

S E C R E T



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9A
Prime Minister.

9 May 1984

To note.

Dear John,

A.J.C. 2/5.

Hong Kong: Manifesto by UMELCO

I enclose copies of Hong Kong telnos 1251 and 1252 reporting that the UMELCO delegation visiting London has prepared one thousand copies of a manifesto for distribution to MPs and the Press in this country. It has now been released to the press in Hong Kong. It reflects familiar concerns of the Unofficials: the need to commit the Chinese to an agreement; the possibility of residual status for Britain in Hong Kong; the position of BDTCs and the need for a test of acceptability. The release of this document to the press raises very serious issues. It has been issued in the name of EXCO, as well as LEGCO, Unofficials and therefore reflects the views publicly of a group of people who are privy to the detail of the negotiations. The tone and content of the document as a whole suggests doubt that a satisfactory arrangement can be negotiated with the Chinese. Thus it risks undermining confidence in Hong Kong and is likely to affect adversely the attitude of outside investors.

The document is also likely to bring a strong reaction from the Chinese, who may well focus on two aspects. First, they will suspect that it was instigated by HMG. They will see it as an attempt to stir up trouble in Hong Kong and somehow to put pressure on them in the negotiations. Second, they are likely to object to a number of the specific points raised by the Unofficials, in particular the suggestion that there should be a residual role for Britain after 1997. This is bound to make our negotiating position more difficult.

The Foreign Secretary therefore sent a telegram last night to the Acting Governor, instructing him to speak urgently to Sir S Y Chung, to make clear the dismay and seriousness with which we viewed this action, and to explore the possibility of the delegation's using the paper simply as a private briefing document and not releasing it to the press. I enclose a copy, together with the reply. Sir S Y Chung declined to accept the suggestion that the statement should not be issued to the press and said that many copies had already been sent out by post. Accordingly, the Ambassador in Peking will by now have acted on his contingency instructions to tell the Chinese about the manifesto and to emphasise to them that HMG were not involved in its preparation.

/A further

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A further development is that Sir S Y Chung has told the Governor that he has been invited, with another EXCO Unofficial, Mr Q W Lee, to visit Peking. The Foreign Secretary sees no objection to Sir S Y, and other Unofficials, visiting Peking. There might, indeed, be advantage in him being exposed to the Chinese position at first hand. It would in any case enable Unofficials to feel that they had had some opportunity to put their point of view to the Chinese. We have therefore confirmed that we see no objection to the proposal.

Y
m ever,
Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

S E C R E T

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TO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG

TELEGRAM NUMBER 839 OF 8 MAY

AND TO IMMEDIATE PEKING (DESKBY 082330Z)

HONG KONG TELEGRAMS 1251 AND 1252: FUTURE OF HONG KONG:

UMELCO VISIT TO LONDON

1. THIS IS A MOST UNWELCOME DEVELOPMENT. I AM CONCERNED BY ITS IMPLICATIONS AND SURPRISED AT THE ABSENCE OF BETTER ADVANCE WARNING, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF OUR OWN RECORD OF KEEPING EXCO CLOSELY IN TOUCH WITH EVERY STEP WE HAVE TAKEN IN THE NEGOTIATION A MANIFESTO OF THIS KIND ISSUED BY THE UNOFFICIALS WOULD BE BOUND TO HAVE A SERIOUSLY ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE NEGOTIATIONS, BOTH BY REASON OF ITS IMPACT IN HONG KONG AND THE UK AND OF ITS RECEPTION IN PEKING. THE CHINESE WOULD BE BOUND TO SEE IT AS AN EVENT INSTIGATED BY HMG. THEY WOULD REACT BADLY AND WOULD FEEL IMPELLED TO ISSUE SOME KIND OF COUNTER STATEMENT WITH DAMAGING EFFECTS ON CONFIDENCE IN HONG KONG.
2. THE MAIN PROBLEM ARISES FROM THE FACT THAT THE STATEMENT WOULD BE ISSUED IN THE NAME OF EXCO, AS WELL AS LEGCO UNOFFICIAL AND THEREFORE WOULD REFLECT THE VIEWS PUBLICLY OF A GROUP OF PEOPLE WHO ARE PRIVY TO THE DETAIL OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE TONE AND CONTENT OF THE DOCUMENT AS A WHOLE SUGGESTS DOUBT THAT A SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENT CAN BE NEGOTIATED WITH THE CHINESE. THUS IT WOULD TEND TO WEAKEN CONFIDENCE IN HONG KONG. WE ARE ALSO NOW IN THE MOST CRUCIAL PHASE OF TWO YEARS OF NEGOTIATIONS, AND TO PUT OUT A STATEMENT AT THIS DELICATE JUNCTURE COULD SERIOUSLY AFFECT OUR NEGOTIATING HAND.
3. I AM CONSCIOUS OF THE DANGER THAT WE SHALL BE SEEN TO BE GAGGING UMELCO IF WE TRY TO STOP THIS EXERCISE, AND WELL UNDERSTAND THAT ANY APPROACH TO SIR SY WILL NEED TO BE UNDERTAKEN WITH THAT DANGER IN MIND. BUT I BELIEVE STRONGLY THAT HE SHOULD BE MADE AWARE OF MY CONCERN, AS SOMEONE WHO HAS HELD LONG AND

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DETAILED CONFIDENTIAL DISCUSSIONS WITH EXCO, AND WHO HAS BEEN READY TO NEGOTIATE WITH THEM THE TEXTS NOT ONLY OF PUBLIC STATEMENTS BUT OF PAPERS PUT FORWARD IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. IF MY UNVEILING STATEMENT IN HONG KONG WAS WORTH WEIGHING SO CAREFULLY WITH EXCO THEN SURELY SIMILAR CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD HAVE APPLIED IN THIS CASE.

