Margaret Thatcher Memoir of the Falklands War

Written at Chequers over Easter 1983

This transcript presents side-by-side the original 1983 handwritten text of the memoir and a transcript made for publication in 2015.

The transcript also draws on a photocopy of the 1983 text made in March 1992 (available on this site) to show where MT made later changes. She evidently re-read and amended the original a number of times after 1992.

MT added many underlinings in these later readthroughs, as can be seen. For sake of clarity the transcript omits them. Underlinings in the transcript were present in the original text as first seen in March 1992.

A few editorial footnotes have been added, in grey text.

Christopher Collins

Margaret Thatcher Foundation June 2015

Notes on the Freugery Cabril- Committee

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Notes on the Emergency Cabinet Committee

1. I set this up following the advice of Harold Macmillan who soon after the weekend of the invasion came to see me to offer his support as the senior Prime Minister. Alec D-H¹ had been going to come with him but was unable to do so because of the recurrence of his old back trouble.

H.M. advised strongly that a small emergency committee be set up for the conduct of the Falklands campaign <u>and</u> that if necessary a <u>separate</u> economic committee should be convened. He said it would be fatal to mix the two.

He also asked if we had reinforced Gibraltar, made arrangements for "wounded ships" and suggested S. Africa may be approached <u>if</u> necessary and he asked about Argentina and nuclear weapons.

I decided to keep the economics of

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¹ Alec Douglas-Home

the carpaign comblety exact. The timyeng Committee westere comment of the Home Lendeng, It Foreign Lecremy, Thepera Lendeng and Chancellor 1 the Ducky (levil Parlarison) as well as my sey. The chief of Telena Stell, Teny Lewin and the Permanent. Secretary of the Foreign Opice Si Antering Adard allended rejularly. Wither a lew meetings it became receiving for the Altorny - a evend to join as we comtenty had to consider whele achour lane within the where reper of sext-defence and Alute 57 M. He United Notions charles.

Realising that the longer law proplems of the Folklands required someone whole line. I arted Si Nichold Palline it he would winderless the whith he did and he regularly attended the meeting, too. In previous his contention and expertise were constantly applied do the application side of our work especially in adming on contents, comunitation and of forestern with other countries.

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the campaign completely separate. The Emergency Committee therefore consisted of the Home Secretary², the Foreign Secretary³, Defence Secretary⁴ and Chancellor of the Duchy (Cecil Parkinson) as well as myself. The Chief of Defence Staff, Terry Lewin and the Permanent Secretary of the Foreign Office Sir Anthony Acland⁵ attended regularly. Within a few meetings it became necessary for the Attorney-General⁶ to join as we constantly had to consider what actions came within the inherent right of self-defence and Article 51 of the United Nations charter.

Realising that the longer term problems of the Falklands required someone whole time, I asked Sir Michael Palliser⁷ if he would undertake the task which he did and he regularly attended the meetings too. In practice his contributions and expertise were constantly applied to the diplomatic side of our work especially in advising on contacts, consultations and information with other countries.

² Willie Whitelaw

³ Francis Pym

⁴ John Nott

⁵ Sic: Sir *Antony* Acland

⁶ Sir Michael Havers

⁷ Acland's predecessor as official head of the Foreign Office

Si Robert Monshof Leaded the Grudatial-, and who his far-syntidises was Robert Wade-Geny injernely and diliperce was Robert Wade-Geny who repetfully lell-before our work was firely complete because he had been frielly complete because he had been appointed the Commissione it Pallie.

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The agenda usually committed of First - all military mallers i.e. is report on last 24 hours (ii) uniediche decinosis (iii) longer leur mollers to be put in hard

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Sir Robert Armstrong headed the secretariat, and absolutely outstanding for his far-sightedness ingenuity and diligence was Robert Wade-Gery who regretfully left before our work was finally complete because he had been appointed High Commissioner in Delhi.

The terms of reference of this sub-committee of the Overseas and Defence Policy Committee (called sub-committee on the South Atlantic and the Falkland Islands - or OD(SA) for short) were:

"To keep under review political and military developments relating to the South Atlantic and the Falklands and to report as necessary to OD."

It was set up formally on the Tuesday following the invasion the previous Friday.

The agenda usually consisted of First - all military matters i.e. (i) report on last 24 hours (ii) immediate decisions (iii) longer term matters to be put in hand.

Second. Replanett reller - which were of.

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Second. Diplomatic matters - which were of course particularly important while the Task Force was in passage to the Falklands and the several sets of negotiations were in progress

and towards the end

<u>Third</u> - preparations for the "post-invasion" period and the longer-term.

By the time of our first meeting (7th April) the Task Force had already been despatched with a speed and inefficiency [sic] which astounded the world and made us feel very proud and very British. The decision had been taken by Cabinet on the evening of the day of the invasion (Friday). The main carrier force and accompanying ships left port on Monday 5th April fully and properly equipped. Also we had secured the passage of the famous Security Council Resolution 502

through the superlature performance of om representative at the United Nations (it was superlature throughout the entire carpays) and the unremitting deplanter effort NIE F.O.

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through the superlative performance of our representative at the United Nations⁸ (it was superlative throughout the entire campaign) and the unremitting diplomatic effort of the F.O.

Alas by the time of our first meeting Peter Carrington had resigned at his own insistence in spite of herculean efforts on the part of Willie Whitelaw and myself to persuade him to stay. John Nott had offered his resignation which I could not possibly accept when the Task Force was on the ocean. Thank goodness I didn't accept it - John was splendid throughout the campaign.

Our first meeting was taken up with

1) a message from AI Haig that he wanted to come to London that day. But we had a debate in the House and couldn't receive him. He agreed to come the following

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⁸ Sir Anthony Parsons

day (Naundy Thursday). He mede itdear that he was coming as a friend and not as a medictor.

2) De dismissable neut militag styri corewelly as our SSN's were due in Uté ara velher the new less days. De were rotable to devide immediately on shellen to ser a 200 mile enclusion 200e for stiges round the Falklands because of aguments aboutte effect on their de but aprel to met at about 7p. Wet some evering in my noon et the Houx to decide whether Ut bleve du. i viding op the delateshould arrowne such a zone. Unusually for him, John had had an entherely despieule. une winding up the premons Salunday and it was wild for his own confidence that he should do well that day. We had entended the debali for ar hom (to end al- Up. -) which for m

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day (Maundy Thursday). We made it clear that he was coming as a friend and not as a mediator.

2) We discussed the recent military steps especially as our SSN's were due in the area within the next few days. We were not able to decide immediately on whether to set up a 200 mile exclusion zone for ships round the Falklands because of arguments about the effect on Haig etc but agreed to meet at about 7pm that same evening in my room at the House to decide whether the Defence Secretary in winding up the debate should announce such a zone. Unusually for him, John had had an extremely difficult time winding up the previous Saturday and it was vital for his own confidence that he should do well that day. We had extended the debate for an hour (to end at 11 p.m) which gave us

a libre more line.

We were uncertain about whether to Jo the hovers to Arenion to perhim about the Toll Form. Some argued thetie. would hossite Co-lidere of the Felhland Islanders - who we neatherd must be in a state of despair. On below we felt it would bok ginnicky and that. He could probably be of more help to us at home. I had seen the Governor (Ren Hut) and the two Manie Commanders on their return. I had spoken to him on Salunday utente landed is Nontriles, - the friether we the mason. When he and the L. Dames now me in No 10, 1 onled him - "were you awar that a manoi war is the offig?" and he replied 'No - 1 charges. is was just arouter alaum of the land we had had

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a little more time.

We were uncertain about whether to fly the Governor to Ascension to put him aboard the Task Force. Some argued that it would boost the confidence of the Falkland Islanders - who we realised must be in a state of despair. On balance we felt it would look gimmicky and that he could probably be of more help to us at home.

I had seen the Governor (Rex Hunt) and the two Marine Commanders on their return. I had spoken to him on Saturday when he landed in Montevideo, - [sic] the first time we knew for sure the time and pattern of the invasion. When he and the two Marines saw me in No.10, I asked him - "were you aware that an invasion was in the offing?" and he replied "No - I thought it was just another alarm of the kind we had had

Premonly. He Gld me that when he had received Our meriage on the previous Wednesday - he had contacted on 1 th Azente representation (1 betwee 1 4 cmi-hie) on the island who assured time that is fai as he knew, nothing has afoot. Mor in retropped it spream that there were a runder of the Argentinians who had been reporting on every movement. If our mounes. One of the slawe commender skulster out the shape of the opender, which he sould had ben my well planned with the first wave of troops coming from the landward side. They would not - come out and Jyiebut waited until overhelming amour and force had arrived. Then, the total me, the but Anjulue commander lines also, Larry one of the names of the newforcement mennies who had been there only Jom days. On his Commanders were very answorms to go trade. One of them was very Janutian with the tention Laving been on a low of dut for

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previously". He told me that when he had received our message on the previous Wednesday - he had contacted one of the Argentine representatives (I believe of the air-line) on the island who assured him that as far as he knew, nothing was afoot. Alas, in retrospect it appears that there were a number of other Argentinians who had been reporting on every movement of our marines.

One of the Marine Commanders sketched out the shape of the operation, which he said had been very well planned with the first wave of troops coming from the landward side. They would not come out and fight but waited until overwhelming armour and force had arrived. Then he told me, the local Argentine Commander knew almost every one of the names of the reinforcement marines who had been there only four days. Our two Commanders were very anxious to go back. One of them was very familiar with the terrain having been on a tour of duty for

Several months. They were soon from to Ascerios and joved the main Force. It was they who frielly both to mender of Covernment House when Portstantes fell. The Governor won it fails a prewhelp to us in handon frequenty broadcarling on Kirlend fentes to the Ferhands assuming them his bays were facted to return as noonas he could. The media commentations were constantly questioning his about whether he nestly apedis to relum and he never fallered. the relation that I had said in the House that ou objetivé des le restorche ? British Sovereigning and the relie of British administration and te was The West. Was what means.

There were of course to be many limes is the coming repolicitions when we wondered whether we should be able to

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several months. They were soon flown to Ascension and joined the main Force. It was they who finally took the Surrender at Government House when Port Stanley fell. The Governor was in fact a great help to us in London - frequently broadcasting on [BBC] External Services to the Falklands assuring them his bags were packed to return as soon as he could.

The media commentators were constantly questioning him about whether he <u>really</u> expected to return and he never faltered. He retorted that I had said in the House that our objective was the restoration of British Sovereignty and the return of British administration and he was sure that was what I meant.

There were of course to be many times in the coming negotiations when we wondered whether we <u>should</u> be able to

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secure the return of Rex Hunt.

But to return to 7th April. We soon heard that Al Haig would come on Easter Thursday and we met accordingly at 7pm that evening. We had a long argument. Francis was absolutely against announcing a Maritime Exclusion Zone that evening. He thought it would upset Haig coming the next day and we could wait longer before deciding. John Nott fought strongly for the zone and eventually through patient persistence the rest of us managed to overcome Francis's objections. It was a pattern to be repeated many times. The decision was the right one. John did a <u>superb</u> winding up speech announcing the establishment of the zone. Not a voice was raised against it and Jim Callaghan was heard to say "absolutely right". And so the zone took effect from midnight 11/12 April - i.e came into effect in the early hours of Easter Monday morning. It is

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worth noting that at <u>no time</u> during the Falklands operation did we say we would take action <u>until</u> we were in a position to do it. By the time the MEZ commenced an SSN was there and others arriving very shortly indeed. I was determined that we should never put ourselves in a position where "bluff could be called". And we never did.

Haig was also informed of the zone a little in advance of the announcement. When I met him the next day he said it was an absolutely right decision.

3rd Meeting - we met briefly before Haig arrived and approved the Rules of Engagement for the SSNs in the Maritime Exclusion Zone - the first time for most of us there. Many more ROE's were to follow and we learned the importance of approving them on time -i.e. before any possible embarrassing occasion could arise and of getting them right.

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We discussed how to handle the Haig talks. But my mind and decisions were totally committed - Argentina must withdraw, British administration must be restored.

I'm afraid the firmness of this approach came as something of a shock to AI Haig and his advisers who included General Walters, Mr Enders and Ed Streator from the US Embassy in London (the Ambassador was away). It soon became clear that mediation was his purpose but at least he came to see us first to be clear about our position before going to Buenos Aires. Again & again we stressed - all Argentine forces out, British sovereignty administration restored (by this time we had realised that British sovereignty at law had not been affected changed by the <u>fact of invasion</u>) - then we would negotiate with Argentina on the basis that the islanders wishes were paramount. AI Haig really wanted to issue an agreed statement before he

befor recognision that there may have do be an intermediate phase between Argertine withdrawed and the north-cluster of British Sovereight - but was not prepared to do so. As the before General Walter raid do me that "you certainly bis up to four name or the Iran Lady! It hadring needly occurred to me to book at it that way - to me the position was clear - end, and that was that.

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left recognising that there may have to be an intermediate phase between Argentine withdrawal and the restoration of British sovereignty - but I was not prepared to do so. As he left, General Walters said to me that "you certainly live up to your name as the Iron Lady". It hadn't really occurred to me to look at it that way – to me the position was clear-cut and that was that.

I had previously asked General Walters whether going back over their intelligence there had been any signs of an impending invasion – knowing that the information we had put together from our intelligence on the Wed. before the invasion had come as a shock to Haig when Nicko Henderson told him as a matter of urgency. But the fact is that the U.S. were no more aware than we were and they had their eyes on Central America rather more than South America. As he faced the TV cameras

who he hell M Hay was absolutely fair (1 always found he was Jan' - throughout. the who he rego hater's - tough, induct a very lough reportation but Jan in his dealings with us and with the mess. When we disapped with any part of a statement he wanted to make the would take is out.).

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when he left AI Haig was absolutely fair (I <u>always</u> found <u>he was fair</u> -throughout the whole negotiations - tough, indeed a very tough negotiator but fair in his dealings with us and with the press. When we disagreed with any part of a statement he wanted to make, he would take it out).

He took off for B.A. [Buenos Aires] The Task Force continued and the military planning proceeded apace and with enthusiasm and concentration. None of us knew whether it would need to be used, but we thought that the nearer the Task Force got, the more chance there <u>may</u> be that the Argentines would withdraw.

I confess that from the outset I never really believed that a military government could withdraw. The scenes in the square in B.A. (balcony scenes to the crowd below massed and chanting) were of such jubilation that I couldn't see the junta pulling

out suget unless they were granted sovereignly on the part of what however. This I had onest patient how explaining to their they that they couldn't have. I remembe asking him whether if a higher had before all his possession he would comiste that he had to repolate with the bruglan as to how much he was interest to keep.

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Foot olhrichly asked for the nearly of
Parliament to report on Hayin note. His

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out except unless they were granted sovereignty as the price of withdrawal. This I had spent patient hours explaining to Haig that they couldn't have. I remember asking him whether if a burglar had taken all his possessions he would consider that he had to negotiate with the burglar as to how much he was 'entitled' to keep.

I'm afraid that Al had a very difficult time in B.A. Again crowds were chanting in the main square although General Walters told me afterwards that the crowds stopped abruptly at the exits from the square. It was difficult for our American friends to know with whom they were negotiating. First Galtieri, then the rest of the junta, then the military (50 or so) behind the junta.

Over that Easter weekend, Michael Foot officially asked for the recall of Parliament to report on Haig's visit. His

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talks in B.A. took much longer than expected.

Eventually our own group met again at No.10 on Sunday evening because there were some decisions that <u>we</u> had to take over the Task Force. We agreed that Parliament should be recalled on the <u>Wednesday</u> which would give time should anything come out of Haig's visit to B.A.

We reviewed the position and response from other countries, the old Commonwealth, especially Rob Muldoon and also Malcolm Fraser were magnificent, the EEC had come up trumps with President Mitterrand (who was staunch throughout) and Helmut Schmidt who was also firm, in the lead. All had agreed to take positive action on armaments suspension and to stop imports from the Argentine. We decided that

Francis and I, topether with John would meet M Hajo on Monday morning to resume laths. When we had beard whelfer he had to say we would adjust and call in while read for corrulation.

Thus began in cowert the long Series of repolitions. When we had been discussing in Cahriel whether to send the Tank Fru - or rellé the prois rons, for Here was never much down. Wed. it, would have to go - we had been very worried dod. the time is would leden to ferview and how in should deal with pullic spinor i the ulaivering rendet. De knew That the Appellines would provery pile new neteral into the islands (which they did) and we were! (will some hos we were forje to scupy opinion of home, We needle have

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Francis and I, together with John would meet Al Haig on Monday morning to resume talks. When we had heard what he had to say we would adjourn and call in Willie & Cecil for consultation.

Thus began in earnest the long series of negotiations. When we had been discussing in Cabinet whether to send the Task Force - or rather the pros & cons, for there was never much doubt that it would have to go - we had been very worried about the time it would take to get there and how we should deal with public opinion in the intervening period. We knew that the Argentines would probably pile men & materiel into the islands (which they did) and we weren't quite sure how we were going to occupy opinion at home. We needn't have

Dorred about that particular meller - ships were combothy being challed and there was a now the truite of, repolation which light the media very busy. We had also decided to put defence co crespondents on the ships and they reported during the long journey.

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worried about that particular matter - ships were constantly being chartered and there was a shuttle service of negotiations which kept the media very busy. We had also decided to put defence correspondents on the ships and they reported during the long journey.

Never shall I forget that first "round". Again General Walters and Enders were with Haig.

He began by giving an oral account of some proposals he was putting forward and which were we understood had been discussed in Buenos Aires and which could secure agreement to withdraw.

There were [gap in text - perhaps MT intended to add a number here] general points and I made a careful note:

1 . On basis 502 - we and Argentine agree follow [sic] steps which should be seen altogether.

2. An security forces to be withdrawn.

for islands - zones within 2 weeks.

