

Office - month ago, Prime Minister.
Answers to Dean

From: Sir J Leahy
Date: 27 November 1983
cc(with enclosures):

Mr Coles *AD 27/a*

Sir R Armstrong
PUS
Mr Ingham
Mr Goldsmith

Δ US

*Melbourn with Dryden
J. Moran*

CHOGM: SOUTHERN AFRICAN ITEM

1. The attached notes are written without my knowing whether, and if so how, the Namibia question came up in Goa. Nor do I know who will introduce the item on Monday morning.
2. The Melbourne communique dealt with Southern Africa at inordinate length (12 paragraphs). Apart from Zimbabwe, it covered: apartheid; the Gleneagles statement (in a one-sentence paragraph); Namibia; the establishment of a Commonwealth education and training programme for young refugees from South Africa in neighbouring countries; and the need to support the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC).
3. To judge by Mrs Gandhi's opening speech and the performance of the Indian representative in the communique-drafting group we shall be faced by another long draft passage this time. It will undoubtedly contain much stronger criticism of the Contact Group than last time - and in Mr Trudeau's absence in Peking we can expect no help at all from the Canadians. It may also be "action-oriented" (a phrase much used by the Indians at this Conference) in the sense of telling the Contact Group either to get on or give up. I think it less likely, though not impossible, that some sort of intervention by yet another core-group of Commonwealth countries will be suggested, since there is already a Standing Committee on Southern Africa which meets three or four times a year in London (basically the African High Commissioners - plus

*Sub-
grpd*

/one



- one or two others and chaired by the Guyan - together with the Secretary-General and Foreign and Commonwealth Office representatives). The Committee's report to
- A CHOGM is attached. We managed to get some of the worst excesses removed (such as a call for an extension of the arms boycott into other areas) at the drafting stage, but it remains an unbalanced document couched in sometimes extravagant language. I have marked the more important passages for the Prime Minister to look at if she has time.
- B 4. I also attach a copy of Sir Geoffrey Howe's recent speech to the Royal Commonwealth Society. (I have marked the Southern African section.)

John Leahy

John Leahy

Mr. Gandhi. Colonial questions of primary importance to India. African nations finding their soul. FREEDOM like PEACE is INDIVISIBLE. Deeply concerned about S. Africa.

Reject linkage between Namibia's South about construction of contact group

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Nyuni

Tan

Tini

N.2





NAMIBIA

1. Since preparing these notes I have exchanged notes with my Canadian colleague (Michael Shenstone). Like me he has not been able to discover what the Africans have in mind. We have jointly asked the Secretariat to let us have advance copies of the draft passage already being prepared for the communique.

2. Mr Trudeau (who will not be there tomorrow morning) is apparently fed to the teeth with Canada's continued involvement in the Contact Group, but reluctantly recognizes that to get out abruptly and bring on the demise of the Group would leave things in a worse state than they are already.

3. Shenstone says the Canadians agree broadly with the point in paragraph 7 below, though they think it is a delicate matter which needs to be carefully broached.

4. The Canadians believe that the UN Secretary-General has the right idea in suggesting (though he has not said it publicly and should not be quoted) that it would make it easier for the Angolan Government to contemplate Cuban

/withdrawal

withdrawal if the South Africans would first get out of Southern Angola. Sir Geoffrey Howe also referred to South African withdrawal as a "vital step" in his RCS speech (he did not say a first step). It is hard to see the South Africans agreeing to go first without some clear Angolan commitment to Cuban withdrawal, but there is no reason for us to object to a suitable mention of the idea in the communique.

5. Shenstone says that like us the Canadians will resist any attempts to drive a wedge between the two Commonwealth members of the Contact Group and the Americans, suggestions that we should try to bring pressure on them to drop linkage or critical references to them by name. I hope they will live up to this.

Deaky

Disputes - not entirely internal problem.

No internal organized sanctions, experts, etc
can bring about change within.

Bi. - Cerezo - are members of that group.

Resolution 435,

Angola's decision that it needs Cuban troops
to defend itself.

Trans, arms, finances.

Nigeria

- S. Africa remains power
continued cold looks on

③ Prepared to assist
blackened
countries

- Resol = 435 was passed

1) S. Africa

doesn't withdraw - it can't talk
about Cuban withdrawal

Uganda - Trans

U.S.
U.K.
France
Germany
Canada

Continuation
Namibia - CC
U.S. Contans must withdraw.
- Apartheid in S.M.

NAMIBIA

Contact Group

Alternatives

Economic Sanctions

1. The Contact Group has made a major, perhaps the major, contribution to the progress already achieved. We are prepared to continue our efforts, despite the difficulties and frustrations (which we feel too).

2. What are the alternatives? Continuation of the armed struggle? A logical answer but not a realistic one. The military imbalance is too great. We mislead ourselves if we imagine that the South Africans will be evicted from Namibia by force.

3. Economic sanctions? These would not bring South Africa to its knees either. Indeed South Africa would be in a strong position to retaliate against its neighbours. Make no mistake about that. So what would sanctions achieve? They would bring the negotiating process to an abrupt halt.

4. What then is left if we cannot simply impose a settlement? We have to persuade, cajole and badger the South Africans to come round to our way of thinking. We take every opportunity we can to do just that: we talk to their Ministers [the Prime Minister could mention, if she wished, that Foreign Minister, Pik Botha, will be in London at the end of the week on a visit to Europe]; their members of parliament, their journalists, academics, businessmen, people in all walks of life. Always with the same message: "a settlement will not get easier for you the longer you wait, on the contrary experience elsewhere shows that the terms will

/become

Problem How
S. Africa } removed all foreign
hasn't

become harder and harder". Perhaps like Chinese torture the drip, drip, drip will eventually get through.

5. Much is said about "linkage" these days. The report of the Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa is eloquent on the subject. We for our part have made it clear that Cuban withdrawal from Angola has never been for us a condition for Namibia independence and we stick by that.

linkage

linkage

Diplomacy
Intelligence
Freedom

6. But we all know that the issue has been raised. We have not imagined it. None of us can just wish it away

or pretend that simply by denouncing linkage we can somehow remove it. That is why I have been particularly interested to read recently of certain ideas that have been mooted for replacing the Cuban soldiers in Angola with troops drawn from other African countries. I should like to hear more about that, because it seems to me at least to have the merit of trying to deal with the obstacle instead of closing the eyes to it. Of course I have no idea whether it is a practical proposition and I understand the Angolans themselves have already turned it down. Perhaps someone can come up with a better idea?

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Cuba + S. Africa

7. I sometimes wonder for my own part whether there is anything that Angola's friends in the region could do to help terminate the internecine conflict between the Government and UNITA. For I cannot help thinking that if the opposing forces inside Angola could in some way be reconciled, it too would enhance the chances of getting an early Namibia settlement. Some people might argue that in saying that I am delving into an internal Angolan matter

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and other countries should keep out of it. But is it not the case that in one way or another a number of foreign countries are already deeply involved in Angola? That indeed is one of the underlying factors in the present situation. In any event all I am suggesting is that it would be a signal service to the cause of peace in the whole region if some way could be found to bring peace to Angola itself.

First duty of
 Africans to assist
 beleaguered Africans to
 defend themselves

h Angolans sought assistance from
 Cuba

APARTHEID

1. As Sir Geoffrey Howe said recently in a speech to the Royal Commonwealth Society in London which some of you may have read, apartheid and the absence of a form of Government in South Africa which has the consent of all the people cast a long shadow over Britain's relations with South Africa. Our rejection of apartheid reflects the firm view of a wide spectrum of British public opinion.

2. Some forces for change in South Africa. Economic forces, ie the demand for black workers, the increase in their purchasing power, the development of black trade unions. Impetus of their own.

3. Of course political reform also needed. There was strong white support for the new constitutional proposals concerning the coloured and Indian population in the referendum on 2 November and the South African Prime Minister called it afterwards a mandate for evolutionary reform. We must see what that means in practice. Meanwhile it is hardly to be wondered at that so much dissatisfaction is felt everywhere with a system of Government that excludes the majority of the population from participating directly in it.



GLENEAGLES STATEMENT ON APARTHEID IN SPORT

- /
1. Please see the attached special brief.
 2. If asked about the possible English rugby tour of South Africa next year the Prime Minister could say that we shall continue to advise the Rugby Football Union strongly against it.

COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING: NEW DELHI,
23-29 NOVEMBER 1983

SPORTING CONTACTS

UK OBJECTIVE

1. To maintain the 1977 Commonwealth Statement on Apartheid in Sport ('Gleneagles Agreement') in its present form, and to avoid endorsement or approval of the Commonwealth Games Federation's (CGF) Code of Conduct, and discussion of its merits.
2. We reaffirm our support for the Commonwealth Statement.
3. We take all practical steps in accordance with UK law and tradition to discourage sporting contacts with South Africa. We advise and persuade, generally in private. The response of sport is normally favourable, eg the MCC vote. But we cannot prevent individuals entering or leaving the UK in pursuit of lawful activities.
4. The objective of the Commonwealth Statement is supported in practice by the majority of UK sportsmen and their governing bodies. We ca-not dictate to them. The obligation of the Statement to discourage is rightly placed on governments.

Proposal to discuss or endorse the Commonwealth Games Federation's Code of Conduct

5. The code is the responsibility of the CGF and applies to National Commonwealth Games Associations and to the

/governing



governing bodies of sport: these are autonomous. Discussion here would be inappropriate.