4. UNLESS THE GOVERNOR SEES VERY STRONG OBJECTION, THEREFORE, YOU SHOULD SEEK AN IMMEDIATE MEETING WITH SIR S Y CHUNG AND EXPRESS TO HIM MY DISMAY AT THIS UNHERALDED STEP BY THE UNOFFICIALS. YOU SHOULD THEN PUT ACROSS THE APPROPRIATE POINTS IN PARAGRAPHS L-3 ABOVE. YOU SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE FINAL DECISION ON THE ISSUE OF THE MANIFESTO IS OF COURSE ONE FOR SIR S Y CHUNG AND HIS COLLEAGUES. BUT THEY SHOULD BE IN NO DOUBT OF OUR OWN VIEWS ABOUT ITS CONSEQUENCES. WE REALISE THAT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ISSUE OF THE DOCUMENT ARE NOW FAR ADVANCED. BUT YOU SHOULD EXPLORE WITH HIM THE POSSIBILITY OF AT LEAST AVOIDING THE ISSUE OF THE STATEMENT TO THE PRESS ON THE DEPARTURE OF THE DELEGATION AS AT PRESENT CONTEMPLATED, AND ASK WHETHER IT COULD NOT BE KEPT TO BE USED SIMPLY AS A PRIVATE BRIEFING DOCUMENT FOR DISCUSSION WITH MPS. SIMILAR CONSIDERATION ALSO APPLY TO THE LETTER OF SIR S Y CHUNG REFERRED TO IN HONG KONG TELEGRAM NUMBER 1251.

5. I HAVE SEEN THE AMBASSADOR'S VIEW (PEKING TELEGRAM NUMBER 876) THAT WE SHOULD NOT (NOT) SAY ANYTHING TO THE CHINESE UNTIL THEY RAISE THE QUESTION. HOWEVER I SHOULD MUCH PREFER THE AMBASSADOR TO TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION WITH THE CHINESE TO LIMIT THE POTENTIAL DAMAGE IF SIR S Y GOES AHEAD WITH RELEASING HIS TEXT TO THE PRESS. THERE WOULD SEEM TO BE CONSIDERABLE ADVANTAGE IN TAKING THE INITIATIVE TO WARN ZHOU NAN OF THE IMPENDING ISSUE OF THE STATEMENT AND TO EMPHASISE STRONGLY TO HIM THAT THIS IS A DEVELOPMENT IN WHICH HMG AND THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT HAVE PLAYED NO REPEAT NO PART AND TO UNDERLINE THAT THIS IS ENTIRELY AN EXPRESSION OF VIEW BY THE UNOFFICIAL MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL. THE AMBASSADOR COULD ALSO EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT WOULD AVOID A COUNTER-STATEMENT, WHICH WOULD ONLY AGGRAVATE THE

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SITUATION AND HAVE DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR CONFIDENCE IN HONG KONG.

7. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF THE GOVERNOR WOULD TELEGRAPH HIS VIEWS FLASH TO HONG KONG TO ENABLE YOU TO ACT. GRATEFUL IN TURN FOR AN URGENT REPORT ON YOUR DISCUSSION WITH SIR S Y, REPEATED FLASH TO PEKING TO ENABLE THE AMBASSADOR, UNLESS HE SEES SERIOUS OBJECTIONS TO ACT IN TURN WITH ZHOU NAN, IF NECESSARY, ON 9 MAY.

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FUTURE OF HONG KONG
LIMITED
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ED/FED
ED/PLANNING STAFF
ED/PUSD
D/ED/PUSD
RES.B. (MR WALKER)
LEGAL ADVISER (MR FREELAND)
PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR W HARDING
MR WILSON
MR WRIGHT
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PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE D
PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL
SIR P CRADOCK RM K195
SIR P CRADOCK NO 10 DOWNING STREET

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FM HONG KONG 090342Z MAY 84
TO FLASH PEKING
TELEGRAM NUMBER 375 OF 9 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE F C O

FCO TELNO. 839 AND PEKING TELNOS. 876 AND 82:
FUTURE OF HONG KONG: UMEICO VISIT TO LONDON

I HAVE NOW SPOKEN TO SIR S. Y. CHUNG AND HE DECLINED TO ACCEPT THE SUGGESTION THAT THE STATEMENT SHOULD NOT BE ISSUED TO THE PRESS THIS EVENING AS THE DELEGATION DEPARTS FOR LONDON. HE SAID THAT, IN ANY CASE, IT WOULD BE QUITE IMPOSSIBLE TO KEEP IT 'AS A PRIVATE BRIEFING DOCUMENT FOR DISCUSSION WITH MPS' AS SO MANY COPIES WERE NOW ON THEIR WAY BY POST TO MPS AND MANY OTHER TARGETED PERSONS.

2. FOR A FULLER REPORT ON MY CONVERSATION WITH SIR S. Y. PLEASE SEE MIFT.

HADDON-CAVE

FUTURE OF HONG KONG

LIMITED

ED/EKD

ED/FED

ED/PLANNING STAFF

ED/PUSD

D/ED/PUSD

RES.B. (MR WALKER)

LEGAL ADVISER (MR FREELAND)

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

SIR W HARDING

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MR BRENNAN CABINET OFFICE

PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE D

PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL

SIR P CRADOCK RM K195

SIR P CRADOCK NO 10 DOWNING STREET

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DESKBY FCO 080800Z
DESKBY PEKING 080800Z
FM HONG KONG 080520Z MAY 84
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1251 OF 8 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE PEKING

FUTURE OF HONG KONG:

UMELCO VISIT TO LONDON

1. IN PREPARATION FOR THEIR VISIT TO LONDON THE UMELCO DELEGATION HAVE DRAWN UP A MANIFESTO WHICH THEY HAVE HAD PRINTED. THE TEXT, A COPY OF WHICH SIR S Y CHUNG GAVE ME THIS MORNING, IS IN MIFT.
2. ONE THOUSAND COPIES OF THIS MANIFESTO ARE ALREADY ON THEIR WAY TO LONDON AND WILL BE POSTED TO MP'S ON WEDNESDAY UNDER COVER OF A LETTER SIGNED PERSONALLY BY SIR S Y CHUNG. IT WILL BE RELEASED TO THE PRESS HERE TOMORROW EVENING TO APPEAR IN THE FOLLOWING DAYS'S MORNING PRESS.
3. WE ARE BOUND TO BE ASKED WHEN THE MANIFESTO APPEARS WHETHER THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT WAS CONSULTED IN ITS PREPARATION. I HAVE AGREED WITH SIR S Y CHUNG THAT WE WILL SAY THAT THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT WERE NOT CONSULTED: IT IS ENTIRELY A UMELCO DOCUMENT: BUT THAT WE WERE GIVEN A COPY IN ADVANCE OF PUBLICATION AS A COURTESY. I SUGGEST THAT THE NEWS DEPARTMENT SHOULD TAKE THE SAME LINE.

