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TELEGRAM NUMBER 1510 OF 2 DECEMBER
INFO PRIORITY NICOSIA, ATHENS, ANKARA, WASHINGTON.

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MY TELNO 1492: CYPRUS

1. TUR REPORTS URQUHART AS SAYING THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL MIGHT BE WILLING TO CONSIDER PROPOSALS FROM US FOR CONCERTED ACTION TO BREAK OUT OF THE CURRENT DEADLOCK ON CYPRUS. WE HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING HERE WHAT FORM SUCH A PROPOSAL MIGHT TAKE. WE MUST ACCEPT THAT THERE IS A STRONG LIKELIHOOD THAT WE WILL HAVE TO GOT BACK TO THE LABORIOUS BUSINESS OF PUTTING TOGETHER THE BUILDING BLOCKS FROM THE BEGINNING AND OVER A LONG PERIOD. BUT THERE IS, AS SEEN FROM HERE, A CHANCE THAT WE MAY BE ABLE TO SHORT-CUT THIS PROCESS IF WE CAN USE THE PERIOD WHEN THE TURKS ARE STILL FEELING TWINGES OF CONSCIENCE TO EXTRACT CONCESSIONS FROM THEM. IF WE COULD DO THIS, IT WOULD SERVE TO LIMIT GREEK CYPRIOT FRUSTRATION AT FAILURE TO SECURE REVERSAL OF UDI, AND MAKE TI MORE DIFFICULT FOR PAPANDREOU TO MOVE ON TO US, THE BLAME FOR FAILURE (SEE ATHENS TELNO 722).
2. I AGREE WITH URQUHART THAT THE CORE OF THE PROBLEM LIES IN PERSUADING KYPRIANOU NOT TO INSIST ON REVERSAL OF UDI BEFORE HE CAN CONTEMPLATE TAKING UP ANY OTHER MOVES BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL. I SUGGST THAT TO GET HIM OUT OF HIS HOLE WE SHOULD ADOPT A STICK AND CARROT STRATEGY. HE NEEDS TO BE PRESENTED WITH A PACKAGE OF TURKISH CONCESSIONS, BACKED BY THE UN, WHICH WOULD BE GENUINELY ATTRACTIVE ENOUGH FOR HIM TO SELL TO HIS PUBLIC, AND AT THE SAME TIME WITH THE CLEAR WARNING THAT IF HE REFUSED TO CONSIDER THE PACKAGE SERIOUSLY, THE UN WOULD NOT HESITATE TO EXPOSE HIM PUBLICLY. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SHOULD EXPLAIN TO HIM THAT HE SHOULD AIM AT REJECTION NOT REVERSAL OF UDI AND THAT THIS WOULD IN PRACTICE, BE ACHIEVED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S INSISTENCE ON DEALING WITH DENKTASH ONLY AS LEADER OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY. KYPRIANOU MAY RECOGNISE THAT IT WILL BE A LONG TIME BEFORE HE GETS A BETTER OFFER.
3. OTHERS MAY BE ABLE TO HELP TIGHTEN THE SQUEEZE ON KYPRIANOU. THE WEST COULD TELL HIM THAT THEY CONSIDER THE CONCESSIONS WORTH TAKING UP. CONCEIVABLY, THE NON-ALIGNED CONTACT GROUP MIGHT ENCOURAGE HIM TO STICK TO THE NON-ALIGNED PRINCIPLE OF SEEKING SETTLEMENT (THOUGH WE SHOULD NEED TO BE CAREFUL TO AVOID A FALKLANDS BACKLASH), OF DISPUTES THROUGH NEGOTIATION. GREEK CYPRIOT POLITICAL PARTIES OR THE VAROSHA

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/ REFUGEES

REFUGEES LOBBY COULD HELP. EVEN GREECE MIGHT PITCH IN IF TROOP WITHDRAWALS WERE INCLUDED IN A PACKAGE. BUT NONE OF THESE COULD HAVE THE SAME IMPACT ON KYPRIANOU AS THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL. IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR HIM TO BE CLEARLY IN THE LEAD.

4. THE FOLLOWING MIGHT MAKE UP SUCH A PACKAGE. IN RETURN FOR GREEK CYPRIOT AGREEMENT TO INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS ON THE EXISTING AGREED BASIS (BUT WITHOUT NECESSARILY HAVING REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES IN THE SAME ROOM), AND FOR AN UNDERTAKING BY THEM NOT TO PURSUE THE CYPRUS PROBLEM AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT PRESENT, THE TURKISH SIDE MIGHT BE ASKED TO OFFER:

(A) READINESS TO DISCUSS DETAILS OF THEIR PROPOSAL ON VAROSHA, NOT NECESSARILY LIMITED TO THE 1981 TERRITORIAL OUTLINE (AND WITHOUT THE NICOSIA AIRPORT ELEMENT):

(B) AN UNDERTAKING THAT THE OTHER TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS PROPOSED IN 1981 COULD BE DISCUSSED AT THE SAME TIME:

(C) AN UNDERTAKING TO MAKE A SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION ON TURKISH TROOPS IN CYPRUS: AND

(D) WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS SOME RELAXATION OF THE PRESENT RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH CYPRUS (AS ALREADY HINTED AT IN NICOSIA TELNO 329).

5. IF WE CAN AGREE THAT SUCH A PACKAGE HAS A WORTHWHILE CHANCE OF SUCCESS, WE MUST CONSIDER HOW TO BRING IT ABOUT. THE KIND OF PROPOSAL I SHOULD LIKE TO PUT TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD INCLUDE SUGGESTIONS ON HOW HE AND WE (AND OTHERS PREPARED TO GO ALONG), MIGHT DIVIDE UP THE LABOUR.

6. THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD HAVE TO TAKE THE LEAD WITH THE GREEK CYPRIOTS. HE MIGHT BRING HOME TO THEM HIS DETERMINATION TO PURSUE HIS MISSION, AND TRY TO WEAR DOWN THEIR RESISTANCE TO ANY CONCRET PROPOSALS HE MAY COME UP WITH. IF POSSIBLE, HE MIGHT EVEN WIN FROM THE ADMITTANCE THAT THEY WOULD BE READY TO CONSIDER, IN PAPANDREOU'S WORDS, 'RATIFYING A DEAL'. THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD ALSO HAVE TO WORK ON DENKTASH TO KEEP THE VAROSHA PROPOSAL ON THE BOIL AND PRESS HIM ON THE RELAXATION OF MOVEMENT RESTRICTIONS. HE COULD ALSO SEEK TO ENLIST NON-ALIGNED SUPPORT FOR HIS ACTIVITY.

7. IN RETURN WE AND OTHERS, NOTABLY THE AMERICANS, WOULD HAVE TO BE PREPARED TO ARGUE TOUGHLY TO THE TURKS THAT THEY MUST HELP US TO GET INTERCOMMUNAL EXCHANGES GOING. THIS IS THEIR OWN POLICY BUT IT REQUIRES A CONSIDERABLE EXPANSION OF DENKTASH'S EXISTING OFFERS. URQUHART'S TALK WITH WILSON (SED) ON 1 DECEMBER, SHOWED QUITE CLEARLY THAT THIS IS WHERE THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD BE INTERESTED IN OUR HELP. DETAILS WOULD NEED TO BE WORKED OUT, PERHAPS BEARING IN MIND PICCO'S COMMENTS IN TUR. BUT IF I CANNOT ASSURE THE SECRETARY GENERAL THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO DO THIS I DOUBT WHETHER ANY SCHEME OF THIS KIND WILL BE A STARTER AT THIS TIME.

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8. IF A SCHEME ON THESE LINES SEEMS TO YOU TO HAVE MERIT I SHOULD LIKE TO PUT IT TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL IN AS MUCH DETAIL AS POSSIBLE. WE WOULD NEED TO COORDINATE OUR EFFORTS AT LEAST WITH THE U.S. AND THE FRG. THE FRENCH MIGHT BE PREPARED TO DO THEIR BIT IN ATHENS. I AGREE WITH URQUHART THAT WE SHOULD NOT START MAKING WAVES UNTIL THE UNFICYP RENEWAL DEBATE IS OUT OF THE WAY. BUT I WOULD SEE ADVANTAGE IN OUR BEING READY TO BEGIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THEREAFTER. ANKARA TELNO 587 SUGGESTS THAT THE TURKS MAY ALREADY BE SPRINGING BACK.

9. IT MAY BE WORTH NOTING THAT A SUBSTANTIAL PROGRAMME OF THIS KIND WOULD MAKE IT EASIER TO KEEP UP THE PRESSURE ON THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO APPOINT A SUBSTANTIVE REPLACEMENT FOR GOBBI QUICKLY.

THOMSON

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

LIMITED

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LEGAL ADVS
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CONS D
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TRED

EED
SOV DEPT
PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RIFKIND
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR WHITNEY
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
MR WRIGHT
SIR C TICKELL
SIR J LEAHY
MR ADAMS
MR CARTLEDGE
MR EGERTON
LORD N GORDON LENNOX
MR HANNAY
MR THOMAS
MR JENKINS

ADDITIONAL DISTN
CYPRUS

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