much trouble.

We of course had many anxieties to bear – our great Armada of ships was well within the possibility of attack from their [Argentinian] aircraft carrier & submarines and the prospect of losing a ship carrying large numbers of troops was terrible. So we did not want the amphibious unit to sail south before it was necessary. That day we did authorise the Vulcans & associated Hercules aircraft to go to Ascension in case they were needed.



10 DOWNING STREET

But things did not move as quickly on the Diplomatic side as we had thought - although the military preparations continued at all possible speed.

One deadline for an Argentine reply passed, and another 24 hours was given - the deadline was fixed at midnight Washington time on 29/30<sup>th</sup> Apr. i.e. Thursday/Friday. We reported to full Cabinet later in the morning. They shared our view that it would be fatal to allow deadline to slip.

After Cabinet I sent a message to President Peron saying that in our view the Argentines must now be regarded as having ~~been rejected by the Argos~~ <sup>rejected the American proposals. They</sup> had ignored the deadline and Costa Rica had sent a letter to Gary stating that the U.S. proposals fell short of Argentine demands.

[p56 begins]

But things did not move as quickly on the Diplomatic side as we had thought - although the military preparations continued at all possible speed.

One deadline for an Argentine reply passed and another 24 hours was given, the new time was fixed at midnight Washington time on 29/30 Apl [*April*], i.e. Thursday/Friday. We reported to full Cabinet later in the morning. They shared our view that it could be fatal to allow deadlines to slip.

After Cabinet I sent a message to President Reagan saying that in our view the Argentinians must now be regarded as having ~~been rejected by the Arge~~ rejected the American proposals [*crossing through in original text*]. They had ignored the deadline and Costa Mendez had sent a letter to Haig stating that the U.S. proposals fell short of Argentine demands

10 DOWNING STREET

and did not deny Argentine aspirations  
in relation to Sovereignty. Mr Haig  
had previously told Francis that he  
had made it clear to the Junta that if  
they did not accept, the U. S. would  
support us. We regarded that point as  
having been needed and Labour would  
feel deeply let down if that support  
was not known forthcoming. We felt  
that Britain and the U. S. should now be  
seen to be on the same side staunchly  
standing for those fundamental values on  
which the Western way of life depends.

The President, Mr Haig, and  
we believe The Weinberger were magnificent.  
Later on the Friday, Haig announced public  
support for us in the form of a ban on arms

[p57 begins]

and did not satisfy Argentine aspirations in relation to Sovereignty. Al Haig had previously told Francis that he had made it clear to the Junta that if they did not accept, the U.S. would support us. We regarded that point as having been reached and Cabinet would feel deeply let down if that support was not know *[sic: now]* forthcoming. We felt that Britain and the US should now be seen to be on the same side staunchly standing for those fundamental values on which the Western way of life depends.

The President, Al Haig, and we believe Mr Weinberger were magnificent. Later on the Friday, Haig announced public support of us in the form of a ban on arms

10 DOWNING STREET

Plans to Argentina, coupled with financial  
restrictions and help for us over requests  
for "material" support.

We were very  
pleased very grateful. The President sent me a wonderful reply  
[from then on he,

Hay & Weinberger couldn't do enough for us.

Whatever we wanted they did then almost  
to procure. That day we decided that

Francis should go to the U.S. to see Hay

to visit the U.N. - see Perez de Cuellar.

We also had to consider whether the ICRC

could be persuaded to have a presence on the  
frontiers and what more could be done

to help 3 journalists who had been put into  
detention awaiting 'trial' in Argentina. Further

we decided to brief the Opp<sup>s</sup> parties  
on Privacy Council's terms about the negotiations

although we couldn't reveal everything because

Hay did not want to publish them.

[p58 begins]

sales to Argentina, coupled with financial restrictions and help for us over requests for 'materiel' support. We were very pleased & very grateful. [The President sent me a wonderful reply.] From then on he, Haig and Weinberger couldn't do enough for us. Whatever we wanted they did their utmost to procure. That day we decided that Francis should go to the U.S. to see Haig & to visit the U.N. & see Perez de Cuellar. We also had to consider whether the ICRC could be persuaded to have a presence on the Falklands and what more could be done to help 3 journalists who had been put into detention awaiting 'trial' in Argentina. Further we decided to brief the Oppn [*Opposition*] parties on Privy Counsellor terms about the negotiations although we couldn't reveal everything because Haig did not want to publish them.

10 DOWNING STREET

That day the T.E.2 came into force.

A number of difficult problems assailed us. We remained desperately worried about the aircraft carrier which so far had only been sighted twice by the sub. Both times outside the T.E.2. Nevertheless she was a threat to our ship's supply line as were her associated cruiser group & destroyer escorts. Previously, on 23-4 April we had given a friendly warning to Argentina that any approach on the part of Argentine warships which could amount to a threat to our line would be regarded as hostile and dealt with accordingly. The aircraft carrier could cover 500 miles a day and her aircraft a further

[p59 begins]

That day the TEZ [*Total Exclusion Zone*] came into force.

A number of difficult problems assailed us. We remained desperately worried about the aircraft carrier which so far had only been sighted twice by the subs, both times outside the T.E.Z. Nevertheless she was a threat to our ships & supply line as were her associated cruiser group & destroyers carrying Exocet. Previously, on 23rd April we had given a general warning to Argentina that any approach on the part of Argentine warships which could amount to a threat to interference with the mission of British Forces in the South Atlantic would be regarded as hostile and dealt with accordingly. The aircraft carrier could cover 500 miles a day and her aircraft a further



10 DOWNING STREET

500. We authorized an attack whenever she was provided it was south of  $35^{\circ}$  and east of longitude  $48$  and outside territorial waters of 12 miles. Such an attack was within the inherent right of self defense and within Art. 51. of the U.N. Charter. In view of the 23<sup>rd</sup> April notification no further warning was required.

The Chiefs of Staff had also decided that we needed to send down some 3000 to 3500 more soldiers. By that time the landing site had been chosen and we were going to need far more <sup>ground forces</sup> than we already had on the way to Juba across land. The only ship in ships available ~~was~~ was the A.E. 11.

We knew too that the Port Stanley airfield would have to be attacked

[p60 begins]

500. We therefore authorised an attack wherever she was provided it was south of 35 degrees and east of longitude 48 and outside territorial waters of 12 miles. Such an attack was within the inherent right of self defence and within Art. [Article] 51 of the U.N. Charter. In view of the 23rd April notification no further warning was required.

The Chiefs of Staff had also decided that we needed to send down some 3000 to 3500 more soldiers. By that time the landing site had been chosen and we were going to need far more [ground forces] than we already had on the way to fight across land. The only ship or ships available ~~were~~ was the QEII.

We knew too that the Port Stanley airfield would have to be attacked

10 DOWNING STREET

that night if weather permitted. The choice of aircraft had to be left to C.D.S. but we knew we were going to need every hour we had and without more had to be set down on the Martin Conway.

That evening I had to go to a great rally in Stephen Hacking's constituency. They had put up the largest marquee I had ever seen. Stephen spoke splendidly and so did Alan Kenyon - Boyd who had been the previous M.P. - a magnificent speech. I was given a rousing reception - but more than that. It was a very emotional time - Britain was being tested and the odds of weather and distance were difficult to overcome. And yet no-one

[p61 begins]

that night if weather permitted. The choice of aircraft had to be left to C.D.S [*Chief of Defence Staff*] but we knew we were going to need every Harrier we had and indeed more had to be sent down on the Atlantic Conveyor.

That evening I had to go to a great rally in Stephen Hastings' constituency. They had put up the largest marquee I had ever seen. Stephen spoke splendidly and so did Alan Lennox-Boyd who had been the previous MP - a magnificent speech. I was given a rousing reception - but more than that. It was a very emotional time - Britain was being tested and the odds of weather & distance were difficult to overcome. And yet no-one

10 DOWNING STREET

had any doubt that we could win through. The responsibilities on one's shoulders were enormous. We could only get the decisions through on time, try to foresee what lay ahead, supply indeed try to over-supply equipment because we may lose some, keep the morale of our people the hoops high, and our friends across the world with us. And grant-  
for the U.S. - Pat Muldon of New Zealand was a real friend. Right from the beginning he had the field. He offered us a New Zealand frigate to replace one of ours on permanent patrol so that ours could be released for active service.

We stayed at Milton - that most beautiful ancestral home which belongs to Stephen's wife. Over breakfast there was a telephone call for me to say that-

[p62 begins]

had any doubt that we could & would win through. The responsibilities on one's shoulders were enormous. We could only get the decisions through on time, try to foresee what lay ahead, supply indeed try to over-supply equipment because we may lose some, keep the morale of our people & the troops high, and our friends across the world with us. And apart from the U.S. - Rob Muldoon of New Zealand was a real friend. Right from the beginning he led the field. He offered us a New Zealand frigate to replace one of ours on peacetime patrol so that ours could be released for active service.