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MR BRENNAN CABINET OFFICE
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SIR P GRADOCK RM K198
SIR P GRADOCK NO 10 DOWNING STREET

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FM HONG KONG 080600Z MAY 84
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1252 OF 8 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE PEKING

MIPT. FUTURE OF HONG KONG: UMELCO VISIT TO LONDON.

THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT.

BEGINS.

'STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE UNOFFICIAL MEMBERS OF THE HONG KONG -
EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS ON 9TH MAY 1984:

THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG

THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS ARE THE TWO CENTRAL ORGANS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG. UNOFFICIAL MEMBERS ARE IN THE MAJORITY IN BOTH COUNCILS. THEY ARE APPOINTED BY THE GOVERNOR FROM A WIDE SPECTRUM OF SOCIETY. THROUGH THEIR MEMBERSHIP AND THESE TWO COUNCILS, UNOFFICIAL MEMBERS ADVISE ON THE FORMULATION OF GOVERNMENT POLICIES, PARTICIPATE IN THE ENACTMENT OF LEGISLATION, MONITOR THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND CONSIDER COMPLAINTS BY MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC AGAINST GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS.

AS THEY ARE APPOINTED BY THE GOVERNOR RATHER THAN ELECTED, UNOFFICIAL MEMBERS MAKE NO CLAIM TO REPRESENTATIVE STATUS, BUT THEY ARE IN TOUCH WITH ALL SECTORS OF THE COMMUNITY THROUGH THEIR MEMBERSHIP OF OVER 300 BOARDS AND COMMITTEES DEALING WITH PUBLIC AFFAIRS, AND WITH ALL FACETS OF HONG KONG'S ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL LIFE. SINCE THE SINO-BRITISH TALKS ON THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG BEGAN IN LATE 1982, UNOFFICIAL MEMBERS HAVE RECEIVED, BOTH INDIVIDUALLY AND THROUGH THE EMELCO OFFICE, MANY REPRESENTATIONS ON THE QUESTION OF HONG KONG'S FUTURE AFTER 1997. SO THEY ARE IN A POSITION TO REFLECT THE VIEWS AND WISHES OF HONG KONG PEOPLE ON THIS VITAL QUESTION.

THE SINO-BRITISH TALKS HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED THROUGHOUT IN THE STRICTEST CONFIDENCE, ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN MANY STATEMENTS FROM THE CHINESE SIDE. SIR GEOFFREY HOWE'S STATEMENT IN HONG KONG ON 20TH APRIL PUBLICLY LIFTED THE VEIL FOR THE FIRST TIME FROM THE BRITISH SIDE ON SOME ASPECTS OF THE TALKS. INTER ALIA HE SAID THAT:

IT WOULD NOT BE REALISTIC TO THINK OF AN AGREEMENT THAT PROVIDES FOR CONTINUED BRITISH ADMINISTRATION IN HONG KONG AFTER 1997.

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OTHER WAYS WERE BEING EXPLORED TO SECURE THE ASSURANCES NECESSARY FOR THE CONTINUATION OF HONG KONG'S STABILITY, PROSPERITY AND WAY OF LIFE AND, ALTHOUGH HONG KONG WOULD BECOME A PART OF CHINA, IT WOULD ENJOY, AS A SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, A HIGH DEGREE OF AUTONOMY.

THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP CLAIM THAT THEY WISH EXISTING SYSTEMS AND FREEDOMS IN HONG KONG AND THE FREE MARKET ECONOMY TO REMAIN FUNDAMENTALLY UNCHANGED FOR AT LEAST 50 YEARS AFTER 1997.

HONG KONG HAS ENJOYED A CONSTITUTIONAL LINK WITH THE BRITISH CROWN FOR 143 YEARS. THIS LINK HAS PROVIDED AN EFFECTIVE EXTERNAL INSULATOR AGAINST INTERFERENCE FROM THE RULING GOVERNMENT ON THE MAINLAND, DESPITE THE TURBULENCE WHICH HAS CHARACTERISED CHINA'S HISTORY FOR SO MANY YEARS AND DESPITE THE ESSENTIAL INCOMPATIBILITY OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM PREVAILING IN PRESENT DAY CHINA, ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE LIBERAL TRADITIONS OF A CAPITALIST SOCIETY, ON THE OTHER.

IT IS NOW SUGGESTED THAT THIS LINK SHOULD BE REMOVED BUT THAT, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE A HIGH DEGREE OF AUTONOMY FOR HONG KONG UNDER CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY, THERE WOULD BE A DEVOLUTION OF POWER FROM THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT TO THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION VIA A BASIC LAW TO BE PROMULGATED IN THE EARLY 1990'S. HONG KONG PEOPLE ARE BEING ASKED TO ACCEPT, IN OTHER WORDS, THAT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT WILL RESUME SOVEREIGNTY AND EXERCISE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OVER THE WHOLE OF HONG KONG AFTER 1997, AGAINST A PROMISE THAT HONG KONG'S EXISTING SYSTEMS AND ACCUSTOMED LIFE STYLE WILL REMAIN UNCHANGED.

Check.

BUT MANY ANXIOUS QUESTIONS SPRING TO MIND TO WHICH NO SATISFACTORY ANSWERS HAVE BEEN GIVEN AS YET. FOR INSTANCE.

WILL THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE BASIC LAW BE ENSHRINED IN THE SINO-BRITISH AGREEMENT? IF NOT, WOULD NOT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT RUN THE RISK OF SIGNING AN AGREEMENT WHICH THE CHINESE SIDE MAY LATER UNILATERALLY ALTER ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT IS IN CONFLICT WITH THE BASIC LAW?

IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, THE MORE DETAILED THE AGREEMENT, THE MORE THAT THE BASIC LAW IS COMPATIBLE WITH IT AND THE MORE BINDING IT IS IN FORM, THE MORE LIKELY THAT THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG WILL FIND IT ACCEPTABLE IN THE BELIEF THAT THE CHINESE ARE MORE LIKELY TO HONOUR IT. THUS, IF THE AGREEMENT IS TO BE SIGNED BEFORE THE BASIC LAW IS PROMULGATED, SHOULD NOT PARLIAMENT WITHHOLD RATIFICATION UNTIL THE DETAILS OF THE BASIC LAW ARE KNOWN?

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EVEN SO, GIVEN THE HISTORICAL REALITY THAT HONG KONG HAS DEVELOPED OVER MANY YEARS AS A RECOGNISABLE COMMUNITY IN ITS OWN RIGHT, WITH ITS OWN DISTINCTIVE LIFE-STYLE, SURE HONG KONG PEOPLE HAVE THE RIGHT TO ASK FOR ASSURANCES THAT ANY AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND CHINESE GOVERNMENTS WILL BE HONOURED? THAT IS TO SAY, SHOULD NOT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT INSIST ON A MECHANISM WHICH WILL ENSURE THAT THE AGREEMENT IS FAITHFULLY IMPLEMENTED?

TO THIS END, SHOULD NOT BRITAIN INSIST ON RETAINING SOME RESIDUAL STATUS IN HONG KONG BEYOND 1997 TO PROVIDE RE-ASSURANCE THAT THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT WILL BE KEPT?

GIVEN THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE CHINESE AUTHORITIES WILL SEEK TO ANTICIPATE 1997 AND START INTERFERING WITH THE ADMINISTRATION OF HONG KONG BETWEEN NOW AND THEN, WILL THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT INSIST THAT IT MUST RETAIN EFFECTIVE CONTROL, AS THE SOVEREIGN POWER, DURING THE NEXT 13 YEARS? IF EFFECTIVE CONTROL IS NOT EXERCISED BY THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF HMG, A SMOOTH TRANSITION UP TO, LET ALONE STABLE GOVERNMENT BEYOND. 1997 WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR HONG KONG PEOPLE WILL NOT FEEL IT IS WORTH-WHILE EVEN TO TRY TO ADJUST TO THEIR NEW CIRCUMSTANCES. A COLLAPSE OF CONFIDENCE BEFORE 1997 WOULD MAKE HONG KONG VIRTUALLY UNGOVERNABLE. FOR EXAMPLE, THE ALLEGIANCE OF THE POLICE AND THE CIVIL SERVICE WILL BE SERIOUSLY IMPAIRED. QUITE APART FROM THE DISASTROUS EFFECT ON THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG, THIS WOULD BE AS EMBARRASSING TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AS A RUINED ECONOMY WOULD BE DISAPPOINTING TO THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

ABOUT HALF OF HONG KONG'S PRESENT POPULATION OF 5.3 MILLIONS CAME TO HONG KONG FROM CHINA TO SEEK A BETTER LIFE HERE. THEY DO NOT RELISH THE THOUGHT OF A RETURN TO CHINESE COMMUNIST RULE. BUT WHAT OF THE REST OF THE POPULATION? THEY ARE BRITISH NATIONALS BY BIRTH (A SMALL NUMBER BY NATURALISATION) HOLDING BRITISH PASSPORTS WITH A RIGHT OF ABODE IN THE BRITISH DEPENDENT TERRITORY OF HONG KONG. PARLIAMENT MAY CEDE SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE TERRITORY, BUT IT CANNOT, BY THE SAME ACT, DEPRIVE BRITISH NATIONALS OF THEIR NATIONAL STATUS. WHAT THEN WILL BE THE FATE OF HONG KONG'S BDTCS? HOW WILL THEIR RIGHTS AND STATUS BE PRESERVED? HOW WILL BDTCS CONTINUE TO ENJOY BRITISH PROTECTION? WILL THEY, AND OTHER HONG KONG BELONGERS WHO CANNOT ACCEPT THE IDEA OF LIVING UNDER COMMUNIST AUTHORITY, HAVE A RIGHT TO SETTLEMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND SHOULD NOT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT NEGOTIATE SETTLEMENT PLACES FOR THEM?

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RECENTLY, WHEN IN HONG KONG, SIR GEOFFREY HOWE SAID THE AGREEMENT MUST BE SUCH THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT CAN COMMEND IT TO PARLIAMENT, BUT THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG WILL NEED TO KNOW THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT AND HAVE TIME TO EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS, AND HE ADDED THAT PARLIAMENT ITSELF WILL NEED TIME TO REFLECT AND TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE VIEWS OF HONG KONG PEOPLE. THE FOREIGN SECRETARY WAS REITERATING WHAT HAS BEEN SAID MANY TIMES BEFORE, NAMELY, THAT ANY AGREEMENT REACHED BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND CHINESE GOVERNMENTS MUST BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG. THIS RAISES AT LEAST TWO QUESTIONS:

HOW IS IT PROPOSED THAT ACCEPTABILITY IS PUT TO THE TEST?

WHAT WILL BE HMG'S REACTION IF HONG KONG PEOPLE DO NOT ACCEPT THE AGREEMENT OR PARTS OF IT?

PARLIAMENT CANNOT TAKE LIGHTLY THE RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSFERRING AUTHORITY OVER A COMMUNITY (AS OPPOSED TO THE TERRITORY) FOR WHICH THE CONSTITUTIONAL LINK WITH BRITAIN HAS MEANT SO MUCH FOR SO LONG TO A COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT, ALBEIT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT WHICH HAS A LEGITIMATE CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE TERRITORY OF HONG KONG ITSELF. THE INESCAPABLE FACT IS THAT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT IS COMMITTED TO A POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY WHICH IS AT LEAST INCOMPATIBLE, AND AT WORST HOSTILE, TO THE PHILOSOPHY ON WHICH THE VARIOUS SYSTEMS AND FREEDOMS ENJOYED BY HONG KONG TODAY REST.