3. No fulter forces to be whodwed.

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b. Travel statue and communications would be monotot by the Communications - but they could only at they nature remember to the U.K. of Myelie remembers who

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- 2. All security forces to be withdrawn from islands & zones within 2 weeks.
- 3. No further forces to be introduced. The withdrawn forces would go back to <u>normal operating</u> areas.
- 4. There should be a commission in place of the Governor consisting of one UK, one U.S. one Argentine who would act together (whether by unanimity or majority was not specified) but their first duty was to supervise withdrawal. For that purpose they would need each to have observers. Each member of the Commission could fly his flag at headquarters.
- 5. The traditional local administrators i.e Exec. & Leg. [Executive & Legislative] councils would continue but each would have one Argentine representative added to them.
- 6. Travel & trade and communications would be promoted by the Commission but they could only act by making recommendations to the UK & Argentine representatives who

Would both here to exer before anything Could be done

7. The interior preciod would and hopefully by and hearth and repolation about the pretity of end hearth and repolation about the souther or tetri. I the itends would be conducted during that time.

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would both have to <u>agree</u> before anything could be done.

7. The interim period would end hopefully by end December and negotiations about the status of the Islands would be conducted during that time.

We adjourned & went into our larger committee. These general proposals were full of holes about which we would have to negotiated hard but they were presented in such a way that it looked as if there was a possibility that we could get the Argentine forces off by giving only

a) a Commission of which we constituted 1/3 in place of a governor
- and a commission that looked pretty powerless except to achieve withdrawal.

(b) one Argentine rep on each

Council and we would have to ensure

that he had been resident on the Tilends

(both 1 them) and was not - someone from

Agentine nominated by the justice and

c) an Argentine fly from alongs. The

others at teed wearters.

There was obiomy a be month it because (i) there was no security for the istenders of hote interior reised. The U.S would have to be or head to Seeme the islands from nevered women (ii) we were concerned that we the afferred party seemed to have no neit to defend on our regul. Even workwhat did dysbyrip to normal was near. Such we could now say their to South Market were normal one. We number the next to

[p21 begins]

- b) one Argentine rep [representative] on each Council and we would have to ensure that he had been resident on the islands (both of them) and was not someone from Argentina nominated by the junta and
- c) an Argentine flag flown alongside others at headquarters.

There was obviously a lot more to it because

- there was no <u>security</u> for the islanders after the interim period.
 The <u>U.S</u> would have to be asked to secure the islands from renewed invasion;
- ii) we were concerned that we the aggrieved party seemed to have no right to defend our own people. Even worse what did deploying to normal areas mean. Surely we could now say that the South Atlantic was a normal area. We must have the right to

be attent or when to the falklands on the this There was nothing to make it has Arquer Jores. tat ve intenders viter wer Parament. in the Junal regolutions (in) There muste no possibility of steading puting more and more Agentines on to He Hard during the meaning period no their by some laid of somering Hey would soon be in the may only and on people would then motally leave. De verbade Jo. Julie dismissis and it was noon that thet is hed not prui full slorg. I hallen warleig the Tark fru to hun back the moment an efrement des signed. De ayunt for really his hows on the point above with I said I just varie separed to augst i. The Tank for world continue. If an agreement

were signed it would not enter the enclusion

[p22 begins]

be at least <u>as close</u> to the Falklands as the Argentine forces;

- iii) there was nothing to make it clear that the <u>islanders' wishes</u> were paramount in the final negotiations;
- iv) there must be no possibility of steadily putting more and more Argentines on to the island during the interim period so that by some kind of osmosis they would soon be in the majority and our people would then probably leave.

We went back for further discussions and it was soon clear that we had <u>not</u> got the full story.

1. Galtieri wanted the

Task Force to turn back the moment an agreement was signed. We argued for nearly two hours on the point alone until I said
I just wasn't prepared to accept it. The

Task Force would continue. If an agreement were signed it would not enter the exclusion

Zones which were defined as 150 routing miles round Falkwards, South Carpin, South Jandwick.

[Note - we repetied efterwards that we had were put south heavying its the frist proposeds. Pure attacking there was a possibility of july the Angerties of without a better.

2 the Agentines starting from the Commidians appendix of 1571 santed Appendix to here the same reption to residence. Properly his wein the same reption to residence. They wanted that and the Commission that to promote that and to decide it. We forget that one down on the pounds that the president of the commission that the president of the Life on the pounds that the president of the Life on the pounds that the president of the Life on the president of the Life on the pounds that the president of the Life on the Life of the Life on the Life of the Life of the Life on the Life of the Life of

Utore mustonline.

3 the Apertures warted severed U.N. Askerty
resolutions merlowed by name and that
repolations on the long-last plane were
to be conducted in the spirit of those
letter. They were all resolutions the
sist of which was that Aperture here

[p23 begins]

zones which were defined as 150 nautical miles round Falklands, South Georgia, South Sandwich. (Note - we regretted afterwards that we had ever put South Georgia into the first proposals. But at the time there was a possibility of getting the Argentines off without a battle.) [closing bracket accidentally omitted]

- 2. the Argentines starting from the Communications Agreement of 1971 wanted Argentines to have the same rights to residence, property, business etc as the Falkland Islanders. They wanted the Commission +vely [positively] to promote that and to decide it. We fought that one down on the grounds that the period of the administration must not change the nature of the life on the islands. The laws & administration there before must continue.
- 3. The Argentines wanted several U.N. Assembly resolutions mentioned by name and that negotiations on the long-term future were to be concluded in the spirit of those texts. They were all resolutions the gist of which was that Argentina had

time to the ilando and that the hate We melter of they, delaminated? We looked and the charter. The better on self-delamination is between their "hearth can be believe that "hearth can be believe that "hearth can be with a whole is the "hearth can devide what is in the best in the best in the post can devide what is in the best lies of the proper appeals and those who say that it is proper appeals appealed wither and the proper gradulate for left-delamination, and the proper youth to their iliests and the proper youth late of the proper delamination.

Or ay med through the every will grave for a composition that he would private come further repolations on a somewhat woodly lett - her there were some conductors while were crysted when - the with chard somes, that were crysted when - the water chard somes, that were crysted when - the water chard somes, that was one supplies per council numb be local and well they must have the same fuely sign period for voting rights on the Fathlander.

[p24 begins]

title to the islands and that it was time
Western colonisation was ended! No mention
of self-determination! We looked carefully
at the resolutions and at the charter. The
battle on self-determination is between
those who believe that "interests" can be
paramount (in which case governments can decide
what is in the best interests of the people) and
those who say that the peoples expressed
wishes are the proper guide to these interests
and the proper yardstick for self-determination.

We argued through the evening until quite late into the night but finally came to a compromise that we would pursue further negotiations on a somewhat woolly text - but there were some conditions which were crystal clear - the withdrawal zones, that one Argentine per council <u>must</u> be local and that they must have the same qualifying period for voting rights as the Falklanders.

We were to mut of one the following morning. The American lean head had a durist secure line from No 10 to the the White Home and head present their own enquires white her were adjourned. It is possible beginning white her were adjourned. It is possible they had been in touch with B-A. Indicate do not know.

do ended L'arter Monday. By the Jobbing morning works had moved fulté. Let lé prenon rété. Lou tire) Haig had received a ressage from R.A. Apparenty as he left B.A to relim to London, Coste Mender Led Churs- a downer. with ! demands on it. with Hay's hard saying they were his (C. N..) frie pour while were enabled. I) uning the ment of Learlis londing a message was received naying that the five demands were absolute. I canot reventer them of

[p25 begins]

We were to meet again the following morning. The American team had had a direct secure line from No.10 to the White House and had pursued their own enquiries while we were adjourned. It is possible they had been in touch with B.A. but we do not know.

So ended Easter Monday.

By the following morning events had moved further. Late the previous night (our time) Haig had received a message from B.A. [Buenos Aires]. Apparently as he left B.A. to return to London, Costa Mendez had thrust a document with 5 demands on it into Haig's hand saying they were his (CM's) five points which were essential. During the night of Easter Monday a message was received that the five demands were absolute. I cannot remember them all

hut the man Jealues were

i) Sovereignts numble belong to the Appellues

2) The Appellue Covernor numbers by

31 . . . flag number to flow

I reed to so fulti. It tremed on
if our menous day had been wanted - and
ret - ward- this really whether corrected
of a juste. The condition for withdrawd
was that they keep the spoint of maison?

Al Horizo - Leveral Wallers of h. Endus
were very dynamed and byon to work on

B.B. Later in the day he represent that

the just was not to now purity with the

Spories but were being difficult, about the

term of relevant for the repolations on

the first status. We prome punited

with the paramounts of the literature withers

and provies out that we were writing for

the restoration of Brain commissions. We

[p26 begins]

but the main features were:

- 1) Sovereignty must belong to the Argentines
- 2) The Argentine Governor must stay
- 3) " " flag must be flown etc

I need go no further. It seemed as if our previous day had been wasted - and yet - wasn't this really what we expected of a junta. The condition for withdrawal was that they keep the spoils of invasion?

Al Haig & General Walters & Mr. Enders were very depressed and began to work on B.A. [Buenos Aires]. Later in the day he reported that the junta was <u>not</u> now persisting with the 5 points, but were being difficult about the terms of reference for the negotiations on the 'final' status. We of course <u>persisted</u> with the paramountcy of the <u>Islanders' wishes</u> and pointed out that we were working for the restoration of British administration. We

decided to prepare our cheft of the relevant pare about the supplies to us.

We reduis tel. ve could jo so Julier villed nome of us were worried thatre had checky fore too fet in every cominon. the withdrawd - a appeared that he would not este to exclusion your filte Argulies vikdes. We knew Her. ve much for Junalet of the l'ilender; semmig- from the U.S. But if the Argumen would totally with ches, - could be revoled from relining - which there Conversion world metrip?

Hay draited to return to Washington onor B.A. He asked in not to reveal the delasts Mite dismission — such right. On last repolate is pulling Summer fully.

[p27 begins]

decided to prepare our draft of the relevant paragraph about what would be acceptable to us.

We realised that we could go no further indeed some of us were worried that we had already gone too far in evening [sic: even] considering the Special Commission, the withdrawal - or agreement that we would not enter the exclusion zones if the Argentines withdrew. We knew that we must get a guarantee of the islanders' security from the US. But if the Argentines would totally withdraw, and could be prevented from returning -weren't these concessions worth making?

Having decided to return to Washington & not B.A. he asked us not to reveal the details of the discussions – quite right. One can't negotiate in public successfully.

We had to your to Parliament the L'anti 1983 - worden n' notioned from note.

Parliament was understanding that day - and in other debates. That we couldn't neved the delants of the regoliations. shorty after the epinop suches The Itaig was on the Wephone. He had been having bown from B.A. that We U.S. was not being "even handed" as between · Aprilia. He was jour to Lan to make a statement it he was ever to be alle to relien to B.A to continue the réptialions. Problèmes corse over to une of Ascension Island. We were hamp to put an enormous amount. A equipment, planer of ships through there which required enter state , stores and feel. In market the U.S.

[p28 begins]

We had to report to Parliament the following day.

Easter 198<u>3</u> - written in retrospect from notes

Parliament was understanding that day - and in other debates - that we couldn't reveal the details of the negotiations.

Shortly after the opening speeches Mr
Haig was on the telephone. He had been
having trouble from B.A. that the
US was not being "even-handed" as between
Argentina & Britain. He was going to
have to make a statement if he was ever
to be able to return to B.A. to continue the
negotiations. Problems arose over the use of
Ascension Island. We were having to put
an enormous amount of equipment, planes
& ships through there which required extra
staff, stores and fuel. In practice the U.S.

was being splendidly helpful but B.A. was complaining and it was supposed that the statement would violable a passye to the effect, that only round Jaulies were beig remitted. This would have made We inpossible for us and I had to visit the although the base was American the Tolands wen British soweign tendory and we mustlike them as much as we wish. Fortuntlety Al Haje was very co-spendire and the maller of, Ascension was not, menhored in the statement.

The committee met apani on L'arter Themsday morning - not- in No 10 hot in the M.O.I). De Lead to send more hoops to join the Tark Force, to agree the new draft about the wented intering

[p29 begins]

was being splendidly helpful but B.A. was complaining and it was suggested that the statement would include a passage to the effect that only 'normal' facilities were being permitted. This would have made life impossible for us and I had to insist that although the base was American the islands were British sovereign territory and we must use them as much as we wish. Fortunately Al Haig was very co-operative and the matter of Ascension was not mentioned in the statement.

The Committee met again on
Easter Thursday morning - not in No.10 but in
the M.O.D. We had to send more
troops to join the Task Force, to agree
the new draft about the vexed "interim

Newood dank and to apre a nessage to the U.S. shusing the read for the U.S. to play an important role in enforcing the agreement during the interior revised and Ensuing that often it learner ded the Argorinians did not alleight another morrier. I'm ahaid me rever for very far in moling the Americans in either of these ways. We had not at M.O.I) so that the whole committee could have a thorough nullary briefre. It was in polant that we know meanly the forus ranged against us. their capability, The effects of the Antarche winter and the options available. At the time many resple had the idea that if the repolicitions were not successful, the Tank Force would blocach the Fulhlands and

[p30 begins]

period" and to agree a message to the U.S. stressing the need for the <u>U.S.</u> to play an important role in enforcing the agreement during the interim period <u>and</u> <u>ensuring</u> that after it terminated the Argentinians did not attempt another invasion. I'm afraid we never got very far in involving the Americans in either of these ways.

We had met at M.O.D so that
the whole Committee could have a thorough
military briefing. It was important that
we knew precisely the forces ranged against
us, their capability, the effects of the
Antarctic winter and the options available.
At the time many people had the idea that
if the negotiations were not successful, the
Task Force could blocade [sic: blockade] the Falklands and

mount several Commando ly re raids. Anyon who had harboured such ideas was Doon dischused of them. Quite apart from the Cosses of. anicelle which could be expected (and the los animals carriers only had 20 Idennes) the difficulties of maintaining them is storing seas were enormous. It was dean that we had a period of 2.3 wells in I lay during which we should have to land, it Much a landing were feasiler without betile Casuellier. Un were faced almost unnidicately with problems of how much more equipment; hoops, and aniagt to send - how to deal with P.O. Wi what to do dod. I heavie and when. There was to be no respect of all. Theirson ruste made quilly. I boked from the Chiefs of state to the committee. It was a bot for them to take and I reduced they were

[p31 begins]

mount several Commando type raids. Anyone who had harboured such ideas was soon disabused of them. Quite apart from the losses of aircraft which could be expected (and the two aircraft carriers only had 20 Harriers) the difficulties of maintaining them in stormy seas were enormous. It was clear that we had a period of 2-3 weeks in May during which we should have to land, if such a landing were feasible without terrible casualties. We were faced almost immediately with problems of how much more equipment, troops and aircraft to send - how to deal with POWs, what to do about South Georgia and when. There was to be no respite <u>at all</u>. Decisions must be made quickly. I looked from the Chiefs of Staff to the Committee. It was a lot for them to take and I realised they were

Donewhol- sturred (mysen come of Sfo-Ibbra who was chearly aware). By this time We press had forto know we were ell al-M.O.D. I remember saying that everyone nust book worlither as they left- and we would Mail- to later the requirer decisions the Jollovije day. (1 he M.D.I). were maj nificent. al-Planipo the logisties. Recourté for mon muchan! ships rules of enjagement. more troops Came through thise and Jan-. Sometimes 1 realise that we can take things a day da line which would be impossible it they all Came d'us dronce. Soit wontok with the Fulhlands. The initial Tark Form seemed lig but a venil-able Armede was to follow.

Our mani task on the Furley

[p32 begins]

somewhat stunned (except of course the S. of S. [Secretary of State] for

Defence who was already aware). By this time the press had got to know we were all at M.O.D. I remember saying that everyone must look confident as they left and we would start to take the requisite decisions the following day.

The M.O.D were magnificent at planning the logistics. Requests for more merchant ships, rules of engagement, more troops came through thick and fast. Sometimes I realise that we can take things a day at a time which would be impossible if they all came at us at once. So it was to be with the Falklands. The initial Task Force seemed big but a veritable Armada was to follow.

Our main task on the Friday

Was to comider and approve the Culu J. L'yogener for trans, J. villi the 200 mile 200 round Lout arongin, and for repossession of South acongin. It was the first time any Now had had the awerone responsibility of ensuing that Our Arned Forces had the right, vistualist. that very were clear and that we had Covered all possible werteralities. At no line nunt they even be in deph'aulty became of our lade of foresight. We customed the Chiefs of Malt Cantally and often a long dismission and close enamiclos un groved them. I lary others were to follow as each new Phone of the operation had to be considered.

We had other things to consider. Vulcan bombus had been converted to in-flying repulling and one of the remspapers had found out. Usually

[p33 begins]

was to consider and approve the Rules of Engagement for transit, for within the 200 mile zone round South Georgia, and for repossession of South Georgia.

It was the first time any of us had had the awesome responsibility of ensuring that our Armed Forces had the right instructions, that they were clear and that we had covered all possible eventualities. At no time must they ever be in difficulty because of our lack of foresight. We questioned the Chiefs of Staff carefully and after a long discussion and close examination we approved them. Many others were to follow as each new phase of the operation had to be considered.

We had other things to consider. Vulcan bombers had been converted to in-flight refuelling and one of the newspapers had found out. Would they

run a Siane story that we could therefore reach the Agestinan mainland - whith we had so interlos of doip. We decided there was nothing we could do to much any such report. I had also received a reportfrom President Regan saying that - Catherin was arrupin to avoid will!! There was no deficulty is replying to that one! Al Haig had the wremidle laste of returns to F.A. vilt our modified proposels.

He was having a very definable line with the justa. I was at the present over the westered and had to return to No. 10 on Dalmiday everif to recent a lelephone cell for President Reagan. For some reason the duck before he was not worked well to

[p34 begins]

run a scare story that we could therefore reach the Argentinian mainland - which we had no intention of doing. We decided there was nothing we could do to prevent any such report. I had also received a report from President Reagan saying that Galtieri was anxious to avoid conflict!! There was no difficulty in replying to that one! Al Haig had the unenviable task of returning to B.A. with our modified proposals.