6. The Statement and Code share a common purpose. Responsibility for the implementation of the former falls to governments, and of the latter to sport. We must respect this distinction.

27 November 1983



SOUTH AFRICAN "DESTABILISATION" OF ITS NEIGHBOURS

1. In Southern Africa, as elsewhere, relations between states must be conducted without the use or threat of force. The use of force across frontiers, whether by Governments or by armed groups who employ violence in the name of politics, leads inevitably to ever-increasing tension and bitterness. Unless checked it will polarise opposing attitudes even further, weaken the authority of Governments, seriously harm the economies of the countries concerned and cause the introduction of yet more alien forces into the region.
2. The British Government never cease putting this message across to all concerned, not least of course to the South African Government.
3. We also stand ready to encourage and support in any way we can the direct cross-border contacts and cooperation which we believe are indispensable to the peace and stability of Southern Africa.



DISTANCE EDUCATION PROGRAMME FOR SOUTH AFRICAN REFUGEES

/SUMMARY ATTACHED/

1. Support principle of humanitarian assistance to South African refugees and accept concept of Distance Education Programme.

2. Have some reservations about the programme as proposed.

3. Cannot yet make any commitments on a financial contribution.

4. Will watch pilot programme carefully and look forward to seeing consultant's views on educational needs and any other comments.



DISTANCE EDUCATION PROGRAMME FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA - SUMMARY

1. The Melbourne CHOGM in 1981 endorsed a proposal for a Commonwealth educational programme for South African refugees, and instructed the Secretary General to prepare detailed proposals. Mr Ramphal will seek the endorsement of Heads of Government for these.

2. For various reasons, including financial ones, the Commonwealth Secretariat has abandoned its original idea of a scholarship scheme for refugees. Instead it has now proposed a 'distance learning programme' ie education in the countries where South African refugees are located. The main features of the Secretariat's proposals are as follows:

(a) The project will start by catering for the basic educational needs of about 2000 refugees in Tanzania, located at 4 centres (one UNHCR, 2 ANC settlements, and one PAC settlement).

(b) While the programme should be seen as a Commonwealth initiative, responsibility for it will rest with an Extension Unit headed by a director, to be located in close association with Tanzania's Institute of Adult Education. The director will be responsible to an independent board of trustees

/including



including representatives of the government of Tanzania (3), the Commonwealth Secretariat (1), UNHCR (1) and of major donors to the programme (1 or 2).

(c) Consultants will be employed, particularly to assess education needs at the settlements.

(d) The programme will cost £125,000 in the first year, and £175,000 in the second (including 50% increase in enrolment). CFTC will meet some costs, but additional funds of the order of £85,000 are required for year one, and £135,00 for year two. The Secretariat is seeking donors.

The project is scheduled to begin in 1984.

3. In discussing the project with the Secretariat and in the Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa, we have reiterated our support in principle, providing the educational assistance is for individuals and not for organisations. We have avoided any commitment of funds and have not signified agreement to the project as how defined, because:

(a) We have lingering concerns about the provision of assistance, even indirectly, to ANC and PAC camps.

/(b)...



(b) We have doubts about the management of the system proposed (both about the Tanzanian Institute of Adult Education, and the system of trustees which would leave donors in a minority).

(c) We would like to see the consultant's report on educational needs before taking any further decisions. The Secretary General has made clear that the consultant will have a free reign to make recommendations on educational needs and the substantive nature of the programme.

4. We are in touch with the Commonwealth Secretariat about our concerns.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

November 1983

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COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING
NEW DELHI 1983

Mr Goldsmith

PL with the last paragraph of III and para 10 of the annex.
This ^{subject} may figure in the final communique. I do not think we have a
separate brief, but I assume we should make it clear, once again, that
we cannot commit HMG to give financial support?

REPORT OF THE COMMONWEALTH COMMITTEE
ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

OCTOBER 1981 - OCTOBER 1983

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S. Afr. - Hand

Commonwealth Secretariat
Marlborough House
London SW1

November 1983

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REPORT OF THE COMMONWEALTH COMMITTEE ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

OCTOBER 1981 - OCTOBER 1983

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I. INTRODUCTION

With the accession to independent statehood by Zimbabwe in 1980, Commonwealth Heads of Government at their Melbourne Meeting in October 1981 enjoined the Committee to pay particular attention to developments on Namibia in discharging its renewed mandate. While destabilisation of neighbouring countries by South Africa was quite serious at that time, it has since assumed alarming proportions. The Committee has naturally been acutely concerned with these twin problems of South African intransigence over the question of Namibia and the apartheid regime's all-out attempt to subjugate Lesotho and its other neighbours.

2. In the wake of the stalemate over the Namibian question which followed United States and South Africa's insistence that settlement of the Namibian problem would be conditional on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, the Committee has held fewer meetings than in the previous two years while remaining alert to developments, especially within the United Nations framework.

3. Our Report has avoided traversing the same ground as that covered by the Secretary-General's Report on political developments in Southern Africa. However, we have had the opportunity to reflect on the latest developments which took place after the Secretary-General's Report went to print.

4. We have kept in close consultation with the Secretary-General in his preparation of detailed proposals for establishing a programme of education and training for South African refugees scattered among the Front-Line States (attached at Annex). We are glad to commend them to Heads of Government.

II. SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Namibia

5. In renewing the Committee's mandate at their Melbourne Meeting in 1981, Heads of Government enjoined us "to pay particular attention to the developments on Namibia" in our work. The emphasis on Namibia was in recognition of the urgency which the Namibian question had assumed in the aftermath of Zimbabwe's independence.

6. The intensive negotiations which resumed in October 1981 between the Contact Group and all the parties concerned after the collapse of the Geneva pre-implementation talks earlier in the year culminated in June in a wide measure of agreement on the principles which would govern the Constituent Assembly and the main elements which would underpin an independence constitution. Such was the willingness of all the parties to proceed with the negotiations that the Contact Group in its Summary of Points of May 1982 said that the possibility existed "for the implementation of Resolution 435 to begin within a few months and elections to be held by March or April 1983".

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7. That Namibia's independence settlement remains problematic is due to United States and South Africa's insistence on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a pre-condition for a Namibian settlement. In an attempt to break the stalemate, the United Nations Security Council met from 23 May to 1 June 1983 and passed its Resolution 532 of 31 May which inter alia mandated the UN Secretary-General "to undertake consultations with the parties to the proposed cease-fire, with a view to securing the speedy implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978)". The Secretary-General's consultations with the parties concerned led to agreement on the electoral system to be adopted for the elections to the Constituent Assembly as well as on the composition of UNTAG; but further progress towards an early implementation of the Settlement Plan itself remains blocked.

8. Virtually the entire international community is at one in its resolute rejection of linking Namibia's independence to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. The UN Secretary-General, in his recent consultations pursuant to Security Council Resolution 532(1983), reiterated this position. The Front-Line States have equally expressed themselves strongly against the linkage issue. For its part, the Commonwealth including the countries which are members of the Contact Group remains unanimously and unalterably of the view that Namibia's independence is far too long overdue and that the linkage issue further delays implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435.

9. The Committee is also disturbed that while Namibian independence remains blocked the apartheid regime has continued to consolidate its illegal occupation of the territory and its repression of the population. We are also disturbed by the continued use of the international territory of Namibia as a springboard for attacks against Angola. The Committee recommends that the Commonwealth reiterate its stand at Melbourne against these acts of repression, invasion and subversion, including its call for the unconditional withdrawal of South African troops from Angolan territory and for the cessation of all forms of assistance to Angolan dissidents.

10. We believe that New Delhi will provide Commonwealth leaders with a unique opportunity to consult together and agree on a possible Commonwealth contribution to the resolution of this intractable international problem and responsibility.

South Africa's aggression against its neighbours

11. Since the Melbourne Meeting the security situation in Southern Africa has deteriorated. There is widespread concern about increasing South African destabilisation of neighbouring countries. Such destabilisation has taken the form of ground and air-strikes and the use of armed bandit groups, as well as economic blackmail and sabotage, directed particularly at the economic infrastructure of these countries. Armed attacks have also been directed at refugees. We believe that the main objective of this harassment and intimidation is to frighten these countries away from supporting opposition to South Africa's apartheid policy.

12. In addition to its invasion and occupation of Southern Angola and frequent air strikes against Mozambique, South Africa attacked civilian residential areas

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in Maseru, Lesotho, on 9 December 1982 murdering twelve Lesotho citizens and thirty South African refugees. Since then South Africa has stepped up economic pressure on Lesotho by withholding essential supplies including medical drugs and dressings and arms needed for the maintenance of law and order, and heavily restricting movement of goods and people across their common borders contrary to existing agreements between the two countries. For a landlocked country which is dependent on South Africa for almost all her essential needs and for her entire transit trade the effects of South African action have been and continue to be disastrous.

13. At the request of the Government of Lesotho, the Security Council met from 14 to 16 December 1982, to consider South Africa's attack on that country. In its Resolution 527 of 15 December, the Security Council condemned the attack as an act of premeditated aggression and a flagrant violation of Lesotho's sovereignty and territorial integrity. It called upon South Africa to desist from future attacks on Lesotho and to pay adequate compensation for the damage to life and property. South Africa's response to this call has been an intensification of pressures on Lesotho by way of economic blockade and arms embargo.

14. As Heads of Government pointed out at their London summit in 1977, Lesotho's difficulties are a direct result of that country's refusal to recognise the so-called "independence" of the apartheid inspired Bantustans. Furthermore, Lesotho has resisted the pressure to abandon its international responsibilities towards bona fide South African refugees.

