



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 April, 1984

Cyprus: Contingency Planning

The Prime Minister has seen your letter of 19 April to John Coles about contingency planning in relation to Cyprus. She has noted this without comment.

DAVID BARCLAY

R. B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister ⁽²⁾

19 April 1984

This is very much a piece of contingency planning, and there is no need to read right through the paper.

John Deane,

DMS
19/4

Cyprus: Contingency Planning

In the light of the current delicate situation in Cyprus, we have agreed the enclosed paper which considers possible developments on Cyprus and UK reactions to them. You may wish to be aware of its contents.

One such development, the exchange of Ambassadors between Turkey and the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" occurred on 17 April. Sr Perez de Cuellar at once expressed deep regret and concern at the effect on his current efforts. We have issued a supportive statement (copy enclosed). Sir J Bullard summoned the Turkish Ambassador today and parallel action is being taken in Ankara. We have co-ordinated this action with the Americans, who are acting similarly, and are keeping them and our other principal allies informed.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary believes that, while we should be prepared for any eventuality, we should try to prevent the UK being drawn into possibly dangerously exposed positions. It will therefore remain important to keep in close touch with the Americans and with the Secretary-General of the United Nations as the situation develops.

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
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CYPRUS: POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS

Introduction

1. This paper examines possible developments over Cyprus in the near future, including actions by both communities and the UN Secretary General. It considers their likely effects on British interests; action that could be required by the UK and/or others; and possible initiatives for making progress towards a settlement. We must, whilst looking ahead, retain flexibility to react as appropriate in what may well be nuanced situations.

UK Objectives

2. Our objectives are:

- i) to avoid further weakening of the southern flank of NATO by increasing hostility between Greece and Turkey which could lead to estrangement of either or both from the Western Alliance;
- ii) to protect our interests in the Sovereign Base Areas;
- iii) to demonstrate to UK public and Parliamentary opinion that we are fulfilling our responsibilities as a guarantor power and what many see as an historic role .

For these reasons our actions should aim to assist in the process of finding a solution to the Cyprus problem, or, failing that, to ensure that the situation does not deteriorate.

Possible Developments

3. Possible developments can be roughly classified into three groups:

- i) Turkish Cypriot and Turkish actions;
- ii) Greek Cypriot and Greek actions;
- iii) action by the UN Secretary General.

The developments discussed below are inter-related. Some Turkish Cypriot actions seem almost inevitable; some less so; unhelpful Greek Cypriot actions may occur in retaliation for Turkish Cypriot actions or in frustration at lack of progress

of the efforts of the Secretary General. External factors, particularly the activities of the US Congress, would also have a bearing.

A Turkish Cypriot Actions

I The Establishment of a Constitution (with possible timings)

4. It seems highly unlikely that the Turkish Cypriots will freeze any of the following stages towards the adoption of a constitution and election of state officers:

- (1) publication of draft constitution in "Official Gazette" (April);
- (2) adoption of constitution by "TRNC Assembly" and submission to referendum (June);
- (3) approval by referendum and passage of electoral law (July/August);
- (4) elections for "President" and "Assembly" (mid-October). Greek Cypriot reaction is likely to be strongest to (2) and (4).

UK Reaction

5. We should be prepared to make statements containing two elements: (a) a reiteration of our position on UDI; (b) our opposition to anything which could make a settlement to the Cyprus problem more difficult. We should urge the Greek Cypriots to take a restrained position on such developments, as they have done over the "TRNC" flag. We should consider demarches to Denktash, but not under any illusion that they might be successful.

II Manifestations and Consolidation of Statehood

(a) Stepping up of international propaganda campaign

6. The Turkish Cypriots already expend a great deal of effort sending "diplomatic" communications to other governments and the UN, inviting politicians and Parliamentarians to visit the "TRNC" (with some success in the case of the UK) etc. They

could step this up by opening further "TRNC" offices in foreign capitals (there is one in London already) or proposing that Denktash and his "Ministers" should pay formal visits to such capitals.

UK Reaction

7. We should continue to ignore such activities, not answer letters and refuse to extend diplomatic courtesies to "TRNC" representatives. As before, a request to call on Ministers by Denktash would need to be considered in light of circumstances at the time. The Greek Cypriots will continue to ~~be~~ protest sporadically whilst treating such manifestations with contempt.

