

10 DRAYTON GARDENS
LONDON S.W.10
TELEPHONE: 01-373 6346
TELEX: 917506 GLOTEL G

ACHMETAGA ESTATE
PROKOPION, EUBOEA, GREECE
TELEPHONE: 0227 41204
TELEX: 214716 ELBR GR

FROM THE HONOURABLE
Francis Noel-Baker

PERSONAL

Euboea: 11.4.1984

Dear John,

Many thanks for your letter of 17 March and for the PM's kind message.

A.J.C. $\frac{9}{5}$
b-a

1. Achmetaga Estate: my offer to donate the Forest to the Government of May 1983 was conditional of relief from taxes paid while the Estate was prevented from working and on compensation for damage. This was refused, but the Greek Government offer to purchase it for one-twentieth its taxable value. I then offered to sell one twentieth of the Forest if the Government would donate that to the Village Council. This was also refused, and my offers lapsed.
2. We therefore now wish to go back to the status quo ante: to control and operate the whole Estate with full cooperation from all greek officials and agencies.
3. But if, in future, a new Village Council agrees, I will donate, or let for fifty years, at a nominal rent, an appropriate area of Forest to the Village on condition they surrender any rights over the remainder.
4. On about 1 April, Papandreou, in a speech at Larissa, again threatened expropriation of "Baker-type chiftliks" and monastery lands. I have asked the Ambassador here to obtain a copy of the relevant extract and to ask what Papandreou means. I have also sent a short note about this to the European Commission.
5. Our Submission to the Commission goes ahead as complaint no 97/84 and I hope to see Narjes, the Commissioner concerned on about 27 April.
6. I enclose Papers about Cyprus. I am convinced the UN can do nothing but harm, but that our 'Team' might find a solution. The Swiss, Austrians and Yugoslavs seem particularly keen.
7. Could you spare time for lunch in the first ten days of May? My Secretary will ask yours.
8. Thank you so much for all your help.

All good wishes,
Yours sincerely,

A.J.Coles Esq,
10 Downing Street.

BORREGAARD DIPLOMAT

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FROM THE HONOURABLE
Francis Noel-Baker

P.S. from Athens - 13. 4. 1984.

We have had a further incident in the Village when a small mob*
(led by the local police sargent) drove off a tennant plowing
our field behind the Police Station. The Ambassador kindly
arranged for the Consul General to take me to Gendarmerie HQ where
we protested to Brigadier Dascalakis, Director of Security, and I
am seeing the Public Prosecutor for Euboea today. This is a set-
back. I will keep you informed of developments. All good wishes.
In haste,

NB

A.J.Coles Esq.

* The men were mostly at work in the mines. The atmosphere in
the village remains good.

Nicosia

1. In January, I visited (for the 46th time since Eden sent me to mediate in 1956) and saw the Acting President Ladas (Kyprianou was in New York) and Ambassador Inal Batu and Messrs Onan, Konuk and others (Denktas was in New York also).
2. The response was good from both sides. I discussed this with James Holger, Acting Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Nicosia.
3. I had previously visited Ankara at the invitation of senior Foreign Office Officials, to discuss the Plan. The response was encouraging.
4. I also mentioned the matter to the UK High Commissioner in Nicosia and to the American and Yugoslav Ambassadors, explaining to the first two (as I already had to Monty Stearns, the US Ambassador in Athens and an old friend) that I sought only unofficial approval from their Governments, not participation.
5. In Stockholm on 20 March, I saw Sverker Aström, former Head of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, Representative at UN, Ambassador at Paris etc., also also Mats Bergquist Assistant Under-Secretary, Political Department and Herman at Trolle Head of Section covering Cyprus. Their view was that tacit UN approval was necessary for any Swedish participation.
6. In Stockholm I also saw the Austrian Ambassador and the Yugoslav Counsellor Iovan Ilić, who made further arrangements (see below).
7. In Bern on 20 and 21 March I had detailed talks with Auguste Lindt former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Ambassador at Delhi etc., and amended my Paper on his advice. He urged that the Team be kept small for both efficiency and security.
8. On 23 March, I telephoned Holger in Nicosia who told me Gobbi (whom I had seen in Rome when I asked him to sound out the Secretary-General. I later saw Probst, Statssekretär at the Swiss Foreign Ministry) had been sent as Ambassador to Madrid but was still nominally the S-G's Representative in Cyprus. He suggested deletions in my paper which I had already made.
9. On 25 March, I redrafted Paper CIR 1.
10. In Vienna on 27 March I saw ex-Ambassador Peter Jankowitsch MP now International Secretary of the Socialist Party (an old acquaintance) and Counsellor Helga Konrad Division II 2 for Southern Europe at the Foreign Ministry (her boss had flu).
11. On 28 March, I saw ex-Ambassador Dr Ludwig Steiner MP, international spokesman for the Peoples' Party at the Nationalrat, Vienna, for a long, detailed and most encouraging talk.
12. On 30 March in Sarajevo, I saw ex-Minister and ex-Ambassador Niaz Disdarević, Member of the Praesidium of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Member of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav League of Communists and Chairman of the Federal Foreign Affairs Council. He evinced particular interest in a federal settlement for Cyprus. (He feared the hiving-off of "independent" republics elsewhere as a threat to the Yugoslav federal system.) He seemed keen on active Yugoslav participation. He suggested that former Yugoslav Ambassador in Switzerland Madame Radić might sound out the Secretary General after I had news of Gobbi's offer to do so. He also advised me to consult