15. We commend the response of the Commonwealth Secretary-General, supported by the Committee, to the crisis by keeping in close consultation with Lesotho and other Commonwealth governments and, especially by sending a mission to advise Lesotho on an appropriate policy and strategy designed to minimise the disruptive effects of South African incursions and pressures on Lesotho's economic development. We urge Commonwealth governments to respond favourably to the Lesotho Government's bilateral approaches on this matter. In so doing they will be keeping faith with the Commonwealth's unremitting stand against apartheid, a philosophy and policy that is in direct contradiction to the very *raison d'etre* of our association.

16. We consider that the time has come for Heads of Government to review and where necessary reaffirm their collective stand on the central problem of apartheid in South Africa itself and its appalling consequences for the peoples of Southern Africa as a whole. South Africa's continued affront to the norms of civilised international behaviour, to say nothing of the values which it defies, has reached a stage where a more effective collective response by the international community cannot be put off for much longer without highly damaging consequences. An effective strategy is urgently needed for ensuring that South Africa lives peacefully with her neighbours and grants internal political birthrights to all her citizens.

The economic dimension

17. South Africa's aggression against her neighbours and its support of dissident movements against independent African countries in the area is clearly

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aimed at frustrating the objectives of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) in order to retain and, if possible, strengthen its economic domination over the whole region.

18. We commend the efforts of the Front-Line States "to reduce as far as possible the vulnerability of the countries of the region to economic blackmail and reprisals" by South Africa. We urge the Secretariat and individual Commonwealth countries to continue their commendable efforts to assist the member states of SADCC in realising their objectives. To strengthen SADCC is to frustrate the dangerous and hegemonic ambitions of the South African regime and to weaken its capacity to destabilise its neighbours and to erode its ability to perpetuate racism and apartheid.

19. Many members of the Committee welcome the initiatives taken by certain Western countries to restrict and prohibit new investments in South Africa and they urge Commonwealth governments to consider taking similar measures.

Sporting contacts with South Africa

20. In the six years since the Gleneagles Agreement came into force committing all Commonwealth governments vigorously to combat the evil of apartheid by taking every practical step to discourage contact or competition by their nationals with sporting organisations, teams or sportsmen from South Africa, it has made a major contribution to the international campaign to isolate apartheid South Africa from international sport. As the foundation of Commonwealth policy on a vital moral issue, the Agreement has, by helping to checkmate South Africa's persistent attempts to break out of its international isolation via sport, also strengthened Commonwealth sport. More importantly, however, Gleneagles has given expression to and upheld the Commonwealth's cherished principles embodied in both the Singapore Declaration of 1971 and the Lusaka Declaration on Racism and Racial Prejudice of 1979.

21. In drawing up the Agreement, Heads of Government acknowledged that the full realisation of its objectives "involved the understanding, support and active participation of the nationals of their countries and of their national sporting organisations and authorities". The Code of Conduct and the constitutional amendment agreed by the Commonwealth Games Federation in Brisbane in 1982 was a welcome reinforcement of the Gleneagles Agreement.

22. Faced however with the increasing success of the international boycott, the apartheid regime has now resorted to huge financial blandishments in a major effort to entice sportsmen to play in South Africa. That the apartheid regime should resort to such a stratagem is a measure of the success scored by the international sporting boycott; but it is also a reflection of the strength of its determination to undermine the resolve of the international community in general and the Commonwealth in particular on this issue.

23. In the face of the determined challenge now issued by South Africa, it is the view of the Committee that there is need for a reiteration by Commonwealth governments of their continuing commitment to the Gleneagles Agreement. So far, the vast majority of Commonwealth sportsmen and women have stood firm by Gleneagles and the Code of Conduct often rejecting substan-

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tial financial enticement in the process. We are grateful to them for their unswerving support of vital Commonwealth values. But if they are to continue to hold their own in the face of South African material blandishments, they will need the unstinted and sustained support of their own governments. In this connection, it is particularly noteworthy that proposals are currently before West Indian Heads of Government for the establishment of a comprehensive, regional 'regime' on sporting contacts with South Africa, one element of which will be a special fund to help offset the financially disadvantaged position of some West Indian sportsmen, and thus to blunt the financial overtures of South Africa. The Committee fervently hope that other Commonwealth governments will take the West Indian governments' initiative into account in considering their own approach to problems arising from South Africa's offers of financial inducements to Commonwealth sportspeople.

24. Many members of the Committee note that because of the effectiveness of the sports boycott of South Africa the regime has turned increasingly to the promotion of cultural links as a new way of breaking out of its isolation. They believe this to be damaging and wish to draw the attention of Commonwealth governments to this new danger.

III. COMMONWEALTH HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO SOUTHERN AFRICA

Existing programmes

25. Heads of Government requested the Secretary-General through the Committee to prepare detailed proposals for establishing a programme of education and training for the increasing number of mainly young refugees from South Africa who are scattered among the Front-Line States. The Committee has considered and approved those proposals. It has also kept a continuing interest in the administration of the Zimbabwe and Namibian schemes.

(i) Zimbabwe

Under the special Commonwealth Programme for Zimbabweans, the provision of new scholarships ceased following the conclusion of the Lancaster House Agreement. As students have finished their courses and returned to Zimbabwe, there has been a steady fall in the numbers supported by the Commonwealth Secretariat. In 1981/82, there were 413 Zimbabwean beneficiaries of such awards. In the current year, this has been reduced to 97 and it is anticipated that fewer than 10 will continue during 1984/85, which is the final year of the Programme. As the Programme draws to a close, the Committee wishes to record its deep appreciation to Commonwealth governments for their generous provision of study places, employment opportunities and financial support under the scheme to a total of over 4,500 Zimbabweans in more than 30 Commonwealth countries.

(ii) Namibia

In its Report to Heads of Government at Melbourne, the

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Committee stressed the importance of increasing the number of Namibians in full-time training, and stated that "study places and suitable candidates are available in significant numbers; lack of finance is the only constraint on the Programme's development". Regrettably, that situation has not changed. In the absence of any special contributions to the Programme from Commonwealth governments during the last two years, all the funds available to the award scheme have been provided by or through the CFTC, with almost half of these resources being made available by the Swedish Government. A total of 148 full-time students have been assisted since 1981; 70 of them through a contribution to the CFTC by the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA). The Committee is very grateful to SIDA for this generous provision of scholarship support.

A notable development since the Melbourne Meeting was the establishment of the Namibian Extension Unit (NEU) at the end of 1981. The purpose of the NEU is to provide basic education opportunities, using distance learning techniques, to Namibian refugees in Angola and Zambia. The CFTC played a significant role in planning this project, and continues to support it through funding two experts at the NEU's Lusaka Headquarters and through making available consultancy services. The bulk of the NEU's finance comes from Nordic sources and from the Commission of the European Communities.

The NEU's pilot programme, involving basic English and mathematics instruction for almost 2,000 Namibian refugees, is approaching completion. All the indications suggest that it has been successful. There are plans to increase significantly the numbers assisted by the NEU, and to offer basic courses under the scheme in such practical skills as agriculture, community health and child care.

(iii) **South Africa**

At the request of Heads of Government, expressed in paragraph 19 of their Melbourne Communique, the Secretariat drew up detailed plans for a Commonwealth education and training programme for South African refugees. It is envisaged that the programme will initially take the form of instruction in English, mathematics and agriculture for exiles who are in refugee camps in Front-Line States. This instruction will be provided using distance learning techniques, in a manner broadly similar to the procedures adopted by the Namibian Extension Unit. It has been agreed that, subject to the availability of the necessary financial resources, a special unit will be established in Dar es Salaam to plan and co-ordinate arrangements for the scheme.

At its meeting on 27 October 1983, the Committee considered and approved the Secretary-General's proposals for this significant new initiative which, through the generosity of the Tanzanian Government, will make maximum use of the extensive

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expertise available within the Tanzanian Institute of Adult Education. We wish to draw attention to the budget which has been prepared for the scheme; this envisages expenditure of less than £125,000 to assist 2,000 students in the first year of operations. This sum represents a unit cost of less than £65 per student. It is hoped that funds will be made available so that this project can be launched as early as practicable in 1984.

DISTANCE EDUCATION PROGRAMME FOR SOUTH AFRICAN REFUGEES

I. INTRODUCTION

At its meeting on 6 June 1983, the Committee received a report from the Secretary-General on the steps that had been taken to prepare a proposal for the establishment of a distance education project for the benefit of South African refugees, as requested by Heads of Government at their Meeting in Melbourne. The Committee noted that detailed discussions had been held with a number of governments, with the OAU, the UNHCR and other agencies which assist South African refugees and with South African nationalist movements. These discussions had revealed a high level of interest and enthusiasm for the proposal which, it was felt, would fulfil a specific and urgent need which other agencies had not hitherto attempted to meet.

2. The Secretary-General reported that the possibility of locating the Programme in Dar es Salaam was under discussion with the Government of Tanzania. Tanzania was already host to a significant number of South African refugees and had long and valuable experience of providing distance learning for its own citizens.