We stayed at Milton - that most beautiful ancestral home which belongs to Stephen's wife. Over breakfast there was a telephone call for me to say that

10 DOWNING STREET

The Vulcans had bombed Port Stanley. So far no casualties but it would be many hours before they returned to Atencio.

I could not tell my hosts. We left soon after - listening to the radio in the car all the way back to Chaymas.

It was well after 2 p.m. when the Vulcan and Lantins arrived safely back at Atencio. What a relief - 4 or 5 refuellings and a fantastically long trip for the crews. This really was a suspension of time - although later such facts came to be later for granted.

[p63 begins]

the Vulcans had bombed Port Stanley. So far no casualties but it would be many hours before they returned to Ascension. I could not tell my hosts. We left soon after - listening to the radio in the car all the way back to Chequers. It was well after 2p.m when the Vulcan and tankers arrived safely back at Ascension. What a relief - 4 or 5 refuellings and a fantastically long trip for the crew. This really was a stupendous feat - although later such feats came to be taken for granted.



10 DOWNING STREET (ii)

(Sunday)

That day the Argentine Air Force attacked our Task Force very heavily indeed. ~~The~~ The Argentinians were in a position to send photographs to the outside world - we weren't.

- They claimed many of our planes were shot down but Brian Hume in a famous broadcast put the record straight when he said 'I counted them all out, and I counted them all back'. What a relief - there was some damage but not a lot. Nevertheless the attacks had been heavy and one wondered whether we would have enough air-cover.

I had arranged another Cheques meeting on Sunday. Decisions had to be taken. The Cheques meetings were always very good. The combination of the "War" cabinet, chief of staff and cabinet office worked extremely

[p64 begins]

That day [(Saturday)] the Argentine Air Force attacked our Task Force very heavily indeed. The Argentinians were in a position to send photographs to the outside world - we weren't. They claimed many of our planes were shot down but Brian Hanrahan in a famous broadcast put the record straight when he said 'I counted them all out, and I counted them all back'. What a relief - there was some damage but not a lot. Nevertheless the attack had been heavy and one wondered whether we would have enough air-cover.

I had arranged another Chequers meeting on Sunday. Decisions had to be taken. The Chequers meetings were always very good. The combination of the "War" cabinet, chiefs of staff and Cabinet Office worked extremely

10 DOWNING STREET (ii)

well and we were really welded into a very effective team.

We met against the background of the previous day's heavy attack. Admiral Pakenham said that one of our submarines had been shadowing the Belgians which was accompanied by two destroyers carrying rocket missiles. She was not far off the exclusion zone and in the light of the intelligence we had about the intentions of the Argentine fleet, there was no doubt she was a threat. I called everyone together quickly - the committee (the FS were there but Sir Anthony (Admiral) was) the CDS and Adl Fieldhouse etc. We decided that British forces should be able to attack any Argentine naval vessel on the basis of the previous day for the aircraft carrier. After lunch we met in full formal session again and approved reinforcements - the 20th for the Falklands.

[p65 begins]

well and we were really welded into a very effective team.

We met against the background of the previous day's heavy attack. Admiral Fieldhouse said that one of our submarines had been shadowing the Belgrano which was accompanied by two destroyers carrying exocet missiles. She was not far off the Exclusion Zone and in the light of the intelligence we had about the intentions of the Argentine fleet, there was no doubt there was a threat. I called everyone together quickly - the committee (the FS [*Foreign Secretary*] wasn't there but Sir Antony Acland was) the CDS and Adl [*Admiral*] Fieldhouse and the A.G. [*Attorney General*]. We decided that British Forces should be able to attack any Argentine naval vessel on the basis agreed the previous day for the aircraft carrier. After lunch we met in full formal session again and approved reinforcements & the QEII for the Falklands.

Politically we had to consider the legal consequences if Argentina formally declared war on Britain - which she never did.

The F-1 was not with us that day - he was in New York calling on the President & Council of the U.N.

We broke up desperately worried that we hadn't got a found the aircraft carrier again. We believed the navy had been removed for a major attack on our Tank Force or on our landing with ships in the west of a landing.

The next day, Monday 3 May the submarine torpedoed the Belgians which later sank. The two accompanying destroyers were not touched but were slow to pick

[p66 begins]

Politically we had to consider the legal consequences if Argentina formally declared war on Britain - which she never did.

The F.S. [*Foreign Secretary*] was not with us that day – he was in New York calling on the Secretary General of the UN.

We broke up desperately worried that we hadn't got or found the aircraft carrier again. We believed the navy had been reserved for a major attack on our Task Force or on the landing craft & ships in the event of a landing.

The next day, Monday 3rd May, the submarine torpedoed the Belgrano which later sank. The two accompanying destroyers were not touched but were slow to pick

10 DOWNING STREET (iv)

up survivors from the Pelicans. We knew she had been hit, but it was some hours before we knew she had sunk.

The following day, H.M.S. Sheffield

was hit by an E-boat missile and  
just were burning fiercely. They could not  
be got under control and she was abandoned.

It was difficult to get precise numbers of  
those who had been killed or wounded and it was  
an anxious time for all the relatives and for  
everyone in Britain. The rescue operation &  
transfer to hospital treatment on Hermes was  
carried out heavily - but we were indeed  
shocked at the fierceness of the fire which it  
could not be controlled - so many suffered such  
bad burns. Sheffield had chaff but didn't  
have time to get it up to deflect the E-boat,  
which was not seen until too late.

[p67 begins]

up survivors from the Belgrano. We knew she had been hit but it was some hours before we knew she had sunk.

The following day, HMS Sheffield was hit by an Exocet missile and fires were burning fiercely. They could not be got under control and she was abandoned. It was difficult to get precise numbers of those who had been killed & wounded and it was an anxious time for all the relatives and for everyone in Britain. The rescue operation & transfer to hospital treatment on Hermes was carried out bravely - but we were indeed shocked at the fierceness of the fire & that it couldn't be controlled - so many suffered such bad burns. Sheffield had chaff but didn't have time to get it up to deflect the Exocet, which was not seen until too late.



At first we heard that casualties were limited to 20 - and then 40. We never learned how best to announce fusion news. We would have liked to confirm all news - 1st - last first.

● But the Argentinians were putting out statements some time some false before we learned the facts and our families spent some agonising days & nights. We also like to know that day - It was indeed a bad day.

Francis had returned from

● Washington and New York. Incidentally Mr Hare & Peter de Cullen were involved in new negotiations "to fill a vacuum" were hoped to get a ceasefire. Obviously from our viewpoint that wasn't enough - it would leave the Argentinians in possession. It had to be a ceasefire accompanied by withdrawal

[p68 begins]

At first we heard that casualties were limited to 20 - and then to 40. We never learned how best to announce grievous news. We would have like to inform all next-of-kin first. But the Argentinians were putting out statements, some true, some false before we knew the facts and wives and families spent some agonising days & nights. We also lost a Harrier that day - it was indeed a bad day.

Francis had returned from Washington and New York. Inevitably Al Haig & Perez de Cuellar were involved in new negotiations "to fill a vacuum" & were trying to get a cease-fire [sic]. Obviously from our viewpoint that wasn't enough - it would leave the Argentines in possession. It had to be a ceasefire accompanied by withdrawal.

10 DOWNING STREET

Above all - the wishes of the islanders  
must be respected in any settlement of their  
status.

I received a ~~letter~~ message from  
President Reagan urging us to consider some  
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In the meantime one of our submarines  
had found the '25 May' canister but  
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she was in territorial waters or not. She was  
in the middle of a <sup>bay</sup> bay the question was  
whether the whole bay was territorial waters or  
only the 12 miles from shore leaving the centre  
outside. We had to consult the A-G &  
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[p69 begins]

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10 DOWNING STREET

should attack. As the carrier moved - we believe inshore and north - and we never found her again. Our anxieties about the potential damage she could do remained.

The Committee and Cabinet whom I called together for a special meeting then had to consider the U.S./Peruvian proposals before us. The Foreign Secretary wanted us to accept them. He thought it would be damaging to reject Hay's proposal especially in view of the battle in the South Atlantic. However the NSC having been very short at first was shifting ground. The sanctions they had agreed were only for 1 month and there would be difficulty about getting everyone's agreement to renew. I was unhappy with them <sup>the Peruvian proposals</sup> and called Cabinet together.

