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Ref. A083/1556MR COLES

(PA)

--- I attach a note for record of the discussion at Williamsburg
--- on the morning of Sunday 29 May when Heads of State or Government
--- considered the draft statement on arms control, and summary notes
of the afternoon's discussion of the revised draft.

2. I am sending copies of this minute and of the notes to the
Private Secretaries to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and
the Secretary of State for Defence.

3. I suggest that no copies should be made of the notes, that
the notes should not go outside Private Offices, that they should
be seen by only those with a strict need to know, and that they
should be asked to read them in Private Offices.

Re
Approved by
ROBERT ARMSTRONG
and signed in his absence

1 June 1983



Note of a Meeting held in the House of Burgesses,
Williamsburg, Virginia, on Sunday 29 May 1983 at 11.30 am

Present

President of the United States (In the Chair)
President of the French Republic
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
Prime Minister of Canada
Chancellor of the Federal German Republic
Prime Minister of Italy
Prime Minister of Japan
President of the Commission of the European Communities

Each Head of State or Government was accompanied by his Foreign Minister and by his Personal Representative

The President of the United States reminded the meeting that, when Heads of State or Government had been together the previous evening, there had been general agreement that it would be useful if the Summit Conference could issue a statement about arms control, with particular reference to Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF). As a result Foreign Ministers had been working on the draft of such a statement, which he now invited his Secretary of State to introduce.

2. The Secretary of State said that the draft now circulated had been prepared by the United States delegation on the basis of the comments made by the President at dinner the previous evening, and had been revised at a meeting of Foreign Ministers earlier in the morning.

3. The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom said that she thought that the draft statement was an excellent document. It made clear that the West was determined to defend freedom, but would welcome the possibility of doing so at lower levels of armaments, and would wish to pursue negotiations vigorously with that object. She could agree to the draft document without any change.

4. The Prime Minister of Italy also welcomed the document. It showed a strong determination to maintain freedom, a commitment to a realistic timetable for the introduction of INF, and a commitment to negotiate upon global reductions in INF. He could also accept the document.



5. The President of the French Republic said that he was not in agreement with the text. France was not in the NATO command; she had not taken part in the dual track decision. This was not a subject which was suitable for discussion at what was intended to be an Economic Summit and France should not be asked to discuss the matter in this forum. He was ready to support the major proposals in the draft statement, but as the Head of State of a sovereign country and not as a member of the seven Summit countries. The declaration might be acceptable in substance, but it went outside French policy over the last ten years. He could not agree to the issue of a text resulting from NATO discussions to which France was not a party.

6. The Chancellor of the Federal German Republic said that he was able to subscribe to the text as drafted. It would, however, be very important to have a text that was supported by all those present: it would be worse than nothing if it was not possible to arrive at a draft upon which everybody could agree. The previous evening the Soviet Union had issued a statement which was addressed to the citizens of the Federal Republic, saying that deployment of Pershing missiles in Germany would destroy all German hopes of national unity. It was therefore urgent to issue an agreed joint statement. The Federal Republic of Germany was in the front line and would stick to deployment, but he sought for the help of his colleagues with a joint statement; it would be very bad to leave Williamsburg and fail to arrive at a solution to this problem.

7. The Prime Minister of Canada said that what was said in the draft was something, which as a member of NATO, Canada could and should accept. But it was the wrong message, utterly and tragically wrong. It would be a good message to send to the leaders of the Soviet Union; it was not a good message to send to the peoples of the countries represented round the table. It was proposed to put in the text negotiating postures about which people could not care less, and concepts of equality which would only frighten them. It insisted on deployment of INF by the end of the year, but it was foolish for the West to commit itself to that at this stage.



People wanted their leaders to carry a big stick but to talk softly in their dealings with the Russians. They wanted to hear something about mutual trust, and the ability to live in peace with the Soviet Union, provided that she did not use force. Mrs Thatcher was going to win her Election because Mr Foot had taken an absurd position: people would not buy unilateral disarmament. But they did want their leaders to "bust their asses" to reach agreement with the Soviet Union. The draft proposed would be a sign of escalation.

8. The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom said that the Federal Chancellor had fought his election on this issue, and she was now fighting hers on the same issue. What Mr Trudeau was saying was utterly devastating and could only give comfort to the Soviet Union.

9. The Federal Chancellor suggested that the Conference should work to arrive at a textual agreement with the President of the French Republic. The President's position on these matters and on defence was generally supportive. In all European countries there was a large peace movement. Of course all the leaders present were in favour of peace. But the Soviet Union had been building up its armed forces and was now fuelling anti-Americanism. He was convinced that the Soviet Union was prepared to move towards the West. It was not enough simply to say that we were in favour of peace. It was all very well to use moderate language but it would be disastrous not to make the position of the West clear. The West should tell the Soviet Union that they were in favour of controlling armaments, but that the Soviet Union could not expect the West to stand still while they increased. He appealed to the Canadian Prime Minister to help. Political scientists were apt to say that leaders could not tell the people the truth. The Federal Chancellor did not accept that. He did not believe that the voters were fooled. Young people expected their leaders to set an example. It was not a bad road that they were engaged on, and the example of the Pope showed what could be achieved by moral force.



10. The Prime Minister of Italy recalled that at dinner the previous evening the French President had said that this gathering was in a special position, with Japan not a member of the Atlantic Alliance and France not in NATO. It was not possible to have a declaration sustained by only five or six of those present. At this point the best thing to do would be to work with the French President to identify what were the specific difficulties for him. He understood that the Canadian Prime Minister had problems of structure; but one or two of those round the table faced elections. The message needed to be directed both to the Soviet Union and to public opinion.