3. Detailed discussions took place in Dar es Salaam in July between officials of the Government of Tanzania and the Secretariat. These resulted in an agreement, subsequently confirmed in an exchange of letters between the Foreign Minister of Tanzania and the Secretary-General, to submit a proposal to the Committee. The proposal, details of which are set out below, envisages that, while the Programme should be seen as a Commonwealth initiative, responsibility for organising and running it will rest with an Extension Unit, headed by a Director, to be located in close association with Tanzania's Institute of Adult Education. Association with the Institute will enable the Programme to make the fullest practicable use of Tanzania's extensive facilities and experience in distance education and will materially assist in keeping down costs.

II. OBJECTIVES OF THE PROGRAMME

4. The Programme is aimed at providing distance education opportunities, using a combination of workbooks, audio-cassettes, group learning sessions and tutorial support, for South African refugees. Initially, basic courses will be made available in English, mathematics and agriculture. Consultants will be employed to assess in detail the educational requirements in these subjects which exist within the camps, and which can be met by distance teaching. Suitable materials will then be prepared and tutors and group leaders trained in their use.

III. TARGET GROUPS

5. The project will start modestly by catering for the basic needs of about

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2,000 South Africans in Tanzania, who are located at four centres, namely the UNHCR settlement at Kigwa, the ANC settlements at Mazimbu and Dakawa and the PAC settlement at Bagamoyo. When the Programme has succeeded in its initial aim of providing distance learning opportunities in English, mathematics and agriculture at these four settlements, the experience gained will constitute a useful basis on which the Extension Unit's work could be expanded to assist South African refugees in other Front-Line States, including the possible provision of "O" level and "A" level courses by correspondence. It is stressed, however, that the project will develop pragmatically on the basis of firmly identified needs which are matched by the financial and other resources required to meet those needs.

IV. MANAGEMENT

6. The Director of the Extension Unit will be responsible to an independent Board of Trustees including representatives of the Government of Tanzania (3), the Commonwealth Secretariat (1), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (1), and of major donors to the Programme (1 or 2). The Board will provide policy guidance and will act as trustees for the funds of the Unit.

7. The respective responsibilities of the Tanzanian Government and the Commonwealth Secretariat acting on behalf of Commonwealth governments, concerning the Programme will include the following:

(i) Responsibilities of the Tanzanian Government

(a) To provide facilities for giving education opportunities to South African refugees in Tanzania, and subsequently in other Front-Line States, using distance learning methods. This will involve support for the establishment and management of an Extension Unit which, in accordance with policy guidance provided by the Board of Trustees, will co-ordinate the Programme's work, supervise the preparation of materials, organise the training of course tutors and group leaders, arrange instruction and evaluate students' progress.

(b) It will be necessary to identify 3-5 rooms initially for the Unit in Dar es Salaam city, bearing in mind the possible necessity for future expansion. It is understood that rent will be payable for this accommodation. It will be necessary also to recruit staff probably one professional officer, one secretary, one driver and one messenger/cleaner in the first instance, who will all be paid at local rates and to provide such equipment, materials and facilities as the Unit requires to perform its work efficiently. With such a small staff, the Unit will clearly rely very heavily on the professional, administrative, technical and other support of the Institute of Adult Education.

(c) To provide duty-free facilities for the importation of a vehicle, most probably a Landrover, a mimeograph machine, a

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photocopier, a typewriter, stationery and all other items which the Tanzanian Government may feel are necessary to import for the Unit.

(d) To provide tax-free conditions and accommodation for the CFTC expert who will be assigned to the project, should the Tanzanian Government so wish.

(e) To make available classrooms, during school holidays, for short training courses for the Programme's tutors and group leaders. It is anticipated that each such course will involve no more than 30 trainees for up to 3 weeks' duration.

(f) To allocate storage space for the Unit's printed materials.

(ii) **Responsibilities of the Commonwealth Secretariat**

(a) To collect contributions for the Programme from Commonwealth governments and to make these funds available to the Extension Unit in a manner which ensures that the costs of the Programme are not a charge against Tanzanian Government resources, even on a temporary basis. To encourage other donors to make contributions to the Programme, either through the Commonwealth Secretariat or directly to the Board of Trustees.

(b) To hire a consultant to assess education needs at the four settlements and the levels at which the materials will aim, and to make proposals concerning the operational aspects of the project.

(c) To hire consultants to:

(i) assist the Institute of Adult Education in training group leaders and course tutors for the Programme;

(ii) provide such international support services as the Unit may require.

(d) To purchase and despatch to the Unit a vehicle together with items of equipment and materials which are not readily available locally.

(e) To arrange the printing of materials outside Tanzania, should this be considered desirable, and their despatch to the Unit.

(f) To provide a CFTC expert for the project, if asked to do so.

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V. COST OF THE PROGRAMME

8. During the first year of operations, it is envisaged that up to 2,000 students will be assisted at a total cost of approximately £125,000. Should the student enrolment expand in subsequent years, Unit costs could be expected to fall. While detailed costings have not been obtained to date regarding each item in the provisional budget, the following figures represent preliminary estimates in that respect:

Cost in Year 1	T.Shs.	£
(a) Salaries (local staff)		
1 professional officer	60,000	
1 secretary	36,000	
1 driver	18,000	
1 messenger	12,000	
	<hr/>	
	126,000	6,300
(b) Office accommodation	120,000	6,000
(c) Office expenses (including telephone, postage, electricity, water and vehicle upkeep)		6,000
(d) Printing and despatch of education materials		50,000
(e) Purchase of equipment including transport to Dar es Salaam (including a landrover, photocopier, mimeograph machine, typewriter, cassette players and stationery)		17,000
		<hr/>
	Total A	85,300
(f) CFTC expert		27,500
(g) Consultancy services		12,000
		<hr/>
	Total B	39,500
		<hr/>
	Grand Total A & B	£124,800
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9. In the second year, it is envisaged that there will be a modest expansion of the Programme to cater for the educational needs of some South African refugees in other Front-Line States. As student numbers rise, there will be a corresponding reduction in Unit costs; a budget of £175,000 in year 2 should be sufficient to increase enrolment by approximately 50 per cent and to meet inevitable price rises due to inflation. Further development of the Programme will be dependent on an evaluation of its effectiveness and an assessment of the education needs of the South Africans at that time.

10. The CFTC would be prepared to meet the costs itemised under (f) and (g) above, through the General Technical Assistance Programme. The Distance Education Programme could, therefore, be launched in 1984 if additional funds of the order of £85,000 were made available for that purpose and if pledges totalling £135,000 were made for 1985.

11. In launching this Commonwealth scheme, it is clearly important that all initial financial support should be provided from Commonwealth sources. When the Programme has proved successful, approaches can then be made to other appropriate agencies, such as Nordic aid organisations and the Commission of the European Communities, which have already expressed interest in the proposed scheme.

12. It is hoped that Commonwealth governments will feel able to commit themselves wholeheartedly to the Distance Education Programme, which is a concrete manifestation of Commonwealth support for the victims of apartheid. A Commonwealth South Africa Education Fund, similar to the Commonwealth Zimbabwe Scholarship fund, will be established for the convenience of those governments which wish to make their contributions to the Programme through the Secretariat. Other governments may decide to support the Programme direct through the Board of Trustees in Dar es Salaam, when it is established. The early payment of contributions by either means will enable this significant new Commonwealth initiative to be launched early in 1984.

September 1983.



Verbatim Service

B.

VERBATIM SERVICE 102/83 TUESDAY 15 NOVEMBER 1983
(PRODUCED BY CENTRAL OFFICE OF INFORMATION, PRESS SERVICE)

BRITAIN AND THE COMMONWEALTH TODAY

MAJOR EXTRACTS FROM A SPEECH DELIVERED BY SIR GEOFFREY HOWE, THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY, TO THE ROYAL COMMONWEALTH SOCIETY 14 NOVEMBER:

I KNOW THAT I AM PREACHING TO THE CONVERTED HERE ABOUT THE VALUE OF THE COMMONWEALTH. BUT WE DO HAVE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT NOT ALL IN BRITAIN ARE NOW AUTOMATICALLY CONVINCED OF THIS: I CONFIDENTLY PREDICT THAT BETWEEN NOW AND THE DELHI MEETING SOME BRITISH NEWSPAPERS WILL CARRY SCEPTICAL PIECES ABOUT THE COMMONWEALTH. THEY WILL DECRY THE SUPPOSED INGRATITUDE OF THE THIRD WORLD MEMBERS, SUGGEST THAT THE COMMONWEALTH SHOULD BE WOUND UP, THAT IT NO LONGER HAS RELEVANCE FOR BRITAIN AND SO ON. VERY SIMILAR ARTICLES APPEAR BEFORE EVERY CHOGM...

COMMONWEALTH MEMBERSHIP HAS BEEN OF DIRECT POLITICAL BENEFIT TO BRITAIN. I REGARD THE LANCASTER HOUSE SETTLEMENT WHICH ENDED A CIVIL WAR AND BROUGHT INDEPENDENCE TO ZIMBABWE AS ONE OF THE VERY IMPORTANT ACHIEVEMENTS OF MRS THATCHER'S FIRST GOVERNMENT. I VERY MUCH DOUBT WHETHER BRITAIN WOULD HAVE ACHIEVED THAT SETTLEMENT IF IT HAD NOT BEEN FOR THE AGREEMENT REACHED AT THE CHOGM IN LUSAKA IN 1979. AND THE ROLE OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF COURSE DID NOT STOP THERE. THE COMMONWEALTH MONITORING FORCE AND THE COMMONWEALTH OBSERVER GROUP PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE RUN-UP TO INDEPENDENCE IN ZIMBABWE. THEY HELPED TO ENSURE THAT POWER WAS TRANSFERRED PEACEFULLY AND SMOOTHLY. BRITAIN'S REPUTATION WAS ENHANCED AS A CONSEQUENCE. AND SO WAS THAT OF THE COMMONWEALTH. AND WIDER WESTERN INTERESTS WERE SERVED BECAUSE OPPORTUNITIES FOR MEDDLING OUTSIDE WERE REDUCED.