March 1984

CIR 1 (6)
Sixth Draft

CYPRUS PROJECT / PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

A. Introduction

The longer the status quo in Cyprus persists, the faster it will freeze. It is potentially exceedingly dangerous: for the Cypriots, their partners and neighbours, for the whole Middle East, for East-West relations, for the UN and for the Commonwealth.

1. The UN cannot now act because: (a) it is tied by General Assembly Resolution calling for withdrawal of Turkish Cypriot UDI, (b) because the Greek-Cypriots and Greeks are committed to not talking to Turks before that withdrawal. But withdrawal will not occur unless the new Turkish Cypriot Republic ("Republic") federates with the Greek Cypriot Republic of Cyprus - in which case both will automatically renounce the status quo which, however, does constitute a pragmatic basis for Federation.
3. Even if the UN could resume the inter-Communal talks, these would produce no better result than before. They would do more harm than good. Sadly, they have become "megaphone diplomacy": the occasion for public and aggressive demagoguery which, on each occasion, leaves the situation worse. (Except in the single case of the last Macarios-Denktaş agreement which, unfortunately, was later aborted.)
4. So a new method is necessary and urgent.

B. Method might be:

1. An unofficial, low-key, secret enquiry by a neutral Team: perhaps including Austrian, Canadian, Irish, Swedish, Swiss and possibly Yugoslav participation or close support. (The first four States man UNFICYP; the Swiss provide substantial financial help; and the Yugoslavs enjoy, I hope, good relations with all Parties concerned and are non-aligned and federal.)
2. The Team must be acceptable to both Cypriot Communities and, by extension, to Turkey and, to a lesser extent, Greece (which now has little influence).
3. It should secure tacit approval from UN and major interested governments.
4. It should be given perhaps three months to report on whether or not there is an agreed basis for a federal solution. If not, no harm is done. If so, rapid negotiations should proceed immediately to a settlement. (A retired Swiss Ambassador and former high UN official might undertake preparation of the Report.)
5. Preliminary contacts, at a high level, with the two Cypriot Communities and with the Canadian, Irish, Swiss and Turkish Governments appear to indicate serious interest.
6. Sympathetic interest but, as requested, not in participation, has also been evinced by representatives of the US and UK (Mrs Thatcher personally) Governments and by the Vatican (Archbishop Ferraioli). Ambassador Gobbi also kindly agreed to raise the matter with the UN Secretary General.
7. Retired Attorney General of the Republic of Cyprus Criton Tornarities will act, if required, as one Constitutional Consultant and also, perhaps, Mr Justice Onan (Turkish Cypriot), at a later stage.

C. The Basis for a settlement might be:

1. The status quo merging into a Federation/Confederation of two "independent" republics to be called Federal States.
2. Each State to have maximum autonomy (including security, education etc.) compatible with federation.
3. Federal Government with, at first, powers only over Customs, Immigration, Foreign Affairs, Defence (if any)...
4. Readjustment of Turkish State's boundaries.
5. Return of Greeks to Varosha, reopening of Nicosia Airport.
6. Compensation for lost property.
7. Gradual dismantling of Green Line.
8. Balanced withdrawal of Foreign Troops from both Federal States.
9. International guarantees by ^{U.N.} Commonwealth etc.

NOTE: C above emerges from persistent private, informal conversations with leaders of both Communities and Turkey since 1956 when Prime Minister Eden sent me to mediate between the Governor and Archbishop and when we came close to a settlement better than any later propped.

But it should be examined, tested or modified by the Team.

F.N-B.