(b) Diplomatic Developments

8. Diplomatic developments are likely to prompt a strong Greek Cypriot reaction:

(1) Accreditation of Turkish Ambassador to the "TRNC".

UK Reaction

9. We should try to play the event down. We should issue a statement regretting the move and saying that, in line with SCR 541, it did not alter our view of the "TRNC". Mr Wilberforce would be instructed not to treat the "Ambassador" as one (although we would need to retain contact). We should make appropriate demarches in Ankara and to Dentkash but again not in the expectation of success. We should try to calm the Greek Cypriots and keep them informed of our activity.

(2) Recognition by third countries.

UK Reaction

10. We should continue to make strenuous efforts to resist any move, real or imaginary, by third countries towards recognition of the "TRNC". We should keep in close touch with the Greek Cypriots.

(3) Change in name of Turkish Cypriot forces to "Army of TRNC"

UK Reaction

11. This is probably the most emotive of a number of possible changes of nomenclature in northern Cyprus. Whilst we should react as strongly as necessary to satisfy the Greek Cypriots we should play the event down.

III Other Developments in "TRNC"

- 12(1) attempted registration of "TRNC" companies in UK;
- (2) establishment of "TRNC" bank(s)
- (3) issue of currency
- (4) adoption of national anthem;
- (5) change of name of other institutions (most have no doubt already been changed);
- (6) issue of "TRNC" stamps on export documents.
- (7) further obstruction of UNFICYP.

UK Reaction

13. Most of these developments are relatively insignificant in themselves. Their significance and our reaction would depend on our assessment of the real strength of Greek Cypriot reaction to them. Each case should be considered separately in the situation at the time. We should be prepared to condemn them privately and publicly whilst trying to calm the Greek Cypriots. We should try to keep as low a profile as possible consistent with our objectives as defined in paragraph 2. We should normally seek to work with our partners and avoid a Pavlovian situation in which when the Greeks protest we condemn.

IV Turkish Actions

14. Turkey can be expected to support all the actions by the "TRNC" listed above. It would be more serious if they began to make the attitude of third countries towards the "TRNC" a test of their attitude towards Turkey. At present this does not seem to be in their minds, given their specific request to

the US and ourselves for Cyprus to be kept separate from the rest of Turkey's external relations. If it did come about a firm and united response by Turkey's major Western allies would probably convince her that this was foolish policy. But crude or strident pressure on Turkey would be likely to be counterproductive, as it has been in the past.

B Greek Cypriot/Greek Actions (in order of likelihood)

- 15(1) further strengthening of the GCNG (including arms purchases);
- (2) recourse to the UN General Assembly at its resumed session in late May or Security Council and internationalisation of the Cyprus problem in other fora including EC;
- (3) mobilisation of Greek Cypriot National Guard (GCNG) reservists;
- (4) severance of electricity to northern Cyprus;
- (5) reduction or suspension of cooperation with NATO by Greeks.
- (6) a decision to move Greek troops into Cyprus;

16. These actions might be taken either in retaliation to a Turkish Cypriot move or in frustration at the failure of the Secretary General's efforts. All would be significant, particularly as they are likely to arise at a time of already heightened tension. The Turkish Cypriots themselves would probably react to (4) by cutting off water supplies to the South. Ankara might conceivably authorise the use of mainland forces to attack the Dekhalia power station, although this would involve a significant escalation of the crisis and probably lead to (6). The Turks would almost certainly then increase their own forces in Cyprus.

UK Reaction

17. There is nothing that the UK can do about these actions in themselves. Our efforts should be directed to heading them off in advance. If they occur we must direct our attention to the motivation behind the actions and, depending on the

circumstances at the time, the following options should be considered:

- (1) demarches, where possible with others, to the Turkish Cypriots/Turks (at Foreign Minister level if appropriate) calling for the reversal of the actions that had led to the reactions listed above. A message from the Prime Minister to Evren might be considered;
- (2) similar high level demarches to the Greek Cypriots/Greeks calling for restraint (and informing them of our action under (1) above);
- (3) public call for restraint on all parties;
- (4) action where appropriate with any third parties involved (eg with any countries selling arms to the Greek Cypriots in the event of 15(i)). In the case of (5) this would include our stance in the UN where we should try to avoid a veto to protect the Turkish Cypriots.