THE COMMONWEALTH SAW IT AS THEIR DUTY IN ZIMBABWE TO HELP US TO DISCHARGE A BRITISH COMMITMENT. IT WAS THE SAME WITH THE FALKLANDS. MANY OF YOU WILL REMEMBER MR RAMPHAL'S SPEECH AT THE HEIGHT OF THE FALKLANDS' CONFLICT. ITS TITLE WAS 'NOT BRITAIN'S CAUSE ALONE'. ANOTHER CLEAR EXAMPLE OF A SITUATION IN WHICH THE COMMONWEALTH CAME TO THE AID OF BRITAIN IN DEALING WITH WHAT WAS TECHNICALLY A NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. THE GREAT MAJORITY OF COMMONWEALTH STATES GAVE US STRONG SUPPORT AFTER THE ARGENTINIAN INVASION. NEW ZEALAND LENT US A FRIGATE, OTHERS TOOK ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, SOME GAVE US QUIET SUPPORT FOR MILITARY LOGISTICS OR OPEN POLITICAL SUPPORT IN THE UN. I AM CONVINCED THAT COMMONWEALTH SUPPORT FOR BRITAIN AMONG NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES WAS A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN DETERRING THE SOVIET UNION FROM VETOING SC RESOLUTION 502.

AND I CAN CITE OTHER EXAMPLES WHERE THE COMMONWEALTH HAS HELPED TO PROMOTE STABILITY, THEREBY SERVING OUR POLITICAL AND SECURITY INTERESTS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY. THE ACHIEVEMENT OF INDEPENDENCE FOR BELIZE WAS DUE IN NO SMALL WAY TO THE SUPPORT WHICH THE COMMONWEALTH DRUMMED UP IN THE UN. AND THE COMMONWEALTH DECLARATION ON BELIZE GAVE REASSURANCE TO THE PEOPLE IN THEIR DISPUTE WITH GUATEMALA. THE COMMONWEALTH ALSO HELPED TO PROMOTE STABILITY IN AFRICA WHEN IT SENT OBSERVERS TO MONITOR THE UGANDAN ELECTIONS IN 1980 AND LATER A MILITARY TRAINING TEAM.

AND IN GENERAL THE EXISTENCE OF THE COMMONWEALTH PROVIDES A HIGHLY EFFECTIVE MEANS FOR BRITAIN TO PLAY A RESPONSIBLE PART ALONGSIDE OTHER WESTERN NATIONS IN AIDING THE DEVELOPMENT AND STABILITY OF THE THIRD WORLD. CERTAINLY MANY OF THE SMALLER STATES FEEL THAT THEIR MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND ITS REGIONAL BODIES MAKES THEM MUCH LESS EXPOSED IN A HOSTILE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE. AS I SAID IN THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEBATE ON 3 NOVEMBER, WE SHALL BE EXAMINING WITH OUR COMMONWEALTH PARTNERS WHAT WE CAN DO TO HELP THESE AND OTHER SMALL STATES EVEN FURTHER, IN PARTICULAR SO THAT THEY ARE NOT EXPOSED TO TAKE-OVER BY TINY GROUPS OF EVIL MEN...

TO SPEAK OF SHARED VALUES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE COMMONWEALTH IS TO USE A TRUISM. BUT THE FUNDAMENTAL CHARACTERISTIC OF TRUISMS IS THAT THEY ARE TRUE. THE DECLARATION OF COMMONWEALTH PRINCIPLES ADOPTED IN 1971 IS PERHAPS THE CLEARER EXPRESSION OF THE VALUES WHICH WE HOLD IN COMMON. ONE HAS TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT NOT ALL MEMBERS ARE SUCCESSFUL IN PRACTISING THESE PRINCIPLES. BUT THEY DO PROVIDE AN IDEAL, A BENCHMARK, TOWARDS WHICH ALL THE MEMBER STATES CAN STRIVE. AND THE COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES GENERALLY COMPARE FAVOURABLY WITH THEIR COUNTERPARTS ELSEWHERE IN PRESERVING AND PRACTISING THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY, A KEY FOUNDATION STONE FOR A FAIR SOCIETY. IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE NIGERIA HAS JUST DEMONSTRATED ANEW THAT PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY CAN WORK IN AFRICA. IN A SUBTLE WAY, ALL THESE SHARED VALUES WORK IN OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS BECAUSE THEY HELP TO SPREAD A WAY OF LIFE WHICH HAS WORKED FOR US AND WHICH CAN ENHANCE STABILITY.

UNIQUE CHANNEL

I ALSO SEE THE COMMONWEALTH AS A UNIQUE CHANNEL FOR DEVELOPING CONTACTS AND UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE INDUSTRIALISED AND DEVELOPING WORLD. THIS TOO SERVES OUR INTERESTS. IN PARTICULAR OUR COMMONWEALTH EXPERIENCE PUTS US IN A GOOD POSITION, ALONG WITH CANADA, AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND, TO ACT AS A FULCRUM IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL NEGOTIATIONS. AND THE COMMONWEALTH IN GENERAL PROVIDES A VALUABLE, POSSIBLY A UNIQUE FORUM, FREE OF POLEMIC AND BITTERNESS, IN WHICH THE DEVELOPING AND THE INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES CAN GAIN A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONSTRAINTS AND NEEDS OF THE OTHER. WE SHALL BE ABLE TO DISCUSS THESE ISSUES FURTHER AT CHOGM WHERE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL QUESTIONS WILL BE AMONG THE KEY ITEMS ON THE AGENDA...

BUT THERE IS NO FREE LUNCH IN FOREIGN POLICY...IF WE GET BENEFITS OF THIS ORDER OUT OF THE COMMONWEALTH THEN WE HAVE TO PUT SOMETHING IN. WE HAVE TO BEAR COSTS, MAKE COMMITMENTS. AND WE HAVE TO RECOGNISE THAT THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH MAY SEE IT AS A LEGITIMATE WAY OF FURTHERING THEIR OWN INTERESTS. FOR THE LONG-TERM VALUE AND HEALTH OF THE COMMONWEALTH I HOPE THEY DO.

I HOPE TOO THAT NO ONE HERE HAS DOUBTS ABOUT THE COMMITMENT OF THIS BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO THE COMMONWEALTH. ITS CENTRAL ROLE IN OUR FOREIGN POLICY OUTSIDE EUROPE IS REFLECTED FOR EXAMPLE IN THE DISBURSEMENT OF OUR BILATERAL AID. IN RECENT YEARS ABOUT 75 PERCENT HAS GONE TO SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES IN COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES. AND THAT IS HOW IT SHOULD BE. NOT ONLY DOES OUR MONEY THEN SERVE BRITISH NATIONAL INTERESTS, BUT OUR KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE IN THOSE COUNTRIES HELPS TO MAKE THEM EFFECTIVE RECIPIENTS. AND THIS IS NOT THE WHOLE STORY. MUCH OF OUR AID REACHES COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES THROUGH MULTILATERAL CHANNELS, INCLUDING THE EC. THIS MAY HAVE REDUCED BILATERAL PROGRAMMES IN SOME CASES. BUT LET ME EMPHASISE ONE POINT FOR YOU CLEARLY. THE BENEFIT TO THE RECIPIENTS IS GENERALLY THE SAME - OR EVEN GREATER. AND SOME COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES HAVE DEFINITELY BENEFITTED IN AID TERMS FROM OUR MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMUNITY. INDIA FOR EXAMPLE IS THE LARGEST RECIPIENT OF COMMUNITY AID. MORE THAN HALF THE COUNTRIES IN THE LOME CONVENTION ARE MEMBERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND BENEFIT FROM ITS IMPORTANT AID AND TRADE PROVISIONS. LET ME PUT IT ANOTHER WAY:

THREE-QUARTERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH ARE MEMBERS OF LOME, A MARK OF THE IMPORTANCE THAT WE ATTACH TO COMMONWEALTH LINKS WHEN WE WERE NEGOTIATING OUR ACCESSION TO THE COMMUNITY. ONE OF THE FIRST ACTS OF ST KITTS NEVIS ON ATTAINING INDEPENDENCE WAS TO APPLY FOR MEMBERSHIP OF THE LOME CONVENTION. AND FINALLY, AS YOU KNOW, WE PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN SUPPORTING THE COMMONWEALTH'S OWN INSTITUTIONS AND AID PROGRAMMES.

FOREIGN POLICY IS NOT OF COURSE SUSCEPTIBLE TO ACCURATE COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS. BUT IN TERMS OF THE COMMONWEALTH THE VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE BALANCES OF COSTS AND ADVANTAGES DO APPEAR TO LEAVE US IN SUBSTANTIAL POLITICAL SURPLUS.