He was having a very difficult time with the junta. I was at Chequers over the weekend and had to return to No.10 on Saturday evening to receive a telephone call from President Reagan. For some reason the direct telephone line was not working well to

Chapmens. B.A. apparently was wanting fulter Concessions from us- ever worth they were the approved to now fulter and Printers. I said we could go no fulter and Printers. Recyan afreed that it would not.

On borday we wanted to know exactly Where things slood on the regotations and whatwas the level then buje dismoved in B.A. Later that day further delaits arrived . They did not- med- Om requirements expecially on The paremountry of the wisher of the Vilanders. It was clear that Angertera was higher to lues what The had later by fore. We apred site Hay that he should fo to Washington from B.D. and not. Come on to honder We would let him have a detailed commentary on his Calcit popolals. We also authorned the operation to

[p35 begins]

Chequers. B.A. apparently was wanting further concessions from us - even though <u>they</u> were the aggressors. I said we could go <u>no further</u> and President Reagan <u>agreed</u> that it would not be reasonable to ask us to move further.

On Monday we wanted to know exactly where things stood on the negotiations and what was the text then being discussed in B.A.

Later that day further details arrived. They did not meet our requirements especially on the paramountcy of the wishes of the Islanders. It was clear that Argentina was trying to keep what she had taken by force. We agreed with Haig that he should go to Washington from B.A. and not come on to London. We would let him have a detailed commentary on his latest proposals.

We also authorised the operation to

repossers Sheorgie. As worth happered this was to later longer to star was the obejes arweid in a force u pale which laster for fund days.

The Jollowip day, having received a nessy, fon Haje, we agreed that Francis Should to to Washington with our Coulá-poposeds to Hay's latest D.A. Proposeds They were dreedful - ever Hay admitted thatthey were a sempricant step backwards from We Lordon list is each of the areas of grectest- importance - the loguem republished. the vien admissiplion and with drawal. Om flut. was to stand of al- 1750m. and wither 15 days vanto redeptoy to usual operating leses on areas. The anangements for when administration

[p36 begins]

repossess S. Georgia. As events happened this was to take longer to start than we anticipated because the ships arrived in a Force 11 gale which lasted for several days.

The following day, having received a message from Haig, we agreed that Francis should go to Washington with our counter-proposals to Haig's latest BA proposals. They were dreadful - even Haig admitted that they were a significant step backwards from the London text in each of the areas of greatest importance - the long term negotiations, the interim administration and withdrawal.

Our fleet was to stand off at 1750nm [nautical miles] and within

15 days was to redeploy to usual operating bases or areas. The arrangements for interim administration

World have from the Dynamas 2 reps. on lack courcil. Residence, ownership, disposition of property should all be promoted of facilitated between the Mander Agentina. There would be Proposals for compendation of islanders who did not with to remain to. It was of Cour a complete Tota-over within the Interni Revied. And having for the Brink Forum outof the way the Depotentians would have returned at any line. Al Hay was not for to Pullish the tent, but menty say he had finished that phon of his efforts.

De agreed that frame in his dismission should be frieded by our counter-nopords and should request on the search of the islands.

[p37 begins]

would have given the Argentinians 2 reps on each council. Residence, ownership, disposition of property should all be promoted & facilitated between the Islands & Argentina. There would be proposals for compensation of islanders who did not wish to remain etc. It was of course a complete take-over within the interim period. And having got the British Forces out of the way the Argentinians could have returned at any time. Al Haig was not going to publish the text, but merely say he had finished that phase of his efforts.

We agreed that Francis in his discussions should be guided by our <u>counter-proposals</u> and should request an American guarantee on the security of the islands.

On Dahirday the 24th April Francis
returned from Washigton. This was to be
one of the most- crucial days is the
Fachlands story and a with cal one for
me personally.

Early on Palentlay morning Francis

Came to my study is No 10 to test he

the results of his efforts. The documents

be brought back was a complete self-out.

It differed infinitesimially from the D.A last.

In one respect it was work - our rand

forces would have to be 2000 an or more

away by the cold of the swort day often

aperical.

closeress of hostilities and the need to mentthem. It is a posseiful persuader and

[p38 begins]

On Saturday the 24th April Francis returned from Washington. This was to be one of the most crucial days in the Falklands story and a critical one for me personally.

Early on Saturday morning Francis came to my study in No.10 to tell me the results of his efforts. The document he brought back was a complete sell-out. It differed infinitesimally from the B.A. text. In one respect it was worse - our naval forces would have to be 2000nm or more away by the end of the seventh day after agreement.

Haig had obviously played upon the closeness of hostilities and the need to prevent them. He is a powerful persuader

aryone the 6the side of the Fable nunt Sland up to him and not five fround.

he had returned with were totally unacaptable. They would not the Fathlanders of them freedom and Britain of her horsen and respect.

Clearly Hairy had fol- at him with the conjunct. That can hostilities were close, this was the last chance of a political that the follows. It I suffered that if we did not agree a last that they could put to the Apprehicans that we might be on our own. It was supported about. Our capacity to achieve a satisfactory military solution and thought without staying without south evaporate quicky distributed that would evaporate quicky distributed that had been fixed.

[p39 begins]

and anyone the other side of the table <u>must</u> stand up to him and <u>not give ground</u>.

I told Francis that the terms he had returned with were totally unacceptable. They would rob the Falklanders of their freedom and Britain of her honour and respect.

Clearly Haig had got at him with the argument that as hostilities were close, this was the last chance of a political solution. He (Haig) suggested that if we did not agree a text that Haig could put to the Argentinians then we might be on our own. He was sceptical about our capacity to achieve a satisfactory military solution and thought international support would evaporate quickly after the first shot had been fired.

Hair repured our final converts and arriver to his less by Sat. evening Washing ton time.

time.

I repected to Francis that we could not aught them. They were a told rebeat wheat for our fundamental position. He said he thought we should acceptation. We were at logger teads.

b. 15 p.. Saluday everip. The rest of Willlay 1 spect company the four tents

that we had considered one the whole of

the repolation demonstrating how law our

position had detendented and how the

Formul 1 standes were being believed. I content

for the Ah to come to No. 10. as room as he

could be found. The message went costing the

[p40 begins]

Haig required our final comments and answer to his text by <u>Sat. evening Washington time</u>.

I repeated to Francis that we could not accept them. They were a total retreat from our fundamental position. He said he thought we should accept them. We were at loggerheads.

We had arranged a meeting for 6.15 p.m Saturday evening. The rest of that day I spent comparing the <u>four texts</u> that we had considered over the whole of the negotiations demonstrating how far our position had deteriorated and how the Falkland Islands were being betrayed. I asked for the A.G. [Attorney General] to come to No.10 as soon as he could be found. The message went astray & he

went to the F.O. Less than an home before He meeting He mistelie was discovered the care to No 10 only to contain all my worstleans. Nevertheless, and despré my clian views expressed that morning. Francis had put in a paper to the committee reconnendop acceptance of the Hay leaves. this paper admitted that there were obvious Objections of minimple but not sitt standing Those and the difficulties they would weekwith Parliament and pulsic opinion he recommended that we areyst the dealt- on We founds that the awargement offued the burthare of a recepted solution and was clearly preferche to the military allendent. A former Peters Levelog + ment Foreign Secretary 1, Prient recommendajo

[p41 begins]

went to the F.O. [Foreign Office]. Less than an hour before the meeting the mistake was discovered & he came to No.10 only to confirm all my worst fears. Nevertheless, and despite my clear views expressed that morning, Francis had put in a paper to the Committee recommending acceptance of the Haig terms. His paper admitted that there were obvious objections of principle but notwithstanding those and the difficulties they would create with Parliament and public opinion he recommended that we accept the draft on the grounds that the arrangement offered the best chance of a peaceful solution and was clearly preferable to the military alternative. A former Defence Secretary & present Foreign Secretary of Britain recommending

Place at the mile that it fore through the committee I could not have played.

Shorty before 6p. resple were
assenting outside the cabular room. And
Francis was bying to getter synt. I
asked Willie White law to come one me and
lold him I would not accept their line
and Juve him my reasons. As changs, he
backed my judgment.

The needing began the foreign fewlay put his paper a recommended that But shows we come is the plan. But shows we come is the plan. But shows been wanted. Apparation on my point had not been wanted. I with though the thirt clause by down and what it meast - how come we had not accepted what it meast - how come we had now accepted should been rejected, why had are not initial as a new name on telf-deleghinden.

[p42 begins]

peace at that price. Had it gone through the Committee I could not have stayed.

Shortly before 6 p.m people were assembling outside the cabinet room. And Francis was trying to get their support. I asked Willie Whitelaw to come & see me and told him I could not accept these terms and gave him my reasons. As always, he backed my judgment.

The meeting began, the Foreign
Secretary put his paper & recommended that
we concur in the plan. But 5 hours
preparation on my part⁹ had not been wasted.
I went through the text clause by clause
asking what it meant - how come we had
now accepted what had been rejected, why had we
not insisted as a minimum on self-determination

⁹ MT originally wrote 'point' then altered it to 'part'.

how has he come to accept onlinely unlimited Argunie vinipralis and aquindis of mopels on a equal basis. Thetal blaves badad up my when metalisa, Ceni was very suphed of the agreement and distributed it. But John Not found the procedured way through breame he didn't blu it wife and apred we could not acust it. His proposal was that we should make no Convert on the drell but they to put it to the Azertinians. If they accepted it we should undoubtelly be satis a deshiand Poslion but we could then put the miller to Parliament in the light of that acceptance.

[It sinds) rejected it land we thought they would because it is villally impossible for a military jula to vite draw) then we would mye the U.S. to come down on our side as Hay had indicated he would monthed we did we

[p43 begins]

how had he come to accept virtually unlimited Argentine immigration and acquisition of property on an equal basis. Michael Havers backed up my interpretation. Cecil was very sceptical of the agreement and disliked it. But John Nott found the procedural way through because he didn't like it either and agreed we could not accept it. His proposal was that we should make no comment on the draft but tell Haig to put it to the Argentinians. If they accepted it we should undoubtedly be put in a difficult position but we could then put the matter to Parliament in the light of that acceptance. If they (the Junta) rejected it (and we thought they would because it is virtually impossible for a military junta to withdraw) then we could urge the US to come down on our side as Haig had indicated he would provided we did not

buch the rejolutions. So it was decided. We sent a message at the appointed time indicating that as the Agentinians had stated the appearion, and on purpose had ben to ensure true early withdrawal in accordence with the family Council resolution, we charge. He mut the was for they to put his ideas to them unjusts and is the lightof what they said we would then Corrider them in Cabriet.

So the "cuisin" pasted, the wish of Britain's Loron.

Other things had bun happenge that week. On the Thurday, Galteri had wish the Fathlands and his visit was Marked across on T.V' screens.

[p44 begins]

break the negotiations. So it was decided. We sent a message at the appointed time indicating that as the Argentinians had started the aggression, and our purpose had been to ensure their early withdrawal in accordance with the Security Council resolution, we thought the next step was for Haig to put his ideas to them urgently and in the light of what they said we would then consider them in Cabinet.

So the "crisis" passed, the crisis of Britain's honour.

Other things had been happening that week. On Thursday, Galtieri had visited the Falklands and his visit was splashed across our TV screens.

But there had been unother huller which had made the decision on the Delaiday every one of very day feeling.

On War Thunday wonigo (22 nd April) · Vie CDS and John Not came to the me ungerty. Our special Forms Lad landed on a glawi i South hongin to Cany out a reconnaissance. There was a coul wind which blus all the snow from the glavin and there was no way they would dig in and luss Dam. They sent a merrage to thes Antini orling for heliopless to lette them 0H. The frist beliropher came is - it-Crarbed. The mouthridness was so tad. The Same thing had happened to the triond We didn't was whether all lives had been los or not. It was a territic start to the campagn. Was the weather forige to bruke

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But there had been another matter which had made the decision on the Saturday evening one of very deep feeling.

On that Thursday evening (22nd April) the CDS [Admiral Lewin] and John Nott came to see me urgently. Our Special Forces had landed on a glacier in South Georgia to carry out a reconnaissance. There was a cruel wind which blew all the snow from the glacier and there was no way they could dig in and keep warm. They sent a message to HMS Antrim asking for helicopters to take them off. The first helicopter came in - it crashed, the snowblindness was so bad. The same thing had happened to the second. We didn't know whether all lives had been lost or not. It was a terrible start to the campaign. Was the weather going to beat

On compe and bravey. And right after beginning had we lost not only 2 telisopleus but 16 n1) SAS and helisple cres. Thy hear was heavy as I charged to go to a devie at the Marsion Home to support Te Circ I rent, and to Speak. 1 Wordered Low I could correct my feelings. whether this was an oner and was there worse to come. Was the laste has had her Ousebes impossère. Just as l'reacted Te bollon of the stancare Clive came rushing out of the other - a third helicophin. (a Weren) had landed on the glaver picked up all the men setely and the other his Lelieples cress. I west out washing Or ain. Nothing else is the world meltined the men were sole. What a marvellous piece.

[p46 begins]

our courage and bravery. And right at the beginning had we lost not only 2 helicopters but 16 or 17 SAS and helicopter crews.

My heart was heavy as I changed to go to a dinner at the Mansion House to support the Civic Trust, and to speak. I wondered how I could conceal my feelings, whether this was an omen and was there worse to come. Was the task we had set ourselves impossible. Just as I reached the bottom of the staircase Clive [Whitmore] came rushing out of the office - a third helicopter (a Wessex) had landed on the glacier picked up all the men safely and the other two helicopter crews. I went out walking on air. Nothing else in the world mattered - the men were safe. What a marvellous pilot.

I boute lette - when I was in the Fachlands. Jan. 1983 - I met him on HMS. Antim. A wonderful ruson but so moderer and quely noferrand. He said he had never had no may resple is his helitoples. But though his rupneme slaid and comage and calm. all was well. We delasted another ships HMS Brillians to go from the main lark Jorce to South Googia to make up the Lelisper fore and five symme. Alla that and following the deficult and decisive Daturday, things began to powell in south Georgia. On forus landed on Dunday and Look aryticken. Then

One of our rations spotted an Agentine Submanne on the sulare but about to submerge and it was successfully captured. Astir - an

[p47 begins]

Months later - when I was in the Falklands, January 1983, I met him on HMS Antrim. A wonderful person but so modest and quietly professional. He said he had never had so many people in his helicopter. But through his supreme skill and courage and calm, all was well. We detached another ship HMS Brilliant to go from the main task force to South Georgia to make up the helicopter force and give support.

After that, and following the difficult and decisive Saturday, things began to go well in South Georgia. Our forces landed on Sunday and took Grytviken. Then one of our sailors spotted an Argentine submarine (Santa Fe) on the surface but about to submerge and it was successfully captured. Astiz - an

Anjortinan soldien wanted by hoth French for deeple muchen was in thouse of the gainson at hyterlan and numerical. His applied was to five us preblems, as the accurate convention on prisoners of wan didn't permit us to hard him over to French on Sweder. He had to be returned to the Aryenter.

Chepus, and went over to see the Queen che without. It was wonderful to be alle personally to five her the personally to five her the personal to her.

I returned to the personal solute awaiting the release of the rews and the confirmation of the rews and the confirmation of the signal. I fell that Tohn Nog should

[p48 begins]

Argentinian soldier wanted by both France & Sweden for alleged murder was in charge of the garrison at Grytviken and surrendered. His capture was to give us problems, as the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war didn't permit us to hand him over to France or Sweden. He had to be returned to Argentina.

I learned the news late afternoon at Chequers, and went over to see the Queen at Windsor. It was wonderful to be able personally to give her the news that one of her islands had been restored to her.

I returned to Chequers Downing Street awaiting the release of the news and the confirmation of the signal. I felt that John Nott should

have the privilege of announce it so for him along to No. 10. The Mandonder (mess obtained the mess release. We went out to arrowne the food news to the assented career crews. Man I took days + days to get photographs back - their was one of our mollens throughout the Carpaign.

The recopline of South hisyon gave the Fathland literatus fred head.

But the mess assumed that to would only be a matter of days before we need that fathlands. There were many more arrivary days orwells before that happened.

[p49 begins]

have the privilege of announcing it so got him along to No.10. Mr Macdonald (Press Officer from the M.O.D) joined us & together we drafted the press release. We went out to announce the good news to the assembled camera crews. Alas it took days and days to get photographs back - that was one of our problems throughout the campaign.

The recapture of South Georgia gave the Falkland Islanders great heart. But the press assumed that it would only be a matter of days before we retook the Falklands. There were many more anxious days and weeks before that happened.

It had indeed been an evertful Wedland. One wert from near desparie to contident reassmane. On the Junday I had asked notony the Engine Committee to Checuers but all the chief ? That widnessing Admind Fuldhoise and Olajon. Gevend Obone. Alle Turch we had a meeting to discuss both the military and political problems. It is inportant. that those respondie for cech Mould understand the other. There was still a 64 of slaving to do and we were despertly vorseit about Arestré sulmaures and the carrier progsthe 25th 1 May." They represented a real thust to any landing. We also

[p50 begins]

It had indeed been an eventful weekend. One went from near despair to confident reassurance. On the Sunday I had asked not only the Emergency Committee to Chequers but all the Chiefs of Staff including Admiral Fieldhouse and Major-General Moore. After lunch we had a meeting to discuss both the military and political problems. It was important that those responsible for each should understand the other. There was still a lot of planning to do and we were desperately worried about Argentine submarines and the carrier group the "25th of May". They represented a real threat to any landing. We also

heard from Haip that he had revered Our Salunday nessage and would be pulley his ideas to the Agentine for.

The following day we agreed the answerent of a Total Kreelman Done and the R.O.E. It applied to all arrught as well as ships. It meant that be had to do weguing possilie to don the aipM de Port Startes.