18.

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OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

19. If the Greeks and Greek Cypriots put pressure on the EC to deny preferential access for Turkish Cypriot exports we should probably wish to maintain our policy hitherto - to maintain the status quo without taking the lead in opposing Greek/Greek Cypriot demands. But we might be able to exploit the issue as leverage against Denktash at the same time.

C UN Secretary General's Efforts

20. The Secretary General is not an independent figure, since

he is subject to instructions from either the Security Council or the General Assembly and answerable for their execution. Although Sr Perez de Cuellar has been prepared to play a fairly independent role on Cyprus (for which all concerned recognise he is well suited) he has to take account of the views of member states and is bound by the wording of Security Council resolutions from which he derives his mandate. There are two possible scenarios:

- (a) the Secretary General indicates an inclination to take matters no further;
- (b) the Secretary General abandons his efforts (which we believe he will be reluctant to do explicitly). He may do this by presenting a report to the Security Council blaming the Turks/Turkish Cypriots for the lack of progress (he has to report by 31 May before the UNFICYP mandate expires on 15 June).

Scenario A: UK Reaction

21. The UK objective would be to encourage the Secretary General to persist in his efforts. We can pursue this by the following actions (preferably in cooperation with the US, FRG, France and Italy):

- (1) Pressure on Turks/Turkish Cypriots to be more forthcoming. If Denktash's answer threatens to put an end to the Secretary General's role we should consider Ministerial messages to Ankara.
- (2) Urging restraint on Greeks/Greek Cypriots. Again, Ministerial messages may be necessary, but we might make approaches through diplomatic channels first.
- (3) Support to UN Secretary General. The Prime Minister and Lady Young will see Perez de Cuellar later this month and could enquire about his views on the way forward; and offer of help from ourselves or others. We might suggest further meetings with Kyprianou and Denktash in New York. At a later stage, a message from Ministers might be appropriate. Which action we take and in what order must depend on the circumstances.

Scenario B: UK Reaction

22. If the Secretary General can be judged to have abandoned his efforts our long term objective should be to get him back into play. The immediate result would be likely to be a heightening of tension in Cyprus. But we should aim for a "cooling off" period. To the extent that this may not be possible for reasons which include national political expectations and our relations with the protagonists, we should have the possibility of a new initiative, by ourselves and/or others, in reserve. This would be less dangerous or cumbersome than, for example, forming a UN Western "Contact Group" as on Namibia or involving permanent members of the Security Council. Discussion and an outline of possible initiatives are annexed to this paper. We should have to expect the diplomatic "cooling off" to be accompanied by heightened tension, at least initially, in Cyprus.

23. We have hitherto resisted taking such an initiative in the aftermath of UDI for three main reasons: because we judged the chances of success to be minimal, because we wanted to avoid risking a worsening of our relations with Greece and Turkey by involvement in a fruitless exercise, and because we did not wish to undermine the efforts of the Secretary General. The latter element would no longer be so relevant, but we would need to take account of the other two before launching any initiative of our own. We would also need to consider the chances of success where previous plans had failed, and whether such an initiative could achieve at least the basic objective of creating enough diplomatic momentum to reduce tension in Cyprus itself. We should also need to consider whether any plan should be put forward by ourselves alone, or in concert with allies such as the United States.

24. In parallel with such action, we would wish to pursue the primary objective of getting the Secretary General back into play. To this end we would consider the following actions:

- (1) Review in Security Council; possibility of renewing Secretary General's mandate as reaffirmed in SCR 541.

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- (2) Reiterate position on UDI as in November 1983.
- (3) Take appropriate position on Denktash's response to Secretary General's ideas.
- (4) Urge restraint and non-internationalisation on Greeks/Greek Cypriots.
- (5) Approaches to Greek and Turkish Governments.
- (6) Consultations with partners. Ministerial contact may be required.
- (7) Statements in Parliament.

25. When it seemed possible that the Secretary General could re-enter the arena, we might suggest the appointment of new Special Representative.

