

SUBJECT  
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RECORD OF A DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND A  
UMELCO DELEGATION AT 0930, 15 MAY 1984

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PRESENT

The Prime Minister  
Sir Percy Cradock  
Mr. Wilson  
Mr. Coles

Sir S Y Chung  
Mr. Oswald Cheung  
Mr. Rogerio Lobo  
Mr. T. S. Lo  
Miss Maria Tam  
Mr. Allen Lee  
Mrs. Selina Chow  
Mr. Stephen Cheong  
Mr. Benton Cheung Yan-Lung  
Mr. Chan Ying-Lun  
Secretary-General

The Prime Minister welcomed the delegation, said that she was pleased that they had visited the United Kingdom and invited them to state their feelings about the future of Hong Kong.

Sir S Y Chung thanked the Prime Minister for receiving the delegation. They were here not just as members of the Executive and Legislative Councils of Hong Kong, but as representatives of the Unofficial members of the two Councils. During their stay in London they had met a number of Members of Parliament. They were not here to make demands but to reflect the wishes, fears and feelings of the Hong Kong people about their future. The whole of Hong Kong was watching their visit and the delegation had been supplying to the Hong Kong people a continuous report of their activities.

He wished to ask that the meeting should not be regarded as confidential so that the delegation could fully reflect what transpired to the press. The Prime Minister said that the delegation was free to convey to the press anything which they said to her. But it would be best to decide at the end of the meeting what should be said about her own remarks.

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Sir S. Y. Chung then handed over a copy of the UMELCO statement of 9 May. EXCO had visited London on several occasions. On their return they had always been asked what they had said to the Prime Minister. They had always replied that the discussions were confidential. The Hong Kong people had become increasingly resentful of this secrecy. On 20 April the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had made a public statement in Hong Kong. The Main points he had made were reflected in paragraph 3 of the UMELCO statement. Then, there had been news of the forthcoming debate in the British Parliament. The Unofficials had felt that the time had come to give the public an account of their work.

The UMELCO statement was in three parts. Page 2 set out the major worries of the Hong Kong people. Some of these might be unfounded. Some might be well founded but difficult to deal with. It was not the delegation's purpose to say which of these worries could be met but one day Her Majesty's Government would have to give answers to the various questions. Since the delegation's arrival in London they had received at least 30 telegrams from Hong Kong reflecting support for their views. Some British MPs had told them that they were not elected representatives of Hong Kong. The Unofficials agreed. They nevertheless had a duty to reflect Hong Kong's views. Moreover, the House of Commons was not elected by Hong Kong either. The final decision on their future had to be made by the Hong Kong people.

The second part of the UMELCO statement comprised the two questions at the top of page 3. When the Prime Minister visited Hong Kong in 1982 she said that whatever agreement might be reached it would have to be not only approved by China and Britain but must also be acceptable to the people of Hong Kong. That statement had brought great relief because Hong Kong had always been worried that the two Governments might make an agreement above its head. Now two questions arose. First, what would the test of acceptability be? The method of testing must be agreed by the Hong Kong people. Secondly, the Hong Kong people wished to know whether, if they did not accept the fundamental agreement, or parts of it, Britain would return to the negotiating table?

Part 3 of the UMELCO statement spelt out four points which would determine the acceptability of the agreement. How far these could be met was another matter. Individuals in Hong Kong would attach differing weight to the four points according to their own particular circumstances.

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The Chinese Government, through the New Chinese News Agency, had criticised the UMELCO statement. The Chinese had alleged that the Unofficials did not want an agreement. This was wrong. But they wanted a good agreement. China also said that they were trying to delay a settlement. This was not true. But they had to set out the necessary elements of an agreement to ensure a smooth course of events. Then the Chinese claimed that the Unofficials were trying to disrupt confidence. But the latter believed that confidence could only be built on truth. They were not prepared to promote confidence on a false basis.

The delegation was not in London to negotiate, merely to inform the Prime Minister of their views.

The Prime Minister said that she would be particularly interested to hear the views of those who had not visited London before. She would also welcome information on how the delegation had canvassed Hong Kong opinion.

