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JWP

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7 November 1983

CYPRUS: POSSIBLE TURKISH CYPRIOT
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

The Prime Minister was grateful for your letter of 4 November and the enclosed paper. She has noted the contents of both these documents. With regard to paragraph 24 of the paper, Mrs. Thatcher has recorded her agreement with the statement in Annex A, should the need arise for it. With regard to paragraph 27, she agrees that we should rule out the use of force by the UK to ensure the Treaty of Guarantee.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 November 1983

John T. [unclear]

*Prime Minister
in answer A should
we need write
MS
A.S.C. 4/11*

Cyprus: Possible Turkish Cypriot Declaration of Independence

Thank you for your letter of 31 October saying that the Prime Minister had commented on the need for contingency planning for a possible Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence and on the difficulty of fulfilling the guarantee in the 1960 Treaties.

I enclose a copy of a paper which describes the implications of a declaration of independence and possible action both immediately and in the longer term. The paper is being submitted in parallel to the Secretary of State in his box this evening.

As the paper makes clear, we believe our reactions should be coloured by the need to be seen to fulfil our treaty obligations; the desirability of maintaining good relations with the Republic of Cyprus in the interest of preserving trouble-free use of the SBAs, and, for more general reasons, with Greece; the implications for NATO; and the implications for Turkey's relations with the West. Possible immediate action following a declaration of independence might include:

- (a) a statement condemning Turkish Cypriot action and calling for its reversal;
- (b) representations to the Turkish Government;
- (c) co-ordination of our efforts with our main allies and with the UN Secretariat;
- (d) consultations with the Cyprus Government;
- (e) calling for consultations with Greece and Turkey under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee (although such consultations are unlikely to be fruitful and one or other of the guarantor powers might refuse to take part we should be seen to fulfil our obligations under the Treaty for the guarantor powers to consult together);
- (f) initiatives in the Ten and in NATO;
- (g) calling a meeting of the UN Security Council and possibly taking the initiative in tabling a draft resolution.



Such tactics envisage seizing the diplomatic initiative in an effort to meet inevitable calls from the Greek Cypriots and the Greeks for some form of immediate response to UDI. It is most unlikely that they would succeed in reversing UDI; but there is a good chance that they will serve to limit a further deterioration in the situation.

We would not wish to recommend any military action in attempting to "deliver" the guarantee in the Treaty. To do so would involve a direct clash with a major NATO ally (the Turks have some 17,000 troops in northern Cyprus). Although the Treaty might seem to give us the right to take such action, in the absence of a decision by the Security Council it would in any case probably be incompatible with the UN Charter. We believe it is correct to conclude, as the Prime Minister has done, that we could not in practice deliver the guarantee of the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus to which the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee refers. Nor indeed have the guarantor powers been able to preserve the 1960 constitutional arrangements referred to in the Treaties which broke down in 1963 when, following intercommunal violence, the Turkish Cypriots withdrew from the federal government.

UDI would not of itself pose any threat to the Sovereign Base Areas: the Turkish Cypriots would argue that it does nothing more than formalise the situation which has effectively existed since 1963. There is some possibility, however, that heightened tension could lead to sporadic acts of violence on the ground in Cyprus which might spill over into the vicinity of the SBAs. This risk has already been assessed and will need to be checked constantly in the light of further developments.

Copies of this letter go to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
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TURKISH CYPRIOT DECLARATION OF STATEHOOD: THE CONSEQUENCES

Introduction

1. Since May this year the Turkish Cypriot leader has renewed earlier threats to declare an independent Turkish Cypriot state. The immediate likelihood of such a move has receded. But the threat remains real and could be revived at any moment if Denktash or the Turks think it could be to their advantage.
2. This paper considers the implications of a Turkish Cypriot unilateral declaration of independence (UDI); HMG's responsibilities; the need for action to prevent a declaration; and what we should do if it occurred nevertheless. UDI is used as a term of convenience. What is involved is secession from the Republic of Cyprus.