Annex

Outline of Possible Initiatives

I Comprehensive settlement

1. This could be a "one-off" package or a "staged" approach as devised by Gobbi in 1982. The latter would be unlikely to meet with Perez de Cuellar's approval. Either would need to cover:

- (a) demilitarisation of the Republic
- (b) arrangements to maintain security on the island
- (c) reduction of proportion of territory currently held by Turkish Cypriots
- (d) constitutional proposals, probably including details of:
 - (i) executive
 - (ii) legislative
 - (iii) judiciary
 - (iv) division of powers between Federal Government and "Provinces"
- (e) (possibly) other matters including economic.

2. Such an approach was adopted or inherent in the following attempts at reaching a settlement in the past:

- (a) the 1960 Constitution
- (b) the UK/US/Canada proposals of 1978
- (c) the "Waldheim Evaluation" of 1981
- (d) the UN Secretary General's "Indicators" of August 1983
- (e) President Kyprianou's proposals of January 1984.

3. The main attractions of such an approach are:

- (a) its comprehensive nature
- (b) its proximity to the 1960 approach (for which the UK remains a Guarantor under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee)
- (c) its similarity with the Greek Cypriot preference.

4. Past failures demonstrate the disadvantages. There is little reason to suppose that such an approach would be workable in the circumstances following a failure of the Secretary General's efforts. It could at best serve as a desirable objective within which lesser targets may be

achievable.

II Mini Package

If a comprehensive solution is unattainable it might be possible to save the situation from deteriorating by focussing attention on a Mini Package.

1. The elements from which a "mini package" might be selected on an à la carte but balanced basis are:
 - (a) territorial changes involving Varosha and possibly Morphou
 - (b) the opening of Nicosia Airport
 - (c) lifting of economic embargo on northern Cyprus
 - (d) high level meeting between two communities
 - (e) intercommunal discussions
 - (f) freeze on military enhancements
 - (g) freeze in northern Cyprus on further consolidation of UDI
 - (h) freeze on internationalisation of problem by Greek Cypriots
 - (i) other territorial adjustment
 - (j) freedom of movement by both communities within the island
 - (k) establishment of Federal Republic with, initially, very limited federal powers
 - (l) limited definition of provincial powers
 - (m) withdrawal of troops from the vicinity of the Green Line.

2. In principle, any "mini package" should include Varosha since it was agreed in 1979 by Denktash and Kyprianou that Varosha should be given priority. But the selection would have to be made in light of the circumstances prevailing at the time. Any "mini package" launched in the immediate aftermath of the failure of the Secretary General's current efforts should probably initially avoid Varosha since the inadequate response of Denktash on this point will have been a

main reason for the Secretary General's lack of success.

3. Since it is a less ambitious approach it may stand a greater chance of some limited success given adequate political will. But Kyprianou has made clear that it would be difficult for him to sell to domestic public opinion. Acceptance of even a part of a mini package might offer the Secretary General a re-entry card.

4. Three possible "mini packages" are:

(i) "Ambitious Package":

- (a) territorial adjustment (possibly Varosha/Morphou)
- (b) establishment of limited Federal Republic
- (c) high level meeting
- (d) freedom of movement
- (e) withdrawal of troops from the Green Line

(ii) "Unambitious Package"

- (a) Nicosia Airport
- (b) intercommunal discussions
- (c) minor territorial adjustment

(iii) Military disengagement package

- (a) Dismantling of fortifications etc in or near buffer zone and military withdrawal to rear areas.
- (b) Return of Varosha to Greek Cypriots, rest of buffer zone to be divided according to predominant distribution of population before partition.
- (c) Reduction of troops in rear areas.
- (d) Ports and Airports to come under Federal Aviation Authority. Chances of success of such an initiative would be enhanced by support from eg US, FRG, France and Italy. We should not however lobby them at present as we wish to avoid any suggestion of potential failure of the Secretary General's initiative.

FCO STATEMENT OF 18 APRIL

We share the disappointment and concern expressed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations at the ceremonies which took place in Ankara and Northern Cyprus on 17 April. This action is inconsistent with the UN Security Council Resolution 541, which we continue to support. We wish to underline our support for Sr Perez de Cuellar's mission of good offices and regret any actions which may impede his chances of success.

19 APR 1984