Mr. Lee said that he had visited Peking as a member of a delegation of young professionals. Since that visit they had collected many views, especially from professional organisations. These people understood Communism and its past history very well. They were very much alive to the human consequences of the negotiations. Workers in his own factory had said that they were very fearful for the future. At least half the population of Hong Kong had lived under a Communist regime at one time or another. And they had seen problems in China since. Despite their fears they were now becoming more out-spoken because they realised that their future was at stake.

The Prime Minister said that she understood the UMELCO document. It was a manifestation of free speech. It had caused concern in Peking. The Chinese Government had found it difficult to understand that HMG had not been involved in its preparation but they now appeared to accept that.

Responding to a question from the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee said that during his visit to Peking the Chinese had initially not believed his delegation's statements. They had not understood the nature of the crisis of confidence and had failed to comprehend the relationship between the US dollar and the Hong Kong dollar. The Prime Minister commented that the Bank of China must understand the latter point. Mr. Lee agreed but their understanding did not percolate to the Chinese leadership. However, he believed that Peking now understood that there was a crisis

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of confidence. The Chinese had told his delegation that sovereignty was not negotiable but everything else was. Whether that was true, he did not know.

Mrs. Chow said that the basis of Hong Kong's fears was that they were never certain of the Chinese position. Chinese statements kept changing. But there was no doubt that there was a deep distrust of Chinese intentions in the hearts of the Hong Kong people. While China admitted that the cultural revolution had been a mistake, there were reports today of execution without trial and the jailing of people including religious leaders. There were references to "spiritual pollution". Those who publicly stated their fears were subjected to verbal abuse from China. Assurances were necessary. It was not clear that the words of Chinese leaders could be taken at face value.

Mr. Cheung Yan-Lung, speaking through an interpreter, said that he had been on two visits to China as a member of a delegation from the New Territories. The last visit had taken place just before he came to London. The delegation had been very well treated and had held four days of meetings. It had raised 35 old points and 10 new ones. From these he would select two because they gave a clear impression that China did not keep its word.

First, in March 1983 the delegation had been told that China would not station troops in Hong Kong. This time the Chinese had said that they would do so in order to demonstrate that they had recovered sovereignty.

Secondly, the Chinese had described the British Dependent Territories Citizens of Hong Kong as persons holding the passports of a dependent territory. They claimed that after China had regained sovereignty, these passports would no longer be valid. Asked what China would do to people deprived of their nationality, the Chinese had said that before 1997 the Hong Kong people could request Britain to give them overseas citizenship status as it had done in other countries. He had reminded the Chinese that in 1980 they had passed a law forbidding dual nationality. The reply had been that some changes could be made to accommodate BDTCs for one generation. The delegation had asked whether this could extend to two generations. The reply had been "all right" but this had apparently not been a sincere response. Asked what the Chinese attitude would be to the new type of passport, the Chinese had said that it could be used for the purposes of travelling.



They had claimed that Britain was considering issuing new passports and had advised the delegation to talk to the British Government.

Mr. Stephen Cheong said, with regard to the Prime Minister's interest in how Hong Kong opinion had been sounded, that Unofficials had attended some 9 to 10 District Board discussions. They had also talked to student groups, labourers, taxi drivers, workers' representatives, industrialists, foreign investors and civil servants. The civil servants were very worried, especially the local Administrative Officers who were not professional grade employees. They believed that they might not be needed in any new governmental system and might be persecuted. Their morale was low and if nothing was done it could collapse before 1997. It was necessary to face squarely the fact that there was a confidence crisis. Words would not cause it to go away.

Mr. Chan Ying-Lun said that he had stood for election in 1982. He represented a constituency in the squatter area of 35,000 people. He had been born in Hong Kong and had no experience of China. But he had discussed the problems with the squatters. They, drawing on their experience of China, had convinced him that if China took over Hong Kong the future would be very unhappy.

A survey of 8,700 people in the area of the Eastern District Board had produced overwhelming support for a continuing British role. 76 per cent of those interviewed felt that Britain had a responsibility to the people of Hong Kong. Only 18 per cent had confidence in an arrangement whereby the Hong Kong people ruled Hong Kong, and 42 per cent believed that Britain should have some place in that system.