Al Have was at an OAS Continue that day and he made a free and forthytis speech. OAS insiled that S.CR. 502 he observed but recognised Arjentine sovercijnty,

[p51 begins]

heard from Haig that he had received our Saturday message and would be putting his ideas to the Argentine govt.

The following day we agreed the announcement of a <u>Total</u> Exclusion Zone and the R.O.E. It applied to all aircraft as well as ships. It meant that we had to do everything possible to close the airport at Port Stanley.

Al Haig was at an OAS Conference that day and he made a full and forthright speech. OAS insisted that S.C.R 502 be observed but recognised Argentine sovereignty. Written on 10 DOWNING STREET
L'anti Sunday
1983 - a hum 4le.

We were all aware that. He repolished Could not go on villentity; that soon we should have to make critical decision abouta landing. I lenes of the work forige on i Mo) about the delasted planning and the possible choice of landing areas. There was at the line a technic of discomfort on on baddutes that we ment he fiving up 150 hunch in the negotiations. But in parting the Home the rim that we numb go on ton reptieting and not me form until mys holisis Jailed reverted. This was experiently so of I like Fool. osome 1 his parts. Knowing the Lier military limitates 1 has to say in the Hour our rover gain that no milliang , legs were busp held is because of rejolitisis. And they rever were.

[p52 begins]

[MT changes to black felt tip pen]

Written on Easter Sunday 198<u>3</u> - a year after. [Sunday 3 April 1983]

We were all aware that the negotiations could not go on indefinitely; that soon we should have to make critical decisions about a landing. I knew of the work going on in MOD about the detailed planning and the possible choice of landing areas. There was at this time a feeling of discomfort on our backbenches that we might be giving up too much in the negotiations. But in part of the House the view that we must go on & on negotiating and not use force until negotiations failed prevailed. This was especially so of Michael Foot and some of his party. Knowing the tight military timetable I had to say in the House over and over again that no military steps were being held up because of negotiations. And they never were.

About this line I received a message widness for the President of Phonis through a personal mersanger that although he did notwish to be unshed taking sides is the dispulé - he would gladly movide a verme for a meeting between those Tomered it is would be helpful. This message committed with the OAS mely on contents Hay to suggest that a much simple formula could be launched at their meeting of the Marians were prepared to p.d. is. But Have lunted down the suffertion and I down whether the Mercian volt is Zent. Lan proposed to Aprilians on Tunday requestion a reply by modnytie (17,A. time) on 27/21 April. We had of come by the line retailer South appir home une still aprelet under his til. to vitt dies half om form vitter ? days

[p53 begins]

About this time I received a message indirectly from the President of Mexico through a personal messenger that although he did not wish to be involved taking sides in the dispute - he would gladly provide a venue for a meeting between those concerned if it would be helpful. This message coincided with the OAS meeting and we contacted Haig to suggest that a much simpler formula could be launched at that meeting if the Mexicans were prepared to put it. But Haig turned down the suggestion and I doubt whether the Mexicans would in fact have proposed it. Instead Haig passed his text to the Argentinians on Tuesday (27 April) requesting a reply by midnight (B.A. time) on 27/28 April. We had of course by this time retaken South Georgia but we were still expected under his text to withdraw half our forces within 7 days.

We could never never have augrest the Hay formula. It was however Cuile tough in the Day he put to to the Tunte - no emerdments were permission and he imposed the O huit-home himle relevent to. He do esses that if the Brutines did not respond postwery to that spreak he would require mapoids as buy hunes down. Mom meting Wet day (Tuesday 27 Brui) we worth- he Led nothing to wait before a delimitive rept vas received. In the meantime we went on to other humain northy out the military devision that would need to be later on the morrow so that he had a little have to think about them - for maple , should be vertine the use of refuelled Valens to bombite Pristentes aufald whom the Teach 1= ou amind: whether the considerable amphilions form that was buje held of Mentinos should proved.

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We could never have accepted the Haig formula. He was however quite tough in the way he put it to the Junta - no amendments were permissible and he imposed the strict time limit referred to. He also added that if the Argentinians did <u>not</u> respond <u>positively</u> to that approach he would regard the proposals as being turned down. At our meeting that day (Tuesday 27th April) we thought we had not long to wait before a definitive reply was received. In the meantime we went on to the other business sorting out the military decisions that would need to be taken on the morrow so that we had a little time to think about them - for example should we venture the use of refuelled Vulcans to bomb the Port Stanley airfield when the Task Force arrived: whether the considerable amphibious force that was being held off Ascension should proceed.

The merchant. Hear that hed him charted had reached comidentle proportion and the new aprile the hermany commences had ber cameil out. to eight laubene and the Ujarde was a symboline advantument. Lo. what. Traini could do Someon everyone, the whole population was involved in this carpagin and nothing was too much hothe. We of women had many answerter to kear -Om greet Amed. of shins was well wither.
The possibility of accept for their animals · canvi os Amaries and the mospet of love a ship causing laye mental of hosps was lender. No en did not week to amphibiam unis to sail south before it var reunery. That day in dist automi the Vileum or ensuited Hunter antight to fo to Arencesi vi can they have reeded.

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The merchant fleet that had been chartered had reached considerable proportions and the rate at which the necessary conversions had been carried out to e.g. the Canberra and the Uganda was a superlative advertisement for what Britain <u>could do</u>. Someone <u>everyone</u>, [sic] the whole population was involved in this campaign and nothing was too much trouble. We of course had many anxieties to bear our great Armada of ships was well within the possibility of attack from their [Argentinian] aircraft carrier & submarines and the prospect of losing a ship carrying large numbers of troops was terrible. So we did not want the amphibious unit to sail south before it was necessary. That day we did authorise the Vulcans & associated Hercules aircraft to go to Ascension in case they were needed.

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had thought - although the military menon
continued at the possible speed.

On deading for an Applied righty passed, and another the hours was fiven the mediane was friend here was friendly friendly. We reported to full Calini, let is the morning. They shared our view that it would be falled to allow deadlines to this

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had sinks better to blay slating that the

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But things did not move as quickly on the Diplomatic side as we had thought - although the military preparations continued at all possible speed.

One deadline for an Argentine reply passed and another 24 hours was given, the new time was fixed at midnight <u>Washington</u> time on 29/30 Apl [April], i.e. Thursday/Friday. We reported to full Cabinet later in the morning. They shared our view that it could be fatal to allow deadlines to slip.

After Cabinet I sent a message to President Reagan saying that in our view the Argentinians must now be regarded as having been rejected by the Arge rejected the American proposals [crossing through in original text]. They had ignored the deadline and Costa Mendez had sent a letter to Haig stating that the U.S. proposals fell short of Argentine demands

and did not soluty Apreline aprillion in reletion to Sovereigny. Al Hay had periously told Francis thethe had made it dear to the Justa Wel-y they did not accept, the U.S. would pupped m. We rejurded that point as Lewing been needed and latited would Jul depty let down it. their syspert was not tenow forthoming. De fell that Tilan other U.S. should now be seen to be on the same sick slaunty Marding for their fundamental values on which the western way of the depends. The President. M Hay, and we behen. Ih Wentryn wer negrihier. Lalí on the Friday, Hay answed public nyppet for us in the form of a ban on aims

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and did not satisfy Argentine aspirations in relation to Sovereignty. Al Haig had previously told Francis that he had made it clear to the Junta that if they did not accept, the U.S. would support us. We regarded that point as having been reached and Cabinet would feel deeply let down if that support was not know [sic: now] forthcoming. We felt that Britain and the US should now be seen to be on the same side staunchly standing for those fundamental values on which the Western way of life depends.

The President, Al Haig, and we believe Mr Weinberger were magnificent. Later on the Friday, Haig announced public support of us in the form of a ban on arms

nous to Aportine, complet with friended restribisis and help for us over requests for "material sypport. We were very The Principal surme a wonderful riphy Theoret overy greated. I From then on the, Hay Nuibages coulded do croyet for is. Whaten is wanted they did then white to procure. That day we devided that. Francis should go to U.S. to the they No viil. the U.N. - su Perez de Cuellar. We also had to comitte whether the TCRC Could be persueded to have a neuron on the Fulleres and whatmore could be don to help 3 jourdation who had been putries delenhón awaiting 'tural' in Apentine. Further un devided to high the Opp to parket On Pring Consello- leine about the rejohelis of allogh or couldn't reved everything become Hay did not want to publish them.

[p58 begins]

sales to Argentina, coupled with financial restrictions and help for us over requests for 'materiel' support. We were very pleased & very grateful. [The President sent me a wonderful reply.] From then on he, Haig and Weinberger couldn't do enough for us. Whatever we wanted they did their utmost to procure. That day we decided that Francis should go to the U.S. to see Haig & to visit the U.N. & see Perez de Cuellar. We also had to consider whether the ICRC could be persuaded to have a presence on the Falklands and what more could be done to help 3 journalists who had been put into detention awaiting 'trial' in Argentina. Further we decided to brief the Oppn [Opposition] parties on Privy Counsellor terms about the negotiations although we couldn't reveal everything because Haig did <u>not</u> want to publish them.

That day We TEZ came it's force. A number of difficult nothers assailed us. We remarried desperetity warried about the animals camin which so la had only been righted there by the sub. both times ontride to T.E.Z. Neverther she was a thust to our ships Turnly his is wer her amounted owner group + derlugers canying Liseat. Princomy. on 23-1 April we had fiver a friend warming to Argentine that' any approach on the pour of Aprehant Danships which would ans met to a third, to wie been with miller of Total Franci He South Marke would be holle and drew sik accordingly. The animals could Can 500 min e day and her aringt a futher

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That day the TEZ [Total Exclusion Zone] came into force.

A number of difficult problems assailed us. We remained desperately worried about the aircraft carrier which so far had only been sighted twice by the subs, both times outside the T.E.Z. Nevertheless she was a threat to our ships & supply line as were her associated cruiser group & destroyers carrying Exocet. Previously, on 23rd April we had given a general warning to Argentina that any approach on the part of Argentine warships which could amount to a threat to interference with the mission of British Forces in the South Atlantic would be regarded as hostile and dealt with accordingly. The aircraft carrier could cover 500 miles a day and her aircraft a further

shown she was movided it was southern 30° and early beginned let and outside tembrid water of 12 miles. Much an electe was written the material was written where and within the other of the standard of 15. N. W. waster. In was I the 27-4 April mothers no further warpo

The Units of Staff Led also decided

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500. We therefore authorised an attack wherever she was provided it was south of 35 degrees and east of longitude 48 and outside territorial waters of 12 miles. Such an attack was within the inherent right of self defence and within Art. [Article] 51 of the U.N. Charter. In view of the 23rd April notification no further warning was required.

The Chiefs of Staff had also decided that we needed to send down some 3000 to 3500 more soldiers. By that time the landing site had been chosen and we were going to need far more [ground forces] than we already had on the way to fight across land. The only ship or ships available were was the QEII.

We knew too that the Port Stanley airfield would have to be attacked

their reject of weether permitted. The choice of aways head to be left to C.D.S. but we live we were fourt read every Hannin we had and willed more had to be he had one on the Market.

Group on.

That wering I had to fo to a freet relly in Stephen Hartings Contituéres. They had many the Tayes marquer 1 had wer tren. Stepter spola solution and so did Man Lemon-1707d who had been the previous M.P - c majorificant speech 1 weiferen a soussjo reuption - but more then thet. It was a very emphoned line - Brian was lengt liter and the olds of weather -distance ven deprimer to overone. And get no-one

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that night if weather permitted. The choice of aircraft had to be left to C.D.S [Chief of Defence Staff] but we knew we were going to need every Harrier we had and indeed more had to be sent down on the Atlantic Conveyor.

That evening I had to go to a great rally in Stephen Hastings' constituency. They had put up the largest marquee I had ever seen. Stephen spoke splendidly and so did Alan Lennox-Boyd who had been the previous MP - a magnificent speech. I was given a rousing reception - but more than that. It was a very emotional time - Britain was being tested and the odds of weather & distance were difficult to overcome. And yet no-one

had my down that we could would without. The repositilities on one's shoulder were express. We could only gente duison though on line. In to forme what lay cheed, syrry willed by to over-14114 e supment became we may love some leep in freids ausi the weld with me And grand-Jos We U.S. - Por Thelewon 2 New nedand was a red friend. Reit from to beginning he had the field. The obbied is a New Yealand figele to replece one of ours on peru time Nation no that our could be released for achie sence.

De staged at Milian - that mont beautiful arunhal home which belongs to Stephens with Over breekfast. Here was a betyphene call for me to say that

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had any doubt that we could & would win through. The responsibilities on one's shoulders were enormous. We could only get the decisions through on time, try to foresee what lay ahead, supply indeed try to over-supply equipment because we may lose some, keep the morale of our people & the troops high, and our friends across the world with us. And apart from the U.S. - Rob Muldoon of New Zealand was a <u>real</u> friend. Right from the beginning he led the field. He offered us a New Zealand frigate to replace one of ours on peacetime patrol so that ours could be released for active service.

We stayed at Milton - that most beautiful ancestral home which belongs to Stephen's wife. Over breakfast there was a telephone call for me to say that

the Vulcan: hed bombed Port Dlanley . So for no cornelles but it would many Lows before they returned to Bruneian. I could not tell my hosts. We Willnoon du - historio to the nectio in We can all the way back to Cheyman. It was well often 2 p. - when the vulcan and leatures arrived redsty back at Asunsian. When relief - 4 n 5 repullings and a Jantanticolly long his for the crows. This needly was a shoundon ted - allogh later such frats came to be later for granted.

[p63 begins]

the Vulcans had bombed Port Stanley. So far no casualties but it would be many hours before they returned to Ascension. I could not tell my hosts. We left soon after - listening to the radio in the car all the way back to Chequers. It was well after 2p.m when the Vulcan and tankers arrived safely back at Ascension. What a relief - 4 or 5 refuellings and a fantastically long trip for the crew. This really was a stupendous feat - although later such feats came to be taken for granted.

10 DOWNING STREET (i)

That day We Myentine Die Forme allacted on Tark Forme very Leavily vidual. the Agentinian were in a position to send phohopoph to the only would - or went. · They claimed many of our planes were shot down but Brian Handen in a famous broadcast purti resord strugie. When he said 'I could then all oil; and I counted them all back. What a velif - there was some damage burnet of 601. Newstern the allect hed her heavy and one wordered whether we would have enoyt ani-wer.

The Chequen meetings were always very food.

The combination of the "War about chip

of step and coloner the world entering

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That day [(Saturday)] the Argentine Air Force attacked our Task Force very heavily indeed. The Argentinians were in a position to send photographs to the outside world - we weren't. They claimed many of our planes were shot down but Brian Hanrahan in a famous broadcast put the record straight when he said 'I counted them all out, and I counted them all back'. What a relief - there was some damage but not a lot. Nevertheless the attack had been heavy and one wondered whether we would have enough air-cover.

I had arranged another Chequers meeting on Sunday. Decisions had to be taken. The Chequers meetings were always very good. The combination of the "War" cabinet, chiefs of staff and Cabinet Office worked extremely

bell and we were really welded into a very Mulie lean.

We not against the bedgrand of the Prenous dez's Leavy allate. Admid Puldeon said that one of our submerment had been Thedowng the Belgens which was accompanied by his dulingen cany in creater misites. The was not for ofthe wedness were and in the heft of the intelligence we had about. The interhors of the Aprelia Just, there was ors don. The war a threat. I called everyone topethe quicky - the committee (the FS word their but Si Autory Orland was the 201 and Adl Fuldhome +URAG. We decided that. Portion from should be the to alled any Aprilia rend veind on the banis qued the menion day for the aningt camei. Alle hand ur met in full formed kessoni egani and spoused renderent - we aut for the Foundands.

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well and we were really welded into a very effective team.

We met against the background of the previous day's heavy attack. Admiral Fieldhouse said that one of our submarines had been shadowing the Belgrano which was accompanied by two destroyers carrying exocet missiles. She was not far off the Exclusion Zone and in the light of the intelligence we had about the intentions of the Argentine fleet, there was no doubt there was a threat. I called everyone together quickly - the committee (the FS [Foreign Secretary] wasn't there but Sir Antony Acland was) the CDS and Adl [Admiral] Fieldhouse and the A.G. [Attorney General]. We decided that British Forces should be able to attack any Argentine naval vessel on the basis agreed the previous day for the aircraft carrier. After lunch we met in full formal session again and approved reinforcements & the QEII for the Falklands.

10 DOWNING STREET (114)

Politically we had to comitte the legal consciences if Aprelia formelly delated was on Britain - which the never did.

The F-I was not vit in that day
the was in New York calling on the fruiting.

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The new day. Monday 3 May
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later sank. The two accommon duchofun
were not bourted between slow to sich

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Politically we had to consider the legal consequences if Argentina formally declared war on Britain - which she never did.

The F.S. [Foreign Secretary] was not with us that day – he was in New York calling on the Secretary General of the UN.

We broke up desperately worried that we hadn't got or found the aircraft carrier again. We believed the navy had been reserved for a major attack on our Task Force or on the landing craft & ships in the event of a landing.

The next day, Monday 3rd May, the submarine torpedoed the Belgrano which later sank. The two accompanying destroyers were not touched but were slow to pick

up numion for the Pelpan. We knew how she had her his but it was some how before we knew she had such.

The Journe day, HMS. Shelhild was hil. by an Lisaut minde and Just burie buries of wing. They could not be formede control and she was abundaned. It was dephicult- to for mean numbers of Whore who had been lulled or wounded and it-was an answoin time for all the relation and for every one vi Milai. The resure operation transfer to harrier buttered on themes was camed out havely - but we were ideed Moded at the freience 1 the fire otherse Contain the controlled - 10 may nethered buch had burn. Shelled had that but dithi have lime to get it or to deflect the Front, while Jas not seen will too leter.

[p67 begins]

up survivors from the Belgrano. We knew she had been hit but it was some hours before we knew she had sunk.