COMMONWEALTH SENTIMENT

THE COMMONWEALTH HOWEVER MEANS MUCH MORE THAN THAT TO US. WE CANNOT AND DO NOT IGNORE THE MORE HUMAN AND EMOTIONAL FACTORS. THAT IS WHAT DISTINGUISHES OUR SOCIETY FROM THAT OF THE COMMUNISTS. THERE IS DEEP SENTIMENT IN THIS COUNTRY IN FAVOUR OF THE COMMONWEALTH. THE TIES OF KINSHIP AND BLOOD TO THE OLD COMMONWEALTH ARE NOW STRENGTHENED AND ENRICHED BY THE LINKS BETWEEN THE ETHNIC MINORITIES HERE AND THEIR FAMILITES IN THE CARIBBEAN, THE SUB-CONTINENT AND WEST AFRICA. AND THEN THERE IS THE UNOFFICIAL COMMONWEALTH, THAT BENIGN MAFIA OF EVERYBODY FROM COMMONWEALTH ARCHITECTS TO ATHLETES...

BUT IT IS NOT ALWAYS GOING TO BE 'SWEETNESS AND LIGHT' INSIDE THE COMMONWEALTH. IN SUCH A DIVERSE BODY THERE WILL BE OCCASIONAL DIFFERENCES OF PERCEPTION AND INTEREST. THE GRENADAN INTERVENTION SHOWED THAT EVEN WITHIN A SMALL REGION OF APPARENTLY SIMILAR STATES, COMMONWEALTH MEMBERS CAN DIFFER SHARPLY ON WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE. BUT ANY DIFFERENCES ARE TEMPORARY AND SOLUBLE. THEY WILL NOT DETRACT FROM THE UNDERLYING VALUE OF THE COMMONWEALTH FOR MULTINATIONAL COOPERATION AND MUTUAL HELP. NOR SHOULD THE WELCOME TREND TOWARDS REGIONAL COOPERATION WITH FELLOW COMMONWEALTH MEMBERS AS WELL AS OTHER STATES.

THE COMMONWEALTH IS IN SHORT A BODY OF WHICH BRITAIN IS PROUD TO HAVE BEEN THE MIDWIFE. AND IT IS CLEAR THAT THE ATTRACTIONS OF THE COMMONWEALTH ENDURE FOR OTHERS. SINCE THE LAST CHOGM, ANTIGUA, BARBUDA, THE MALDIVES AND ST KITTS NEVIS HAVE ALL JOINED. BRUNEI IS PLANNING TO DO SO WHEN IT GAINS FULL INDEPENDENCE NEXT YEAR.

THE CONTINUED GROWTH IN MEMBERSHIP IS WELCOME IN ITSELF. BUT IT ALSO MEANS THAT THE COMMONWEALTH HAS A BETTER CHANCE OF SHARING ITS EXPERIENCE WITH THE WIDER WORLD. AND IN PARTICULAR FOR DEMONSTRATING THAT COOPERATION BETWEEN PEOPLES OF DIFFERENT RACES AND BACKGROUNDS CAN HELP TO SOLVE WORLD PROBLEMS. I HAVE ALREADY REFERRED TO THE COMMONWEALTH'S ROLE IN BRINGING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN ZIMBABWE AND IN HELPING UGANDA. THE COMMONWEALTH EXPERIENCE COULD ALSO BE OF PARTICULAR RELEVANCE TO THE PROBLEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA WHERE NATIONS OF VERY DIFFERENT CULTURES AND HISTORIES SEEM TO BE SLIDING TOWARDS INCREASED VIOLENCE.

WE IN BRITAIN ARE COMMITTED TO PREVENTING THIS, AND TO HELPING TO ENSURE STABILITY THROUGHOUT AFRICA. THIS GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT TO AFRICA WAS CLEARLY SHOWN BY THE HARD WORK PUT IN TO THE LUSAKA CHOGM AND TO THE SUBSEQUENT AND SUCCESSFUL LANCASTER HOUSE CONFERENCE... AND IT HAS ENABLED US TO ESTABLISH STRONG RELATIONSHIPS THROUGHOUT THE CONTINENT: IN THE PAST WE HAVE CONCENTRATED - AND RIGHTLY SO - ON THE THIRTEEN AFRICAN COMMONWEALTH MEMBERS. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO BUILD ON THESE TIES. BUT WE HAVE ALSO STARTED TO SUPPLEMENT THEM BY IMPROVING OUR LINKS WITH SOME OF THE FRENCH AND PORTUGUESE SPEAKING COUNTRIES. THE RECENT SUCCESSFUL VISIT TO BRITAIN BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE IVORY COAST WAS JUST ONE OUTWARD AND VISIBLE SIGN OF OUR DEVELOPING RELATIONS WITH FRANCOPHONE WEST AFRICA. AND WE HAVE JUST OPENED UP A SMALL POST IN THE CONGO. PRESIDENT MACHEL'S VISIT TO BRITAIN AND MALCOLM RIFKIND'S TO ANGOLA SHOWS THAT WE ARE EQUALLY SERIOUS ABOUT COOPERATING WITH THE LUSOPHONE STATES.

OUR COMMITMENT TO AFRICA REFLECTS OUR EXTENSIVE INTERESTS THERE. THE CONTINENT HAS A MAJOR PLACE IN BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY... TAKEN TOGETHER THE COUNTRIES OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA ARE THE LARGEST RECIPIENTS OF BRITISH BILATERAL AID OUTSIDE INDIA AND THE SUB-CONTINENT. AND MUCH MORE HELP FROM BRITAIN REACHES AFRICA THROUGH MULTILATERAL AGENCIES, NON-GOVERNMENTAL FLOWS AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT. THE GOVERNMENT'S ABOLITION OF EXCHANGE CONTROLS HAS HELPED SIGNIFICANTLY. CONTRAST THAT TO THE ABYSMAL SOVIET RECORD IN PROVIDING ECONOMIC AID TO AFRICA. IN 1981 ONLY 6 PERCENT OF SOVIET CIVILIAN AID WENT TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA. EVEN WORSE, THAT WAS WORTH ONLY 2 PERCENT OF WESTERN AID TO THOSE COUNTRIES.

DONOR-RECIPIENT PARTNERSHIP

BUT TO BE EFFECTIVE, AID FROM WHEREVER IT COMES CANNOT BE A ONE-WAY PROCESS. IT REQUIRES PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN DONORS AND RECIPIENTS. THIS IS WHY THE COMMUNITY ATTACHES SUCH IMPORTANCE TO DEVELOPING A GENUINE DIALOGUE WITHIN THE LOME PARTNERSHIP WITH THE ACP STATES: WE NEED TO IDENTIFY THE MOST EFFECTIVE USE OF THE SUBSTANTIVE RESOURCES AND TRADE OPPORTUNITIES WE PROVIDE. AS I SAID AT CHATHAM HOUSE ON 4 NOVEMBER, IN THE PRESENT SITUATION, WHERE MONEY IS BOUND TO BE TIGHT, IT IS MORE THAN EVER IMPORTANT THAT AID SHOULD BE SEEN TO BE WELL USED. EFFECTIVE AID REQUIRES TOO A SENSE OF ECONOMIC REALITY AMONG THE RECIPIENTS, A RECOGNITION THAT LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT COULD REQUIRE PAINFUL SHORT TERM ADJUSTMENTS. I AM PLEASED BY THE COURAGEOUS STEPS IN THIS DIRECTION. AND I AM ENCOURAGED THAT A NUMBER OF AFRICAN COUNTRIES ARE NOW BEGINNING TO ADOPT THE RIGHT APPROACH IN COOPERATING WITH THE IMF. I KNOW THAT THE FUND'S CONDITIONS WILL OFTEN BE TOUGH BUT THEY ARE SYMPATHETICALLY APPLIED AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL REALITIES OF THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED. WE IN BRITAIN STAND READY TO PROVIDE MORE HIGH-LEVEL EXPERTISE TO HELP WITH THE PROCESS OF ADJUSTMENT AND TO HELP TOWARDS THE GOAL WE ALL SHARE, SUSTAINABLE NON-INFLATIONARY GROWTH.

I SEE OTHER ENCOURAGING TRENDS IN AFRICA... THEY SHOW WHAT CAN BE DONE WHEN SENSIBLE POLICIES ARE PURSUED, WHEN FOREIGN INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS IS REJECTED. AND ABOVE ALL WHEN THE PEACEFUL ROUTE TO CHANGE IS FOLLOWED.

EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTING ON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, SAID THAT "A STATE WITHOUT THE MEANS OF SOME CHANGE IS WITHOUT THE MEANS OF ITS CONSERVATION". THAT MESSAGE NEEDS TO RING MOST LOUDLY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND IN PARTICULAR IN SOUTH AFRICA ITSELF. CHANGE THERE IS INEVITABLE AND DESIRABLE. I FIND IT UNTHINKABLE THAT A MINORITY WILL BE ABLE INDEFINITELY TO DEPRIVE THE MAJORITY OF ITS RIGHTFUL SAY IN RUNNING THE COUNTRY. AND APARTHEID IS NOT ONLY MORALLY ABHORRENT, IT IS IN PRACTICAL TERMS UNTENABLE AND INCOMPATIBLE WITH DYNAMIC ECONOMIC POLICIES.

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOUTHERN TIP OF AFRICA ARE OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE TO BRITAIN. NOT ONLY ARE A NUMBER OF COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES DIRECTLY INVOLVED BUT OUR POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND STRATEGIC INTERESTS THROUGHOUT THE CONTINENT ARE AFFECTED BY THE WAY THINGS GO THERE. I THEREFORE INTEND TO DEVOTE THE REST OF MY SPEECH TODAY TO SOUTHERN AFRICA.