Miss Maria Tam said that, since the debate on the Lobo Motion, 12 District Boards had discussed it. They had all supported it.

She handed over the document annexed to this record and briefly summarised the results of the discussions. Those involved believed that the Hong Kong people should have a say in their future and in the test of acceptability. Debates in the Urban and District Boards had given the Unofficials a mandate to represent their views. Just before the Unofficials had come to London, four District Boards had carried out a special survey. She handed over a further document reflecting the results which is annexed to this record.



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Sir S. Y. Chung said that he had received a telephone call today to the effect that four District Boards representing one million people would today make a public statement supporting the UMELCO statement of 9 May.

Miss Maria Tam referred to another communication sent by the Official Receiver's Office which emphasised the particular worries of Crown servants as to their future.

Mr. Cheung Yan-Lung said that he had also received a telephone call today to the effect that the Head of the New China News Agency had privately told a group of reporters in Hong Kong that the UMELCO statement was true and that the Unofficials had been brave and courageous in making it. Mrs. Chow drew attention to the problem of split families. This phenomenon was very much the order of the day among the young professionals. Wives and children were emigrating to acquire green card status while their husbands stayed in Hong Kong. All these people wished to live in Hong Kong but they feared for the future. 60 per cent of a group of people polled by professional societies had said that they were planning to emigrate.

The Prime Minister said that it was not difficult to understand the basic fears of the people of Hong Kong. They were concerned that a society based on the total regulation of life would fail to understand how another society could work without such regulation. The best approach was to work to keep Hong Kong prosperous and thriving up to 1997. Then, more and more people would come to understand how Hong Kong society worked. If it continued in this way until 1997 there would be a good chance of it continuing thereafter. It was right to work for as detailed an agreement as possible. She understood the tensions in Hong Kong. She would feel the same way herself. She knew that the Hong Kong people would prefer the status quo. But China insisted that administration was a function of sovereignty. Hence the importance of as detailed an agreement as possible. The passport problem still had to be negotiated. In general, we were up against the fact that the lease would expire in 1997. The best chance of maintaining the present life style of Hong Kong was to make sure that it continued up to 1997. We must try to get China to understand that if they contravened the agreement they would do so before international opinion. We must seek to ensure that China upheld the agreement and must try to make known to the Chinese leadership the anxieties which had been expressed. It was helpful to her to have heard the views of the Unofficials. It was important that they should express

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them but also important that they should not put Peking in a position where it lost face.

Mrs. Chow said that there was a widespread feeling in Hong Kong that Britain might attach higher priority to an agreement than to a good agreement. The Prime Minister said that the British Government would eventually have to decide whether they could recommend the agreement to Parliament. But Parliament's first question would be about the attitude of the people of Hong Kong. Sir S. Y. Chung asked whether this meant that the Prime Minister would not put the agreement to Parliament unless the Hong Kong people had previously accepted it. The Prime Minister said that this was not her meaning. We knew that Parliament would ask about Hong Kong's views and we should therefore have to take them into account.

Sir S. Y. Chung asked what our attitude would be if Hong Kong did not accept the agreement. The Prime Minister said that we would have to state that that was a factor to be taken into account. But it would also be necessary to consider what the alternatives were. Sir S. Y. Chung stated that the judgement should be left to the Hong Kong people. The Prime Minister pointed out that 92 per cent of the territory would pass to China in 1997 on the expiry of the lease. Our aim was that the present life style should continue. The right approach was to seek a detailed agreement so as to ensure that, so far as possible, stability and prosperity continued beyond 1997. But if there were no agreement in 1997 the lease would end anyway.

Sir S. Y. Chung said that it was for the Hong Kong people to decide. They must be made aware of the consequences of not accepting an agreement. The Prime Minister stated that we would take all these matters into account when deciding whether to put the agreement to Parliament. We would not be prepared to recommend an inadequate package. We were not seeking an agreement for its own sake. But life was a question of alternatives.