Turkish Cypriot Position

3. The Turkish Cypriot leader, Denktash, has long wanted to announce the establishment of an independent Turkish Cypriot state. Following the UN debate on Cyprus in May, resulting in a Resolution favourable to the Greek Cypriots (the UK abstained), he has stepped up and persisted with threats to do so, possibly around the time of the Turkish elections (6 November) or towards the end of the year. He has called for a summit meeting with President Kyprianou (who has agreed in principle) and may hope to link action on UDI to the outcome of such a meeting. The Turkish Cypriots would claim that UDI would do no more than formalise the current status quo (the Turkish Cypriot community ended their participation in the Government of Cyprus in 1963).

Turkish Position

4. The Turkish Government appear to have successfully restrained Denktash from declaring UDI in the past and to have exercised similar restraint again recently. They will have judged that the international reaction which this would provoke would be against their wider interests. But there are signs that their will and ability to continue to exercise restraint over the longer term may

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have diminished. They will nonetheless probably continue to try to delay UDI for the time being, at least until their tactical position is stronger.

Greek Cypriot Position

5. The Greek Cypriots realise that a Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence would probably end all chance of a solution to the Cyprus problem on terms even remotely acceptable to them. They are firmly opposed to it. But President Kyprianou is aware of the risks of provoking the Turkish Cypriots and is apparently trying to avoid giving Denktash a pretext for UDI.

Greek Position

6. The Greeks are bound strongly to oppose UDI. But Papandreou sees Cyprus as part of the wider Greek/Turkish struggle and there are signs that the Greek Government would privately not find UDI so unwelcome. Having little real concern for the welfare of either community in Cyprus they could use UDI for their own purposes in lining up Western support for the Greek case vis à vis Turkey. It would provide them with a pretext for being even less cooperative with NATO and EC if their Western partners could be presented as not having reacted sufficiently strongly to UDI. It could also provide them with a pretext, if they wanted one, to withdraw again, or at least to threaten to withdraw, from NATO's integrated structure.

HMG's Responsibilities

7. The relevant UK obligations, which are shared with Greece and Turkey, derive from the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee (copy attached). They are broadly:

- (a) to 'guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus...';
- (b) to prohibit, so far as concerns them, any activity aimed at partition of the Island;
- (c) in the event of a breach of the Treaty, to consult with the other guarantor powers on representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of it.

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8. If common or concerted action above proves impossible, the Treaty preserves the right of each of the guarantor Powers 'to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty'. So far as the use of force is concerned, it is open to question whether this right is compatible with obligations under the UN Charter.

9. In view of our obligations and the consequences for the UK (see below) our first objective should clearly be to oppose the idea of UDI and seek to prevent it.

Probable Consequences of UDI

(a) In Cyprus

10. Although UDI in itself would have little practical effect, the definitive separation of North and South would be seen in Cyprus and elsewhere as signifying the final abandonment of the concept of a unified state which is enshrined in the 1960 Treaty of Establishment. There would be a fierce Greek Cypriot and international political reaction. General intercommunal violence would be unlikely: the Turkish Cypriots would have no incentive for it and neither Greece nor the Greek Cypriots have the means to engage in hostilities. But some violence by extremists on the Greek Cypriot side cannot be ruled out. The present forces in UNFICYP should be able to cope with 'brush fires' although they could not deal with a general conflagration.

11. The Greek Cypriots would probably impose a complete embargo on North/South contacts. Continued sharing of the key common services (electricity, which goes from south to north; water which goes mainly from north to south) would also be jeopardised. Cutting these services, particularly electricity, would cause serious inconvenience and heighten tension.

12. Denktash claims that he would continue the intercommunal talks. This is consistent with his line that UDI has little

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practical significance (para 3). But the Greek Cypriots would break off the talks. The UN Secretary General would then find it extremely difficult to continue his 'good offices' role and might abandon it altogether. In these circumstances, the prospects of any agreed long-term solution would recede, if not disappear.

(b) For the UK

13. The UK's principal practical interest in Cyprus is the Sovereign Base Areas which we retain under the 1960 Treaty of Establishment and our rights over them are guaranteed by the Treaty of Guarantee. Claims that the Treaty of Guarantee no longer had any effect and criticism of the UK's failure to carry out its guarantee of the territorial integrity of Cyprus could call into question, at least politically, the continued validity of the Treaty of Establishment and the justification for our use of the SBAs.

