

PS

PS/LADY WOUNG

PS/MR WHITNEY

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

~~MR JAMES~~

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HD/SED

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS D

Hy UNQ

RESIDENT CLERK

PS/No 10 DOWNING STREET  
D I O CABINET OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

FM ANKARA 151755Z NOV 83  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO (DESKBY 151830Z)  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 553 OF 15 NOVEMBER  
INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA AND ATHENS (DESKBY 151830Z)  
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, BONN, ROME, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON,  
UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS, MODUK, CBFC.  
INFO PRIORITY ISTANBUL.

ADVANCE COPY

YOUR TELNO 305: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT EVREN

1. ON RECEIPT OF YOUR TUR I SOUGHT AN IMMEDIATE INTERVIEW WITH THE PRESIDENT BUT WAS ADVISED THAT THIS WAS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH TURKISH PROTOCOL AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD SEE ME. I ACCORDINGLY CALLED ON TURKMER AT 7.30 THIS EVENING (1630Z) AND HANDED HIM THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE. AFTER READING IT HE SAID THAT HE WOULD DELIVER IT IMMEDIATELY TO THE PRESIDENT.

2. WHEN I ASKED HIM TO COMMENT ON THE SITUATION, TURKMER RECALLED THE MANY DISCUSSIONS HE HAD HAD ON THIS SUBJECT WITH UK MINISTERS AND WITH MYSELF. THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT HAD NOT CHANGED ITS POSITION. IT HAD SUPPORTED THE RESUMPTION OF INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS AND THE IDEA OF A KYPRIANOU/DENKTASH SUMMIT HAD BEEN THEIRS IN ORDER TO KEEP THE PROSPECT OF NEGOTIATION IN BEING. THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT HAD GONE AS FAR AS IT COULD AND EVEN TO THE POINT WHERE THEY WERE BEING CRITICISED BY TURKISH PUBLIC OPINION FOR LACK OF ROBUSTNESS. HE HAD ALWAYS WARNED THAT THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT DID NOT CONTROL DENKTASH AND SO IT HAD BEEN PROVED.

3. IN THIS SITUATION THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT WERE OBLIGED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE RIGHT OF THE TURKISH COMMUNITY IN CYPRUS TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE. THEY WERE RECOGNISED INTERNATIONALLY AS ONE OF THE INTERLOCUTORS IN THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS AND IF THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE ENTITLED TO INDEPENDENCE SO WERE THE TURKS.

4. TURKMER THEN DREW MY ATTENTION TO THE POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN THE TURKISH CYPRIOT DECLARATION THIS MORNING. IN PARTICULAR THE

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THE TURKISH CYPRIOT DECLARATION THIS MORNING. IN PARTICULAR THE  
TURKISH CYPRIOTS HAD ESCHEWED PERMANENT PARTITION, UPHELD THE  
1960 TREATIES, FAVOURED A FEDERAL SOLUTION, WISHED TO CONTINUE  
THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS AND CONFIRMED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE GOOD  
OFFICES OF THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL. TAKING THESE POSITIVE  
ELEMENTS INTO CONSIDERATION, THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT HAD DECIDED  
TO EXTEND RECOGNITION TO THE NEW STATE. BUT IN DOING SO THEY  
HAD UNDERLINED THAT IN THEIR VIEW THIS DID NOT MEAN AN END  
TO THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, RATHER THE REVERSE.

5. GIVEN THAT POSITIVE APPROACH, THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN  
DISAGREEABLY SURPRISED BY THE UNITED KINGDOM'S PUBLIC  
PRONOUNCEMENT TODAY. THEY WOULD HAVE EXPECTED A MORE BALANCED  
APPROACH. TO DENY RECOGNITION TO THE TURKISH CYPRIOT SIDE WAS  
NOT GOOD POLICY. IN THE END THAT COULD LEAD TO UNIFICATION WITH  
TURKEY WHICH WOULD 'FINISH' THE CYPRUS PROBLEM ONCE AND FOR  
ALL. HE HOPED THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE INTO  
ACCOUNT THE LONGER-TERM IMPLICATIONS OF THEIR ACTIONS AND ADOPT  
A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH. THE UK WAS A FRIEND AND  
CONSEQUENTLY HE HAD NOT SPOKEN MORE STRONGLY. THE UK WAS ALSO A  
PRAGMATIC COUNTRY AND TURKEY LOOKED TO HER TO DEVISE EFFECTIVE  
DIPLOMATIC FORMULAE. WHEN I SAID THAT DENKTASH'S ACTION THREATENED  
TO PUT PAID TO THE 1960 TREATIES, TURKMEN MADE LIGHT OF THE UK'S  
ROLE AS A GUARANTOR POWER AND, AS HE HAS PREVIOUSLY DONE, CRITICISED  
OUR LACK OF ACTION WHEN APPROACHED BY TURKEY IN 1974. HE IMPLIED  
THAT WE HAD LITTLE STANDING NOW IN OUR GUARANTOR POWER CAPACITY  
TO CALL FOR ACTION.