[p70 begins]

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*[At this point MT changes to from black felt tip to blue fountain pen, probably resuming the following day]*

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10 DOWNING STREET

Cabinet didn't <sup>like</sup> like them very much -  
but agreed that we must make some  
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accepted provided three things were made  
clearly clear: that South Georgia & the other  
dependencies were outside the proposals; that  
any interim administration must consult the  
islands' executive and legislative council and  
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to request that to make those amendments.  
Francis was doubtful but Cabinet was firm.  
The truth was that none of us liked the terms  
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[p71 begins]

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10 DOWNING STREET

In fact Reagan and Itaip accepted the amendments and forwarded the revised terms to Peru.

But Argentina was now more interested in pursuing the matter through the United Nations. Perez de Cuellar had made certain proposals which were nothing more than a framework and we were right back to the drawing-board again with yet another round of proposals. Nevertheless the framework was a familiar one to us and by this time we knew all the pit-falls and the things we must visit upon.

I must at this point say that Cabinet were marvellous throughout. They stuck to certain fundamental principles uncluttered by details. Those principles had to be observed in any negotiated settlement and that was that.

[p72 begins]

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## 10 DOWNING STREET

With the <sup>traffic</sup> sinking of Sheffield and the  
realisation that other ships on picket duty  
could be damaged by Leisouts - we had a real  
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the public were as resolute as ever. We  
decided it was necessary to have a  
statement in the House about the Peruvian  
proposals and for MoJ to indicate intent  
to which reinforcements were going to the  
Falklands. Tony Levin was visiting  
Northwood that afternoon and we wanted him  
on T.V. to indicate his views which were in  
fact very confident or reassuring. This was  
one occasion on which we succeeded in  
getting the P.R. right. Argentina had  
rejected the Peruvian proposals as we expected.  
At least we were not at fault in the eyes  
of the international community and the terms  
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[p73 begins]

With the [tragic] sinking of the Sheffield and the realisation that other ships on picket duty could be damaged by Exocets - we had a [real] ~~public relations~~ problem on our hands although the public were as resolute as ever. We decided it was necessary to have a statement in the House about the Peruvian proposals and for the MOD to indicate extent to which reinforcements were going to the Falklands - Terry Lewin was visiting Northwood that afternoon and we wanted him on T.V. to indicate his views which were in fact very confident and reassuring. This was one occasion on which we succeeded in getting the PR right. Argentina had rejected the Peruvian proposals as we expected. At least we were not at fault in the eyes of the international community and the terms we had insisted upon were reasonable and

10 DOWNING STREET

Self-determination is of course a cardinal principle for the free world.

Francis went off to an W.E.C. meeting in Belgium - some country house - but could not persuade them all to renew sanctions.

The committee (without the chiefs - of staff) had our customary Sunday afternoon meeting at Chequers. I am glad that Chequers played quite a part in the Falklands story. Winston had used it quite a lot during World War II and its atmosphere helped to get us all together. It was a wonderful example of how odds can be overcome with singleness of purpose and total co-operation between the political & military aspects.

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## 10 DOWNING STREET

Looking back it is easy to forget what a large part the attempts to negotiate played in the Falklands story - because of course we know with the benefit of hindsight that they did not succeed. But then I never

did see how a military dictatorship could withdraw unless they managed to persuade a United Nations - sympathetic to Republican sovereignty - that without a for-real live sovereignty would be transferred. Our diplomatic task was to maintain the United Nations principle in practice that aggression must not pay.

And so we entered another round of negotiations. But not one did I hold up the military preparations. We were all aware that we were coming to the critical time. If we were to land and progress it would have to be done somewhere between the 16<sup>th</sup> and 30<sup>th</sup> May. The weather and the

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## 10 DOWNING STREET

Condition of the troops were the compelling factors.  
So U.N. negotiations had to be completed  
within 10 days or so. If they were successful,  
within our fundamental principles and minimum  
requirements - well good. If not or they were  
still dragging on, then if the Chiefs of Staff  
agreed, we should have to go ahead.

We came to rely tremendously on  
Sir Anthony Parsons who had been magnificent  
throughout. That Sunday afternoon we

discussed all these things as well as some  
military matters which had arisen.


Argentine air aircraft were flying over  
our supply lines and doubtless commencing  
their forays direct to submarines. Could  
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civil aircraft - it would be an Argentine one  
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[p76 begins]

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## 10 DOWNING STREET

All of these things we considered & made preparations to meet, in the next two hours & days. Both the radar characteristics and the typical flight path of an aircraft on surveillance helped to identify  such reconnaissance missions.

In the meantime, trouble with the media continued. Many of the public (including us) did not like the attitude particularly of the BBC and I was very worried about it. They were sometimes respectful as if they were neutral between Britain & Argentina. At other times we felt strongly that they were assisting the enemy by open discussions with experts on the next likely steps in the campaign. This applied to ITV as much as to BBC. This of course was the first conflict we had fought without censorship. The media & the job took totally different views. My

[p77 begins]

All of these things we considered & made preparations to meet in the next few hours & days. Both the radar characteristics and the typical flight path of an aircraft on surveillance helped to identify such reconnaissance missions. *[MT added in the text some wavy lines to show the typical path of a reconnaissance plane, flying back & forth across a heading.]*

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## 10 DOWNING STREET

Concern was always the safety of our  
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Over the middle days of that week  
specific instructions went to Anthony Parsons  
about withdrawal disturbances, interim administration,  
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the interim period and above all the Government  
must not prejudice the issue on sovereignty.  
There was for the islanders. There were  
considerable discussions on the constitutional  
position of a United Nations administration.  
We thought the U.N. representative could only  
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If he were to attempt to do so, he was obliged  
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We still handed over a United States

[p78 begins]

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## 10 DOWNING STREET

military guarantee of the integrity of the islands. A guarantee was needed if we could not respect our then military deployments

On Thursday 13<sup>th</sup> May we had another debate in the House. Our back benches were becoming restless about the negotiations. There was a noticeable difference in approach on this matter between Francis and myself. His weaker line was not liked - a fact which he picked up quickly.

That day we handed over to the ICRC at Ascension Island all the prisoners captured on South Georgia. (188) They were flown out to Uruguay to be returned to Argentina. Asteri was detained.

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[p79 begins]

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## 10 DOWNING STREET

were spelt out - the resolutions would end them and we might be blamed. On the other hand the Argentines were making contradictory statements about sovereignty. There had been a rumour that they would not 'prejudge' the issue of sovereignty but the speeches of Costa Mendez indicated that they did just that.

At our Friday meeting we therefore decided to recall Anthony Parsons for consultation - also Nicko Henderson who had been missy supers in putting our case in Washington. Mrs. Kilepalma's behaviour had been very vexing and thoroughly anti-British. Nicko it was more than a matter for her. He said what would the Americans have thought if he had dined at the Iranian Embassy the night the hostages were taken? We British thought the same thing of Mrs. K. when she went to the American Embassy the Fri. and Sat night of the

[p80 begins]

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## 10 DOWNING STREET

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That morning we all had a major briefing about a landing on Falklands.

We all had great confidence not only in Admiral Fieldhouse but in General Moore who was still in London preparing the plans.

Once again we had an important

Sunday meeting at the press - the usual pattern, lunch together and then straight down to business in the Parlour upstairs and sit until we had thoroughly ventilated our concerns, dismissed all the possibilities and finally arrived at a decision for action.

We went over every point in detail

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10 DOWNING STREET

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hardened our terms so as to protect the position in the interim. <sup>and by using Art 73 of U.N. Charter to imply that self-determination was also later to</sup>

explain the necessity of every phrase to the House of Commons thus

allaying their fears. Francis had to go to Luxembourg that evening for a N.A.T.O meeting the following day. It was decided

that we keep U.S. support and F.S. was authorized to brief Al Hay about our proposals that evening.

We agreed that Anthony Parsons should hand over the ~~text~~<sup>text</sup> as our final negotiating position and ask him to put it to the Argentines. We required an answer by Wednesday evening. If one was not -  
→ Art 73 "interest of inhabitants" - we paramount.

[p82 begins]

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[?*contemporary addition at end of page*]

## 10 DOWNING STREET

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But we thought it possible that the  
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We met again on the Monday  
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## 10 DOWNING STREET

I suggested that all Cabinet Ministers should refrain from being involved. The Pope as Head of State must meet the Queen but the Cabinet need not see him nor I myself. Nor should be attended any functions officially. Our Junior Ministers who were R.C. would of course go in their private capacity. When we later referred this to Cabinet, Quintin was very disappointed but agreed and understood. We had all wanted a chance to talk with the Pope but the important thing was to enable him to continue with his visit.

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Pope in the Vatican - but on that occasion it had been about the Irish question and hunger strikes. This time I explained that in my view the essence of liberty and democracy is personal choice as an individual and self-determination as a people. I was glad to have the chance of such a long talk.

In the R.F.C. - eight of the members agreed to enter sanctions for seven days. I had telephoned Colombo (having failed to get Spadolini) to urge him to support but he explained that it was possible Spadolini's four would fall if they did. Ireland also did not renew sanctions although I personally phoned Stangor.