THE QUESTION THAT WE MUST FACE AND THAT ABOVE ALL THE PEOPLE OF THE REGION MUST FACE IS HOW CHANGE IS TO COME ABOUT. WHETHER IT IS TO OCCUR PEACEFULLY AND IN A WAY WHICH PRESERVES ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT. OR WHETHER THE EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS FALLS PREY TO THE FORCES OF REVOLUTION, AND TO THE COUNSELS OF DESPAIR, EXACTING A DREADFUL PRICE FROM ALL SOUTHERN AFRICANS.

THE TREND I FEAR AT THE MOMENT IS A TREND TOWARDS GREATER VIOLENCE, TERRORIST ATTACKS AND DESTABILISATION. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT DEPLORES THAT TREND. IN PARTICULAR ALL PARTIES SHOULD STRICTLY RESPECT THE SANCTITY OF NATIONAL BORDERS. CROSS BORDER VIOLENCE IS IN ANY CASE COUNTER PRODUCTIVE. THE BLACK GUERRILLAS SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT ATTACKS ON SOUTH AFRICA MERELY STRENGTHEN INTRANSIGENCE, JUST AS PLO ATTACKS DID ON ISRAEL. THEY WILL MAKE THE WHITES EVEN MORE FEARFUL OF MAKING CONCESSIONS. AND THE SOUTH AFRICANS FOR THEIR PART HAVE TO SEE THAT DESTABILISATION OF THEIR NEIGHBOURS RISKS PRECIPITATING THE SITUATION THEY FEAR MOST: MAKING THE RUSSIANS AND THEIR SURROGATES A MORE POWERFUL FACTOR IN THE EQUATION. PUNITIVE RAIDS MAY BUY A LITTLE TIME, PROVIDE A BREATHING SPACE. BUT THE LONG TERM COSTS ARE THOSE OF FEAR, BITTERNESS AND HATRED. THESE COSTS WILL BE PAID BY ALL CONCERNED, IN THE REGION AND OUTSIDE. AND WILL MAKE PEACEFUL CHANGE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT.

THEY KEY TO PEACE IS MAINLY IN THE HANDS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE. NOBODY CAN FORCE THEM TO USE IT. BUT USE IT THEY MUST IF THEY ARE TO SECURE THEIR LONG-TERM STABILITY AND PROSPERITY. I HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE INTERNAL ECONOMIC FORCES WHICH HAVE ALREADY BROUGHT ABOUT A DEGREE OF CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA. THE DEMAND FOR BLACK WORKERS, THE INCREASE IN THEIR PURCHASING POWER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF BLACK TRADE UNIONS - ALL GIVE IMPETUS TO A POWERFUL DYNAMO FOR CHANGE INSIDE SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIETY. THESE ARE TRENDS WHICH I WELCOME. AND THEY SHOULD BE WELCOMED BY ALL SOUTH AFRICANS. TO ALLOW THE DOGMA OF APARTHEID TO BLOCK THE BENIGN FORCES OF THE MARKET PLACE WOULD BE TO THE BENEFIT OF NO ONE. IN THE END, THE RESULT MIGHT BY SOME STANDARDS IN SOUTH AFRICA BE IDEOLOGICALLY SOUND BUT IN AN ECONOMIC WASTE LAND.

POLITICAL REFORM NEEDED

IN MY VIEW THEREFORE ECONOMIC FORCES OFFER SOME HOPE THAT THE EVILS OF APARTHEID CAN BE MODERATED. BUT POLITICAL REFORM IS ALSO NECESSARY. I AM NOT GOING TO SUGGEST FORMULAE FOR REFORM OR TRY TO PRESCRIBE PRECISE REMEDIES. WE HAVE NEVER DEVIATED FROM OUR VIEW THAT IT IS FOR THOSE IN SOUTH AFRICA TO JUDGE WHAT IS BEST FOR THEM, BUT WE HAVE MADE CLEAR ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS THAT WE ARE LOOKING FOR PROGRESS TOWARDS CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS ACCEPTABLE TO THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH AFRICA AS A WHOLE. THERE WAS STRONG WHITE SUPPORT FOR THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS IN THE REFERENDUM ON 2 NOVEMBER. BUT ONLY PART OF THE POPULATION HAS BEEN CONSULTED ABOUT THESE PROPOSALS, AND THEY HAVE BEEN SERIOUSLY CRITICISED BY THE MAJORITY OF SOUTH AFRICANS BECAUSE THEY MAKE NO PROVISIONS FOR THEM. I SEE THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT THE VOTE WAS A MANDATE FOR 'EVOLUTIONARY REFORM' IT WOULD I THINK BE INAPPROPRIATE FOR ME TO COMMENT ON THE OUTCOME OF THE REFERENDUM OR ON THAT STATEMENT. BUT WE DO HOPE THAT THE REFERENDUM WILL FACILITATE THE PROCESS OF CHANGE WHICH WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE. WE SHALL OF COURSE CONTINUE TO TAKE A KEEN INTEREST IN DEVELOPMENTS.

FOR APARTHEID AND THE ABSENCE OF A FORM OF GOVERNMENT WHICH HAS THE CONSENT OF ALL THE PEOPLE CAST A LONG SHADOW OVER BRITAIN'S RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA. OUR REJECTION OF APARTHEID AND OF THE OPPRESSION LINKED WITH IT REFLECTS THE FIRM VIEW OF A WIDE SPECTRUM OF BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION. IT ALSO REPRESENTS THE CLEAR CONSENSUS WITHIN THE COMMONWEALTH. THE PRIME MINISTER AND I WILL IN NEW DELHI BE REAFFIRMING THE GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT TO THE GLENEAGLES AGREEMENT ON APARTHEID IN SPORT. I HOPE OUR SPORTS BODIES WILL TAKE ACCOUNT OF THIS AND REFLECT TOO ON THE WIDER IMPLICATIONS OF THEIR DECISIONS ABOUT SOUTH AFRICA, NOT LEAST FOR OTHER COMMONWEALTH SPORTSMEN. IN PARTICULAR, WE SHALL CONTINUE TO ADVISE THE RUGBY FOOTBALL UNION AGAINST AN ENGLAND TOUR OF SOUTH AFRICA NEXT YEAR. AS FOR OTHER ISSUES THIS GOVERNMENT WILL UPHOLD THE UNITED NATIONS ARMS EMBARGO. WE SHALL ESCHUE ANY MILITARY COLLABORATION WITH SOUTH AFRICA. AND WE SHALL NOT HELP WITH SOUTH AFRICA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAMME.

"DESTABILISATION"

INTERNAL / APARTHEID

GLENEAGLES

BU WE ARE NOT GOING TO CUT OFF CONTACT WITH SOUTH AFRICA. ONE OF THE MESSAGES I WANT TO LEAVE WITH YOU TODAY IS THAT YOU CAN ONLY INFLUENCE SOMEONE IF YOU ARE READY TO TALK TO HIM. THAT APPLIES TO THE WESTERN GOVERNMENTS IN THEIR APPROACH TO RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET BLOC. AND IT APPLIES WITH EQUAL FORCE TO THE WESTERN GOVERNMENTS AND TO THE OTHER STATES OF SOUTHERN AFRICA IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA.

CONTACT / SANCTIONS

YOU CANNOT GET YOUR POINT ACROSS BY REFUSING EVEN TO DISCUSS YOUR DIFFERENCES. EQUALLY WE DO NOT THINK THAT THE CASE HAS BEEN MADE FOR ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. I HAVE A GENERAL OBJECTION TO INTERFERENCE IN COMMERCIAL RELATIONS FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES., NOT LEAST BECAUSE SUCH INTERFERENCE HAS NORMALLY PROVED INEFFECTIVE. I MUST BE FRANK AND ADMIT THAT SANCTIONS WOULD OF COURSE DAMAGE IMPORTANT BRITISH COMMERCIAL AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS. BUT I ALSO BELIEVE WE SHOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH THE ECONOMIC FORCES THAT ARE AT WORK FOR CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA. NOR IS IT IN OUR INTERESTS, OR THAT OF SOUTH AFRICANS TO PROVOKE THROUGH DRASTIC ACTION A VIOLENT ECONOMIC COLLAPSE THERE. RATHER POSITIVE CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA IS LIKELY TO COME ABOUT THROUGH A GROWTH IN CONTACT WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD, NOT BY TREATING IT AS A PARIAH. AND THROUGH DEVELOPMENT OF ITS ECONOMY, NOT BY THE IMPOSITION OF A COMMERCIAL SIEGE. THAT IS WHY WE SUPPORT THE EUROPEAN CODE OF CONDUCT FOR COMPANIES WITH INTERESTS IN SOUTH AFRICA. NOT AS A PUNITIVE MEASURE BUT AS A POSITIVE WAY FOR IMPROVING THE SITUATION OF BLACK WORKERS.

NAMIBIA

THERE ARE NO QUICK OR EASY SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA. THOSE WHO SAY THERE ARE HAVE BEEN BADLY BRIEFED OR ARE NAIVE. BUT OUR POLICY FOR THE REGION IS CONSISTENT AND AIMED AT THE LONG-TERM. IT IS A POLICY OF CONTACT AND INVOLVEMENT, OF WORKING WITH ALL THE PARTIES IN AND AROUND SOUTH AFRICA TO PRODUCE FASTER CHANGE BY PEACEFUL MEANS. THIS IS NOTHING NEW. WE HAVE BEEN WORKING WITH OTHER WESTERN NATIONS IN THE CONTACT GROUP OF FIVE - INCLUDING CANADA, ANOTHER LEADING COMMONWEALTH MEMBER - TO BRING ABOUT A FAIR AND LASTING SETTLEMENT IN NAMIBIA. THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL'S RECENT SUCCESSFUL VISIT TO THE REGION RESULTED IN THE RESOLUTION OF VIRTUALLY ALL THE OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS ON NAMIBIA. I UNDERSTAND THE IMPATIENCE FELT BY SOME AFRICAN STATES. BUT THE WORK OF THE CONTACT GROUP HAS CONTRIBUTED IN NO SMALL WAY TO THE PROGRESS ALREADY ACHIEVED.

