

PRIME MINISTER

Anglo-German Summit

In an attempt to sharpen up the briefing for meetings of this sort it has been agreed to produce for each briefing meeting a draft "Game Plan". Following the meeting this will be revised and submitted to you together with your brief for the talks.

A draft "Game Plan" for this Summit is attached. You may like to concentrate discussion on it at the briefing meeting.

The programme for the summit is:-

Thursday 21 April

Chancellor Kohl arrives at Northolt: met by Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary

2015 for 2030 Dinner at No. 10 for Chancellor (48 at small tables)

Friday 22 April

0900-1030 Tete-a-tete

1030-1130 Joined by Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors

1145-1245 Plenary in Cabinet Room

1300 Lunch at No. 10 for participating Ministers and 2 Ambassadors (Lambsdorff has to leave before lunch)

1445 Joint Press Conference at No. 12

1545 Chancellor Kohl leaves

A.J.C.

19 April 1983

## ANGLO-GERMAN SUMMIT

## DRAFT GAME PLAN

1. There is a wide identity of views:  
see Bonn telno 377, Sir Antony Acland's minute of 19 April to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, both attached, and Mr Hancock's minute of 15 April to Mr Coles.

Organisation of business

2. Underlying much of the agenda is the question of Europe's relations with the United States. At dinner on 21 April the Prime Minister may have a chance to compare notes with Dr Kohl about President Reagan's leadership and its implications for Britain and Germany.

3. When the talks begin on Friday, the Prime Minister could ask Dr Kohl to describe the results of his visit to Washington last week. He claims to have convinced the Americans that in the interests of carrying through the deployment of INF they should (a) not press for far-reaching conclusions on East/West economic relations at Williamsburg

/and (b)

and (b) not stand out for more than is now available  
at the CSCE Review Conference in Madrid. It is not  
clear however whether the Americans consider  
themselves committed to these propositions.

4. This could lead on to discussion of the  
agenda for the Economic Summit at Williamsburg,  
especially the world economy, in the light of this  
week's meeting of Personal Representatives.

5. Before Foreign Ministers join the meeting,  
the Prime Minister will want to consolidate the  
understanding reached with Dr Kohl in February  
that an interim budget solution for 1983 must be  
achieved by the time of the European Council in  
Stuttgart. In return the Prime Minister could say  
we are willing to work constructively with the  
Germans on a number of issues which matter to them,  
including youth unemployment, the internal market,  
and 'acid rain'. She could also say that she  
is prepared to sign the Genscher/Colombo document  
('Solemn Declaration' is now its title), provided  
the question of majority voting can be satisfactorily  
resolved.

/6.

CONFIDENTIAL

3

6. When the Foreign Ministers join the meeting, the points in paragraphs 3 to 5 above can be discussed further. It is important that Genscher should hear what the Prime Minister and Dr Kohl have agreed on the Community budget, since he may have to chair important meetings on the subject.

7. The other main subject for discussion by Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers together is INF deployment.

Specialist Points of particular importance

8. The most important of these from the British point of view are (Brief numbers in brackets):-

German Arms Supplies to Argentina (9c)

Tornado for Oman (5c)

Annual Reports by Armaments Directors (5a)

Progress report before next Summit on

Anglo-German Relations (11)

[list to be finalised after the Prime Minister's briefing meeting.]

9. All of these should be covered by Ministers in their bilateral talks, reported to the Plenary Session. [It will be for decision which should be mentioned in briefing the Press afterwards.]

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

Secretary of State

cc: PS/Mr Hurd  
Sir Julian Bullard  
Mr Evans  
WED  
EESD  
Defence Dept  
ERD  
ECD(I)  
Planning Staff  
Sir Jock Taylor KCMG, BONN

TALKS WITH HERR VON STADEN

1. I had a day's talks yesterday in London with my German opposite number, Herr von Staden. The talks were extremely friendly and open, and showed a close identity of view on a wide range of issues. They reinforced our impression that Anglo/German relations are very good at the moment. Chancellor Kohl's visit at the end of the week provides another important opportunity to reach agreement on common objectives and policies. Von Staden's thoughts on the topics which Chancellor Kohl would want to raise with the Prime Minister coincided closely with those set out in Bonn telno 377 of 18 April (attached). He thought Chancellor Kohl would want to concentrate on the following points:

- a) East/West relations, especially the INF negotiations and the prospect of INF deployment later in the year. He would want to talk about progress in the negotiations themselves and the need to create the right climate for deployment through public campaigns in Germany and in Britain and, if possible, through progress on other related arms control issues. He would see a satisfactory outcome to the CSCE meeting in Madrid, including agreement on a CDE, as particularly important in this context. Chancellor Kohl would also want to talk about his recent visit to Washington, his forthcoming visit to Moscow (he would welcome the Prime Minister's advice on how to handle it), and the role which the Western Europeans might play in preparing for a possible meeting between President Reagan and Andropov. Chancellor Kohl had told President Reagan that he favoured such a meeting, (though von Staden thought the Americans might so hedge it with conditions that it would not take place).
- b) Transatlantic relations, especially the preparations for the Williamsburg Economic Summit, concentrating on what we should achieve and what we should avoid. Chancellor Kohl thought it particularly important to prevent East/West economic relations, on which negotiations were now going ahead

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

satisfactorily in the various fora (NATO, COCOM, OECD, IEA) from becoming divisive and acrimonious once again.

- c) The European Council in Stuttgart in June. Chancellor Kohl was determined that the German Presidency should be seen as a success, and therefore attached great importance to a good outcome to the Stuttgart meeting.
- d) A number of Third World issues, notably Arab/Israel, the Iran/Iraq war, Lebanon, Namibia and Central America.

2. I said that I thought that Chancellor Kohl would find that the Prime Minister's mind was directed to very much the same subjects. I stressed in particular the importance which we attached to a successful outcome on the European Budget at the Stuttgart meeting. I also said that I thought that the need for proper Transatlantic consultation, without which we and the Germans sometimes found it difficult to give as strong and convincing support for American policies as we would like, might be an underlying theme of the discussions. Finally, I said I thought that the Prime Minister might want to suggest a review by officials of the Anglo/German bilateral relationship with a remit to report to the next Summit. Relations were extremely close at the moment, but such a review could be worthwhile as a stock-taking exercise and in order to give new impetus or emphasis to certain activities. Von Staden thought Chancellor Kohl would be receptive. Both he and the German Ambassador here are extremely keen on the idea. We thought that in the interests of speed it might be better for each side to prepare a report according to an agreed framework, rather than to try to produce an agreed report.

3. Von Staden spent some considerable time at the beginning of our talks on the one main outstanding issue in the Genscher/Colombo plan. He was clearly under instructions from Herr Genscher to press the German position. Chancellor Kohl is likely to say that he wants the Declaration signed at the next European Council (he attached a good deal of importance to this) but the details are more likely to be raised with you by Herr Genscher.

4. There was much common ground between us on other subjects we discussed, such as the Middle East and Southern Africa. On the Middle East, von Staden said the situation had deteriorated and it was hard to see what the EC could do about it. We said we were sticking with the Reagan Plan for a little longer, but if it became apparent that it was dead, we would have to look at what the EC might do, limited though the options were. Von Staden seemed rather more relaxed than I had expected over Namibia, and thought it still worth working hard for a settlement. He was a little more convinced than I am of South Africa's commitment to a solution, and of the chances of a solution to the Cuban problem. Von Staden listened to what I had to say about the Falklands and Argentina and said that the Germans understood our position and would do all they could to

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

help in talking to the Argentines, but did not reply directly when I said that we hoped the Germans would not open up any new lines of arms supplies to Argentina. He said that the Germans believed that South America, and particularly its more important countries, including Argentina, would become more rather than less important in world affairs in the future, and that it was important that we managed our relations so as to ensure that they aligned themselves with the West, as their history and culture should dictate, rather than the East. He said this did not have operational implications at the moment for our policy towards the Falklands, which was our affair, but he hoped we would bear it in mind for the longer term.

5. In a brief discussion on Spain, von Staden said the Germans would consider whether there was anything they could say to the Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez when he visited Bonn about the need for sensible handling of the Gibraltar question. I encouraged this, since the Germans (more the SPD than the CDU) have always had a lot of influence with Gonzalez.

*Antony Acland*

---

19 April 1983

Antony Acland

CONFIDENTIAL