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FM WASHINGTON 150330Z JUL 83
 TO PRIORITY FCO
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 1987 OF 15 JULY
 INFO PRIORITY BONN PARIS UKDEL NATO

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YOUR CALL ON MR WEINBERGER

1. YOU TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO EMPHASISE THE IMPORTANCE YOU ATTACHED TO OUR VERY CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE AMERICANS IN THE DEFENCE AND INTELLIGENCE FIELDS, AND TO EXPRESS APPRECIATION AGAIN FOR US SUPPORT DURING THE FALKLANDS WAR.

2. FOLLOWING ARE MAIN POINTS:

(I) INF: WEINBERGER CONFIRMED THAT THE AMERICANS WERE CONTENT THAT DEPLOYMENTS IN BRITAIN AND GERMANY SHOULD MOVE IN TANDEM. THE LARGEST EQUIPMENT AND TEST DEPLOYMENTS WOULD OF COURSE BE VISIBLE, AND THE AMERICANS WOULD WANT TO CONCERT WITH US ON THE HANDLING. ON THE NEGOTIATIONS, WEINBERGER SAID THAT HIS UNDERSTANDING IN THE LIGHT OF THE KOHL VISIT WAS THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD NOT WALK AWAY IN RESPONSE TO DEPLOYMENT. THE 15 NOVEMBER DEBATE IN THE BUNDESTAG HAD SEEMED TO HIM AN UNNECESSARY HURDLE, BUT THE GERMANS SEEMED CONFIDENT THAT IT WOULD NOT CAUSE TROUBLE.

(II) KOHL VISIT TO MOSCOW: WEINBERGER'S ASSESSMENT WAS VERY MUCH IN LINE WITH OURS. HE CLAIMED THAT ANDROPOV, WHILE SHOWING NO LOSS OF INTELLECTURAL ACUTENESS, NEEDED TWO OR THREE DAYS REST A WEEK. HE COULD NOT MAINTAIN A STEADY WORK SCHEDULE.

(III) BRITISH DEFENCE BUDGET: WEINBERGER SAID THAT OUR RECORD WAS EXTREMELY IMPRESSIVE AND THAT HE WOULD MAKE GOOD USE OF THE FACT WITH THE CONGRESS.

(IV) ARMS TO ARGENTINA: WEINBERGER SAID THAT NO DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN. IN HIS VIEW, THE FACTORS REQUIRED TO JUSTIFY CERTIFICATION WERE NOT YET THERE.

(V) THEATRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS: YOU SAID THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE REDUCTIONS, BUT WOULD LIKE ALSO TO GET SOMETHING IN EXCHANGE. WEINBERGER AGREED. PERLE SAID THAT THERE WAS SCOPE FOR REDUCTIONS BEYOND A ONE FOR ONE SUBSTITUTION FOR INF DEPLOYMENTS, BUT THE NUMBER COULD NOT BE AS LARGE AS THAT IMPLIED BY THE UK PAPER (WHICH WOULD CREATE A QUOTE TERRIBLE FRACAS UNQUOTE WITH SHAPE AND THE US ARMY AND AIR FORCE). HE ADDED THAT IF THE US AND THE UK COULD REACH AGREEMENT THE OTHERS WOULD COME ALONG. YOU AGREED THAT WE SHOULD TRY TO REACH A CONSENSUS AND EMPHASISED THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF OUR WANTING A REDUCTION IN NUCLEAR TASKS.

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(VI) BELIZE: YOU EXPLAINED THE REASONS WHICH HAD LED US TO SET AN END OF YEAR DEADLINE FOR WITHDRAWAL. WEINBERGER SAID THAT THE GARRISON WAS A GREAT FACTOR FOR STABILITY AND THAT ITS WITHDRAWAL MIGHT BE SEEN AS AN INVITATION TO OTHERS TO INTERVENE.

(VII) COCOM: WEINBERGER AND, MORE PARTICULARLY PERLE, MADE A VERY STRONG PITCH FOR A MILITARY COMMITTEE OR SUB-COMMITTEE. YOU SAID THAT THERE WAS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US ON THE BASIS OBJECTIVES AND THAT COCOM MUST BE GIVEN THE TOOLS TO DO THE JOB, BUT YOU KNEW THAT WE HAD NOT BEEN CONVINCED OF THE CASE FOR A MILITARY COMMITTEE. YOU MADE NO COMMITMENT, BUT SAID THAT YOU WOULD BE PREPARED TO LOOK AT WHAT COCOM NEEDED IN ORDER TO WORK MORE EFFICIENTLY. PERLE SAID THAT THE QUESTION WOULD NEVER BE RESOLVED IN PARIS AND SUGGESTED BILATERAL TALKS.

(VIII) LEBANON MNF: WEINBERGER EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE IDEA THAT THE US CONTINGENT MIGHT BE ASKED TO TAKE ON A WIDER ROLE, INCLUDING THE SECURING OF MAIN ROADS. THIS WOULD BE A SUBSTANTIAL EXPANSION OF FUNCTION, AND CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT WAS ALREADY FRAGILE.

WRIGHT

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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