

00 ATHENS

00 NICOSIA

00 ANKARA

PP UKREP BXLS

PP UKDEL STRASBOURG

PP BONN

PP UKDEL NATO

PP PARIS

PP ROME

GRS 550

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 172250Z NOV 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3464 OF 17 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE ATHENS ANKARA NICOSIA UKMIS NEW YORK PRIORITY  
UKREP BRUSSELS UKDEL NATO UKDEL STRASBOURG PARIS BONN ROME

CYPRUS: TURKISH CYPRIOT DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

1. BURT ASKED MINISTER TO CALL THIS AFTERNOON TO REVIEW DEVELOPMENTS IN CYPRUS. HE STRESSED THE US DESIRE TO WORK VERY CLOSELY WITH US OVER THIS ISSUE.

2. BURT SAID THAT THE US WOULD CONTINUE TO URGE PUBLICLY THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOT DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED AND TO TAKE THE SAME LINE WITH THE TURKS, BUT IN HIS VIEW THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS WERE NEARLY ZERO. IT WOULD HOWEVER BE WORTH EXAMINING WHETHER DENKTASH'S DECISION MIGHT OPEN UP NEW NEGOTIATING POSSIBILITIES. HIS WILLINGNESS TO OPEN VAROSHA TO GREEK CYPRIOT RESETTLEMENT AND TO AGREE TO THE REOPENING OF NICOSIA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT OFFERED OPPORTUNITIES WHICH WE SHOULD DISCUSS FURTHER. IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER DENKTASH'S MOTIVE WAS TO DEFUSE THE NEGATIVE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO HIS DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, OF TO SIGNAL A GENUINE INTEREST IN NEW NEGOTIATIONS. BUT IN EITHER CASE HIS INITIATIVE SHOULD NOT BE IGNORED.

3. BURT NOTED THAT THE AMERICANS HAD PRIVATELY BEEN URGING

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~~3. BURT NOTED THAT THE AMERICANS HAD PRIVATELY BEEN URGING~~  
BOTH THE TURKS AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS TO TAKE SOME SUCH MOVE TO  
BUILD CONFIDENCE. THEY HAD RECEIVED SOME INTRIGUING SIGNALS  
FROM THE TURKS SUGGESTING THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOT DECISION  
COULD BE CONSISTENT WITH AN EFFORT TO ESTABLISH A SINGLE  
FEDERATED STATE ON CYPRUS. THE TURKS MAINTAINED THAT THEY HAD  
NOT ABANDONED THE 1977 AND 1979 UNDERSTANDINGS AND STILL  
SUPPORTED WALDHEIM'S EVALUATION. BURT WENT ON TO SPECULATE ON  
A PERSONAL BASIS THAT, THOUGH DENKTASH MIGHT SIMPLY HAVE CHOSEN  
AN OPPORTUNE MOMENT TO CONSOLIDATE HIS OWN POSITION HE MIGHT ALSO  
BE KEEPING OPEN THE OPTION OF ENTERING REAL NEGOTIATIONS. THERE WOULD  
BE OPPORTUNITIES THIS WEEK IN NEW YORK TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES.

4. THOMAS AGREED THAT WE SHOULD KEEP CLOSELY IN TOUCH. OUR  
DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION KEPT OPEN THE WAY FOR THE  
SECRETARY GENERAL TO BUILD ON HIS PREVIOUS CONTACTS WITH THE  
PARTIES. A PARTICULAR UK CONCERN WAS TO FULFIL OUR OBLIGATIONS UNDER  
THE 1960 TREATIES FOR OBVIOUS REASONS CONNECTED WITH THE SOVEREIGN  
BASE AREAS. THE TURKS HAD AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO CONSULTATIONS BUT  
THE GREEKS HAD PROPOSED SEPARATE BILATERAL TALKS. THOMAS SAID  
THAT HE DID NOT EXPECT US TO ACCEPT THIS PROPOSAL OR TO SEEK  
A MEDIATION ROLE. THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL WAS BEST PLACED TO  
TAKE UP THE PROBLEM. A GOOD SUCCESSOR TO GOBBI WAS URGENTLY  
NEEDED.

5. BURT STRESSED THAT THE US HAD NO DESIRE TO TAKE THE LEAD  
THEMSELVES IN DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS OR TO PRESS THE UK  
TO DO SO. THEY ENTIRELY AGREED THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL SHOULD  
TAKE THE LEAD. WE SHOULD ACT TOGETHER TO SUPPORT HIS EFFORTS.

6. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION ABOUT CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES, BURT SAID  
THAT THERE WAS SUPPORT ON THE HILL FOR THE POSITION THE  
ADMINISTRATION HAD TAKEN. THERE WOULD NOT BE TIME BEFORE THE  
RECESS FOR CONGRESS TO TAKE ACTION TO CUT AID TO TURKEY. BUT  
MEMBERS WOULD COME UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE IN THE NEXT FEW  
WEEKS, PARTICULARLY FROM GREEK AMERICANS. IT WAS THEREFORE  
DESIRABLE THAT THERE SHOULD BE SOME VISIBLE PROGRESS BEFORE  
CONGRESS REASSEMBLED IN JANUARY.

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