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11/10/83



CYPRUS: ADVANCE COPIES 12

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PS/MR WHITNEY
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FROM COMMCEN HSP

TO MODUK

INFO CBFC

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FLASH

I have asked the
F.C.O. to provide an early
assessment to the Prime Minister.

A.J.C. 12/10

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FM NICOSIA 111500Z

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NO 244 OF 11 OCTOBER 83.

INFO IMMEDIATE ANKARA, UKMIS NEW YORK.

INFO PRIORITY ATHENS, WASHINGTON, MODUK.

INFO ROUTINE CBFC, BONN, PARIS, ROME, UKDEL NATO.

MY TEL NO 242 : CYPRUS PROBLEM.

1. IN MY HOUR LONG INTERVIEW WITH IACOVOU ON THE MORNING OF 11 OCTOBER HE BRIEFED ME ON KYPRIANOU'S MEETINGS WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL IN NEW YORK, ALONG THE GENERAL LINES OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH US OFFICIALS ON 5 OCTOBER (PARA 4 OF WASHINGTON TEL NO 2905). HE STRESSED THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOT RESPONSE ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S INDICATORS AND ON OTHER POINTS WHICH WOULD NEED TO BE COVERED HAD BEEN DESCRIBED PRIVATELY BY PEREZ DE CUELLAR AS MORE POSITIVE THAN HE COULD EVER HAVE EXPECTED. IT EXPRESSED GREEK CYPRIOT PREFERENCES ON THE SUBJECTS COVERED BUT ALWAYS LEFT THE DOOR OPEN TO NEGOTIATION AND CONSIDERATION OF ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS. KYPRIANOU HAD AGREED THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL COULD CONVEY THE GIST OF THE GREEK CYPRIOT RESPONSE ORALLY TO THE TURKISH SIDE BUT NOT HAND OVER THE TEXT IN THE ABSENCE OF AN EQUIVALENT RESPONSE FROM THE TURKISH SIDE. IACOVOU SAID THAT HE WOULD BE SEEKING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S AGREEMENT TO THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATING THE TEXT OF THEIR RESPONSE TO A NUMBER OF FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS, AS WELL AS AT A LATER STAGE TO ITS EVENTUAL PUBLICATION.

2. IACOVOU CONTRASTED THIS SERIOUS GREEK CYPRIOT SUPPORT FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE WITH THE 'FLIPPANT AND UNCONSIDERED' REJECTION OF IT BY THE TURKISH SIDE. HE WAS MORE CALM THAN I EXPECTED IN THE FACE OF DENKTASH'S LATEST PUBLIC THREAT OF PROCEEDING TO INDEPENDENCE UNLESS KYPRIANOU HAD SAT DOWN WITH HIM WITHIN THREE WEEKS (BY WHICH HE APPEARS TO MEAN THE END OF OCTOBER). IACOVOU TREATED THIS AS ABSURD GIVEN THE PREPARATION THAT WOULD ON PAST FORM BE REQUIRED AND THE FACT THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL COULD NOT MAKE HIMSELF AVAILABLE BEFORE

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL COULD NOT MAKE HIMSELF AVAILABLE BEFORE JANUARY. HE BY NO MEANS RULED OUT HOWEVER A HIGH LEVEL MEETING WHICH WOULD ADDRESS ISSUES OF SUBSTANCE AS A STAGE IN THE PURSUIT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S INITIATIVE.

3. THE THREE FORMS OF ACTION WHICH IACOVOU SAID HE WAS ASKING THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO TAKE AT THIS JUNCTURE WERE :

- (A) TO ENCOURAGE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO PERSEVERE WITH HIS INITIATIVE AND NOT TAKE NO FOR AN ANSWER FROM THE TURKISH SIDE AT THIS STAGE (I DETECTED A FEAR THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR MIGHT HAVE BECOME TOO DISCOURAGED).
- (B) TO ENCOURAGE THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS AND THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT TO COOPERATE WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL BY GIVING HIM A SUBSTANTIAL RESPONSE OF THEIR OWN IN PARALLEL TO THE GREEK CYPRIOT ONE :
- (C) TO MAKE CLEAR TO THEM THAT DENKTASH'S THREATS WERE UNHELPFUL IN SPOILING THE ATMOSPHERE FOR A SETTLEMENT. IACOVOU EMPHASISED THAT HE HAD DONE HIS UTMOST TO AVOID DISTURBING THE ATMOSPHERE. HE CITED NOT ONLY THE POSTPONEMENT OF A DECISION ON CYPRIOT REPRESENTATION IN THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE ASSEMBLY BUT ALSO HIS OWN RESTRAINT AT STRASBOURG ON THE ISSUE OF TURKEY'S RELATIONS WITH THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE. (HE READ TO ME A WARMLY APPROVING COMMENT ON THIS FROM MILLIYET).

4. IACOVOU CLEARLY SEEMED STILL TO WANT TO MAINTAIN AN ATMOSPHERE OF CALM DESPITE DENKTASH'S LATEST THREATS. HE WOULD SAY NO MORE TO THE PRESS ABOUT HIS CONTACTS TODAY WITH ME AND MY COLLEAGUES THAN THAT HE HAD BRIEFED US ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS.

5. IN CONTRAST TO THIS NOTABLY MODERATE GREEK CYPRIOT DEMARCHE, THE PUBLIC EVIDENCE IS MOUNTING OF DENKTASH CAREERING TOWARDS UDI AND THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT FAILING TO REIN HIM IN. DENKTASH IS COMING DANGEROUSLY CLOSE TO REACHING HIS LONG-STANDING AIM OF AN INDEPENDENT STATE. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES I THINK WE SHOULD NOT DELAY FURTHER IN MAKING FIRM REPRESENTATIONS TO THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT BOTH ON THE LINE OF PARA 3 (B) AND (C) ABOVE BUT ALSO AGAINST THEIR INCREASINGLY COMPLAISANT LINE OVER UDI BY DENKTASH. OUR 1980 CONTINGENCY PAPER FOR THIS EVENT (SEE DAIN'S LETTER TO SYNNOTT OF 21 SEPTEMBER NOT COPIED TO ALL) ENVISAGED THAT WE WOULD EXERT OURSELVES MORE STRONGLY THAN WE HAVE YET DONE IN ORDER TO

EXERT OURSELVES MORE STRONGLY THAN WE HAVE YET DONE IN ORDER TO PREVENT A UDI. WE COULD PUT THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT CLEARLY ON NOTICE OF THE INCONSISTENCY WITH THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE TREATY OF GUARANTEE (ON THE BASIS OF WHICH THEY CLAIM TO EXERCISE THEIR RIGHTS IN CYPRUS) AS WELL AS OF THE DAMAGE WHICH TURKEY WOULD DO TO HERSELF BY PUTTING HERSELF IN THE WRONG AT THE VERY MOMENT OF THE RETURN TO DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY.

6. I WILL COMPARE NOTES WITH MY U.S. COLLEAGUE ON 12 OCTOBER.

WILBERFORCE.

BT

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