The following day, HMS Sheffield was hit by an Exocet missile and fires were burning fiercely. They could not be got under control and she was abandoned. It was difficult to get precise numbers of those who had been killed & wounded and it was an anxious time for all the relatives and for everyone in Britain. The rescue operation & transfer to hospital treatment on Hermes was carried out bravely - but we were indeed shocked at the fierceness of the fire & that it couldn't be controlled - so many suffered such bad burns. Sheffield had chaff but didn't have time to get it up to deflect the Exocet, which was not seen until too late.

10 DOWNING STREET (*)

My forme heard that caentha were bruil it to 20 - and then 40. We never learned Low but to announce fruion ment. We would Lan Wind to reform all rent. 1,-lui frit. Burk Byselician were policy out statements some hui some fatre lespore un knew the facts and wwis Tamilies some ajoning days meter. De dro leste Havin that day - It was is had a bad day. Francis had returned from Washington and New York. Invitally Milteri There de Cueller were uno hed is new rejolisher "to fill a vanur" mue horp do per uen fre. Owney for our vierous. that would enough - i. would have the Aprilia in posteriori. It had be a reaulte arronanced by with chard

[p68 begins]

At first we heard that casualties were limited to 20 - and then to <u>40</u>. We never learned how best to announce grievous news. We would have like to inform <u>all</u> next-of-kin first. But the Argentinians were putting out statements, some true, some false before we knew the facts and wives and families spent some agonising days & nights. We also lost a Harrier that day - it was indeed a bad day.

Francis had returned from
Washington and New York. Inevitably Al Haig
& Perez de Cuellar were involved in new
negotiations "to fill a vacuum" & were trying to
get a cease-fire [sic]. Obviously from our viewpoint
that wasn't enough - it would leave the
Argentines in possession. It had to be
a ceasefire accompanied by withdrawal.

Abose all. the wither I the intendent runstre repeted i my sestiment them.

Overidet Reger myrig in de comide some U. S. / Personan Maposals.

In the meantine on on submanis had found the '25 May camin but there was a legal courties on to whether The was is tentered weller or not. She was · vi de muredle of a boy the question was whethe the whole boy was tempored weller of only the 12 miles from shore leaving the centre outrice. We had to commenté A-a outer specialist legal advisers. I called a D) committee that evering in the House a we apred she was outside lenterial volué mil sulmans could de so-she

[p69 begins]

Above all - the wishes of the islanders must be respected in any settlement of their status.

I received a letter message from President Reagan urging us to consider some U.S./Peruvian proposals.

In the meantime one of our submarines had found the '25th May' carrier but there was a legal question as to whether she was in territorial waters or not. She was in the middle of a bay & the question was whether the whole bay was territorial waters or only the 12 miles from shore leaving the centre 'outside'. We had to consult the A.G. [Attorney General] & other specialist legal advisers. I called a OD Committee that evening in the House & we agreed she was outside territorial waters & if the submarine could do so - she

should ettede. Mas the cause moved - we believe in shore and north - and we never found her again. Our answelver about the position danger she could do remained.

The Committee and Calinet whom I called toputer for a recid metig then had to comiden the U.S. Penvien proposeds before as. The Foreign Leveling warled in to augst them. He thought it would be danger to reject tag', proposal especially in view of the battle in the Doub Martie. Bresie the DFC. having been very short al. frist was shiften ground. The random they had qued were only for I worth and these world he definally about july everyone; aprend to reneral.

I was unhappy with them I and called Calmit to, etter

[p70 begins]

should attack. Alas the carrier moved – we believe inshore and north - and we never found her again. Our anxieties about the potential damage she could do remained.

[At this point MT changes to from black felt tip to blue fountain pen, probably resuming the following day]

The committee and Cabinet whom
I called together for a special meeting
then had to consider the U.S./Peruvian
proposals before us. The Foreign Secretary
wanted us to accept them. He thought
it would be damaging to reject Haig's
proposal especially in view of the battle
in the South Atlantic. Moreover the E.E.C.
having been very strong at first was shifting
ground. The sanctions they had agreed were
only for 1 month and there would be difficulty
about getting everyone's approval to renewal.
I was unhappy with them [the Peruvian proposals] and called
Cabinet together.

Cabriet didnt like them very much but apred that he must make some response. There proposeds were not very detailed, indul very let a lot to be worked out. Nevertheliss they could be aug led provided three things were made Neeledy clean: that Touth heorgia the other dependenció were outride the propositio that any intern' administration near town Mr the islandins useallée and legislation courcil and the wither of the inhabitants must be respected in the long-lain sufferent, the agreet to request their to make those amendments. Francis was doubt ful but Cabriel was from. The tenth was that now I us hims the Terms but it un would make their reasonable is the wheni and log-luin, and some the vikdrand of hypetime fores, and thurston avoid fulter loss of life - we would agre.

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Cabinet didn't like them very much but agreed that we must make some response. These proposals were not very detailed, indeed they left a lot to be worked out. Nevertheless they could be accepted provided three things were made perfectly clear: that South Georgia & the other dependencies were outside the proposals; that any interim administration must consult the islanders' executive and legislative council and the wishes of the inhabitants must be respected in the long-term settlement. We agreed to request Haig to make those amendments. Francis was doubtful but Cabinet was firm. The truth was that none of us liked the terms but if we could make them reasonable in the interim and long-term, and secure the withdrawal of Argentinian forces, and therefore avoid further loss of life - we would agree.

In Jand- Reagan and Itais accepted the amendments and forwarded the rewind learn to Peau.

But Appetra was now more whiteled in purposeds. Pour de lauten hed made cesteur proposeds which were nothing more than a framwork and are were right-back to the drawing-board of air with yet another round of purposeds. Nevertheless the framwork was a familier one to as and by this line we love all the prifalls and the things we must visit upon.

Cabriel were monvellows throughout. They
would be certain fundamental puriciples
unclutived by details. Those puriciples
had to be observed in any repolicles
sufferent and that, was ther.

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In fact Reagan and Haig accepted the amendments and forwarded the revised terms to Peru.

But Argentina was now more interested in pursuing the matter through the United Nations. Perez de Cuellar had made certain proposals which were nothing more than a framework and we were right back to the drawing-board again with yet another round of proposals. Nevertheless the framework was a familiar one to us and by this time we knew all the pit-falls and the things we must <u>insist</u> upon.

I must at this point say that
Cabinet were marvellous throughout. They
stuck to certain <u>fundamental</u> principles
uncluttered by details. Those principles
<u>had</u> to be <u>observed</u> in any negotiated
settlement and that was that.

Vik the Suling of Shelfield and the realisation that other things on sidel-duly could be danged by Enouts - we had a red Della sellar problem on our hards although Un pullie were as resolute as even. We chained it was recurrany to Lave a Malener i the House about the Permian proposeds and for Moi) to vidide culent. to which reinforcements were forige to the Fathlands - Tany Lewis was visting Noutrosse that elemen and we wanted him Jat very confident - reassump. This was ore occasión on while or numeraled in guly the P.R. reject. Argentine had rejected the Pennius Mapolds as we expected. At least we were not at fault in the eyes of the interdered commenty and the Terms ur had visibled you were recramble and

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With the [tragic] sinking of the Sheffield and the realisation that other ships on picket duty could be damaged by Exocets - we had a [real] public relations problem on our hands although the public were as resolute as ever. We decided it was necessary to have a statement in the House about the Peruvian proposals and for the MOD to indicate extent to which reinforcements were going to the Falklands - Terry Lewin was visiting Northwood that afternoon and we wanted him on T.V. to indicate his views which were in fact very confident and reassuring. This was one occasion on which we succeeded in getting the PR right. Argentina had rejected the Peruvian proposals as we expected. At <u>least we</u> were not at fault in the eyes of the international community and the terms we had insisted upon were reasonable and

Self-delementer is of come a condised Aniapie for the free world.

Francis west of to an Lite. meeting house - but in Thely um - some country house - but Could not persued them all to rerew Dardio of.

The committee (without the chiefs - 1. 8 way) had on customay Anday attenuson meeling al. Cheques. I am glad that. Cheques played quile a part in the Fathlands story. United had used il' (mili a lot- duning World war !? and its almosphere helped to get us all togetter. It was a worderful enample of how olds can be overcome with sogienen of purpose and total to-spendes. between the political or military expects.

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<u>self-determination</u> is of course a cardinal principle for the free world.

Francis went off to an E.E.C. meeting in Belgium - some country house - but could not persuade them all to renew sanctions.

The committee (without the Chiefs-of-Staff) had our customary Sunday afternoon meeting at Chequers. I am glad that Chequers played quite a part in the Falklands story. Winston had used it quite a lot during World War II and its atmosphere helped to get us all together. It was a wonderful example of how odds can be overcome with singleness of purpose and total co-operation between the political & military aspects.

a laye part the allempts to repolicle played in the Fachlands 1600y - because of course we know with the benefit of his dight that they did not runned. Put then I never they did not runned. did see how a mulitary distals, ship Could with draw unless they marged to Persuede a United Nation - Sympethetic to Deputieian severejets - that within a Joseph him soveregels would be townstand. Ou deplandée larle vas to mantain the Unted Notion principle in practice that aggression must not pay.

And so we entered another round

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hold of the military preparation. We were

all aware that we were coming to the writical

lime. If we were to land and yourses

it would have to be done somewhere between

the 16° 30 or May. The weeks, and the

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Looking back it was easy to forget what a large part the attempts to negotiate played in the Falklands story - because of course we know with the benefit of hindsight they did not succeed. But then I never did see how a military dictatorship could withdraw unless they managed to persuade a United Nations - sympathetic to Argentinian sovereignty - that within a foreseeable time sovereignty would be transferred. Our diplomatic task was to maintain the United Nations principle in practice that aggression must not pay.

And so we entered another round of negotiations. But not once did I hold up the military preparations. We were all aware that we were coming to the critical time. If we were to land and repossess it would have to be done somewhere between the 16th & 30th May. The <u>weather</u> and the

Cordilión of the hoofs when the competing Jackers. So U.N repolitions had to be completed wither 10 days on 80. 1/ they have successful. within on fundamental puriples and minimum requiements - well good, if not or they have still deagging on then if the with I still agued, we should have to fo ahead. We came to my tremodersty on Di Millong Parism who had been magnificent throughout. That Luday elternoon we discursed de thek things as well as some miliag melles which had anim. Apolle and and were flying over Du supply lines and doubters communicating their findings duck to submanies. Could we be some that if we shot at a Civil aniadr-ir would be an Aprilian one And there was a daye that Assension would be allated by a comando raid,

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conditions of the troops were the compelling factors. So U.N. negotiations had to be completed within 10 days or so. If they were successful within our <u>fundamental principles</u> and minimum requirements - well and good. If not or they were still dragging on then if the Chiefs of Staff agreed we should <u>have</u> to go ahead.

We came to rely tremendously on Sir Anthony Parsons who had been magnificent throughout. That Sunday afternoon we discussed all these things as well as some military matters which had arisen.

Argentine civilian aircraft were flying over our supply lines and doubtless communicating their findings direct to submarines. Could we be sure that if we shot at a civil aircraft, it would be an Argentinian one. And there was a danger that Ascension could be attacked by a commando raid.

All of these tings we considered mede preparadose to meet in the new this hours stays. Both the nadar characterishes and the typical flying path of an awards on surveillance helped to identify MM such recommensione missions.

In the meantine louble with the media continued. Many of the public (cicles days us) did not the allethate Partially of the BBC and I was very were sometimes reposité as ils very were rentre between Bodeni - Agentine. Me ocher Times va. Jeve shorts that they were assisting the every by open dismussions with expects on This applied to IN as much as to B.BC. This of come was the first conflictive had Joyce without consortes. The media - the dock look totally define views , I by

[p77 begins]

All of these things we considered & made preparations to meet in the next few hours & days. Both the radar characteristics and the typical flight path of an aircraft on surveillance helped to identify such reconnaissance missions. [MT added in the text some wavy lines to show the typical path of a reconnaissance plane, flying back & forth across a heading.]

In the meantime trouble with the media continued. Many of the public (including me) did not like the attitude particularly of the BBC and I was very worried about it. They were sometimes reporting as if they were neutral between Britain & Argentina. At other times we felt strongly that they were assisting the enemy by open discussions with experts on the next likely steps in the campaign. This applied to ITV as much as to BBC. This of course was the first conflict we had fought without censorship. The media and the Government took totally different views. My

Concer was always the safety of our forus. Neis war news. Our postion was made more difficult because we had limited satetule' commiculor and all Phologiaphs had to be returned by way of ship do Asurvi and then awards from there. Over the middle days of their week Precipe vistander went to Anthony Parions about withdrawd disteries interior administration no mmojidon or property acquirlos dump the viteria period and about all the Mertines nun nes prejude the issue on Sovereignety. There is for the islanders. There we Considerable dismission on the constitutional Postion 1 a United Nation administration We thought the U.N. representative could only administer the law- he could not charge it. If he were to alleget to do so, he was stiped to at though the ligitative council. We state handered efter a United States

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concern was always the safety of our forces. Theirs was <u>news</u>. Our position was made more difficult because we had limited satellite communication and all photographs had to be returned by way of ship to Ascension and then aircraft from there.

Over the middle days of that week specific instructions went to Anthony Parsons about withdrawal distances, interim administrations, no immigration or property acquisition during the interim period and above all the Argentines must <u>not</u> prejudge the issue on Sovereignty. That was for the islanders. There were considerable discussions on the constitutional position of a United Nations administration. We thought the U.N. representative could only administer the law - he could <u>not change</u> it. If he were to attempt to do so, he was obliged to act through the legislative council. We still hankered after a United States

military quantum of the origing of the islands. A quantum was readed if we could not repect our thin military deployments

On Thursday 13th Day we had

another litalist in the House. Our bulk brukes were knowing nearlest about the repolitions.

There was a notweath different in spreach on this million between Francis and regret.

On this million between Francis and regret.

On this weeker hie was not liked - a fait with this weeker hie was not liked - a fait with

That day we harded over to the ICRC at Ascersion Island all the Misoners Captured on South Gasyia. [188] They were from out to thing way to be returned to Agentine. Astri was delained.

We were reaching the end of the road is the U.N. regolators. We were admind that if our specific conditions

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military guarantee of the integrity of the islands. A guarantee was needed if we could not repeat our then military deployments.

On Thursday 13th May we had another debate in the House. Our backbenchers were becoming restless about the negotiations. There was a noticeable difference in approach on these matters between Francis and myself. His weaker line was not liked - a fact which he picked up quickly.

That day we handed over to the ICRC at Ascension Island all the prisoners captured on South Georgia (188). They were flown out to Uruguay to be returned to Argentina. Astiz_was detained.

We were reaching the end of the road in the U.N. negotiations. We were advised that if our specific conditions

was speet out. We repolation would end their other and we night to Maned, on the other hand the Mynthians were melaripe contributions statements about sovereignty. There had been a rumou that they would not. Prejudge the issue of sovereignty but the openior of Costa Pender individed that they did just that.

At our Friday metig un Verfore chaided to recall bolling Paris for Consultation - also Nides Underson who had been ning symb i pelling on case in Washington. This Kilepalmis behaviour had been very vering and thorough anti- Wilst. Nilo It was more than a mality. her the Said whet would the American have thought if Le had durid at the Inanium Limbury the ngie lé hostiges were later? De Bolis chonque the same thing of The. 11. when she work to the Apertine on Limberry the Fri. of at mitt - Mite

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were spelt out, the negotiations would end there & then and we might be blamed. On the other hand the Argentinians were making contradictory statements about sovereignty. There had been a rumour that they would not 'prejudge' the issue of sovereignty but the speeches of Costa Mendez indicated that they did just that.

At our Friday meeting we therefore decided to recall Anthony Parsons for consultations - also Nicho Henderson who had been simply superb in putting our case in Washington. Mrs Kirkpatrick's behaviour had been very vexing and thoroughly anti-British. Nicho H was more than a match for her. He said what would the Americans have thought if he had dined at the Iranian Embassy the night the hostages were taken? We British thought the same thing of Mrs K when she went to the Argentinian Embassy the Fri. & Sat. night of the

invarior of the Fulhlands. 1- preparché for a metro me decided to prepare our own rejolithing lem. If we didie, we traved Perce de Cuellan night put up one that we Could not accept. De ver adament on the within of the islanders and on whichering s. a conjuice that morning we all had a major brelie about a landing on Fathlands. We all had great confidence not only in Adul Fieldhoine but in General Ibone who was Muy in Lordon myrang the Mars.

Once again we had an important.

Durday meeting at theywar - the would potter,

lunch topether and then ottagens down to business

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the possibilities and finally arrived as a

clevision for action.

We went over every points in detail

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invasion of the Falklands.

In preparation for a meeting we decided to prepare <u>our own</u> negotiating terms. If we didn't we feared Perez de Cuellar might put up one that <u>we</u> could not accept. We were adamant on the <u>wishes</u> of the islanders and on not including S. Georgia.

That morning we all had a major briefing about a landing on Falklands.
We all had great confidence not only in Admiral Fieldhouse but in General Moore who was still in London preparing the plans.

Once again we had an important Sunday meeting at Chequers - the usual pattern, lunch together and then straight down to business in the parlour upstairs and sit until we had thoroughly ventilated our concerns, discussed all the possibilities and finally arrived at a decision for action.

We went over every point in detail

making substantial charges to the downer as we went. We had the full combitational position of both the U.N. and the law on Fathlands administration before us. Us Posion is the steem. I was the motion to the later to erplan the news symbolore of every Phien to the Home of Comments thus allaging their teas. Francis had to go to humenbury that every for a N.A.T.O meeting the following day. It was entertial that we keep U.S. Sygnt and F.S. var authorned to brit Al Haif about on proposeds that wing. Weapurd that Anthony Parson should hard over the tent as on fried repolición positión and arte him to pue il to

by Wednesday everip. If one was not
The 173" while out A while and one or answer.