6. AFTER REMINDING TURKMEN THAT THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT AT ALL  
LEVELS HAD BEEN LEFT IN NO DOUBT OVER THE PRECEDING MONTHS THAT  
HMG COULD ONLY TAKE A VERY SERIOUS VIEW OF UDI, WERE TOTALLY OPPOSED  
TO IT AND WOULD NOT RECOGNISE A TURKISH CYPRIOT STATE, I ASKED  
HIM FOR HIS VIEWS ON THE PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM YOU TO INITIATE  
TALKS BETWEEN THE 3 GUARANTOR POWERS. HE SAID HE WOULD NOT WISH  
TO COMMIT HIMSELF AND WOULD CERTAINLY REFLECT ON ANY MESSAGE YOU  
MIGHT SEND. BUT IN HIS VIEW IT WOULD HAVE BEEN MUCH BETTER IF THE  
IF THE PROPOSAL FOR TRIPARTITE CONSULTATION HAD BEEN MADE BEFORE  
THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD ISSUED ITS VERY STRONG PUBLIC STATEMENT  
TODAY. THE TURKISH SIDE IN PARTICULAR FOUND IT HARD TO ACCEPT  
THAT WE RECOGNISED KYPRIANOU'S GOVERNMENT AS REPRESENTING  
THE WHOLE ISLAND IGNORING THE TURKISH EXISTENCE. BUT HE REITERATED  
THAT HE DID NOT WISH TO GIVE A CONSIDERED REPLY BEFORE CONSULTING  
PRESIDENT EVREN AND ALSO SEEING ANY FURTHER MESSAGE FROM YOU.

7. I THEN ASKED TURKMEN FOR HIS VIEW ON THE PRIME MINISTER'S  
VERY STRONG REQUEST TO THE PRESIDENT TO ASSIST IN SECURING  
A REVERSAL OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOT ACTION. HE REPLIED 'THERE IS NO  
REVERSE GEAR IN THIS CAR'. THE WAY AHEAD WAS FORWARD THROUGH  
THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS WHICH DENKTASH AND THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT  
SUPPORTED.

8. I ASKED TURKMEN WHETHER HE REALLY BELIEVED THAT THE  
RESUMPTION OF THOSE TALKS HAD BEEN FACILITATED BY DENKTASH'S  
MOVE. TURKMEN REPLIED THAT HE CERTAINLY DID. DENKTASH'S  
CONDITION OF EQUALITY WAS NOW MET. IT WOULD BE MUCH EASIER FOR  
HIM TO ACCEPT NEGOTIATIONS. WHEN I POINTED OUT THAT ANY GAIN FOR

HIM TO ACCEPT NEGOTIATIONS. WHEN I POINTED OUT THAT ANY GAIN FOR DENKTASH MUST HAVE ITS OBVERSE ON THE GREEK SIDE, TURKMZMSA

DENKTASH MUST HAVE ITS OBVERSE ON THE GREEK SIDE, TURKMAN SAID THAT IF THE GREEKS WERE REALISTIC THEY WOULD SEE THAT THE WAY TO A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WAS OPEN.

9. HE CONCLUDED BY UNDERTAKING AGAIN TO PUT THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

RUSSELL

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THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THE DISCUSSIONS THAT TOOK PLACE DURING THE MEETING HELD AT THE OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER ON 12 SEPTEMBER 1974. THE DISCUSSIONS WERE HELD BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE TURKISH DELEGATION. THE PRIME MINISTER STATED THAT HE WAS INTERESTED IN A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM AND THAT HE WOULD BE WILLING TO MAKE SACRIFICES FOR THE SAKE OF PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. HE STATED THAT HE WAS NOT INTERESTED IN A MILITARY SOLUTION AND THAT HE WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT A SETTLEMENT WHICH WOULD BE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND EQUITY. THE TURKISH DELEGATION STATED THAT THEY WERE INTERESTED IN A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT AND THAT THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO MAKE SACRIFICES FOR THE SAKE OF PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. THEY STATED THAT THEY WERE NOT INTERESTED IN A MILITARY SOLUTION AND THAT THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT A SETTLEMENT WHICH WOULD BE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND EQUITY. THE DISCUSSIONS WERE HELD IN A FRIENDLY AND OPEN MANNER AND IT WAS AGREED THAT THE TWO SIDES WOULD CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM.