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OO ALGIERS  
GRS 344  
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FM FCO 241230Z FEB 84  
TO IMMEDIATE ALGIERS  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 035 OF 24 FEB 84  
INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, WASHINGTON, STOCKHOLM,  
PARIS, GULF POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK  
INITIATIVE TO ENCOURAGE FURTHER MEDIATION IN THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR

1. WE HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING WAYS TO ENCOURAGE EFFORTS AT MEDIATION IN THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR, NOW THAT ATTEMPTS BY THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL TO SEND A MISSION TO BAGHDAD AND TEHRAN HAVE, FOR THE MOMENT, COME TO NOTHING.
2. AS YOU KNOW, THE ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT WERE AT ONE TIME ACTIVE IN ATTEMPTING TO PROMOTE A SETTLEMENT TO THE WAR, FOLLOWING THEIR SUCCESSFUL MANAGEMENT OF THE NEGOTIATION FOR THE RELEASE OF THE US EMBASSY HOSTAGES. WE UNDERSTAND, HOWEVER, THAT THEY WERE IN THE END REBUFFED BY THE IRANIANS WHO CONFIRMED TO A SENIOR MEMBER OF THE UK MISSION TO THE UN IN 1983 THAT THE ALGERIANS NOW REGARDED THEIR MEDIATION EFFORTS AS ENDED.
3. PLEASE DISCUSS THE WAR AT AN APPROPRIATELY HIGH LEVEL WITH THE ALGERIANS. YOU SHOULD SAY THAT THE WHOLE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST BE CONCERNED AT THE RECENT UPSURGE IN FIGHTING AND AT THE DANGERS OF ESCALATION. THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS FULLY SUPPORTED EFFORTS MADE BY THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL TO MEDIATE IN THE WAR, AND WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT HIS LATEST PROPOSAL TO SEND A MISSION TO BAGHDAD AND TEHRAN HAS BEEN POSTPONED. WE ARE NEVERTHELESS CONCERNED TO FIND A MEANS OF ENDING A WAR WHICH HAS BROUGHT MUCH SUFFERING AND LOSS OF LIFE. WE KNOW THAT THE ALGERIANS ARE WELL RESPECTED BY BOTH IRAN AND IRAQ, AND THEIR PART IN THE NEGOTIATION FOR THE RELEASE OF THE US HOSTAGES WAS MUCH ADMIRERD. THE FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER AND MANY OF HIS TOP STAFF LOST THEIR

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LIVES AN A GOOD OFFICES MISSIONS TO BAGHDAD AND TEHRAN IN 1982.  
WOULD THE ALGERIANS BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER A FURTHER INITIATIVE,  
GIVEN THE LATEST SERIOUS OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING? IF THEY FELT ABLE TO  
MAKE ANOTHER ATTEMPT, THEY COULD BE ASSURED OF  
THE FULLEST SUPPORT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM.  
WE WOULD EQUALLY UNDERSTAND IF THEY FELT THEY COULD NOT YET DO SO,  
BUT WOULD HOPE THEY COULD KEEP THE POSSIBILITY IN RESERVE, GIVEN  
THEIR SKILL AND EXPERIENCE.

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IRAN/IRAQ