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making substantial charges to the document as we went. We had the full constitutional position of both the UN and the law on Falklands administration before us. We hardened our terms so as to protect the position in the interim and by using Art [Article] 73 of the UN Charter to imply* self-determination I was able to explain the precise significance of every phrase to the House of Commons thus allaying their fears. Francis had to go to Luxembourg that evening for a NATO meeting the following day. It was essential that we keep US support and the Foreign Secretary was authorised to brief AI Haig about our proposals that evening.

We agreed that Anthony Parsons should hand over the text as our <u>final</u> negotiating position and ask him to put it to the Argentines. We required an answer <u>by Wednesday</u> evening. If one was not

^{*}Art 73 "interests of inhabitants ... are paramount" [?contemporary addition at end of page]

received Francis sufferted that we Pulling the downert. The idea was a food on and, as worth happened we did just that. Port we thought it possible that the Dynhas might augst it. It would flest be very wise of them to do so. The world Would then congratulate them own act of plates marshy and the pressure would be on us to regoliale with them on sovereight. We met gain on the bonday

morning. We had a difficult problem.

It booked as if the Pope may cared his

Wisit to Britain. Met all the eafer

and detailed preparation of our Roman

Catholius and the liver anti-airation of many

other people to the this food man who

was much a corraspons leader. I very

much variety the visit to fo chead

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received Francis suggested that we publish the document. The idea was a good one and, as events happened we did just that. But we thought it possible that the Argentines might accept it. It would after all be very wise of them to do so. The world would then congratulate them on an act of statesmanship and the pressure would be on us to negotiate with them on sovereignty.

We met again on the Monday morning. We had a different problem – it looked as if the Pope may [sic] cancel his visit to Britain. After all the eager and detailed preparation of our Roman Catholics and the keen anticipation of many other people to see this good man who was such a courageous leader, I very much wanted the visit to go ahead.

1 suggesteil that all Cabril Timesters Should repair for being unobed. The Pope as Head of state reast meet the Queen hat the Cabriel need not see him no! I mytey. Non should be altered any fundros Oltwilly. On Junior Minister who were R.C. would of woun to in their pursher copacity. When we take referred this to Cabriel. Quilti was very disproviled but agreed and understood. We had all wanted a chance to Lath with the Pope but the inighter thing was to enable him to continue with his

Ik had a manvellous, moving, and historie visit to Britain. Cardinal Cardin

[p84 begins]

I suggested that all Cabinet Ministers should refrain from being involved. The Pope as Head of State must meet the Queen but the Cabinet need not see him nor I myself. Nor should he attend any functions officially. Our Junior Ministers who were R.C. would of course go in their private capacity. When we later referred this to Cabinet, Quintin [Hailsham] was very disappointed but agreed and understood. We had all wanted a chance to talk but the important thing was to enable him to continue with his visit.

He had a marvellous, moving, and historic visit to Britain. Cardinal Caseroli [Casaroli, Vatican Secretary of State] came to see me and we had a long talk about the Falklands & Argentina. We had of course talked before when I visited the

Pope in the Vatican - but on that occasion it had been about. The purhon and bringer stuties. This time I explained that in my new the essence of there and denoting is personal choice as an inthinded and self-delementation as a people. I was glad to have the chance of such a long tate.

apred to entered sanchos for sever days.

I had letyshored Colombo (having factual to

for Spaddin) to up him to sypport but

he explained that it was possitic spadolini,

for world fell if they did. Ineland

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Pope in the Vatican - but on that occasion it had been about the Irish question and hunger strikes. This time I explained that in my view the essence of liberty and democracy is personal choice as an individual and self-determination as a people. I was glad to have the chance of such a long talk.

In the E.E.C .- eight of the members agreed to extend sanctions for <u>seven</u> days. I had telephoned Colombo (having failed to get Spadolini) to urge him to support but he explained that it was possible Spadolini's Government would fall if they did. Ireland also did <u>not</u> renew sanctions although I personally phoned Haughey.

Tunday 18 m) lay 1982 On the morning of Tuesday 18th we had a full committee including all the Chip of State. We were somebuly aware of the decision before is - we had to decide whether to go ahead with the landing about thish or had been brufed the menious week. Beij awar of hos much was unknown and of the immerse bunden on us oall, I knew that I had to wish each Deme chief to five his veins and his judgment. The possibility of a reculty Sudlement. This cruisted but expired later allemon the Jollowing day. We must be ready it that happened.

touch considered all aspects ofthe stirction in July. Noting was with here

[p86 begins]

Tuesday 18th May 1982

On the morning of Tuesday 18th we had a full committee including all the Chiefs of Staff. We were sombrely aware of the decision before us - we had to decide whether to go ahead with the landing about which we had been briefed the previous week. Being aware of how much was unknown and of the immense burden on us all, I knew that I had to ask each service chief to give his views and his judgment. The possibility of a peaceful settlement still existed but expired late afternoon the following day. We must be ready if that happened.

Each considered all aspects of the situation in full. Nothing was withheld

- we should be outneable on landing, had we enough an cover, Britisti skyn Douldhe is rarge and their postists lanour - we had nother alle to destry as may ships of windt as we would have wisted before the landing, we did not know where their submainier were But if the were delay. we could ruffer more bosss. vided for on neignie and the condition of our hosps to nooner a landing book place the better - the a chaision us had letter to deli had been nin: ur had meeller Jeining fores and the this had weny contidered in the plan of He Foru Commander. None of their would frightly the possible casualties, il-was not possible to do do. They were aware that if we held back now Britain military Cudilly would be sweety lauristed. They constant that the adventages to be gavet

[p87 begins]

- we should be vulnerable on landing, had we enough air cover, British ships would be in range and their positions known - we had not been able to destroy as many ships or aircraft as we would have wished before the landing, we did not know where their submarines were. BUT if there were delay, we could suffer more losses, indeed from our viewpoint and the condition of our troops the sooner a landing took place the better - the decisions we had taken to date had been right, we had excellent fighting forces and the Chiefs had every confidence in the plans of the Force Commander. None of them would quantify the possible casualties, it was not possible to do so. They were aware that if we held back now Britain's military credibility would be severely tarnished. They considered that the advantages to be gained

outweighted the nistes and the landing should be undulated, as planned, by night.

All notes of engagement had menously been agreed.

We discussed then mellis Meght on each speed.

We were unanimous in authorsing the landing on the basis of the Force Commandeis Man. We were told that we could stop it up to last Thursday which enabled us thoroughly to comider any reply to the rejolishers and to discuss and wither carul or realthin aller cabriel or hursday norming. Apart from that, the times was for the Forte Commander. At the United Nothon The Parer de Cular was Landling mallin with great princy (which was very recessary)

[p88 begins]

outweighed the risks and the landing should be undertaken, as planned, by night. All rules of engagement had previously been agreed.

We discussed these matters at length and questioned them on each aspect.

We were unanimous in authorising the landing on the basis of the Force Commander's plan. We were told that we could stop it up to late Thursday which enabled us thoroughly to consider any reply to the negotiations and to discuss and either cancel or reaffirm after Cabinet on Thursday morning.

Apart from that the timing was for the Force Commander.

At the United Nations Mr Perez de Cuellar was handling matters with great privacy (which was very necessary)

and deplomay. We were is deed fortunded to have such a startled Security-Great.

We were to have a Cahnid-muling later that day about the deeds greened and their subject to their bonned by it before Parliament on 20 May. It should be accompanied by a convertage desirily the U.N. repolicities.

On Wednerday the U.N. Landed over to us the last of an Ayulure reply to our proposals. They amounted to a rejection of our paper. In a last minds to d to week a brechdown, the S-G prescribed his aide. memoris to us sto Ayulura selling out his proposals.

[p89 begins]

and diplomacy. We were indeed fortunate to have such a skilled Secretary-General. We were to have a Cabinet meeting later that day about the draft agreement and then subject to their consent lay it before Parliament on 20th May. It should be accompanied by a commentary describing the U.N. negotiations.

On Wednesday the U.N. handed over to us the text of an Argentine reply to our proposals. They amounted to a rejection of our paper. In a last minute bid to avert a breakdown, the S-G [Secretary-General] presented his aide-mémoire to us and to Argentina setting out his proposals.

10 DOWNING STREET

On Thursday morning our Committee met before Caelinel.

The authorischon to land shoot and I super to Caluit) would to abecd.

But one of ani UF-5 sufferted Wat as the S-a'i aide-nemové had Considerable surlaintier to our our proposels He would would underland if we west cheed with military measures. The fact was the the S.a.; reposeds were stuting and obsure and we could have been with back near the beginning again. The object from the Hulman view poil was delay. I sunned up very frimly their would be no question of holding up the ruletay limetalle. It would be fald for on form. If the weatherness ngis Ut landing west about. The Committee and tales Cabriet agent

[p90 begins]

On Thursday morning our Committee met before Cabinet.

The authorisation to land stood and (subject to Cabinet) would go ahead.

But once again the F.S. [Foreign Secretary] suggested that as the S-G's [Secretary-General's] aide-memoire had considerable similarities to our own proposals the world wouldn't understand if we went ahead with military measures. The fact was that the S.G.'s [Secretary General's] proposals were sketchy and obscure and we could have been right back near the beginning again. The object from the Argentinians view-point was delay. I summed up very firmly — there could be no question of holding up the military timetable. It could be fatal for our forces. If the weather was right the landing went ahead.

The Committee and later Cabinet agreed.

10 DOWNING STREET

How then to awaye melling do the World did not condude that a landing was immed? Francitely by that time we had had the enormously successful Commando raid on Pelble Island som deliberally set out. to five the in menui that we should continue for some time with puch raids. The mess rever forgave us - but we had to do for him ally the SAS had destroyed Il aways it. I a fartistically held operated in tenth weather On that showsday the S-G. having received no very from the Afertinars about the aids - newsie cludared that his reace efforts had some to an end.

[p91 begins]

How then to arrange matters so the world did not conclude that a landing was imminent? Fortunately by that time we had had the enormously successful commando raid on Pebble Island so we deliberately set out to give the impression that we should continue for some time with such raids. The press never forgave us - but we had to do it.

Fortunately the SAS had destroyed 11 aircraft in a fantastically bold operation in terrible weather. [later addition by MT]

On that Thursday the S.G. [Secretary General] having received no reply from the Argentinians about the aide-memoire declared that his peace efforts had come to an end. The debate in the House went well.

De awaited the weether

An answirs day and my it were

I had a full day, enjugements in the contituent on Friday and new how what it was to carry on with business - as - usual. I romically I had to open a major colorson of Gewon who specielied is storage and ulter rational movement and packaging. Over 1200 people had ber inter i duding may Ambaisadors. The band of the Counts was there and peutes the were enjected. What would I say but that

[p92 begins]

The debate in the House went well.

We awaited the weather.

An anxious day and night were ahead.

I had a full day's engagements in the constituency on Friday and knew how vital it was to carry on with business-as-usual. Ironically I had to open a major extension of Gersons who specialised in storage and international movement and packaging. Over 1200 people had been invited including many Ambassadors. The band of the Guards was there and speeches etc were expected. What could I say but that

f. 000 miles was really only a heart-beat away - And I was for all on people; not only those who Janily were in the Tark Porce Ore fell the whole audicide with his. It was a nother of mide respect, common and bujo free that mean't we near restore the Fuklands. Sometos in vispelet way they, node on a forte-bije tinde had buch in an enomous warehome and fled to the other to the if there was any news. - Not get. Of come there was none to do than to let us know whatwas happener. I returned to my Frihley oble gain noondli 5pand in conceded layunge under 1654 thetworld had hypered but no more news. Then I was fiver on T.V. and the envluir at a regular n' Woodhouse School that meist was overstelling. The

[p93 begins]

8,000 miles away was really only a heart-beat away - and it was for all our people; not only those whose family were in the Task Force. One felt the whole audience with us. It was a matter of pride, respect, conviction and being free that meant we must restore the Falklands. Somehow we I inspected everything, rode on a fork-lift truck, had lunch in an enormous warehouse and [then] fled to the office to see if there was any news. Not yet. Of course there was more to do than to let us know what was happening. I returned to my Finchley office again soon after 5pm and in concealed language understood that events had happened but no more news. Then it was given on TV and the emotion at a reception in Woodhouse School that night was overwhelming. The

Union Jack was flying in San Carlos Bay. We had returned to the Fathlands. Thy heart or full but despendely unsuois about carnellies. We had landed on a hostile war on a withis met with a fleet of shins full of men and equipment. Was it possible that he had not been deterted. I letter soon du That spoken to relien to No. 10. John Noy Came in with a full your. The actual landing had been achieved without a rongie convelly but day-line was now and of come elledes were friendes. the ani. How they missed the white Carbina is a mich We forher away the Jollowy my ht. But from ter on we wert with a deferrent level of contains. The ships

[p94 begins]

Union Jack was flying in San Carlos Bay. We had returned to the Falklands.

My heart was full but desperately anxious about casualties. We had landed on a hostile coast on a winter's night with a fleet of ships full of men and equipment. Was it possible that we had not been detected.

I left soon after I had spoken to return to No.10. John Nott came in with a full report. The actual landing had been achieved without a single casualty but day-time was now and of course attacks were fierce from the air. How they missed the white Canberra is a miracle. We got her away the following night.

But from then on we went into a different level of conflict. The ships

were in lanson position and all our and are cover had to come from thems and humanite which then selves had to stand of a long way. The rapieis were burg whoaded as fast as possible but there were darpeous hows alead,

Agentine air allates on Penday were heavy or ships in Falkland Sound and San Carlos water. And your on bonday and eler. It was a desperately assume time Jo, everyone 1+M.S. Agrando Antelope was very semonly danged and the Itals. Dollar. Thanks to brave resure grenchés - the loss of-We was less than hight- ochervere Lave been. Vlay meeting stand were shot down better when many more to come. Tuesday or educaday no 25 They were experielly had days. var atte House unling in my noon sten John Nottame is to say that. HALL Country

[p95 begins]

were in known positions and all our air cover had to come from Hermes and Invincible which themselves had to stand off a long way. The rapiers were being unloaded as fast as possible but there were dangerous hours ahead.

Argentine air attacks on Sunday
were heavy on ships in Falkland Sound and
San Carlos Water. And again on Monday
and after. It was a desperately anxious time
for everyone. HMS Argonaut Antelope was very
seriously damaged and then HMS Ardent.
Thanks to brave rescue operations - the loss of
life was less than might otherwise have been.
Many Argentine planes were shot down but there
were many more to come. Tuesday & Wednesday
24th and 25th May were especially bad days.

I was at the House working in my room when John Nott came in to say that HMS Coventry

had bent subject of ellecte by a wave of auach- six nom had continuely boolmeded her and she was sularjo. He had to be on T.V. within half an home and as he appeared the news had jot though although the name of the ship was not lunown. Irues doyper belle hat to revel it white had none details about loins. Whether the deason was nell. on wrong I do not lund - the effection that every many (was antein. The loss was arrounced rest day Marsane werig, later, when I went into the ofther to find the latest heurs dont-Guerlig, the duly deale told me that Martin Coweys, had been hil- by Linous missies, was on Jui and Onders had been from to abandon ship. How many more trappedies could Here be? How many loves could be suffer. I knew also that aloud the Marke Congrer had been 19 Harriew. - minforcements that were

[p96 begins]

had been the subject of attack by a wave of aircraft. Six or more had continuously bombarded her and she was sinking.

He had to be on TV within half an hour and as he appeared the news had got through although the name of the ship was not known. It was thought better not to reveal it until we had more details about losses. Whether the decision was right or wrong I do not know - the effect was that every navy family was anxious. The loss was announced <u>next</u> day. That same evening, later, when I went into the office to find the latest news about Coventry, the duty clerk told me that Atlantic Conveyor had been hit by Exocet missiles, was on fire and orders had been given to abandon ship. How many more tragedies could there be? How many losses could we suffer. I knew <u>also</u> that aboard the Atlantic Conveyor had been 19 Harriers - reinforcements that were

nonly reeded. Den they still on board? If so, and we had lost them - could we Carry on? And she was also carrying helity her white should need for bringing symbol to the hops as they moved forward. from San Carlos. To add to ones dismay, there was new that. Invisable had been hit and received some danage. Perhaps that was the worst mentof M. And somewhere early the Falhlands was the RELI causing 3,600 troops. L'ady rend morning I wanted for news. A remarkable resure for booking and the Marki Tonory or although as we distoured take-Les remarkedu explain was bott. Forturelly Uti 19 Hameis had meriously been from on to themes Principle (rolet froded our me ch that news - we were not fatally wounded) De had box of beliepters but the military this

[p97 begins]

sorely needed. Were they still on board?

If so, and we had lost them - could we carry on. And she was also carrying helicopters which we should need for bringing supplies to the troops as they moved forward from San Carlos. To add to one's dismay, there was news that Invincible had been hit and received some damage. Perhaps that was the worst night of all. And somewhere east of the Falklands was the QEII carrying 3,000 troops.

Early next morning I waited for news.

A remarkable rescue from Coventry and the Atlantic Conveyor although as we discovered later her remarkable captain was lost. Fortunately the 19 Harriers had previously been flown on to Hermes & Invincible (relief flooded on me at that news - we were not fatally wounded).

We had lost 8 helicopters but the military chiefs

a sound me that we had planned & yophing had with Fullands to expect some losted. And we had lost to go on water less. And we had lost to go on accommodate prisoners of war. And the rews that I would was held demayed was to lally Jahr. So - we leaved the day 10110000 of war, but was had to go on to complete the food

Stores were burg unboaded well d-San Carlo. Some landing Typh's Underwere hil and there were wrong loded bombs - noit of Which we defined. On 'Loipital' et In Carlos was hit - but the doctors camed on nawellary. The local night had fori ou lusin an enormous welcome and Couldie de enough for them. One 7 the local young men (who I met telen) had letter his bades and shown on boys the way

[p98 begins]

assured me that we had planned supplies to expect some losses, [later addition] but the paras had to yomp across the Falklands because of the loss.

And we had lost
4,500 winter tents - many of them to accommodate prisoners of war. And the news that Invincible was hit/damaged was totally false. So - we learned the deep sorrows of war, but we had to go on to complete the task.