Mr. T. S. Lo said that some people, while recognising that the British Government had done its best, might prefer to reject a bad agreement and simply wait for a few years to see what happened in China. The Prime Minister replied that she always had to bear in mind that if great problems arose before 1997 the present system might not continue until that year. Our sole aim was to obtain a good agreement for Hong Kong. Mr. T. S. Lo said that he recognised the dangers of making Hong Kong ungovernable before 1997.



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The Prime Minister stressed that in the end it was the responsibility of HMG to take a decision on whether to recommend a package to Parliament. SIR S. Y. CHUNG said that he must sound a warning. For two governments to decide the future of five million people against their wishes would be a serious step. The Prime Minister repeated that if there was no agreement, 92 per cent of the territory would pass in 1997 to China which could then do what it liked. We could not act as if the lease did not exist. Sir S. Y. Chung said that the Hong Kong people would not accept that proposition so lightly. To transfer land was one thing. To transfer people was another. The Prime Minister's advisers might under-estimate feelings in Hong Kong. The Prime Minister denied this. The best hope was a detailed agreement. She did not under-estimate the feelings of Hong Kong. Sir S. Y. Chung suggested that land and people were two different things.

The Prime Minister reiterated her thanks to the delegation for visiting London. Sir S. Y. Chung again thanked the Prime Minister for making time available.

The discussion ended at 1045.

After the Prime Minister's departure, it was agreed that No. 10 would issue the following press statement:-

"A delegation representing the Unofficial members of the Executive and Legislative Councils of Hong Kong, led by Sir S. Y. Chung, spent over an hour with the Prime Minister this morning. They explained to her the wishes and anxieties of the Hong Kong people as reflected in the statement issued by the Unofficial members of 9 May.

"The Prime Minister welcomed the opportunity to talk with the delegation and made it clear that she fully understood the anxieties and wishes expressed to her. Both sides reaffirmed the necessity of maintaining stability and prosperity in Hong Kong. The Prime Minister stressed the importance to that end of reaching a detailed agreement which would be acceptable to the Government and Parliament of the United Kingdom, to the Government of the People's Republic of China and to the people of Hong Kong."

A. J. C.

15 May 1984

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Discussions by District Boards on the Future of Hong Kong

Since the Lobo motion on 14.3.84, the following District Boards have discussed the future issue at their regular or special meetings:-

Sha Tin District Board

meeting on 21.3.84

Sham Shui Po District Board

meeting on 23.3.84

Kwun Tong District Board

(i) meeting on 26.3.84

Mr. Andrew SO and Mr. Stephen CHEONG attended as observers.

(ii) meeting on 9.4.84

Mr. WONG Lam, Mr. Andrew SO, Mr. Stephen CHEONG, Mr. CHAN Ying-lun, Mrs. Rita FAN and Mrs. Pauline NG attended as observers.

Eastern District Board

meeting on 30.3.84

Dr. HO Kam-fai, Mr. Stephen CHEONG and Mr. CHEUNG Yan-lung attended as observers.

Mong Kok District Board

meeting on 12.4.84

Mr. WONG Lam, Mr. Allen LEE, Mr. Stephen CHEONG and Mrs Pauline NG attended as observers.

Wan Chai District Board

meeting on 17.4.84

Mr. WONG Lam, Mr. Andrew SO, Mr. F.K. HU, Mr. Stephen CHEONG, Mr. CHAN Ying-lun, Mrs. Rita FAN and Mr. YEUNG Po-kwan attended as observers.



Central and Western District Board

meeting on 19.4.84

Dr. HO Kam-fai, Mr. Allen LEE, Mr. Andrew SO, Mr. Stephen CHEONG, Mrs. Selina CHOW, Mrs. Pauline NG and Mr. Peter POON attended as observers.

----- At Annex I is a paper produced by Mr. Stephen CHEONG on the impressions of Members who have attended some of the  
----- foregoing DB meetings as observers. At Annex II is a summary of the main points raised at these DB meetings.

It is likely that other District Boards will follow suit and discuss the future issue at their forthcoming meetings. The known schedules are:-

Yaumatei District Board	3.00 p.m. on Friday 27.4.84
Tsuen Wan District Board	2.30 p.m. on Tuesday 1.5.84
Southern District Board	2.30 p.m. on Friday 4.5.84
Sai Kung District Board	10.00 a.m. on Friday 4.5.84 (subject to confirmation)

Members are invited to note the contents of this paper and the annexes.