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10 DOWNING STREET

Tuesday 18<sup>th</sup> May 1982

On the morning of Tuesday 18<sup>th</sup> we had a full committee including all the Chiefs of Staff. We were sorely aware of the decision before us - we had to decide whether to go ahead with the landing about which we had been briefed the previous week. Being aware of how much was unknown and of the immense burden on us all, I knew that I had to ask each senior chief to give his view and his judgment. The possibility of a receipt settlement still existed but expired late afternoon the following day. We must be ready if that happened.

We each considered all aspects of the situation in full. Nothing was withheld

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## 10 DOWNING STREET

- we should be outnumbered on landing, had we enough air cover, British ships would be in range and their positions known - we had not been able to destroy as many ships or aircraft as we would have wished before the landing, we did not know where their submarines were. BUT if there were delay, we could suffer more losses. Indeed from our viewpoint and the condition of our troops, the sooner a landing took place the better - the decision we had taken to delay had been right: we had excellent fighting forces and the Chiefs had very confidence in the plan of the Force Commander. None of them could quantify the possible casualties, it was not possible to do so. They were aware that if we held back now Britain's military credibility would be severely tarnished. They considered that the advantages to be gained

[p87 begins]

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## 10 DOWNING STREET

Outweighed the risks and the landing should be undertaken, as planned, by night. All rules of engagement had previously been agreed.

● We discussed these matters at length and questioned them on each aspect.

We were unanimous in authorising the landing on the basis of the Force Commander's Plan. We were told that we could stop it up to  
● late Thursday which enabled us thoroughly to consider any reply to the negotiations and to discuss and either cancel or reaffirm after cabinet on Thursday morning. Apart from that, the trip was for the Force Commander.

At the United Nations, Mr. Perez de Cuellar was handling matters with great privacy (which was very necessary)

[p88 begins]

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## 10 DOWNING STREET

and diplomacy. We were indeed fortunate to have such a skilled Secretary-General. We were to have a Cabinet meeting later that day about the draft agreement and then subject to their consent lay it before Parliament on 20<sup>th</sup> May. It should be accompanied by a commentary describing the U.N. resolutions.

On Wednesday the U.N. handed over to us the text of an Argentine reply to our proposals. They amounted to a rejection of our paper. In a last minute bid to avert a breakdown, the S-G presented his aide-mémoire to us & to Argentina setting out his proposals.

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## 10 DOWNING STREET

On Thursday morning our Committee met before Cabinet.

The authorisation to land stood and (subject to Cabinet) would go ahead.

But once again the F-S suggested that as the S-G's aide-memoire had considerable similarities to our own proposals the world wouldn't understand if we went ahead with military measures. The fact was that the S-G's proposals were sketchy and obscure and we could have been right back near the beginning again. The objection from the American view-point was delay. I turned up very firmly - there could be no question of holding up the military timetable. It could be held for one force. If the weather was right the landing went ahead.

The Committee and later Cabinet agreed

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## 10 DOWNING STREET

How then to arrange matters so the world did not conclude that a landing was imminent? Fortunately by that time we had had the enormously successful Commando raid on Pebble Island so we deliberately set out to give the impression that we should continue for some time with such raids. The press never forgave us - but we had to do it.

Fortunately the SAS had destroyed 11 aircraft in a fantastically bold operation in Leinthorpe.

On that Thursday, the S-G, having received no reply from the Argentines about the aide-memoire declared that his peace efforts had come to an end.

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Fortunately the SAS had destroyed 11 aircraft in a fantastically bold operation in terrible weather. *[later addition by MT]*

On that Thursday the S.G. *[Secretary General]* having received no reply from the Argentinians about the aide-memoire declared that his peace efforts had come to an end.



The debate in the House went well.

We awaited the weather

An anxious day and night were ahead.

I had a full day's engagements in the constituency on Friday and now how vital it was to carry on with business-as-usual. Ironically

I had to open a major extension of Cewors who specialised in storage and international movement and packaging.

Over 1200 people had been invited including many Ambassadors. The band of the Comrades was there and speeches etc were expected. What could I say but that

[p92 begins]

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8,000 miles was really only a  
heart-beat away - And it was for  
all our people; not only those who  
fairly were in the Dark Force. One felt  
the whole audience with us. It was a matter  
of pride, respect, conviction and brave  
free that meant we must restore the  
Falklands. Sometimes ~~we~~ <sup>I</sup> is is is  
everything, rode on a fork-life truck  
had lunch in an enormous warehouse  
and <sup>then</sup> fled to the office to see if there  
was any news. - Not yet. Of course  
there was more to do than to let us  
know what was happening. I returned  
to my Frithley office again soon after 5 p.m.  
and in connected language understood that  
events had happened but no more news.  
Then it was given on T.V. and the  
emotion at a reception in Woodhouse  
School that night was overwhelming. The

[p93 begins]

8,000 miles away was really only a heart-beat away - and it was for all our people; not only those whose family were in the Task Force. One felt the whole audience with us. It was a matter of pride, respect, conviction and being free that meant we must restore the Falklands. Somehow ~~we~~ I inspected everything, rode on a fork-lift truck, had lunch in an enormous warehouse and [then] fled to the office to see if there was any news. Not yet. Of course there was more to do than to let us know what was happening. I returned to my Finchley office again soon after 5pm and in concealed language understood that events had happened but no more news. Then it was given on TV and the emotion at a reception in Woodhouse School that night was overwhelming. The

Union Jack was flying in San Carlos Bay. We had returned to the Falklands. My heart was full but desperately anxious about Carnellon. We had landed on a hostile coast on a winter's night with a fleet of ships full of men and equipment. Was it possible that he had not been detected.

I left soon after I had spoken to return to No. 10. John Noy came in with a full report. The actual landing had been achieved without a single casualty but day-light was now and of course attacks were fierce from the air. How they missed the White Caracara is a miracle. We got here away the following night.

But from then on we went into a different level of conflict. The ships

[p94 begins]

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But from then on we went into a different level of conflict. The ships

were in known positions and all our  
air cover had to come from Hercules and  
Innawituk which themselves had to stand off  
a long way. The rapreis were being  
unloaded as fast as possible but there were  
dangerous hours ahead.

Argentine air attacks on Monday  
were heavy on ships in Falkland Sound and  
San Carlos water. And again on Tuesday  
and after. It was a desperately anxious time  
for everyone. H.M.S. ~~Argentine~~ Antelope was very  
seriously damaged and then H.M.S. Indra.  
Thanks to brave rescue operations - the loss of  
life was less than might otherwise have been.  
Many Argentine planes were shot down but there  
were many more to come. Tuesday & Wednesday  
26<sup>th</sup> & 27<sup>th</sup> May were especially bad days.

I was at the House working in my room when  
John Nolt came in to say that H.M.S. County

[p95 begins]

were in known positions and all our air cover had to come from Hermes and Invincible which themselves had to stand off a long way. The rapiers were being unloaded as fast as possible but there were dangerous hours ahead.

Argentine air attacks on Sunday were heavy on ships in Falkland Sound and San Carlos Water. And again on Monday and after. It was a desperately anxious time for everyone. HMS ~~Argonaut~~ Antelope was very seriously damaged and then HMS Ardent. Thanks to brave rescue operations - the loss of life was less than might otherwise have been. Many Argentine planes were shot down but there were many more to come. Tuesday & Wednesday 24th and 25th May were especially bad days.

I was at the House working in my room when John Nott came in to say that HMS Coventry



had been the subject of attacks by a wave of aircraft - six or more had continuously bombarded her and she was sinking.

It had to be on T.V. within half an hour and as he appeared the news had got through although the name of the ship was not known. It was thought better not to reveal it until we had more details about losses. Whether the decision was right or wrong I do not know - the effect was that every navy <sup>family</sup> was anxious. The loss was announced next day.

That same evening, later, when I went into the office to find the latest news about Coventry, the duty clerk told me that Martha Conway had been hit by hissed missiles, was on fire and orders had been given to abandon ship. How many more tragedies could there be? How many losses could we suffer. I knew also that aboard the Martha Conway had been 19 Harrier - reinforcements that were

[p96 begins]

had been the subject of attack by a wave of aircraft. Six or more had continuously bombarded her and she was sinking.

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Only needed. Were they still on board?  
If so, and we had lost them - could we  
carry on? And she was also carrying helicopters  
which we should need for bringing supplies to  
the troops as they moved forward, from San Carlos.  
To add to our dismay, there was news that  
Innocente had been hit and received some  
damage. Perhaps that was the worst night  
of all. And somewhere east of the Fitzhughs  
was the Q&A carrying 3,500 troops.