14. Serious political tension between the communities could also threaten our ability to maintain trouble-free use of the SBAs. Provided there was no large-scale violence our main need would be to maintain Greek Cypriot goodwill. In the short term we might be able to satisfy the Greek Cypriots with strong statements and diplomatic action. In the long term, if we decided for example not to join an economic embargo against Northern Cyprus, relations would probably become strained. Pressure on us to withdraw from the Island altogether might increase.

15. Apart from the question of the SBAs, there would be political and moral pressure on the UK to take a conspicuous lead because of our Treaty obligations and because of our present and historic ties with Cyprus.

16. There would be domestic political pressure, especially from the small but vocal pro-Greek Cypriot lobby in the House of Commons, to take specific action to restore the situation laid down by the Treaty of Guarantee. Our right to take action alone (para 6 above) would no doubt be interpreted by some as an

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obligation to do so (a point made in 1974 at the time of the Turkish invasion).

17. Any such action on our part would risk jeopardising our currently good relations with Turkey with consequent implications for trade, and, in the wider context, Turkey's relations with the West generally.

18. There is also a sizeable British Community on the Island, including property owners (2,400). They might be at some risk if any violence occurred and could become targets in the event of dissatisfaction by either side about HMG's stance.

19. Trade with the Island is small (about £125m pa).

International

20. UDI would give rise to strong international condemnation of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. The Turks would feel obliged to stand by the Turkish Cypriots even if they disapproved or were unhappy about the timing. The Greeks and Greek Cypriots would orchestrate action in all available fora, notably in the UN (especially as regards Chapter VII in the UN Charter on Threats to Peace), in the EC and in NATO. Greece would want the UK (and others) to join in diplomatic action, to join their economic embargo against Northern Cyprus, and to impose sanctions on Turkey.

Preventative Action

21. If the risk of UDI increases, as it has done on occasions throughout the past months, strong representations should be made to the Turkish Government and Denktash through our posts in Ankara and Nicosia. Such representations can be reinforced at Ministerial level (as in October). Representations to Denktash are unlikely to be effective. But the Turks have responded in the past by renewing their efforts to restrain Denktash. If UDI appeared imminent we should reinforce other representations with personal messages to the Turkish Government from the Secretary of State or the Prime Minister.

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22. We should also continue to take the lead in pressing our major allies (US, France, FRG and Italy) to act similarly. The US has most leverage with Turkey.

Immediate Action Post-UDI

By the UK

23. Assuming Western representations failed and the establishment of an independent Turkish Cypriot state was announced, British reactions should be coloured by:

- (a) } the need to be seen to fulfill our treaty obligations;
- (b) the desirability of maintaining good relations with the Republic of Cyprus in order to preserve our use of the SBAs and, for broader reasons, avoiding a serious conflict with Greece;
- (c) the need to limit damage (in Cyprus, in NATO and in Turkey's relationship with the West).

24. Our immediate reactions could be:

- (a) A British Government statement condemning the Turkish Cypriot action, calling for its reversal and making it clear that there could be no recognition (a draft is at Annex A); *Amend mt*
- (b) Representations to the Turkish Government, on both legal and political grounds, including a request to bring about a reversal of the Turkish Cypriot action;
- (c) Consultations with our main allies - the other Western members of the Security Council (US, France and at present the Netherlands), and the rest of ^{the} 'European Four' with whom we have confidential discussions on Cyprus (France, FRG and Italy) - and with the UN Secretariat;
- (d) Consultations with the Cyprus Government which might cover British action in the Security Council (see below);
- (e) A proposal of consultations with Greece and Turkey under Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee. Turkey might refuse

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- to take part. (Consultations would be unlikely to be effective and would probably break down in recriminations; but we should propose them nevertheless to fulfill our Treaty obligations);
- (f) Initiatives in the Political Cooperation machinery of the Ten, and in NATO. A common view from either body would be greatly complicated by Greece's membership of both and Turkey's membership of the latter;
- (g) Calling a meeting of the UN Security Council; possibly tabling a draft resolution.

25. (a), (b) and (c) could take place immediately. Action under (g) might depend on the result of these moves and might also await the results of consultations under (d) and (e). The precise form of moves in the Security Council would depend to a large extent on the strength of Greek and Greek Cypriot reaction (if they had already discounted UDI, we should avoid over-reacting ourselves). An immediate call for informal consultations in the Security Council, tabling a draft resolution and pressing for its immediate adoption, might help retain us the initiative and pre-empt a more extreme resolution which we would have difficulty in supporting. An illustrative draft resolution is at Annex B.