DB Discussions on the future of Hong Kong  
- An Impression

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The followings are but, a brief impression on the various District Boards meetings we have attended so far :-

- (a) Generally speaking, all unofficial members of District Boards which we have attended, displayed appreciations to UMELCO taking a direct interest in their views. They specifically appreciated the fact that we were there to listen to their views and that we have observed strictly the protocol of being guest observers.
- (b) Most District Board members wished to help and participate in meaningful contributions towards the future issue. It should be noted that their enthusiasm has led to their undertaking in involving themselves with opinion gathering process within their own districts. This, in my view, can be most helpful if ever the test of acceptability is to be considered.
- (c) We are very encouraged by the general feeling that UMELCO will be advised of the result of individual District Boards' working committees' deliberation so that we can reflect those opinions to the relevant authorities. The fact that motions asking for UMELCO involvement had been passed with a wide margin has, in our view, provided us with some sort of a mandate to speak for them. This may be helpful in counteracting the criticism that we do not have the mandate of the people.
- (d) One point that bears out quite clearly is that a lot of work has been done, possibly by the united front organisations, to the extent that in each DB there were some members who toed the line that discussions in DB at this time could only have the adverse effect of generating unease in the community and affect adversely the atmosphere of the talks. Fortunately, the number of those who toed this line was only a handful and their arguments, though well prepared, were not persuasive enough to do any damage. The Kwun Tong DB was the most obvious one in toeing such a line. Our estimation is that there must have been at least five to six members who toed this line.
- (e) The visits were all very useful, firstly in making our presence felt, secondly, in starting some sort of a dialogue between UMELCO & DB members; thirdly, in broadening the experiences & exposures of UMELCO Members; and fourthly, as a bi-product of our visit, the media took a great interest in our attending the DB meetings and reported our activities with a favourable tone.
- (f) A brief summary of main points raised is presented below for Hon Members reference.



A brief summary of main points raised  
in DB meetings on the future of Hong Kong

(I) Sha Tin DB (meeting on 21.3.84)

A majority of DB unofficials felt that they needed more time to consult their constituents fully on the issue of HK's future. Nonetheless, they morally supported the motion that any proposals for the future of Hong Kong should be debated in the Legislative Council before any final agreement is reached.

(II) Sham Shui Po DB (meeting on 23.3.84)

- (a) DBs should discuss the proposed agreement on the future of Hong Kong.
- (b) Views collected by DB members should be forwarded to UMELCO.
- (c) Discussions on the future of Hong Kong should not only be confined to ExCo, LegCo and Urbco, but also to Area Committees; social, interest and pressure groups as well as among the general public.
- (d) Time is now ripe for such discussions to take place.
- (e) An overwhelming majority of district residents wish to maintain their existing life styles.

(III) Kwun Tong DB

(1) Meeting on 26.3.84

- (a) HK people are not happy to wait in the dark for their future to be arranged by others. HK people should be given a chance to discuss the contents of the talks before finalisation.
- (b) Some members considered that DB members should express their views on the future of Hong Kong which could be channelled to the Central Government. However, others felt that discussing the issue now might jeopardise the talks. A few even considered that the subject should not be discussed in the DB at all, but discussion should only be on how to carry out the UK - China final agreements.



(2) Meeting on 9.4.84

- (a) Hong Kong's present system as well as its people's freedom should be preserved.
- (b) HK people has a right to express their views on their own future and the DB is a suitable forum. However, a few consider this would jeopardise the negotiations.
- (c) There is a need for political and civic education.
- (d) DB members defeated a motion tabled by Mr Sulke seeking to suspend the talks and to conduct a referendum on Hong Kong's future in the territory.
- (e) DB members passed 3 motions, namely, that -
  - (i) LegCo should act as an agent to collect and reflect public opinion;
  - (ii) DB should establish a working party to collect district views on 1997; and
  - (iii) DB should have an opportunity to express views on the contents of the draft agreement.