Early next morning I waited for news.  
A remarkable rescue for Courtney and the  
Marble Canyon or although as we discovered later  
her remarkable captain was lost. Fortunately  
the 19 Hannes had previously been flown on  
to Hannes & Innocente (which flooded over me at  
that news - we were not fatally wounded)  
We had lost 8 helicopters but the military chiefs

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the troops as they moved forward from San Carlos.  
To add to one's dismay, there was news that  
Invincible had been hit and received some  
damage. Perhaps that was the worst night  
of all. And somewhere east of the Falklands  
was the QEII carrying 3,000 troops.

Early next morning I waited for news.  
A remarkable rescue from Coventry and the  
Atlantic Conveyor although as we discovered later  
her remarkable captain was lost. Fortunately  
the 19 Harriers had previously been flown on  
to Hermes & Invincible (relief flooded on me at  
that news - we were not fatally wounded).  
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assured me that we had planned & supplies  
but the Pans had to go <sup>across the Falklands</sup>  
to expect some losses. And <sup>because of the loss.</sup> we had lost  
4,500 winter tents - many of them to  
accommodate prisoners of war. And the  
news that Inverurie was hit/damaged was  
totally false. So - we leaved the  
deep horrors of war, but we had to go on  
to complete the tests.

Stores were being unloaded with a -  
San Carlos. Some landing supplies were  
hit and there were unexploded bombs - most of  
which were defused. Our 'Hospital' at San  
Carlos was hit - but the doctors carried  
on manfully. The local people had  
given our troops an enormous welcome and  
couldn't do enough for them. One of the  
local young men (who I met later) had taken  
his children and shown our boys the way

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assured me that we had planned supplies to expect some losses, *[later addition]* but the paras had to yomp across the Falklands because of the loss.

And we had lost 4,500 winter tents - many of them to accommodate prisoners of war. And the news that Invincible was hit/damaged was totally false. So - we learned the deep sorrows of war, but we had to go on to complete the task.

Stores were being unloaded well at San Carlos. Some landing & supply craft were hit and there were unexploded bombs - most of which were defused. Our 'hospital' at San Carlos was hit - but the doctors carried on marvellously. The local people had given our troops an enormous welcome and couldn't do enough for them. One of the local young men (who I met later) had taken his tractor and shown our boys the way to

to Teal Inlet and across to Mount Hayden  
the entrance to Port Stanley. Only when I  
flew over the ground did I realize what a  
long 'jump' it was. And how remarkable that  
the planes and main guards had achieved it.

It had been several days since the  
landing. On T.V. there had been discussions  
about whether the next stage would be through  
Teal to Stanley or through Nauyas.

We were all concerned that there appeared to  
be little movement out of the bridgehead and  
yet we knew the decision had to be taken  
by the base commander according to his stores  
the weather, his reconnaissance and his  
judgment. Several boats had not yet  
arrived at San Carlos.

We remained gravely concerned at the

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Teal Inlet and across to Mount Longdon & the entrances to Port Stanley. Only when I flew over the ground did I realise what a long 'yomp' it was. And how remarkable that the paras and marines & guards had achieved it.

It had been several days since the landing. On T.V. there had been discussions about whether the next strike would be through Teal to Stanley or through Darwin.

We were all concerned that there appeared to be little movement out of the bridgehead and yet we knew the decision had to be taken by the local commander according to his stores, the weather, his reconnaissance and his judgment. General Moore had not yet arrived at San Carlos.

We remained grievously concerned at the



naval bases and aware that the surface Argentine navy had retreated into 12 mile territorial waters. As two of our ships had been sunk in our territorial waters we lectured the A-6 - could we not make them in their territorial waters. There were parts of the coast where the water was deep enough for our submarines to operate. That time went again the A-6 said No. Once they moved out - into the direction of Falklands - yes - but not unless. Our submarine commanders were left - prodding up & down the line, very frustrated. And we knew their navy could make a sudden rally - and we might not - their fleet them quickly enough to stop the harm they could do.

In the Committee we turned our political attention to the large - territorial issues. How

[p100 begins]

naval losses and aware that the surface Argentine navy had retreated into 12 mile territorial waters. As two of our ships had been sunk in our territorial waters we tackled the A.G. [*Attorney-General*] - could we not sink theirs in their territorial waters. There were parts of the coast where the water was deep enough for our submarines to operate. But time and again the A.G. [*Attorney-General*] said No. Once they moved out & into the direction of the Falklands - yes - but not unless. Our submarine commanders were left prowling up & down the line, very frustrated. And we knew their navy could make a sudden sally - and we might not then find them quickly enough to stop the harm they could do.

In the Committee we turned our political attention to the longer-term issues. How

to deal with P.O.W's. How to secure a  
permanent cessation of hostilities. What  
stage did we call on the Argentinean commander  
to surrender.

By the weekend Dawson & Moon Green  
had been taken. It was a bitter and  
difficult battle. The positions of the enemy  
were very well prepared and dug in. Our forces  
had to advance over a narrow isthmus in face  
of heavy fire. More points it seemed  
impossible to reach through. At that time H.  
made his famous courageous advance. His  
[Victoria Cross] life was lost - but his bravery  
was the turning point in the battle. His  
second in command took over and eventually  
secured the surrender. It had not been easy  
for him because at one time a shell fell very

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to deal with POWs. How to secure a permanent cessation of hostilities. At what stage did we call on the Argentinian commander to surrender.

By the weekend Darwin & Goose Green had been taken. It was a bitter and difficult battle. The positions of the enemy were very well prepared and dug in. Our paras had to advance over a narrow isthmus in face of heavy fire. At one point it seemed impossible to break through. At that time 'H'<sup>10</sup> made his famous courageous advance. His (Victoria Cross) life was lost but his bravery was the turning point in the battle. His Second in Command took over and eventually secured the surrender. It had not been easy for him because at one time a white flag was

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<sup>10</sup> Colonel H. Jones, VC

Waved from the Argentine trenches and when  
two of our boys went forward in response - they  
were shot at and lost their lives. Finally our  
Commander sent two Argentine P.O.s forward with  
a message to surrender - saying they could  
have a parade if they did but they must  
lay down their arms ~~and~~ surrender. They did.  
They laid up, then officers harangued them <sup>about their first course</sup> but  
they surrendered. The people of Cook Green  
who had been perched in the community hall  
for 3 weeks were released. And a few  
deserted military battalions was won. To-day there  
is a memorial to the Paras on the ridge  
near Cook Green.

The press had reported that Newari  
had been taken 2 days before the victory.  
Can there ever have been an army that  
had to fight its battles against media  
reporting like this? I had been very

[p102 begins]

waved from the Argentine trenches and when two of our troops went forward in response - they were shot at and lost their lives. Finally our Commander sent two Argentinian POWs forward with a message to surrender - saying they could have a parade if they liked but they must lay down their arms and surrender. They did. They lined up their officers harangued them about their just cause, but they surrendered. The people of Goose Green who had been pinned in the community hall for 3 weeks were released. And a great and decisive military battle was won. Today there is a memorial to the Paras on the ridge near Goose Green.

The press had reported that Darwin had been taken 2 days before the victory. Can there ever have been an army that had to fight its battles against media reporting like that? I had been very

angry when I heard on early morning  
B.B.C. radio that Q.B. II was near  
North Georgia ~~to~~ to 3 ships -  
the Carbome, Norland and others. I knew this  
was planned but it was devastating to  
hear the report at about the time it was due  
to take place. Within 8 hours of that  
broadcast reconnaissance planes were over  
South Georgia searching. They had not been  
there for weeks. Fortunately they did  
not find the ships - the sea is a big place.  
One of our the Carbome went into  
San Carlos with her previous cargo and  
one of our she shipped out unharmed.

At Cook Green - stores of napalm  
bombs were discovered.....

[p103 begins]

angry when I heard on early morning  
B.B.C. radio that the QEII was near  
South Georgia transferring troops to 3 ships,  
the Canberra, Norland and a third. I knew this was  
planned but it was devastating to  
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there for weeks. Fortunately they did  
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Once again the Canberra went into  
San Carlos with her precious cargo and  
once again she slipped out unharmed.

At Goose Green - stocks of napalm  
bombs were discovered ....



By early June, Spair Parame had letted  
Cecilia's resolution in the Security Council.  
There had of course been efforts, initially in our  
own honed common sense for me to leave our  
negotiating terms 'on the table' under a leadership.  
This I absolutely refused to do. How could we  
ask our own Armed Forces to risk their lives  
only to contemplate a withdrawal if the  
Argentinians wanted to play it that way. Once we  
went in, we went in to complete the task.

But the U.N. was at it again. A  
cease-fire was called for. I was constantly  
repeating a cease-fire must be accompanied by  
a total withdrawal of Argentine troops. Tony  
Parsons fought our case splendidly - but  
new resolution was certainly under way.