IT FOLLOWS THAT ACCEPTABILITY WILL DEPEND ON THE AGREEMENT NOW BEING NEGOTIATED:

CONTAINING FULL DETAILS OF THE PROPOSED ADMINISTRATIVE, LEGAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEMS APPLICABLE AFTER 1997:

PROVIDING ADEQUATE AND WORKABLE ASSURANCES THAT THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT WILL BE HONOURED:

STATING THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE BASIC LAW WILL INCORPORATE THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT:

GUARANTEEING THAT THE RIGHTS OF BRITISH NATIONALS WILL BE SAFEGUARDED.

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WE BELIEVE THAT MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT WILL WISH TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF OUR VIEWS. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT THESE VIEWS ARE AN ACCURATE REFLECTION OF THE VIEWS OF HONG KONG PEOPLE AS A WHOLE, TO WHOM THE IMMINENT WITHDRAWAL OF THE BRITISH LINK HAS BEEN A GREAT, IF NOT ENTIRELY UNEXPECTED, DISAPPOINTMENT."

ENDS.

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PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR W HARDING
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Hilton Cheong-Leen, OBE, JP
Chairman
Urban Council
Hong Kong

AL 75.



張有興
市政局主席
致意

Statement by Hilton Cheong-Leen,
Chairman, Urban Council,
at the Urban Council Meeting
on Tuesday, May 8, 1984

Urban Council Annual Clean-up

The Urban Council's recent big annual clean-up produced a veritable mountain of refuse -- 20,000 tonnes of it plus 3,600 tonnes of junk. It meant six days' hard work for departmental staff who had to service and cart away from 156 permanent junk and reception points, plus 87 temporary ones. But it was a job well worth doing, and widely appreciated, I am sure, by the general public.

It has become apparent that the fight against litterbugs entered a significant new phase with the computerisation of litter offenders which was begun in September of 1982. The main purpose of the computer system is deterrent -- with the aid of these print-outs, our prosecutors can identify repeat offenders and magistrates can then dispense fines accordingly, thereby discouraging habitual litterers.

Generally speaking, penalties for second or third convictions are higher, but perhaps of potentially greater significance is the statistical information we have been able to glean from the computer profiles.

We have found that 85% of all repeat offenders were males but that very few individuals aged under 21 -- fewer than 4% of the total -- appeared in court more than once.

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The latter is a very encouraging finding since it shows that bad habits can be broken and that our message has got across to the young.

The computer also revealed that most habitual litterbugs are either hawkers or workers for private refuse collection services, marine yards or in the waste-paper baling trading.

Now, having these facts and figures to go on, we are able to deploy our prosecution forces and concentrate our educational efforts where they will be most effective.

Confidence in the Future

Now what I have just said is one clear indication that in spite of the major pre-occupation that is in the minds of Hong Kong people -- that is the 1997 issue -- the Urban Council will carry on without any let-up with its day-to-day responsibilities to improve our living conditions in every way possible, especially in the environmental and hygiene field, culture, recreation and sports.

We all now know where we stand over 1997 -- not the details of course, but the significant fact that after that year the administration of Hong Kong will no longer be directly under British jurisdiction. And we in Hong Kong must take Sir Geoffrey Howe's announcement in a realistic and pragmatic way -- by getting on with our day-to-day affairs

/with

with the "work ethic" continuing to be far stronger than the "worry ethic".

Of course we are all vitally concerned that under its post-1997 administration Hong Kong will basically retain its own lifestyle and all of the things -- such as personal freedom, free enterprise, the rule of law -- that we take for granted today. Indeed the reassurances from China recently have been continuous and overwhelming; the question is: can we accept them in the same good faith as they have been expressed?

We would all very much hope that China has learnt the lessons of the Cultural Revolution and that between now and 1997, China's development in her modernization programmes and Open Door Policy will progressively dispel our worries and doubts about our future stability and prosperity when China regains sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997.

Can we hope that by the end of this century, the Communist system in China will have been further modified with more Chinese cultural characteristics so that it could be compatible with the higher standard of living and relatively freer lifestyle in Hong Kong?

Is there also hope that by the end of this century, the proposed Hong Kong Special Administrative Region model will be more clearly understood by Taiwan's 20 million people?

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The fact that the Sino-British discussions on our future are taking place in an atmosphere of amity, co-operation and goodwill on both sides is something from which we can take heart. There are leaders with vision in China, United Kingdom and Hong Kong who wish to keep the Hong Kong miracle alive. This vision must be transmitted intact to the next generation of leaders.

And particularly we in Hong Kong must be united in our efforts to ensure that the Hong Kong miracle will continue for 50 years after 1997 and more!

If I may return to my speech in this Chamber last month, we must look ahead to the future beyond 1997 and set our sights on that momentous time only 17 years hence to the turn of the new century in the year 2001.

The Urban Council's development plans go up to and beyond the turn of the century and our facilities and services will by then be further widened and expanded, and the quality of life will be even better.

Let us all then look forward with courage and strength to the challenging future -- with confidence in ourselves, confidence in our abilities and confidence in Hong Kong itself.

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FUTURE OF HONG KONG: UMELCO VISIT

1. SIR S Y CHUNG TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT AN INVITATION HAD BEEN CONVEYED TO HIM AND TO MR Q.W. LEE FROM DENG XIAOPING TO VISIT PEKING. THEY WERE GIVEN THE IMPRESSION THAT IT WOULD BE ARRANGED FOR THEM TO SEE OTHER LEADERS, INCLUDING ZHAO ZIYANG AND JI PENGFEI, THE INVITATION WAS CONVEYED BY XU JIATUN, THE DIRECTOR OF THE NCNA IN HONG KONG, WHO HAD SEEN DENG DURING HIS RECENT STAY IN PEKING.