IT IS OF COURSE EASIER TO STATE THE OBJECTIVE THAN TO ACHIEVE IT. THE MAIN OBSTACLE IS THE DEMAND FOR AN AGREEMENT ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN TROOPS FROM ANGOLA AS A PRECONDITION FOR A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT. WE HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT FOR US THE ONLY CONDITIONS FOR NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE ARE THOSE IN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 435. BUT AS A MATTER OF PRACTICAL POLITICS WE HAVE TO RECOGNISE THAT THE MAIN PARTIES EACH HAVE THEIR OWN SECURITY PROBLEMS. THESE HAVE TO BE SATISFACTORILY RESOLVED IF THERE IS TO BE AN ENDURING AGREEMENT. I BELIEVE THAT MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF GREATER TRUST IN THE AREA HOLD THE KEY TO THIS. THAT IS WHY WE WANT TO SEE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM ANGOLA. BUT OF COURSE THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS IN ANGOLA AND CONTINUING ARMED CONFLICT THERE MAKE THE WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN TROOPS MORE DIFFICULT. I THEREFORE URGE THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO PULL BACK THEIR FORCES FROM SOUTHERN ANGOLA AS A VITAL STEP. I DO NOT BELIEVE THIS WOULD PREJUDICE THEIR POSITION. INDEED IT WOULD BE A VALUABLE STEP IN THE PROCESS LEADING TO A NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT AND GREATER REGIONAL STABILITY. CONVERSELY, I FIND IT HARD TO SEE HOW THEIR CONTINUED PRESENCE IN ANGOLA CAN SERVE SOUTH AFRICA'S LONG TERM INTERESTS.

ACCEPTABLE NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND ITS PARTNERS IN THE CONTACT GROUP ARE COMMITTED TO CONTINUING THEIR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVING A NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO ALL. THERE ARE SOME IN THIS COUNTRY WHO WOULD ARGUE THAT IT IS BETTER FOR THE WEST THAT SOUTH AFRICA RETAIN CONTROL OF NAMIBIA, THAT AN INDEPENDENT NAMIBIA WOULD FALL UNDER SOVIET DOMINATION. I REJECT THESE NOTIONS. INDEED I BELIEVE THE REVERSE TO BE TRUE. A SETTLEMENT WHICH ENABLES THE PEOPLE OF NAMIBIA FREELY AND WITHOUT ANY KIND OF EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE WOULD BE CLEARLY IN WESTERN INTERESTS. IT WOULD REDUCE, NOT INCREASE, THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR EXTERNAL MEDDLING AND FOR FURTHER VIOLENCE. AND IT COULD HELP TO PROMOTE THE REMOVAL OF THE CUBANS FROM ANGOLA. BUT PERHAPS EVEN MORE IMPORTANT, A NAMIBIA BROUGHT PEACEFULLY TO INDEPENDENCE AND IN A WAY WHICH SAFEGUARDED THE HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLITICAL FREEDOMS OF THE MINORITY COMMUNITIES WOULD MAKE AN IMPORTANT PSYCHOLOGICAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION TO THE REGION'S FUTURE. INDEED IN THAT SENSE, NAMIBIA COULD BE THE KEY TO THE FUTURE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA. IF THAT KEY CAN BE TURNED, THEN THE PROSPECTS FOR THE REGION ACHIEVING PEACEFUL CHANGE, FOR AVOIDING KALASHNIKOV DIPLOMACY WILL BE MUCH BETTER.

IN PARTICULAR THE DOOR WOULD OPEN TO FAR GREATER CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION. THE BLACK STATES IN THE AREA ALREADY UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE OF WORKING TOGETHER. THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COORDINATION CONFERENCE IS JUST ONE OF THE WAYS IN WHICH THEY ARE HELPING ONE ANOTHER WITH THEIR MUTUAL PROBLEMS. WE WELCOME THIS. MORE TO THE POINT, WE ARE OFFERING CONCRETE SUPPORT EG FOR THE LIMPOPO RAILWAY PROJECT. THIS SORT OF COOPERATION MAKES SENSE FOR THE FUTURES OF THESE COUNTRIES. THE INESCAPABLE FACTS OF GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS HAVE ALSO WILLY-NILLY RESULTED IN A MEASURE OF PRACTICAL COOPERATION BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS BLACK NEIGHBOURS.

THAT COOPERATION MUST BE DEVELOPED AND EXPANDED. THE FUTURE FOR THE REGION AS A WHOLE AND IN ALL SENSES - POLITICAL AS WELL AS ECONOMIC - IS LIKELY TO DEPEND ON IT. IF THE BLACK STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA WANT TO INFLUENCE ONE ANOTHER, THEY MUST TALK TO EACH OTHER, EXPRESS THEIR CONCERNS AND EXPLAIN THE CONSTRAINTS UNDER WHICH THEY WORK. NOTHING CAN OR WILL BE SOLVED IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF ISOLATION AND MUTUAL SUSPICION.

A PEACEFUL FUTURE FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA WILL ALSO REQUIRE THE RECOGNITION OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF STATEHOOD AND OF THE MEANING OF SOVEREIGNTY. THOSE CONCEPTS ARE INCOMPATIBLE WITH SUPPORT FOR OR TOLERATION OF THE WORK OF ORGANISATIONS USING VIOLENCE IN THE NAME OF POLITICS. THEY ARE INCOMPATIBLE WITH PUNITIVE MILITARY RAIDS, RETALIATORY OR NOT. AND THEY ARE INCOMPATIBLE WITH POLICIES DESIGNED TO KEEP YOUR NEIGHBOURS OFF BALANCE, TO CHOKE THEIR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OR TO DESTABILISE THEIR GOVERNMENTS. THESE CONCEPTS MUST BE RECOGNISED AND ACTED UPON ON BOTH SIDES OF SOUTH AFRICA'S BORDERS. IF THEY ARE NOT, THE SLIDE TO MILITARY CONFRONTATION, TO VIOLENCE AND INSTABILITY, FROM WHICH THERE CAN BE NO REAL WINNERS WILL CONTINUE. IN SHORT, SOUTH AFRICANS MUST USE THE TELESCOPE, NOT THE MICROSCOPE. THEY NEED A WIDE-ANGLE LENS, NOT A NARROW FOCUS, IF THEY ARE TO ACQUIRE THE BREADTH OF VISION NECESSARY TO ALLOW LONG-TERM CHANGE THROUGH MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND UNDERSTANDING RATHER THAN THROUGH CONFRONTATION AND SUBVERSION.

COOPERATION BETWEEN STATES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT STANDS READY TO ENCOURAGE AND SUPPORT CROSS-BORDER CONTACT AND COOPERATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. THE US ADMINISTRATION HAVE DEMONSTRATED THE SAME ATTITUDE. WE ARE WILLING TO DO WHAT WE CAN WITH OUR OTHER ALLIES, INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE NAMIBIA CONTACT GROUP, TO HELP REMOVE THE MUTUAL SUSPICION AND DISTRUST WHICH IMPEDE PROGRESS. FOR THE WESTERN COUNTRIES SHARE WITH ALL THE AFRICANS OF THE REGION - INCLUDING THOSE OF EVERY COMMUNITY IN SOUTH AFRICA - AN OVERRIDING INTEREST IN PEACEFUL CHANGE AND THE AVOIDANCE OF BLOODSHED. MANY COMMONWEALTH STATES HOLD STRONG AND UNCOMPROMISING VIEWS ABOUT SOUTH AFRICA. I UNDERSTAND THOSE VIEWS. I SYMPATHISE WITH THEIR TOTAL REJECTION OF APARTHEID. I BELIEVE THAT THE COMMONWEALTH MODEL FOR SUCCESSFUL INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ACROSS CULTURES AND RACES IN SOLVING POLITICAL PROBLEMS HAS RELEVANCE FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA. BUT THAT MODEL IS UNLIKELY TO BE TAKEN UP AND USED FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL THE PEOPLE THERE UNLESS THE COMMONWEALTH DEMONSTRATES RECOGNITION OF THE POLITICAL REALITIES OF THE REGION.

WE IN BRITAIN ARE USING OUR BEST EFFORTS TO PROMOTE AND ENCOURAGE THE CHANGES NECESSARY IN SOUTH AFRICA ITSELF FOR THE FUTURE PEACE AND STABILITY OF THE REGION. AND WE ARE ENCOURAGING THE BLACK AFRICAN STATES TO PLAY THEIR PART, REALISTICALLY BUT WITHOUT ANY SACRIFICE OF PRINCIPLE. BUT THIS CANNOT BE THE SOLE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE WEST. IN THE END THE PROBLEMS ARE AFRICAN ONES. THE FIRST STEPS HAVE TO BE TAKEN BY AFRICANS - WHITE AFRICANS AND BLACK AFRICANS.

ENDS VS/102/83

BRITAIN / COMMONWEALTH