There was a great move to urge us to spread  
to Galtieri to withdraw before the final  
assault on Port Stanley. Or to pause before we  
made that assault. I remember me this could

[p104 begins]

By early June, Spain & Panama had tabled ceasefire resolutions in the Security Council. There had of course been efforts, initially in our own House of Commons for me to leave our negotiating terms 'on the table' even after a landing. This I absolutely refused to do. How could we ask our own Armed Forces to risk their lives only to contemplate a withdrawal if the Argentines wanted to play it that way. Once we went in, we went in to complete the task.

But the U.N. was at it again. A cease-fire was called for. I was constantly saying a cease-fire must be accompanied by a total withdrawal of Argentine troops. Tony Parsons fought our case splendidly - but a new resolution was certainly under way. There was a great move to urge us to appeal to Galtieri to withdraw before the final assault on Port Stanley. Or to pause before we made that assault. It seemed to me this could

put our troops in an intolerable position.  
We were in the middle of winter and it  
was essential to repress with all possible  
speed and to wait for nothing.

By 6<sup>th</sup> June all Argentine P.O.W.'s  
from Cook Green were on board M.V. Norland  
waiting to be repatriated. Some had been  
treated in our ~~territory~~ military hospital at San Carlos.  
Our doctors had been very critical of the field work  
of their doctors.

That weekend began the Versailles  
Economic Summit, attended by the Charullo, the  
F-S and myself. I went to Paris first to  
see President Pleyan who was staying at the U.S. Lindalls.  
We had quite a talk together in view as he  
preferred it. I thanked him for the  
enormous help we had received from the U.S.  
and asked that the U.S. vote should

[p105 begins]

put our troops in an intolerable position. We were in the midst of winter and it was essential to repossess with all possible speed and to wait for nothing.

By 4th June all Argentine POWs from Goose Green were on board MV Norland waiting to be repatriated. Some had been treated in our military hospital at San Carlos. Our doctors had been very critical of the field work of their doctors.

That weekend began the Versailles Economic Summit, attended by the Chancellor,<sup>11</sup> the F.S. [*Foreign Secretary*] and myself. I went to Paris first to see President Reagan who was staying at the U.S. Embassy. We had quite a talk together à deux as he preferred it. I thanked him for the enormous help we had received from the U.S. and asked that the U.S. vote should

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<sup>11</sup> Sir Geoffrey Howe

E.R.  
follows our other Kennedy's Council and whether  
the U.S. could give us any help with  
repatriating American P.O.W. after the  
relating of Post-Stanley. I also asked him  
what he wanted out of the Summit. It was  
plain that above all he wanted an agreement  
about trade with the Soviet Union on both  
unsubsidized interest rates and a lower % of  
the orders to be provided by credit. I thought he  
could help on both by supporting him. The question  
of the John Brown business to the Siberian  
gas pipeline had already arisen several times and  
there was an understanding that if we agreed  
the President's interest & credit terms for trade  
with the U.S.S.R. then contracts already agreed  
would go ahead. Plus as events happened  
things went badly wrong on that score. All R.S.'s  
and Finance Ministers had agreed a limit on the  
first day of Versailles, which was entirely what  
the President wanted. It came before heads of gov-

[p106 begins]

follow ours at the Security Council and whether the U.S. could give us any help with repatriating Argentine P.O.W.s after the retaking of Port Stanley. I also asked him what he wanted out of the Summit. It was plain that above all he wanted an agreement about trade with the Soviet Union on both unsubsidised interest rates and a lower % *[percentage]* of the orders to be provided by credit. I thought we could help on both by supporting him. The question of the John Brown turbines for the Siberian gas pipeline had already arisen several times and there was an understanding that if we agreed the President's interest & credit terms for trade with the USSR then contracts already agreed would go ahead. Alas as events happened things went badly wrong on that score. All F.S.s and Finance Ministers had agreed a text on the first day of Versailles, which was virtually what the President wanted. It came before heads of govt

## 10 DOWNING STREET

The second day with President Nutter in the chair. He didn't like it and proceeded to unpack the whole deal. I was trying to get a satisfactory compromise the whole time but it wasn't possible. To add to our troubles, that morning the Israelis had invaded the Lebanon and Al Hajj, who was sitting next to me was trying to arrange a visit to Tel-Aviv that night or the next day.

After my talk with President Reagan in Paris we all arrived at Versailles where we were staying in the Petit Trianon. That evening after dinner (all heads of gov. dined together) we had a long discussion about Falklands. I could not indicate how long it would require to take Port Stanley but said I hoped within the month. They thought this a long time - longer than they had agreed from the viewpoint of sanctions

[p107 begins]

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## 10 DOWNING STREET

However they were most helpful about what they could do to get a permanent cease-fire. I explained about plans for P.O.W's and suggested that, as under the Geneva convention we did not have to return them until hostilities had ceased, it might be possible to return them until Argentina had agreed to a permanent cessation. Helmut Schmidt thought that ~~that~~ present might help to that end. If we kept in touch, possibly all seven could join in bringing pressure to bear on Argentina. I left the evening feeling pleased with their co-operation and duly reported their conversation to officials. We had sent (delegation) been allocated a sitting room. Dave had previously been the King's bedroom and had had the bed removed. It was a large nicely furnished room with windows straight out on to the terrace.

We had only been sitting there talking for

[p108 begins]

However they were most helpful about what they could do to get a permanent ceasefire. I explained about plans for P.O.W.s and suggested that, as under the Geneva Convention we did not have to return them until hostilities had ceased, it might be possible to retain them until Argentina had agreed to a permanent cessation. Helmut Schmidt thought those present might help to that end. If we kept in touch, possibly all seven could join in bringing pressure to bear on Argentina. I left the evening feeling pleased with their co-operation and duly reported this conversation to officials. We had each (delegation) been allocated a sitting room. Mine had previously been the King's bedroom and had had the bed removed. It was a large richly furnished room with windows straight out on to the terrace.

We had only been sitting there talking for

## 10 DOWNING STREET

About fifteen minutes when a message came from the F.O. saying Pearson that a vote was about to be taken in the Security Council and the Japanese were voting against us. As they were the ninth

vote (required for the resolution to pass) that was particularly vital. So much for the previous co-operation. We tried very hard to get on to Suzuki who could not possibly have gone to bed in such a short time, to get him to reverse the decision and at least obtain - but we were

unsuccessful. Meanwhile, more political drama. Mrs Kintoko had received instructions from Hagi to follow us with her vote. She had done so. Then, from Versailles, Hagi had phoned telling her to withdraw that vote. She agreed to change it but was not able to do so. Feathers were ruffled all round. The last was that - Al Hagi had succeeded to pressure from other Latin American countries.

[p109 begins]

about fifteen minutes when a message came from the F.O. & Tony Parsons that a vote was about to be taken in the Security Council and the Japanese were voting against us. As they were the ninth vote (required for the resolution to pass) this was particularly irritating. So much for the previous co-operation. We tried very hard to get on to Suzuki who could not possibly have gone to bed in such a short time, to get him to reverse the decision and at least abstain - but we were unsuccessful. Meanwhile, more political drama. Mrs Kirkpatrick had received instructions from Haig to follow us with her vote. She had done so. Then, from Versailles, Haig had phoned telling her to withdraw that vote. She applied to change it but was not able to do so. Feathers were ruffled all round. The fact was that Al Haig had succumbed to pressure from other Latin American countries.

I thanked Durkin the following morning who gave me a very lame explanation 'As the motion had misinterpreted 502 they thought it would lead to Argentina withdrawal'! We had lunch

in the Palace - heads of jobs and foreign

secretaries all together. Before we started the

T.V. cameras were allowed in. Inevitably the U.S.

interviewer asked a question to President Ruyon asking him

what had happened to the vote at the U.N. the previous

evening. Poor Ron - he knew nothing about it to

my amusement - he just said 'I'm afraid you've

got me there. I don't know anything about that one'.

The interviewer turned to me; well as I was doubtful

I was it just to have a row on the media so

merely said 'didn't give interviews over lunch!' But

also it all went out over the world's T.V. sets &

checked a very bad impression.

What was very good about Falklands was a visit

Veronica was President Thatcher's summary up at the

Press conference the next day - he agreed absolutely with

[p110 begins]

I talked to Suzuki the following morning who gave me a very lame explanation 'As the motion had incorporated 502 they thought it would lead to Argentinian withdrawal!' We had lunch in the Palace - heads of govt & foreign secretaries all together. Before we started the T.V. cameras were allowed in. Inevitably the U.S. interviewer tossed a question to President Reagan asking him what had happened to the Vote at the UN the previous evening. Poor Ron - he knew nothing about it to my amazement - he just said 'I'm afraid you've got me there. I don't know anything about that one'. The interviewer turned to me; cross as I was about it I wasn't going to have a row on the media so merely said I didn't give interviews over lunch! But alas it all went out over the world's T.V. sets & created a very bad impression.