26. For similar reasons, it would be important to seize the initiative under (f) in the EC and NATO. The Greeks would use the Presidency of the EC to promote their interests if UDI occurred before the end of 1983. Immediate proposals for diplomatic action would help avoid proposals for less suitable action.

27. It is assumed that the use of force by the UK to enforce the Treaty of Guarantee is ruled out (see para 34). *Amend not*

28. The Greeks might use UDI as justification for stationing additional troops in Cyprus in order to counter-balance the Turkish military presence. Papandreou has said that such a move has been considered, although it is unlikely that any final decision has been taken. At present the Greeks have about 1800 troops in Cyprus (they are allowed 950 under the 1960 Treaty of Alliance); the Turks have about 17,000 (they are allowed 650). This would be one aspect of Greece's desire to use the declaration of UDI to their own ends (see para 6 above). While this would heighten tension and increase Cyprus' ties with Greece, it is most unlikely in itself to presage military action.

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Medium and Long Term Policy

29. In the longer term our aims should be:

- (a) to avoid being drawn into action (eg open-ended economic sanctions against Turkey) which clashed with other UK/Western interests;
- (b) to contain Greek Cypriot and Greek frustrations;
- (c) to maintain some working contact with the Turkish Cypriots;
- (d) to discourage any further deterioration in the situation, or violence.

Further Action

To Placate the Greek Cypriots

30. The consultations referred to in para 24 above would be in part designed to placate the Greek Cypriots. We should continue to work to contain their frustrations (and those of the Greeks) and bring every reasonable means to bear to strengthen Greek Cypriot links with the West and encourage moderate tendencies in Athens. In doing this, we would hope also to minimise the scope for trouble making by the Greek Cypriot and Greek Communist Parties.

31. Recognition of the Turkish Cypriot 'state' should be withheld indefinitely (this could, however, lead to a North Korea-type situation where what is, in reality, an independent sovereign state is treated as if it did not exist). But some arrangements to deal with the Turkish Cypriot authorities would have to be evolved.

32. The hope of eventual settlement should not be abandoned but publicly encouraged. We should contradict any Greek claim that UDI means the end of the intercommunal talks. But UDI would make any settlement even more difficult. Only a conjunction of strong and moderate administrations in Nicosia, Ankara and Athens would render a breakthrough feasible. Meanwhile we should continue to be guided by the aims in para 29 above.

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33. It might be necessary to try to 'buy' Greek Cypriot political goodwill for the sake of preserving our interest in the SBAs. We should comply with physical Greek Cypriot measures to cut road links with northern Cyprus (we shall probably have no choice). There may be a case for special treatment of the Greek Cypriots over certain forms of aid. We might raise the subsidy for student fees. In consultation with EC partners, we should press the EC to accede to the Greek Cypriot request for full Customs Union with the Community, without necessarily much regard for benefits to the Turkish Cypriots. Legal difficulties are likely to arise over applying the EC/Cyprus Association Agreements to northern Cyprus at all.

Other Action

34. We would not wish to take military action. To do so would involve a major clash with a NATO ally (the Turks have some 17,000 troops in the North). Although Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee might seem to give us the right to take independent military action in the absence of a decision by the Security Council, such action would probably be incompatible with our obligations under the UN Charter, which override all other Treaty obligations. Nor should we wish to take economic sanctions against Turkey which would clash with other important interests. We should try to placate the Greek Cypriots by explaining to them clearly at an early stage the limits of our actions as well as what we could do.

35. There is a range of other possible measures open to us affecting trade; contacts with the Turkish Cypriot 'Government' and the present 'TFSC' office in London; aid; and cultural contacts. None is likely to reverse a decision on UDI or is particularly attractive. A boycott of the Turkish Cypriots, even for a limited period, would affect consular and compensation matters ^{/and} trade (approximately £14m p.a.). These interests are all relatively small. It might also lead to heightened tension along the common boundary between northern Cyprus and ESBA.