2. WHEN XU WAS ASKED BY SIR S Y CHUNG WHETHER THE INVITATION EXTENDED TO THEM PERSONALLY OR TO UMELCO, XU SAID THAT IT WAS PERSONAL. SIR S Y CHUNG EXPLAINED THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR HIM AND MR LEE TO GO WITHOUT UMELCO REPRESENTATION, GIVEN THE FACT THAT THEY WERE ALL PART OF THE DELEGATION VISITING LONDON. HE PROPOSED AS A COMPROMISE THAT THE INVITATION SHOULD BE EXTENDED ADDITIONALLY TO MR ROGER LOBO, THE SENIOR UNOFFICIAL LEGCO MEMBER AND MISS LYDIA DUNN, ANOTHER LEGCO MEMBER WITH WIDE TRADE INTERESTS. THIS GROUP WAS SUGGESTED BECAUSE, AS EXCO MEMBERS, ALL WERE FAMILIAR WITH THE DETAILS OF THE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE CHINESE AND COULD THEREFORE TALK TO CHINESE LEADERS WITHOUT INHIBITIONS ABOUT CONFIDENTIALITY. XU AGREED TO PUT THIS TO PEKING. HE WAS DOUBTFUL ABOUT THE INCLUSION OF MR LOBO BUT TOOK THE POINT PUT BY MR LEE THAT TO INCLUDE THE PROPOSER OF THE LOBO MOTION WOULD BE A SIGN OF CHINESE BROADMINDEDNESS. SIR S Y CHUNG ALSO TOLD XU THAT HE WOULD, AS A MEMBER OF EXCO WISH TO CONSULT ME TO ENSURE THAT I HAD NO

~~ABOUT THE INCLUSION OF MR LOBO BUT TOOK THE POINT PUT BY MR LEE THAT TO INCLUDE THE PROPOSER OF THE LOBO MOTION WOULD BE A SIGN OF CHINESE BROADMINDEDNESS. SIR S Y CHUNG ALSO TOLD XU THAT HE WOULD AS A MEMBER OF EXCO WISH TO CONSULT ME TO ENSURE THAT I HAD NO OBJECTION.~~

3. WHEN DENG AUTHORISED XU TO EXTEND THE INVITATION THE CHINESE WERE NOT AWARE OF THE UMELCO VISIT TO LONDON (AND DENG'S INVITATION WAS ORIGINALLY FOR MAY 12.) IN ADDITION XU WAS ONLY TOLD LAST NIGHT THAT UMELCO PROPOSED TO ISSUE THEIR MANIFESTO (MY TELNO 1251). SIR S Y CHUNG THEREFORE SUGGESTED THAT XU WOULD WISH TO SEE THE MANIFESTO BEFORE DECIDING TO CONFIRM THE INVITATION.

4. I TOLD SIR S Y CHUNG THAT FOR ME TO SEEK TO PREVENT THEM ACCEPTING THE INVITATION WOULD BE A PROPAGANDA GIFT TO THE CHINESE. WHATEVER THE POSSIBLE COMPLICATIONS FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS, WE SHOULD NOT IN ANY WAY WISH TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION OF SEEKING TO PREVENT HONG KONG CHINESE TALKING DIRECTLY TO PEKING. INDEED A DIRECT EXPRESSION OF VIEWS IN THIS WAY COULD BE VERY HELPFUL. BUT AS A COURTESY I THOUGHT THAT I SHOULD LET YOU AND THE P.M. KNOW OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS SO THAT ANY COMMENTS YOU MIGHT HAVE COULD BE CONVEYED TO HIM BEFORE XU CAME BACK WITH HNS CONFIRMATION OF THE INVITATION. IF CONFIRMED THE CHINESE WILL BE THINKING IN TERMS OF A VISIT SOON AFTER THE DELEGATIONS RETURN FROM LONDON ON MAY 20/21.

5. I SHOULD THEREFORE BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD TELEGRAPH ANY COMMENTS YOU MAY WISH TO BE CONVEYED TO SIR S Y CHUNG AND MR LEE TO REACH HONG KONG BY 090030Z. THE CHIEF SECRETARY WILL THEN SPEAK TO SIR S Y CHUNG BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR LONDON TOMORROW EVENING (MR LEE IS REMAINING IN HONG KONG).

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MIPT. FUTURE OF HONG KONG: UMELCO VISIT TO LONDON.

THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT.

BEGINS.

STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE UNOFFICIAL MEMBERS OF THE HONG KONG
EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS ON 9TH MAY 1984:

THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG

THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS ARE THE TWO CENTRAL ORGANS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG. UNOFFICIAL MEMBERS ARE IN THE MAJORITY IN BOTH COUNCILS. THEY ARE APPOINTED BY THE GOVERNOR FROM A WIDE SPECTRUM OF SOCIETY. THROUGH THEIR MEMBERSHIP AND THESE TWO COUNCILS, UNOFFICIAL MEMBERS ADVISE ON THE FORMULATION OF GOVERNMENT POLICIES, PARTICIPATE IN THE ENACTMENT OF LEGISLATION, MONITOR THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND CONSIDER COMPLAINTS BY MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC AGAINST GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS.

AS THEY ARE APPOINTED BY THE GOVERNOR RATHER THAN ELECTED, UNOFFICIAL MEMBERS MAKE NO CLAIM TO REPRESENTATIVE STATUS, BUT THEY ARE IN TOUCH WITH ALL SECTORS OF THE COMMUNITY THROUGH THEIR MEMBERSHIP OF OVER 300 BOARDS AND COMMITTEES DEALING WITH PUBLIC

~~ARE IN TOUCH WITH ALL SECTORS OF THE COMMUNITY THROUGH THEIR MEMBERSHIP OF OVER 300 BOARDS AND COMMITTEES DEALING WITH PUBLIC AFFAIRS, AND WITH ALL FACETS OF HONG KONG'S ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL LIFE. SINCE THE SINO-BRITISH TALKS ON THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG BEGAN IN LATE 1982, UNOFFICIAL MEMBERS HAVE RECEIVED, BOTH INDIVIDUALLY AND THROUGH THE LANELCO OFFICE, MANY REPRESENTATIONS ON THE QUESTION OF HONG KONG'S FUTURE AFTER 1997. SO THEY ARE IN A POSITION TO REFLECT THE VIEWS AND WISHES OF HONG KONG PEOPLE ON THIS VITAL QUESTION.~~

THE SINO-BRITISH TALKS HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED THROUGHOUT IN THE STRICTEST CONFIDENCE, ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN MANY STATEMENTS FROM THE CHINESE SIDE. SIR GEOFFREY HOWE'S STATEMENT IN HONG KONG ON 20TH APRIL PUBLICLY LIFTED THE VEIL FOR THE FIRST TIME FROM THE BRITISH SIDE ON SOME ASPECTS OF THE TALKS. INTER ALIA HE SAID THAT:

IT WOULD NOT BE REALISTIC TO THINK OF AN AGREEMENT THAT PROVIDES FOR CONTINUED BRITISH ADMINISTRATION IN HONG KONG AFTER 1997.