What was very good about Falklands vis-à-vis Versailles was President Mitterrand's summing up at the Press Conference the next day - he agreed absolutely with

what he had done. Britain must recover her islands. He was most understanding and splendid throughout.

There was a grand and beautiful banquet in the Hall of Mirrors which I attended but left before the opera and the fireworks. I had to get home and it would not have been right to stay so much revelry. All my thoughts were of what was happening in the South Atlantic.

By this time General Moore was in charge from his headquarters in San Carlos and his problem was to get enough equipment and ammunition forwards before the final assault on the ridge of mountains which protected Port Stanley.

On the Monday morning 7<sup>th</sup> June there was much to attend to. I had to report the Versailles proposal that other forts were prepared to help in putting pressure on Argentina for a permanent

[p111 begins]

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## 10 DOWNING STREET

cession of hostages and that the U.S. was  
quite anxious to help with the logistics of  
evacuating P.O.W.'s. There had been some  
military matters. One Vulcan had been trying to  
break out - some very well established Argentine radars  
that were reporting all our aircraft movements and  
could pinpoint the position of the aircraft carrier.  
The Vulcan's had been carrying special anti-radar  
weapons. One had failed to release - or had not  
been released and the refuelling probe had  
broken on the return to America. The Vulcan  
had  $\therefore$  landed in Brazil and been impounded  
with its weapon. There were also reports  
from our Ambassador in Chile about Chilean  
hoop movements - which turned out to have  
no significance at all.

Dstiz has finally been questioned by  
French & Swedish jets - had refused to answer and  
we  $\therefore$  agreed to repatriate him by air to Argentina

[p112 begins]

cessation of hostilities and that the U.S. was quite anxious to help with the logistics of evacuating P.O.Ws. There had been some military problems. Our Vulcans had been trying to knock out some very well established Argentine radars that were reporting all our aircraft movements and could pin-point the position of the aircraft carriers. The Vulcans had been carrying special anti-radar weapons. One had failed to release - or had not been released and the refuelling probe had broken on the return to Ascension. The Vulcan had therefore landed in Brazil and been impounded with its weapon. There were also reports from our Ambassador in Chile about Chilean troop movements - which turned out to have no significance at all.

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10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Likely that week we had another terrible  
head-rending hazard of war. General Moore had  
sent Sir Timotei Ardi Gulebed with men, equipment  
and munitions round to Bluff Cove and Filroy.  
They would normally have gone by helicopter but the  
weather was not sufficiently good to get enough  
quantities of stores or impediments in time. The ships  
arrived in Filroy and were unloading the Rapier  
batteries to protect for an attack. The clouds  
cleared and there was a sudden surprise air-attack  
which scored a direct hit on Sir Gulebed causing  
great loss of life and terrible fires & burns. The Welsh  
Guards took the brunt of it. There are "if only's"  
throughout life and if only the men had been taken  
off and dispersed first - the casualties would never have  
been subjected to that extent. General Moore was  
grief-stricken. I was up at Northwood a day after -  
we all felt - how many more. Once again we had

[p113 begins]

Early that week we had another terrible heart-rendering hazard of war. General Moore had sent Sir Tristram & Sir Galahad with men, equipment and munitions round to Bluff Cove and Fitzroy. They would normally have gone by helicopter but the weather was not sufficiently good to get enough quantities of stores and impedimenta in time. The ships arrived at Fitzroy and were unloading the Rapier battery to protect from air attack. The clouds cleared and there was a sudden Argentine air attack which scored a direct hit on Sir Galahad causing great loss of life and terrible fires and burns. The Welsh Guards took the brunt of it. There are "if only's" throughout life and if only the men had been taken off and dispersed first - the casualties would never have been suffered to that extent. General Moore was grief-stricken. I was up at Northwood a day after - we all felt - how many more. Once again we had



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

very difficult decisions to make about releasing news of casualties. Rumours of very large numbers - several hundreds - spread like wildfire and relatives were naturally alarmed & frantically worried. We had to hold up details for days. We knew from intelligence that the Japanese thought the casualties were several times worse than they were and that the Japs would hold up our attack on Port Stanley. In spite of criticism we refused to reveal the numbers but as fast as we could we informed all next of kin. We knew the attack on Bombing Harbour, Two Islands and Wireless Bridge was due to begin on Friday night and surprise was vital.

Friday night (11<sup>th</sup> June) came. Early on Saturday morning the Duty Clerk came up to the flat with a note in his hand. I almost seized it

[p114 begins]

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10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

from him expecting news that the attack had begun. But it was more bad news. H.M.S.

Clamorgan had been bombarding the Adventure positions in Port Stanley and on the hills prior to battle (We had agreed that the hills in Port Stanley would be 'sanctuary' but not all the people went there and three civilians were killed)

Clamorgan had been hit by a land-based rocket and was on fire. She was steering away from the scene of battle at 12 knots. Casualties - some killed - had been sustained. It is impossible to describe the depth of feeling at these times. It is quite unlike anything else I have ever experienced. In fight for liberty - we lose our bravest and best. How unjust and heart-breaking. Now we know the sacrifices that previous generations made for us. And at No. 10 one was protected and safe - one felt so guilty

[p115 begins]

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10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

at the airport.

That day (Saturday) the Colonel was Trooped for the Queen's Birthday. It poured with rain and somehow, that seemed jitting although unpleasant for the Guards. I wore boots - there was much to mow.

John Nott arrived shortly before we were due to take our place on the stand. Had he any news I enquired? None - beyond what I had. But he thought we would have known if the attack had not started. Pm Hunt and Mrs. Hunt were with us - all anxious for news.

We went to the Trooping and came in with all possible speed for news afterwards. All the guests were dripping wet - we dried out before the fire as best we could. Shortly before 1 pm. we heard that all objectives had been achieved, but there had been a stiff battle

[p116 begins]

at the comfort.

That day (Saturday) the Colour was Trooped for the Queen's Birthday. It poured with rain and somehow that seemed fitting although unpleasant for the Guards. I wore black - there was much to mourn.

John Nott arrived shortly before we were due to take our place on the stand. Had he any news I enquired? None - beyond what I had. But he thought we would have known if the attack had not started. Rex Hunt and Mrs Hunt were with us - all anxious for news.

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10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

for Two Sisters. The plan had been to press on to Trumble-down but it was decided to wait a time. I went up to Northwood in the afternoon to hear precisely what had happened. The war letter news about Glamorgan. She had got the fire under control and was steaming at 20 knots.

The next stage was for the Scots Guards - Trumble-down, and then the Cherries - Peppercorn Hill, the last hill before Port Stanley.

The Committee met on Monday morning 14<sup>th</sup> June - too early for news except that we knew the battle was in progress. It was indeed fiercely fought - just how fiercely I learned when I visited it nearly seven months later and walked

[p117 begins]

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The next stage was for the Scots Guards - Tumbledown, and then the Ghurkas [*sic: Gurkhas*] - Sapper Hill, the last hill before Port Stanley.

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## 10 DOWNING STREET

### THE PRIME MINISTER

The ground in early morning in the during  
rain and wind. The whole area is covered  
with outcrops of rock which make natural  
fortifications. I was there at first light. They  
took it by night and in the dark and snow  
A stupendous feat. And once again at a  
critical stage in the battle, the future depended on  
the courage and professionalism of the officer in charge.

What happened later that day seemed  
like a miracle. The Argentines retreated not only  
from Trunkdown but from Sappers Hill as well.  
They threw down their arms and were seen  
picking their way through their own minefields  
into Port Stanley. Ours followed them and Colonel  
Rose went to the surrender about a complete

[p118 begins]

the ground in early morning in the driving rain and wind. The whole area is covered with outcrops of rock which make natural fortifications. I was there at first light. They took it by night and in the sleet and snow. A stupendous feat. And once again at a critical stage in the battle, the future depended on the courage and professionalism of the officer in charge.

What happened later that day seemed like a miracle. The Argentines retreated not only from Tumbledown but from Sappers Hill as well. They threw down their arms and were seen picking their way through their own minefields into Port Stanley. Ours followed them and Colonel Rose went to see Menendez about a complete



## 10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Annexes of West & East Falklands.

We received news "The White Plovers flying over Port Stanley". We dared not hope too much too soon. I wrote out a brief statement for the House. By the time I wrote at 10 p.m. on a point of order, we knew that General Moore had reached Government House and was negotiating with Reverend.

The House cheered, Downing Street was full of people, young people. It was their generation who had done it. Today's heroes Britain still breeds them.