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36. We do not have the legal power to close the unofficial 'TFSC' office London. But we would cease to facilitate its operations by allowing in staff from Northern Cyprus. (The Home Office issue work permits to its expatriate employees). The Turkish Cypriots could no doubt find sufficient talent in the Turkish Cypriot community already in London to keep the office open but we would have made a political point by not actively conniving in its existence.

37. In practice, the British Council office in northern Cyprus would probably have to close because travel into northern Cyprus would be stopped by the Greek Cypriots.

38. It would probably not be appropriate to withhold aid to Turkish Cypriot students in the form of fee subsidies. In practice, as the money is paid in the UK to individuals, we could probably not discriminate against them even if we wished to do so.

39. In the longer term we should work towards the re-establishment of intercommunal contact. But we should not be under any illusions that this could be achieved either easily or quickly.

Conclusion

40. Our main tactics would be:

- (a) to seize the initiative and hold it as long as possible in order to minimise the calls for practical action that we would not wish to undertake.
- (b) to that end, to work on a wide variety of diplomatic fronts.

41. Such tactics envisage seizing a diplomatic initiative in an effort to meet inevitable calls from the Greek Cypriots and the Greeks for some form of immediate response to UDI. It is most unlikely that they would succeed in reversing UDI, but there is a good chance that they will serve to limit a further deterioration in the situation.

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DRAFT STATEMENT BY HMG IN THE EVENT OF UDI

1. We understand that Mr Denktash, leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, has purported to declare unilaterally the establishment of an independent State in the Turkish-occupied part of the Republic of Cyprus. The British Government deplore Mr Denktash's action. The British Government recognise only one Cypriot State; the Republic of Cyprus under the Government of President Kyprianou.
2. Such a declaration of secession is incompatible with the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. It can only complicate the already difficult task of reaching a settlement in Cyprus acceptable to the people of both communities. The British Government have made clear their opposition to any actions which make a settlement to the Cyprus problem more difficult.
3. In accordance with Britain's responsibilities under the Treaty of Guarantee we are calling for urgent consultations with the Greek and Turkish Governments. We shall also be consulting the Government of the Republic of Cyprus and be in touch with other interested governments including EC and NATO partners.

Agreed



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DRAFT OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION

1. Greatly deplores the declaration of the Turkish Cypriot authorities of the purported secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus.
2. (a) Calls for the revocation of the declaration.
(b) Requests the Secretary General to pursue his mission of good offices and to discuss urgently with the two communities and with ^{the} Governments of Greece and Turkey ways by which the intercommunal negotiations may be resumed in order to achieve early progress towards a just and lasting settlement in Cyprus.
(c) Calls upon the two communities to co-operate fully with the Secretary General in his mission of good offices.
3. Calls upon all states to respect the sovereignty independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.
4. Calls upon all states not to recognise any Cypriot state other than the Republic of Cyprus.
5. Calls upon all states and the two communities in Cyprus to refrain from any action which might exacerbate the situation.
6. Reaffirms its resolutions 365 (1974) and 367 (1975) and subsequent resolutions, and calls for their urgent and effective implementation.
7. Requests the Secretary General to keep the Security Council fully informed.

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TREATY OF GUARANTEE

The Republic of Cyprus of the one part, and Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of the other part,

- I. Considering that the recognition and maintenance of the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, as established and regulated by the Basic Articles of its Constitution, are in their common interest,
- II. Desiring to co-operate to ensure respect for the state of affairs created by that Constitution,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution.

It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any other State or partition of the Island.

ARTICLE II

Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, taking note of the undertakings of the Republic of Cyprus set out in Article I of the present Treaty, recognise and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution.

Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom likewise undertake to prohibit, so far as concerns them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the Island.

ARTICLE III

The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey undertake to respect the integrity of the areas retained under United Kingdom sovereignty at the time of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, and guarantee the use and enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights to be secured to it by the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus⁽¹⁾ signed at Nicosia on to-day's date.

ARTICLE IV

In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions.

In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.

ARTICLE V

The present Treaty shall enter into force on the date of signature. The original texts of the present Treaty shall be deposited at Nicosia.

The High Contracting Parties shall proceed as soon as possible to the registration of the present Treaty with the Secretariat of the United Nations, in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.