OTHER WAYS WERE BEING EXPLORED TO SECURE THE ASSURANCES NECESSARY FOR THE CONTINUATION OF HONG KONG'S STABILITY, PROSPERITY AND WAY OF LIFE AND, ALTHOUGH HONG KONG WOULD BECOME A PART OF CHINA, IT WOULD ENJOY, AS A SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, A HIGH DEGREE OF AUTONOMY.

THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP CLAIM THAT THEY WISH EXISTING SYSTEMS AND FREEDOMS IN HONG KONG AND THE FREE MARKET ECONOMY TO REMAIN FUNDAMENTALLY UNCHANGED FOR AT LEAST 50 YEARS AFTER 1997.

HONG KONG HAS ENJOYED A CONSTITUTIONAL LINK WITH THE BRITISH CROWN FOR 143 YEARS. THIS LINK HAS PROVIDED AN EFFECTIVE EXTERNAL INSULATOR AGAINST INTERFERENCE FROM THE RULING GOVERNMENT ON THE MAINLAND, DESPITE THE TURBULENCE WHICH HAS CHARACTERISED CHINA'S HISTORY FOR SO MANY YEARS AND DESPITE THE ESSENTIAL INCOMPATIBILITY OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM PREVAILING IN PRESENT DAY CHINA, ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE LIBERAL TRADITIONS OF A CAPITALIST SOCIETY, ON THE OTHER.

IT IS NOW SUGGESTED THAT THIS LINK SHOULD BE REMOVED BUT THAT, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE A HIGH DEGREE OF AUTONOMY FOR HONG KONG UNDER CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY, THERE WOULD BE A DEVOLUTION OF POWER FROM THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT TO THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION VIA A BASIC LAW TO BE PROMULGATED IN THE EARLY 1990'S. HONG KONG PEOPLE ARE BEING ASKED TO ACCEPT, IN OTHER WORDS, THAT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT WILL RESUME SOVEREIGNTY AND EXERCISE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OVER THE

~~THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT WILL RESUME SOVEREIGNTY AND EXERCISE~~
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OVER THE WHOLE OF HONG KONG AFTER 1997,
AGAINST A PROMISE THAT HONG KONG'S EXISTING SYSTEMS AND ACCUSTOMED
LIFE STYLE WILL REMAIN UNCHANGED.

BUT MANY ANXIOUS QUESTIONS SPRING TO MIND TO WHICH NO SATISFACTORY
ANSWERS HAVE BEEN GIVEN AS YET. FOR INSTANCE.

WILL THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE BASIC LAW BE ENSHRINED IN THE
SINO-BRITISH AGREEMENT? IF NOT, WOULD NOT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT
RUN THE RISK OF SIGNING AN AGREEMENT WHICH THE CHINESE SIDE MAY
LATER UNILATERALLY ALTER ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT IS IN CONFLICT WITH
THE BASIC LAW?

IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, THE MORE DETAILED THE AGREEMENT, THE MORE
THAT THE BASIC LAW IS COMPATIBLE WITH IT AND THE MORE BINDING IT IS
IN FORM, THE MORE LIKELY THAT THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG WILL FIND IT
ACCEPTABLE IN THE BELIEF THAT THE CHINESE ARE MORE LIKELY
TO HONOUR IT. THUS, IF THE AGREEMENT IS TO BE SIGNED BEFORE THE BASIC
LAW IS PROMULGATED, SHOULD NOT PARLIAMENT WITHHOLD RATIFICATION
UNTIL THE DETAILS OF THE BASIC LAW ARE KNOWN?

EVEN SO, GIVEN THE HISTORICAL REALITY THAT HONG KONG HAS
DEVELOPED OVER MANY YEARS AS A RECOGNISABLE COMMUNITY IN ITS OWN
RIGHT, WITH ITS OWN DISTINCTIVE LIFE-STYLE, SURE HONG KONG PEOPLE
HAVE THE RIGHT TO ASK FOR ASSURANCES THAT ANY AGREEMENT ENTERED
INTO BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND CHINESE GOVERNMENTS WILL BE HONOURED?
THAT IS TO SAY, SHOULD NOT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT INSIST ON A
MECHANISM WHICH WILL ENSURE THAT THE AGREEMENT IS FAITHFULLY
IMPLEMENTED?

TO THIS END, SHOULD NOT BRITAIN INSIST ON RETAINING SOME
RESIDUAL STATUS IN HONG KONG BEYOND 1997 TO PROVIDE
RE-ASSURANCE THAT THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT WILL BE KEPT?

GIVEN THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE CHINESE AUTHORITIES WILL SEEK TO
ANTICIPATE 1997 AND START INTERFERING WITH THE ADMINISTRATION OF
HONG KONG BETWEEN NOW AND THEN, WILL THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT INSIST
THAT IT MUST RETAIN EFFECTIVE CONTROL, AS THE SOVEREIGN POWER,
DURING THE NEXT 13 YEARS? IF EFFECTIVE CONTROL IS NOT EXERCISED BY
THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF HMG, A SMOOTH
TRANSITION UP TO, LET ALONE STABLE GOVERNMENT BEYOND. 1997 WILL
NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR HONG KONG PEOPLE WILL NOT FEEL IT IS WORTH-
WHILE EVEN TO TRY TO ADJUST TO THEIR NEW CIRCUMSTANCES. A COLLAPSE
OF CONFIDENCE BEFORE 1997 WOULD MAKE HONG KONG VIRTUALLY

~~OF CONFIDENCE BEFORE 1997 WOULD MAKE HONG KONG VIRTUALLY~~
UNGOVERNABLE. FOR EXAMPLE, THE ALLEGIANCE OF THE POLICE AND THE
CIVIL SERVICE WILL BE SERIOUSLY IMPAIRED. QUITE APART FROM THE
DISASTROUS EFFECT ON THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG, THIS WOULD BE AS
EMBARRASSING TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AS A RUINED ECONOMY WOULD
BE DISAPPOINTING TO THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