As I went to sleep very late that night I felt an enormous burden had been lifted from my shoulders and future worries would be small.

[p119 begins]

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10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Compared with the chance of life or death which had been with us constantly for eleven weeks. It was a miracle wrought by ordinary men and women with extraordinary qualities. Forever bold, forever brave, forever remembered.

Much later - at the Remond Seminar at St. Pauls when the Roll of Honour containing every name of those 257 who gave their lives - the mother, a Glasgow lady - who had lost her dearly loved son suddenly took my arm and said "You'll never let the Islands go will you?" "No - NEVER" I replied, a promise I gave as Prime Minister and which I hope will always be honoured for the sake of those who died.

[p120 begins]

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*[The following few sentences added later, after 1992]*

Forever bold, forever brave, forever remembered.

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10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

There were many things yet to be discussed and decided

The Argentine P.O.W.'s. The fact was we couldn't look after them properly on Falklands - the tents we had intended for use went down on the Atlantic Conveyor. We had to return them to Argentina as soon as proper arrangements could be made. Any bargaining about permanent cessation proved fruitless.

Liverpool we counted 11,848 prisoners and put them aboard Canberra & Orford. Argentine agreed to conduct for them to go to Puerto Deseado. The Argentinians still had one of our P.O.W.'s or 3 British journalists.  
↓  
P.L.H. Glover

[p121 begins]

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Eventually we counted 11,848 prisoners and put them aboard Canberra & Norland. Argentina agreed safe conduct for them to go to Puerto Madryn. The Argentinians still had one of our P.O.W's, Fl.Lt. Glover & 3 British journalists.



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

- Southern Shule had to be registered. This was done without a shot being fired. The Argentines there had not been engaged in scientific activities other than meteorological observations.
- Arrangements had to be made to repatriate the bodies of seamen killed on Falklands for their relatives who wished it. A number - including H's widow wished the bodies to remain in the Falklands.
- Offers to Argentina to repatriate their dead
- Return of Rear Admiral and some lecturers or Falklanders who had been in Britain as soon as possible.
- We made it clear that S.C. Resol<sup>n</sup> 502 was dead because the Argentines had not implemented the operative parts. There was no objection on us to withdraw.

[p122 begins]

- Southern Thule had to be recaptured. This was done without a shot being fired. The Argentines there had not been engaged in scientific activities other than meteorological observations.

- Arrangements had to be made to repatriate the bodies of servicemen killed on Falklands for those relatives who wished it. A number – including H's widow wished the bodies to remain in the Falklands.

- Offers to Argentina to repatriate their dead.

- Return of Rex & Mrs Hunt and some teachers - Falklanders who had been in Britain as soon as possible.

- We made it clear that S.C. [*Security Council*] Resolution 502 was dead because the Argentinians had not implemented the operative paras [*paragraphs*]. There was therefore no obligation on us to withdraw.



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

- After we had evacuated the vast majority of the prisoners some 560 officers & skilled men remained including General Dwyer. Some helped to make the minefields which were and will remain a major hazard for years. We captured large amounts of equipment - but only some of it was usable.  
By 24<sup>th</sup> June - although we had released 10,000 P.O.W's, Fl. Lt. Glover had still not been released.
- We had to recover the Shuttle (rocket) missile from Brazil. The Vulcan was returned to Osenon.
- Adair Woodhead - General Brown had to be released - replaced
- Ships with aircraft carriers had to come home - to a hero's welcome.

[p123 begins]

- After we had repatriated the vast majority of the prisoners some 560 officers & skilled men remained including General Menendez. Some helped to mark the minefields which were and will remain a major hazard for years. We captured large amounts of equipment - but only some of it was usable.

- We had to recover the Shrike (radar) missile from Brazil. The Vulcan was returned to Ascension.

- Admiral Woodward & General Moore had to be relieved & replaced.

- Ships incl. *[including]* aircraft carriers had to come home - to a tumultuous welcome.





## 10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

I went to meet Hermes. She is a fantastic ship. To go below and see how the Harrier and helicopters had been packed in was a great experience. The man who worked on maintenance had kept more aircraft flying than he ever imagined was possible.

And the hospital ward, where men from Sheffield covering had been taken was its own miracle chapter. Capt Middleton himself was an inspiration.

- Rehabilitation work - Packed houses, army units, building equipment, rock crushers supplies of every kind, money for cooperation for the Falklanders - all had to be arranged and put in hand.

[p124 begins]

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And the hospital ward, where men from Sheffield and Coventry had been taken was its own miracle chapter. Capt. Middleton himself was an inspiration.

- Rehabilitation work - Prefab houses, army units, building equipment, rock crushers, supplies of every kind, money for compensation for the Falklanders - all had to be arranged and put in hand.



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

- and of course the Service of Thanksgiving  
and Remembrance in St. Pauls. This had  
its own difficulties because of its ecclesiastical  
nature. No parade was allowed to be  
celebrated, no colours to the Altar and  
it was as much as we could do to persuade  
the Church authorities to allow anyone who  
had taken part in the Falklands campaign to  
take part in the service. Eventually after a  
lot of to-ing & fro-ing they agreed that  
2 <sup>Union</sup> members of the <sup>House of</sup> Commons  
should speak some sentences and the  
Paro-chial should take part by reading  
a lesson.  
The Thanksgiving part was virtually dropped  
from the service. But because of the presence  
of the Queen and all the Royal Family & the  
Supt pageants of the military band &  
Unrepentia, the service was a great  
comfort to the bereaved and their relatives now

[p125 begins]

- and of course the Service of Thanksgiving and Remembrance in St.Pauls. This had its own difficulties because of its ecumenical nature. No parade was allowed to the Cathedral, no colours to the Altar and it was as much as we could do to persuade the Church authorities to allow anyone who had taken part in the Falklands campaign to take part in the service. Eventually after a lot of to-ing and fro-ing they agreed that 2 junior members of the Armed Forces should speak some sentences and the para-chaplain should take part by reading a lesson. The Thanksgiving part was virtually dropped from the service. But because of the presence of the Queen and all the Royal Family & the superb pageantry of the military band & trumpeters, the service was a great comfort to the bereaved and that mattered more



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

It was also indicated that certain of the clergy would not take part if members of the

Armed Forces read the lessons.

I threatened to make this known in Parliament and in public.

than anything else.

At one time it was suggested that the Service should contain elements so apt to attract opinion! Such as the Lords Prayer in Spanish.

- arrangements for a South Atlantic Fund on charitable terms which involved the establishment of Service churches and which avoided the criticisms of the Fund which occurred over the Peace Hospital disaster.

- Restoration and improvement of the airfield with the 'mattress' we had purchased from the U.S.

The Royal Engineers did a superb job as I discovered when I visited them.

- PL. Lt. Coven was repatriated to

Portofino on 8<sup>th</sup> July. We were

[p126 begins]

than anything else.

At one time it was suggested that the service should contain elements to appeal to Argentine opinion! Such as the Lords Prayer in Spanish.

It was also indicated that certain of the clergy would not take part if members of the Armed Forces read the lessons.

I threatened to make this known in Parliament and therefore publicly.

- arrangements for a South Atlantic Fund on charitable terms which involved the established service charities and which avoided the criticisms of the kind which occurred over the Penlee Lifeboat disaster.

- Restoration and improvement of the airfield with the 'matting' we had purchased from the U.S.

The Royal Engineers did a superlative job as I discovered when I visited them.

- Fl.Lt. Glover was repatriated to Montevideo on 8th July. We were



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

arranged to return the rest of the Argentines  
- something we achieved very soon after.

Following that - financial restrictions  
were lifted but the Argentines refused to  
allow flights to Buenos Aires as part of  
the package.

Following these matters the Franks  
Committee was set up with the agreement  
of the opposite parties and reported within  
6 months.

Within one year we had arranged  
for some 500 of the bereaved to  
visit the Falklands - a traumatic  
and profound experience for them. To  
overcome evil requires the bravest of men.

[p127 begins]

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10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

Note 30<sup>th</sup> April - Permission for  
5<sup>th</sup> Brigade or other formation  
of Helicopters

1<sup>st</sup> Div. 3000 men.  
2300 tons ammunition.  
110 vehicles  
79 tanks.  
19 Helicopters  
6 Guns.

Q15 II - £150,000 per day  
Mandi Ferry Day 20<sup>th</sup> May  
Delhi Ferry  
At least 20000.

[p128 begins]

## Notes

30th April:

Permission for

5 Brigade & extra Harriers

& H'copters [*helicopters*]

1st May:

3000 men

2300 tons ammunition

110 vehicles

79 trailers

19 H'copters [*helicopters*]

6 Guns

QEII - £150,000 per day

Nordic Ferry ?By 28th May

Baltic Ferry

Atlantic Conveyor