Stores were being unloaded well at San Carlos. Some landing & supply craft were hit and there were unexploded bombs - most of which were defused. Our 'hospital' at San Carlos was hit - but the doctors carried on marvellously. The local people had given our troops an enormous welcome and couldn't do enough for them. One of the local young men (who I met later) had taken his tractor and shown our boys the way to

The lead total and anoss to Monthogen the estimate for starting. Only when! The over the from dint rective whether bong 'Yours' it. was. And how remade the total. We never and marrier of years had a charied it.

It had been severed clays prive the landing. On T.V. Here had been distursions about whether the new study words be thought Tead to Startey on though Namin.

We were all conversed that, their appreaud to be little movement out of the brightend and yet we live the decision had to be letter by the laced commender according to his stones the weather. In recommendate and his judgment. Correct losse had no trust amongs of far laces.

We remained greening concerned at the

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Teal Inlet and across to Mount Longdon & the entrances to Port Stanley. Only when I flew over the ground did I realise what a long 'yomp' it was. And how remarkable that the paras and marines & guards had achieved it.

It had been several days since the landing. On T.V. there had been discussions about whether the next strike would be through Teal to Stanley or through Darwin.

We were all concerned that there appeared to be little movement out of the bridgehead and yet we knew the decision had to be taken by the local commander according to his stores, the weather, his reconnaissance and his judgment. General Moore had not yet arrived at San Carlos.

We remained grievously concerned at the

In the Committee we hund our Mobilised allerties to the longer-less Times, How

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naval losses and aware that the surface Argentine navy had retreated into 12 mile territorial waters. As two of our ships had been sunk in our territorial waters we tackled the A.G. [Attorney-General] - could we <u>not</u> sink theirs in their territorial waters. There were parts of the coast where the water was deep enough for our submarines to operate. But time and again the A.G. [Attorney-General] said No. Once they moved out & into the direction of the Falklands - yes but not unless. Our submarine commanders were left prowling up & down the line, very frustrated. And we knew their navy could make a sudden sally - and we might not then find them quickly enough to stop the harm they could do.

In the Committee we turned our political attention to the longer-term issues. How

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That did we call on the Aperlian commender
to sounder.

By the weederd Vani of hoon Green had been later. It was a bitter and dellicale bette The postions of the every whe very well regressed and dup is. Our pains hed to edvanu over a namow isthms in face Theory fri. Mon poil. It hemed impossible to heale through. M that him 74' made his famous comageon advenue, His (Vilore Coss) Wie som Cost- but- his haveny was the human point is the backe. This Second in Command Wolfe over and workedly seawed the sunder. It had not been easy for him because chose time a while fly vas

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to deal with POWs. How to secure a permanent cessation of hostilities. At what stage did we call on the Argentinian commander to surrender.

By the weekend Darwin & Goose Green had been taken. It was a bitter and difficult battle. The positions of the enemy were very well prepared and dug in. Our paras had to advance over a narrow isthmus in face of heavy fire. At one point it seemed impossible to break through. At that time 'H'¹⁰ made his famous courageous advance. His (Victoria Cross) life was lost but his bravery was the turning point in the battle. His Second in Command took over and eventually secured the surrender. It had not been easy for him because at one time a white flag was

¹⁰ Colonel H. Jones, VC

Waved for the Argentine hentes and when two on hoors went forward in response - they were shotel and bot then lives. Fielly on Commender set his Dapelin P.DJ", forward with a merrage to somewher - saying they could have a parech it was which hartey must lay down then arm Juneden. They did.

Clock their fint come

They brief up. then others haverpress them the they swended. The people of food & Green Who had been persed in the community hall for 3 weeks were released. And a feels chaire military buth was bon. To-dry, there is a menorial to the Paras on the nidge rear Goon Green. The press had reported that Howin'

The press had reported that I lawning had been later 2 days lepen the visbog. Can their even have been an army that had to feir is butters against medica reported the William ?. I had her very

[p102 begins]

waved from the Argentine trenches and when two of our troops went forward in response - they were shot at and lost their lives. Finally our Commander sent two Argentinian POWs forward with a message to surrender - saying they could have a parade if they liked but they must lay down their arms and surrender. They did. They lined up their officers harangued them about their just cause, but they surrendered. The people of Goose Green who had been pinned in the community hall for 3 weeks were released. And a great and decisive military battle was won. Today there is a memorial to the Paras on the ridge near Goose Green.

The press had reported that Darwin had been taken <u>2</u> days before the victory. Can there ever have been an army that had to fight its battles against media reporting like that? I had been very

angry when I heard on early morning B.B.c. redio Val. Q.E.II was rear North Leanjie Courtement win to 3 ships. the Partern, Norland and a theres. I linear the ver planned butil was desertating to bear the right at close the time it was due to late place. Within flower of thatbodiest reconnectioneplanes were our South Progin searting. They had not been there for weeks. Fortunally they did not fad the things - the Dec is a hig place. One your the Cantrava mentals San Carlo: with her mes nois carjo and Once your she supried out un hained At Loon Green - stocks of rapidon bombs were discovered

[p103 begins]

angry when I heard on early morning B.B.C. radio that the QEII was near South Georgia transferring troops to 3 ships, the Canberra, Norland and a third. I knew this was planned but it was devastating to hear the report at about the time it was due to take place. Within 8 hours of that broadcast reconnaissance planes were over South Georgia searching. They had not been there for weeks. Fortunately they did not find the ships - the sea is a big place. Once again the Canberra went into San Carlos with her precious cargo and once again she slipped out unharmed.

At Goose Green - stocks of <u>napalm</u> bombs were discovered

By early Sure, Spain Parame had latted Cecsajui resolution in the Deauty Council. There had of some been about, without in on our Homed Emmons J. me to leave our rejolitie lems 'on the lath' wordling a landing. This I also hely refused to do. How could we ask on own Amed Forces to viole then lives only to codenplete a with drawl if the Durine wanted to play it that way, One or werting we werkin to complete the Poute. Butte U.N. was de it your. A Ceure-frie ver collect for. I was containty ranje a mone fue must be accompanied by a total with drawd of Argentine Two ps . Tog l'ason foyurou con splendischy - bute new resolution was reclaimed under way. There was a fred-move to mye in to spred to hallen to with chan lesson the Juriel assaulto- Por starty. On to paine before we

rede that arrands. It Trement me this bould

[p104 begins]

By early June, Spain & Panama had tabled ceasefire resolutions in the Security Council. There had of course been efforts, initially in our own House of Commons for me to leave our negotiating terms 'on the table' even after a landing. This I absolutely refused to do. How could we ask our own Armed Forces to risk their lives only to contemplate a withdrawal if the Argentines wanted to play it that way. Once we went in, we went in to complete the task.

But the U.N. was at it again. A cease-fire was called for. I was constantly saying a cease-fire must be accompanied by a total withdrawal of Argentine troops. Tony Parsons fought our case splendidly - but a new resolution was certainly under way. There was a great move to urge us to appeal to Galtieri to withdraw before the final assault on Port Stanley. Or to pause before we made that assault. It seemed to me this could

Purson hosps in an intoterable position.

De une in the middle of winter and it was constrained to represent with all possible speed and to vail for nothing.

Jon Cook Green we on board MV Norland waiting to be repaired. Some her ken beautiful in our tormitted and hospital at Jan Carlos. Our doctors had been very critical of the full work of their doctors.

Thermound beyon the Versaiths

Libramic Nummite, although by the Chandle, the

FIS and myself. I went to Pair's frist to

see President Region who was slaving enter U. S. Lindson,

De had write a laste to getter à deure in the

Peleured it. I thanked him for the

enormous help us had recovered from US U.S.

and asked that the U.S. took should

[p105 begins]

put our troops in an intolerable position. We were in the midst of winter and it was essential to repossess with all possible speed and to wait for nothing.

By 4th June all Argentine POWs from Goose Green were on board MV Norland waiting to be repatriated. Some had been treated in our military hospital at San Carlos. Our doctors had been very critical of the field work of their doctors.

That weekend began the Versailles Economic Summit, attended by the Chancellor,¹¹ the F.S. [Foreign Secretary] and myself. I went to Paris first to see President Reagan who was staying at the U.S. Embassy. We had quite a talk together à deux as he preferred it. I thanked him for the enormous help we had received from the U.S. and asked that the U.S. vote should

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¹¹ Sir Geoffrey Howe

Jours our enté hands Comil and whether the U.S. could give is any help with repolition Aluner P.O.D. after the relating of Poststates. I also asked him Whathe wanted out of the Sumit. It is Plani that above all he wanted an aprevent about trach with the Soviet Union on both unsubsidied vilient notes and a lower by the order to be provided by well. I thought he Could help on both by syprothy him. The grus hon of the John From huthres to the Svinian gas pipelvi had abredy arises severed hims and there was an understanding that if we afreed the President's which readil- leans for brach with the MSSR. then contracts already aprend would go ahead. Mas as wents happened things were badly wrong on their score. Bu F-S.; and France Ministers had greed a line on the firstlay of Versailles, which was windly what the Printeneranted. It came before heads of for-

[p106 begins]

follow ours at the Security Council and whether the U.S. could give us any help with repatriating Argentine P.O.W.s after the retaking of Port Stanley. I also asked him what he wanted out of the Summit. It was plain that above all he wanted an agreement about trade with the Soviet Union on both unsubsidised interest rates and a lower % [percentage] of the orders to be provided by credit. I thought we could help on both by supporting him. The question of the John Brown turbines for the Siberian gas pipeline had already arisen several times and there was an understanding that if we agreed the President's interest & credit terms for trade with the USSR then contracts already agreed would go ahead. Alas as events happened things went badly wrong on that score. All F.S.s and Finance Ministers had agreed a text on the first day of Versailles, which was virtually what the President wanted. It came before heads of govt

10 DOWNING STREET

the second day with Princet of Menors is the chair. He didn't will and proceeded to compact the whole deal. I was leggy to for retulating community the whole time but it want possible. To each to our troubles, that morning the Israelis had wrided the belance and M Haje who was viting ment to me workgroup to aware a visit to Tel-Ario that right of

Mhi my talk with President Playar

in Pairs we all ammed at Versaller where
we were staying in the Path Trians. Thatevering after during (all thanks fort, died
together) we had a long dismission about Fathlands.
I could not indicate how long it would require
to late Put Hatey but rain I hoped within the
ments. They shought this a long limit -longer than
they had in your for the trimpoint of sanctions

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the second day with President Mitterrand in the chair. He didn't like it and proceeded to unpack the whole deal. I was trying to get a satisfactory compromise the whole time but it wasn't possible. To add to our troubles, that morning the Israelis had invaded the Lebanon and Al Haig who was sitting next to me was trying to arrange a visit to Tel-Aviv that night or the next day.

After my talk with President Reagan in Paris we all arrived at Versailles where we were staying in the Petit Trianon. That evening after dinner (all Heads of Govt dined together) we had a long discussion about Falklands. I could <u>not</u> indicate how long it would require to take Port Stanley but said I hoped within the <u>month</u>. They thought this a long time - longer than they had imagined from the viewpoint of sanctions.

However they were not helpful about what-Hey could do to fet a removed cease. The. I emplowed about plan for P.O.W's and my justed thet. as under the Geneva convertion ed did not have to return them until ho, whiles had wared, it ment-be possible to return them until Argulare had afred to a permanent lessalon. Helmar Thomass. thought those those present might. Lelp to that and . If we hept in touch possibly all know could join in highing pressure to has on Agentie. I lett the evering fuling pleased sit their co-spendion and duly reported the Conversation to obliviels. We had each (deligation) been allocated a setting room. The had previously been the Thing's bedroom and had had the bed removed. It was a large risky funited som with willows strucker out on to the

We had only been sitting there lathing for

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However they were most helpful about what they could do to get a permanent ceasefire. I explained about plans for P.O.W.s and suggested that, as under the Geneva Convention we did not have to return them until hostilities had ceased, it might be possible to retain them until Argentina had agreed to a permanent cessation. Helmut Schmidt thought those present might help to that end. If we kept in touch, possibly all seven could join in bringing pressure to bear on Argentina. I left the evening feeling pleased with their co-operation and duly reported this conversation to officials. We had each (delegation) been allocated a sitting room. Mine had previously been the King's bedroom and had had the bed removed. It was a large richly furnished room with windows straight out on to the terrace.

We had only been sitting there talking for

chout litter muiter when a new age came from LiFeo. Song Parion that a worker abouts be talen in the security Couried and the Tapane were voting against us. As they were the minth vote (regiment for the resolution to pair) thomas Particularly intaling. Po much for the menion Co-spendion. De lived very hard to geton to Surulii who could not possibly have fore to bud i such a shortens, to gethin to revenue the decision and about these dolain - but were mountes. Manustile, more political chance. The Killpeline had received in shir clock from Hay to follow us with her wold. The had done so. Then, from Univalles, Hay had showed bellio her to with chew there wat. The applied to charge is here not all to do so, Feather we nuffred all round. The late was that - Al Have had succented to persue for other below mentan combins.

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about fifteen minutes when a message came from the F.O. & Tony Parsons that a vote was about to be taken in the Security Council and the Japanese were voting against us. As they were the ninth vote (required for the resolution to pass) this was particularly irritating. So much for the previous co-operation. We tried very hard to get on to Suzuki who could not possibly have gone to bed in such a short time, to get him to reverse the decision and at least abstain - but we were unsuccessful. Meanwhile, more political drama. Mrs Kirkpatrick had received instructions from Haig to follow us with her vote. She had done so. Then, from Versailles, Haig had phoned telling her to withdraw that vote. She applied to change it but was not able to do so. Feathers were ruffled all round. The fact was that Al Haig had succumbed to pressure from other Latin American countries.

I tacked Duruli Le Jollowje morning who save me a very lane cuplandion 'As the motion had viorpreted 502 they thought it would lead to Apriliner wiltdrawd!! We had but in the Police - heads of John and Joseph sendanes all topeter. Repre un starteit the T.V. camera were allowed in. Ineutally the U.S. mlévreure toine e justien de Printer Reyon arting him wheel had happened to the vole white U.N. the presions wrip. Poor Ron - te linew nothing about it to my anarened - he just said 'I'm afraid you've forme there I don't know anything about that one. • The mlistonine luver do me; wors as I was about it I want four to have a now on the media to merely recid 1 didn't fire whetereins over hurch! But alon 2. ell well-out over the world; T.V. sulfor Creded a my bad inpussion.

Whether very food about Fathered wire is
Unitalis was President Determed. Durange of at the
Press conference the rest day - he apred about with

[p110 begins]

I talked to Suzuki the following morning who gave me a very lame explanation 'As the motion had incorporated 502 they thought it would lead to Argentinian withdrawal'! We had lunch in the Palace - heads of govt & foreign secretaries all together. Before we started the T.V. cameras were allowed in. Inevitably the U.S. interviewer tossed a question to President Reagan asking him what had happened to the Vote at the UN the previous evening. Poor Ron - he knew nothing about it to my amazement - he just said 'I'm afraid you've got me there. I don't know anything about that one'. The interviewer turned to me; cross as I was about it I wasn't going to have a row on the media so merely said I didn't give interviews over lunch! But alas it all went out over the world's T.V. sets & created a very bad impression.

What was very <u>good</u> about Falklands vis-à-vis Versailles was President Mitterrand's summing up at the Press Conference the next day - he agreed absolutely with whatre had done. Britani numb recover her islands. It was most understanding and splendid thoughout.

There was a grand and heartest largent in the Hell of Thinons which I allended but left before the open and the fireworks. I had to get home and it would not have been right to stay to show nearly. My thought were of what was happened in the doubt Market.

The thin him award bloom was in that for his beadquaken in San Caulos charp for mouth was to fet enough every ment and his problem was to fet enough every ment and amountion for sands before the final annually on the rip of mountains which probably Port Starting

On the Donday morning 7th June there was

never to alless to. I had to report the

Versailes proposed that other fort were prepared

to help is pulling pressure on Arweline for a personer

[p111 begins]

what we had done - Britain must recover her islands. He was most understanding and splendid throughout.

There was a grand and beautiful banquet in the Hall of Mirrors which I attended but left before the opera and the fireworks. I had to get home and it would not have been right to stay for such revelry. All my thoughts were of what was happening in the South Atlantic.

By this time General Moore was in charge from his headquarters in San Carlos and his problem was to get enough equipment and ammunition forwards before the final assault on the ring of mountains which protect Port Stanley.

On the Monday morning 7th June there was much to attend to. I had to report the Versailles proposal that other govts were prepared to help in putting pressure on Argentina for a permanent

10 DOWNING STREET
Los Millies and chair the U.S. ves quir ansalous to help with the legislus y evanding P.O.V's. Then had been some rulitary makens. Our Vulcans had been byry to knock out- some very well established Apertire radius What were regreting all our arrively movements and Codd pri, poil the position of the animal causes. The Volcanis had been canying reaid anti-adam weapons. One had failed to release - n had not been reliaved and the refrelling mobe had broken on the return to Aversion. The Vulcan Lad .: landed in Brazil and been in pounded wilk is veapon. There were also reports from our Ambaisade, in thele about thetian hosp movements - which lived out to have no sinhicare atall.

Hotiz her fielly been questioned by French of reduct jors - head refused to arme and we is a cheed to reporter him by and to Arpentine

[p112 begins]

cessation of hostilities and that the U.S. was quite anxious to help with the logistics of evacuating P.O.Ws. There had been some military problems. Our Vulcans had been trying to knock out some very well established Argentine radars that were reporting all our aircraft movements and could pin-point the position of the aircraft carriers. The Vulcans had been carrying special anti-radar weapons. One had failed to release - or had not been released and the refuelling probe had broken on the return to Ascension. The Vulcan had therefore landed in Brazil and been impounded with its weapon. There were also reports from our Ambassador in Chile about Chilean troop movements - which turned out to have no significance at all.

Astiz has [sic: had] finally been questioned by French & Swedish governments - had refused to answer and we therefore agreed to repatriate him by air to Argentina.