11. The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom said that they had to try to reach an agreement on a statement. If they did not, the message to the Soviet Union would be that the leaders of the Western Alliance were in disarray on a fundamental issue at a time when it would be particularly embarrassing for those of them who were fighting elections. She wondered whether Mr Trudeau's difficulties would be made easier by bringing paragraph nine of the proposed statement up to the beginning.

12. The Prime Minister of Japan said that at dinner the previous evening there had been general agreement that the West should express its intentions on INF. If they were now to come out without a statement, that would have a negative impact; so they had to come out with a statement. Japan was fully in agreement with those who sought to achieve peace, even though she was not a member of NATO. On defence, he was convinced of the need for deterrence and a balance of arms. He understood the French President's problem, but thought that it would be useful for France to agree with NATO in these matters in the interests of unity and solidarity.

13. The French President said that he would like to say something that would not stress difficulties but help to get out of them. The idea of a statement was legitimate. For the reasons he had already stated he had not been willing to accept it. The fact that the statement had been drafted and discussed created a different situation. It was a situation for which he had no responsibility,



but he was ready to try to settle upon a statement in the interests of unity and in order to avoid the risks and danger now envisaged in not issuing a statement. There was not much in the text with which he would disagree, as a partner in the Atlantic Alliance. It was not the objectives he rejected; his difficulty was that France was not in a position to go along with an approach which put France in a position which was inconsistent with French diplomatic policy. France could not put herself into the NATO integrated command system. The twin-track decision had been taken in NATO, and the French were not involved in it, though it was of interest to them. The Atlantic Alliance should stay within its limits. The Summit leaders were not gathered here for the purpose of discussing questions of defence. So his problems were a mixture of substance and form. He would have preferred no text. He would not now want to hamper the search for a text, though he pointed out that France would be committing herself far more than others. The Summit leaders were not a directorate for other countries. Nonetheless he did not see how it was now possible to get out of a situation which he regretted without a statement, which should simply state principles.

14. The President of the United States reminded the French President that he had publicly said that deployment of INF should go ahead if agreement between the Soviet Union and the West was not reached. The President of the French Republic interjected that he would say the same again. The President of the United States said that the Soviet Union were the common enemy and the only threat. Round this table were represented countries who had once been enemies and were now friends, and he found that very moving. The very fact that the text now before them had been reproduced meant that it was very likely that the press already had it. The Soviet Union were on record as saying that nuclear war would be acceptable to further progressive ideas. The only interest of the West was in stopping them from fulfilling their threats. It simply was not true that the United States already had enough nuclear weapons. The ones they had were old and inaccurate and could not penetrate hardened Russian silos. The



Russians had 1,350 "intermediate" nuclear warheads in Europe; the Americans did not have a single one. The Russians had made it clear that the Pershing II missile was unacceptable and they were trying in every way to stop its deployment. That showed how much it mattered to them: it was the only threat that would keep them at the negotiating table. There was no reason why any country round the table should not accept the proposed declaration. What was wrong with taking the moral high ground against the use of these weapons? He could not understand the objections to the statement. It simply was not true that the United States had enough missiles to blow up the world. If the Russians took out the American silos, the Russians would then be in a position to threaten to blow up American cities if the United States used the other two legs of their "triad". The leaders of the Summit countries were acting in the defence of the free world and not just of NATO.

15. The Prime Minister of Canada said that the French President was saying that the substance of the draft statement was acceptable to him, but he could not commit himself to it for various political reasons. He himself was saying that the draft statement would be a good message to send to the Soviet Union but not a good statement to publish to public opinion. That was not a matter of elections; he just thought that the time was not right. He might be utterly wrong, but if he was utterly wrong it was on timing, because he agreed on the substance. Public opinion did not want to hear that Western leaders were supporting a particular negotiating posture. He thought that it was unwise to seek to be as precise as the statement now proposed. It would be better to send a clear message to the Soviet Union but to speak more softly.

16. The President of the United States said that that was what the West had done for ten years. Who believed that the Soviet Union would listen to that? If they were not careful, all the good of the Williamsburg meeting was going to disappear behind a barrage of headlines about failure to agree on this subject. They needed to lay down a marker that the West was not going to sit back and wait while the Soviet Union built up its forces. The Soviet Union



were at full economic stretch, and could not afford to increase the resources devoted to defence. The United States and the West could do so, and the Soviet Union knew that they could do so, because they had seen us do it. So, faced with the possibility of an arms race, the Soviet Union would pull back.

17. The President of the French Republic said, in response to what had just been said, that he had made it clear before the meeting that he was unfavourable to the idea of a statement on the lines now proposed. He could not be tied to the draft prepared by Foreign Ministers simply by fear that it was already in the hands of the press. As he had already said, he regretted the situation which had now been created, but he recognised that it would now be very difficult to get out of that situation acceptably without a statement. The drafting of the statement should be further considered in the light of the discussion.

18. The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom reiterated her suggestion that paragraph nine of the draft statement should be brought up to the beginning of the draft.

19. The President of the United States invited the Secretary of State and other Foreign Ministers to reconsider the draft statement in the light of the discussion, and to report back to Heads of State or Government at their meeting later in the day.

20. The meeting of Heads of State or Government was adjourned shortly before 12.30 pm.

1 June 1983