ABOUT HALF OF HONG KONG'S PRESENT POPULATION OF 5.3 MILLIONS
CAME TO HONG KONG FROM CHINA TO SEEK A BETTER LIFE HERE. THEY DO
NOT RELISH THE THOUGHT OF A RETURN TO CHINESE COMMUNIST RULE.
BUT WHAT OF THE REST OF THE POPULATION? THEY ARE BRITISH NATIONALS
BY BIRTH (A SMALL NUMBER BY NATURALISATION) HOLDING BRITISH PASSPORTS
WITH A RIGHT OF ABODE IN THE BRITISH DEPENDENT TERRITORY OF HONG
KONG. PARLIAMENT MAY CEDE SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE TERRITORY, BUT IT
CANNOT, BY THE SAME ACT, DEPRIVE BRITISH NATIONALS OF THEIR
NATIONAL STATUS. WHAT THEN WILL BE THE FATE OF HONG KONG'S BDTC'S?
HOW WILL THEIR RIGHTS AND STATUS BE PRESERVED? HOW WILL BDTC'S
CONTINUE TO ENJOY BRITISH PROTECTION? WILL THEY, AND OTHER HONG KONG
BELONGERS WHO CANNOT ACCEPT THE IDEA OF LIVING UNDER COMMUNIST
AUTHORITY, HAVE A RIGHT TO SETTLEMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND
SHOULD NOT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT NEGOTIATE SETTLEMENT PLACES FOR
THEM?

RECENTLY, WHEN IN HONG KONG, SIR GEOFFREY HOWE SAID THE
AGREEMENT MUST BE SUCH THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT CAN COMMEND IT
TO PARLIAMENT, BUT THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG WILL NEED TO KNOW THE
TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT AND HAVE TIME TO EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS,
AND HE ADDED THAT PARLIAMENT ITSELF WILL NEED TIME TO REFLECT
AND TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE VIEWS OF HONG KONG PEOPLE. THE FOREIGN
SECRETARY WAS REITERATING WHAT HAS BEEN SAID MANY TIMES BEFORE,
NAMELY, THAT ANY AGREEMENT REACHED BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND
CHINESE GOVERNMENTS MUST BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG.
THIS RAISES AT LEAST TWO QUESTIONS:

HOW IS IT PROPOSED THAT ACCEPTABILITY IS PUT TO THE TEST?

WHAT WILL BE HMG'S REACTION IF HONG KONG PEOPLE DO NOT ACCEPT THE
AGREEMENT OR PARTS OF IT?

PARLIAMENT CANNOT TAKE LIGHTLY THE RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSFERRING
AUTHORITY OVER A COMMUNITY (AS OPPOSED TO THE TERRITORY) FOR WHICH
THE CONSTITUTIONAL LINK WITH BRITAIN HAS MEANT SO MUCH FOR SO LONG
TO A COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT, ALBEIT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT WHICH
HAS A LEGITIMATE CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE TERRITORY OF HONG
KONG ITSELF. THE INESCAPABLE FACT IS THAT THE CHINESE

~~HONG KONG ITSELF. THE INESCAPABLE FACT IS THAT THE CHINESE~~
GOVERNMENT IS COMMITTED TO A POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY WHICH IS AT
LEAST INCOMPATIBLE, AND AT WORST HOSTILE, TO THE PHILOSOPHY
ON WHICH THE VARIOUS SYSTEMS AND FREEDOMS ENJOYED BY HONG KONG TODAY
REST.

IT FOLLOWS THAT ACCEPTABILITY WILL DEPEND ON THE AGREEMENT NOW
BEING NEGOTIATED:

CONTAINING FULL DETAILS OF THE PROPOSED ADMINISTRATIVE, LEGAL,
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEMS APPLICABLE AFTER 1997:

PROVIDING ADEQUATE AND WORKABLE ASSURANCES THAT THE TERMS OF THE
AGREEMENT WILL BE HONOURED:

STATING THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE BASIC LAW WILL INCORPORATE THE
PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT:

GUARANTEEING THAT THE RIGHTS OF BRITISH NATIONALS WILL BE
SAFEGUARDED.

WE BELIEVE THAT MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT WILL WISH TO TAKE ACCOUNT
OF OUR VIEWS. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT THESE VIEWS ARE AN ACCURATE
REFLECTION OF THE VIEWS OF HONG KONG PEOPLE AS A WHOLE, TO WHOM
THE IMMINENT WITHDRAWAL OF THE BRITISH LINK HAS BEEN A GREAT, IF
NOT ENTIRELY UNEXPECTED, DISAPPOINTMENT."

ENDS.

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FUTURE OF HONG KONG:

UMELCO VISIT TO LONDON

1. IN PREPARATION FOR THEIR VISIT TO LONDON THE UMELCO DELEGATION HAVE DRAWN UP A MANIFESTO WHICH THEY HAVE HAD PRINTED. THE TEXT, A COPY OF WHICH SIR S Y CHUNG GAVE ME THIS MORNING, IS IN MIFT.
2. ONE THOUSAND COPIES OF THIS MANIFESTO ARE ALREADY ON THEIR WAY TO LONDON AND WILL BE POSTED TO MP'S ON WEDNESDAY UNDER COVER OF A LETTER SIGNED PERSONALLY BY SIR S Y CHUNG. IT WILL BE RELEASED TO THE PRESS HERE TOMORROW EVENING TO APPEAR IN THE FOLLOWING DAYS'S MORNING PRESS.
3. WE ARE BOUND TO BE ASKED WHEN THE MANIFESTO APPEARS WHETHER THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT WAS CONSULTED IN ITS PREPARATION. I HAVE AGREED WITH SIR S Y CHUNG THAT WE WILL SAY THAT THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT WERE NOT CONSULTED: IT IS ENTIRELY A UMELCO DOCUMENT: BUT THAT WE WERE GIVEN A COPY IN ADVANCE OF PUBLICATION AS A COURTESY. I SUGGEST THAT THE NEWS DEPARTMENT SHOULD TAKE THE SAME LINE.

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