THE PRIME MINISTER

L'any that week we had another lente head-rending hazard of som General ilosa had port Si Trustan Ni halehal with men ecuponedand number sound to Totalt Cove and Filmay. They would normally have fore by helicople butto weather was not sufficiently food to get worth quantités of stores ornicedeniente in line. The ships anurid in Filmey and were unbaching the Rapper belley to protein for an allants. The clouds cleared and where was a sudden Aportor and allack which scored a duel hil- on Di adetect carrie great tou of the and leastle fries of hours. The webste aucude look the brund of it. There are "it only i" throughout life and it only the men had been later Of and dispersed first - the cornelles would never have been sultred to that - endine. Great Those was frief. studies. I war up al- Nath 2001 a day aller we all fell - Los many more. Once ajan we had

[p113 begins]

Early that week we had another terrible heart-rendering hazard of war. General Moore had sent Sir Tristram & Sir Galahad with men, equipment and munitions round to Bluff Cove and Fitzroy. They would normally have gone by helicopter but the weather was not sufficiently good to get enough quantities of stores and impedimenta in time. The ships arrived at Fitzroy and were unloading the Rapier battery to protect from air attack. The clouds cleared and there was a sudden Argentine air attack which scored a direct hit on Sir Galahad causing great loss of life and terrible fires and burns. The Welsh Guards took the brunt of it. There are "if only's" throughout life and if only the men had been taken off and dispersed first - the casualties would never have been suffered to that extent. General Moore was grief-stricken. I was up at Northwood a day after we all felt - how many more. Once again we had



THE PRIME MINISTER

very difficult. decision to make about released rens of carnellies. Rumous of very lay numbers. feverel hundreds - spread litie videlyni and relatives were reduced a fartielly worried. We had to hold up details for days. We know from intellière that the Dynamies thought the Casuallies were several limes wrome than they were and there the blow would hald up our allact on Portstady. In option of cuticism is represente reveal the hundres but as Jant- as we would we informed all ment him. We know the attack on Nowthoughten, Two Disters and Win Paidle var due to hyri on Friday ne'ter and suprise was intal.

Friday right (11 June) came. L'auty on Daturday mornige the Muly Club came up to the pater with a notion his hand. I almost seizudit

[p114 begins]

very difficult decisions to make about releasing news of casualties. Rumours of very large numbers - several hundreds - spread like wildfire and relatives were naturally alarmed and frantically worried. We had to hold up details for days. We knew from intelligence that the Argentines thought the casualties were several times worse than they were and that the blow would hold up our attack on Port Stanley. In spite of criticism we refused to reveal the numbers but as fast as we could we informed all next of kin. We knew the attack on Mount Longdon, Two Sisters and Wireless Ridge was due to begin on Friday night and surprise was vital.

Friday night (11th June) came. Early on Saturday morning the Duty Clerk came up to the flat with a note in his hand. I almost seized it



THE PRIME MINISTER

from him expecting news that the attack had begun. Pout it was none bad news. HM.S. Clamorgan Lad been bombending the Apenture positions in Portionly and on the hills prior to bathe (We had appeal that - the Celebration in Port Starty would be 'sandway' but not all the people werther and thus civilian were (ulled) Clamongen had been hit by a land. based Crowl- and was on Jui. The was storning away for the siere of balte of 12 knows. Comallis -nome killed - had been sultred. It is impossible to describe the depth of feeling at these times. It is quite untile anything else I have ever experienced. In Je her for bledy - we lose our bravent and best. How regions and heart-breaking. Now we know the Daufiles that Previous generations made for us. And ct No. 10 on was protested and rate on futto fully

[p115 begins]

from him expecting news that the attack had begun. But it was more <u>bad news</u>. HMS <u>Glamorgan</u> had been bombarding the Argentine positions in Port Stanley and on the hills prior to battle (we had agreed that the Cathedral in Port Stanley would be 'sanctuary' but not all the people went there and three civilians were killed).

Glamorgan had been hit by a <u>land-based</u> exocet and was on fire. She was steaming away from the scene of battle at 12 knots. Casualties – some killed - had been suffered. It is impossible to describe the depth of feeling at these times. It is quite unlike anything else I have ever experienced. In fights for liberty - we lose our bravest and best. How unjust and heart-breaking. Now we know the sacrifices that previous generations made for us. And at No.10 one was protected and safe - one felt so guilty



THE PRIME MINISTER

That day (Saluthon) the Colour was Incoped
for the Queen's Pultillary. It pound with nair and
nomehow, that teemed fitting although unpleasant for
the Zuards. I wore hack - there was much to

John Nott annied morty before in we due to later our place on the stand. Had be any news I expuried? None - beyond what? had. Parte thought we would have known The Hut were with us - all and using for news.
We went to the Dropping and came in with all possible speed for news allestrands. All the guests were dipping out - we duid outbefore the fires as bure could. Shortly before I pm. we beard that all objectives had been achieved, but there had been a stiff butte

[p116 begins]

at the comfort.

That day (Saturday) the Colour was Trooped for the Queen's Birthday. It poured with rain and somehow that seemed fitting although unpleasant for the Guards. I wore black - there was much to mourn.

John Nott arrived shortly before we were due to take our place on the stand. Had he any news I enquired? None - beyond what I had. But he thought we would have known if the attack had not started. Rex Hunt and Mrs Hunt were with us - all anxious for news.

We went to the Trooping and came in with all possible speed for news afterwards. All the guests were dripping wet - we dried out before the fires as best we could. Shortly before 1pm we heard that all objectives had been achieved, but there had been a stiff battle



THE PRIME MINISTER

for Two Sisters. The plan had been to press
on to Tumberdown but it was decided to
wait a line. I wantup to Worthwood in
the afternoon to bear precisely whether happened.
The was better here about humanger. The had
for the fries under control and was steaming
al- 20 knows.

The rentstage was for the Tools Guards - Tumbledown and then the Churches - Pappers Hill the Part hill before Port Startey.

The Committee metron Pandy normings

14th June - los early for news everyt- that we limes the before was in propers. It was inlend freienly form - just how freinly I have when I have when I will it really there months I also and walked

[p117 begins]

for Two Sisters. The plan had been to press on to Tumbledown but it was decided to wait a time. I went up to Northwood in the afternoon to hear precisely what had happened. There was better news about Glamorgan. She had got the fires under control and was steaming at 20 knots.

The next stage was for the Scots Guards
- Tumbledown, and then the Ghurkas [sic: Gurkhas] - Sapper
Hill, the last hill before Port Stanley.

The Committee met on Monday morning
14th June - too early for news except that we
knew the battle was in progress. It was indeed fiercely
fought - just how fiercely I learned when I
visited it nearly seven months later and walked



THE PRIME MINISTER

the ground in early morning in the during now and wind. The shok were is covered with outerops of which make natural forthialion. I was their at fire life. They Look is by my his and in the steel and snow A stependous ted. And once again at a Critical slage in the verne the fulme depended on the compre and prodessionalism of the other in charge. What happened tali that day seemed ble a misule. The Agentines retréalest notonly for Tumbledown but from Sappens this as well. They three down their owns and were seen Pilling their way through their own middles vito Portstarley. Ours followed them and tolored Rose went the Newsder close a complete

[p118 begins]

the ground in early morning in the driving rain and wind. The whole area is covered with outcrops of rock which make natural fortifications. I was there at first light. They took it by night and in the sleet and snow.

A stupendous feat. And once again at a critical stage in the battle, the future depended on the courage and professionalism of the officer in charge.

What happened later that day seemed like a miracle. The Argentines retreated not only from Tumbledown but from Sappers Hill as well. They threw down their arms and were seen picking their way through their own minefields into Port Stanley. Ours followed them and Colonel Rose went to see Menendez about a complete



THE PRIME MINISTER

Dunorde of West of the Falklands.

We received news "The While Play out

Played over Port Starley". We doned not

kape too hunch toodoon. I wook but

a brief of telement for the House. Thy the time

I note at 10p - on a point of onder we know

that a creat Noon had reached a vernment

House and was regoliably with Neverler.

The House cheered, Nowing Sheet was their full of maple. Young people. It was their generation who had done it. To day's tensors Triain still breads them.

A I went to steep very late that night I felt an enormous bruden had been Wied from my shouldest and Juluie worries would small

[p119 begins]

surrender of West & East Falklands.

We received news. The White Flags are flying over Port Stanley. We dared not hope too much too soon. I wrote out a brief statement for the House. By the time I rose at 10 p.m on a Point of Order, we knew that General Moore had reached Government House and was negotiating with Menendez.

The House <u>cheered</u>, Downing Street was full of people, young people. It was their generation who had done it. Today's heroes. Britain still breeds them.

As I went to sleep very late that night I felt an enormous burden had been lifted from my shoulders and future worries would be small



THE PRIME MINISTER

Compared with those of life on death which had been with us constantly for eleven weeks. It was a miade wrought-by ordinary men and women with entraordinary qualities. Forever bold, forwer brave, forwer remembered.

Much latin - at the Newsrich Semin et St. Panto when the Round Honor containing every name of those 257 who fave their Twis - the mother, a Clasgod lady - who had both her deathy loved son suddenly look my aim and said "You'll never what the Islands go will you?"

No - NEVER' I replied, a promise I saw as Primi Thinster and which I hope will always be horowed for the Jake of those who ched.

[p120 begins]

compared with those of life or death which had been with us constantly for eleven weeks. It was a miracle wrought by ordinary men and women with extraordinary qualities.

[The following few sentences added later, after 1992]

Forever bold, forever brave, forever remembered.

Much later, - at the Memorial service at St. Pauls when the Roll of Honour containing every name of those 257 who gave their lives - the mother, a Glasgow lady - who had lost her dearly loved son suddenly took my arm and said "You'll never let the Islands go will you?" "No - NEVER" I replied, a promise I gave as Prime Minister and which I hope will always be honoured for the sake of those who died.



THE PRIME MINISTER

Then were many things yet to be discussed and decided

The Angelow P.O.W. . The last was we conduit. bole efter them properly on Fullmands - the lists we had intended for me ver down on the Manti Conveyor. Us had to return them to Aprilia es soon as proper arrangements could be made. Any banquing about. pencioneresselo- proved fuetters. Livertuelly we counted 11,848 pursons and purchen about Cantine Morland. Argelie aprecessede conduct for them to foto Pueto Madrya. The Dyrahini ans plushed one of on P.D.V.'s of 3 Fl. H. Glown Bulist jourabils.

[p121 begins]

There were many things yet to be discussed and decided:

- The Argentine POWs. The fact was we couldn't look after them properly on Falklands - the tents we had intended for use went down on the Atlantic Conveyor. We had to return them to Argentina as soon as proper arrangements could be made. Any bargaining about permanent cessation proved fruitless.

Eventually we counted 11,848 prisoners and put them aboard Canberra & Norland. Argentina agreed safe conduct for them to go to Puerto Madryn. The Argentinians still had <u>one</u> of our P.O.W's, Fl.Lt. Glover & 3 British journalists.



THE PRIME MINISTER

- Souther That had to be receptioned. This

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- Often to Aprilia to repolition their dead

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 - Britain as soon as possible.
 - We made it. clear that, S.c. Resolt 502 was dead became the Alertin and had not implemented the openhit pares. There was i. no objection on in to with draw,

[p122 begins]

- Southern Thule had to be recaptured. This was done without a shot being fired. The Argentines there had <u>not</u> been engaged in scientific activities other than meteorological observations.
- Arrangements had to be made to repatriate the bodies of servicemen killed on Falklands for those relatives who wished it. A number including H's widow wished the bodies to remain in the Falklands.
- Offers to Argentina to repatriate their dead.
- Return of Rex & Mrs Hunt and some teachers - Falklanders who had been in Britain as soon as possible.
- We made it clear that S.C. [Security Council] Resolution 502 was dead because the Argentinians had not implemented the operative paras [paragraphs]. There was therefore no obligation on us to withdraw.



THE PRIME MINISTER

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Slathed men renaired viduality hereal

Thrender. Some helped to made the

minefulds which were and will remain

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10,000 P.O.W. FI. Lt. Glove had stud

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- De had to record the Shule (redes) missile from Brazil. The Vilcan was relieved to Burson.
- Adal woodsand General Noon had to be relieved - replaced
 - Ships vid. aniuft camen Led to Come home - to a humillions withome.

[p123 begins]

- After we had repatriated the vast majority of the prisoners some 560 officers & skilled men remained including General Menendez. Some helped to mark the minefields which were and will remain a major hazard for years. We captured large amounts of equipment but only some of it was usable.
- We had to recover the Shrike (radar) missile from Brazil. The Vulcan was returned to Ascension.
- Admiral Woodward & General Moore had to be relieved & replaced.
- Ships incl. [including] aircraft carriers had to come home to a tumultuous welcome.



THE PRIME MINISTER

I won't to meet Hermes. She is a fartishe ship. To go below and the how the Harvier and helicopless had been naded in was a fect expensive. The men who writed on manderance had beginner an end Jungo that were vicigied was possible.

And the hospiter would, where men from Shephelis Moverly had been latter was it's own miach chapter. Capt Middleton himself was an ispriction.

- Rebolitation work - Prefet houses, any mile, buildings equipment, noch constans syphis of every laid, morey for commundoss for the Futhernows - all had to be amarged and puts hard

[p124 begins]

I went to meet Hermes. She is a fantastic ship. To go below and see how the Harriers and helicopters had been packed in was a great experience. The men who worked on maintenance had kept more aircraft flying than we ever imagined was possible.

And the hospital ward, where men from Sheffield and Coventry had been taken was its own miracle chapter. Capt. Middleton himself was an inspiration.

- Rehabilitation work - Prefab houses, army units, building equipment, rock crushers, supplies of every kind, money for compensation for the Falklanders - all had to be arranged and put in hand.



THE PRIME MINISTER

- and of council the Semu of Thanks giving and Remembrane in Sr. Pauls. This had is own deficables because of its economical rature. No parede was allowed to the Catredad, no coloms to the Allin and it was as much as we could do to pursuach He Church authorhis to allow anyone who hed taken pauli the Zuthlands campay in to talu part i the senie. Everluelly after a Lot of toing of from they afee a teal

funion mentus of the mond sentences and the

2 L should speak some sentences and the Para - Chapteri should tale part by reading from the derive. But because of the presence of the Rue and My the Royal Family - the spect pageanters of the method band humpeleis. Me dervie was a great confort to the bearand and that me there more

[p125 begins]

- and of course the Service of Thanksgiving and Remembrance in St.Pauls. This had its own difficulties because of its ecumenical nature. No parade was allowed to the Cathedral, no colours to the Altar and it was as much as we could do to persuade the Church authorities to allow anyone who had taken part in the Falklands campaign to take part in the service. Eventually after a lot of to-ing and fro-ing they agreed that 2 junior members of the Armed Forces should speak some sentences and the para-chaplain should take part by reading a lesson. The Thanksgiving part was virtually dropped from the service. But because of the presence of the Queen and all the Royal Family & the superb pageantry of the military band & trumpeters, the service was a great comfort to the bereaved and that mattered more

indicated that without letter

10 DOWNING STREET part if mention 1 the

THE PRIME MINISTER

I threatened to make the leasen in Parliament and

than anything else. I pulling.

Of one time it. was suffered that the suise should contain elements to april to Aprilie opinion! Such as the Lords Prayer in Spanish. - anargements of, a South Mark. Fund

on chantable leins which involved the established Denice charbes and which established Denice charbes and which avoided the cultains of the Parish which occurred over the Penter Uplich disorter.

- Restarché and in provement- of the anifold with the 'matting' we had punched from the U.S.

The Royal Dogwein die a nepuldie job as I discovered when I hister them

- 121. Lt (love was repatrished to Rochbillo on gradient John We were

[p126 begins]

than anything else.

At one time it was suggested that the service should contain elements to appeal to Argentine opinion! Such as the Lords Prayer in Spanish.

It was also indicated that certain of the clergy would <u>not</u> take part if members of the Armed Forces read the lessons.

I threatened to make this known in Parliament and therefore publicly.

- arrangements for a South Atlantic Fund on charitable terms which involved the established service charities and which avoided the criticisms of the kind which occurred over the Penlee Lifeboat disaster.
- Restoration and improvement of the airfield with the 'matting' we had purchased from the U.S.

 The Royal Engineers did a <u>superlative</u> job as I discovered when I visited them.
- Fl.Lt. Glover was repatriated to Montevideo on 8th July. We were



THE PRIME MINISTER

- something in achieved very noon ofter.

Following that I financial restricted to when the Myrelinians refused to allow flythis to Theore, Aris as party the padage.

Following Here molles the Frenchs

Committee was setup with the aprement

Committee was setup and reported within

Me opp- parties and reported within

6 months.

Ditie one year we had awayed for some 500 of the beneared to wish the Falklands - a traumatic and proposed superiorie for them. To oversome with requires the branest- of mer.

[p127 begins]

anxious to return the rest of the Argentinians - something we achieved very soon after.

Following that financial restrictions were lifted but the Argentinians refused to allow flights to Buenos Aires as part of the package.

Following these matters the Franks Committee was set up with the agreement of the Oppn [Opposition] parties and reported within 6 months.

Within one year, we had arranged for some 500 of the bereaved to visit the Falklands - a traumatic and profound experience for them. To overcome evil requires the bravest of men.



THE PRIME MINISTER

Note 30 t April - Pennissi for

5-- Bright - ester burner

of 'Location

120 lans. 3000 men. 2300 kom annumli.

110 vehilles

79 waleis.

19 10 cplus

QE 11 - /100,000 Long 6 6 mm. Nochi Ferry Dy 200 Day

Ment Conrys.

[p128 begins]

Notes

30th April:Permission for5 Brigade & extra Harriers& H'copters [helicopters]

1st May: 3000 men 2300 tons ammunition 110 vehicles 79 trailers 19 H'copters [helicopters] 6 Guns

QEII - £150,000 per day Nordic Ferry ?By 28th May Baltic Ferry Atlantic Conveyor