(IV) Eastern DB (meeting on 30.3.84)

- (a) The Chinese and British Authorities should listen to the views of the Hong Kong people.
- (b) The early uplifting of the veil of confidentiality.
- (c) Hong Kong people wish to preserve their freedom.
- (d) It is of utmost importance to maintain confidence in HK and 1984 is a critical year.
- (f) DB members must reflect the views of the residents after the views are collected by systematic and scientific surveys.
- (g) An unofficial working group will be set up to collect these views.
- (h) LegCo Unofficials should co-ordinate the views of DBs with a view to formulating plans for the future of Hong Kong.



- (V) Mong Kok DB (meeting on 12.4.84)
- (a) Existing system should remain unchanged.
  - (b) People should have more detailed information on the arrangements of their future.
  - (c) HK should have an independent set of constitution, not one that would be included as an appendix to the Chinese Constitution.
  - (d) DB should discuss the future of Hong Kong before the final agreement is reached and the Lobo Motion is strongly supported.
  - (e) Views of HK people should be made known to UK and China.
  - (f) Many have reservations on the feasibility of the coexistence of a capitalist and socialist system.
  - (g) There is a need for some guarantee that Hong Kong would not be subjected to external intervention.
  - (h) A working group consisting of all DB unofficials should be formed to obtain the views of the residents in this issue. All information would be presented systematically to UMELCO.
- (VI) Wan Chai DB (meeting on 17.4.84)
- (a) Unanimously agree that the 1997 issue is a major concern of DB members.
  - (b) Support the spirit of the Lobo Motion.
  - (c) Want more information about the negotiation because it is DB members' role to reflect public opinion before any final agreement is reached.
  - (d) LegCo should co-ordinate a systematic consultative framework with all 18 DBs for effective territory-wide consultation on the 1997 issue.
  - (e) A working group on 1997 to be set up to collect public opinion after the proposals for the future of Hong Kong is announced.



(VII) Central and Western DB (meeting on 19.4.84)

- (a) Agree that the outcome of the negotiation will be of vital concern to the people of Hong Kong, including residents of the Central and Western District.
- (b) Wish to reflect the views of the residents when the proposals for the future are finalised.
- (c) Propose to conduct a scientific survey on residents' views in due course.



Addendum to Representation Made By Local Groups (May 8, 1984)

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Wan Chai DB

Results of a survey conducted by Wan Chai District Board in the district showed that 60% of the 1,118 respondents had no confidence in China's guarantee to maintain HK's system unchanged for 50 years because of their fear that the successors of the future Chinese government would not keep the agreed promises and of their apprehension of a communist regime. 60% of the interviewees felt that Britain had an obligation to make arrangements for British-HK passport holders to emigrate in 1997 and the same percentage of respondents felt that they intended to emigrate when Britain ended its rule here in 1997. Results of the survey had been submitted to the Umelco Group who would visit London this week.

Central/Western DB

Nine Unofficial members of Central/Western DB issued a joint statement on May 6 urging Britain to fulfil its obligation to British-HK passport holders by providing protection to those who found that they could not continue to live in HK under a new administration after 1997. The statement also asked Britain to make clear in what way they would find that the final agreement on HK's future would be acceptable to HK people. The joint statement by Britain and China to indicate their intention to sign the formal agreement should not be brief. The statement was submitted to the Umelco Office.

Eastern DB

Unofficial members of the Eastern District Board conducted an opinion poll among some 9 000 residents in the district on May 5 and 6 with the results published on May 7.

Findings of the poll are:

- (1) 76.4% of the respondents felt that Britain should have a moral obligation towards towards HK people;
- (2) 33% felt that Britain and China should take into account the wishes of HK people;
- (3) 67% felt that the wishes and interests of HK people should be an important factor in reaching a decision on the HK question;
- (4) 61.4% felt that the Sino-British agreement should attach importance to the human rights of HK people;
- (5) 42.6% felt that the feasibility of the "HK people governing HK" and "50 years no change" proposals depended on whether there would be substantial arrangements; 23.7% felt the proposals were empty words, and 18.6% felt the plans were workable;
- (6) 41.6% felt that HK people were neglected in the talks because attention was paid to the interests of both Britain and China;





- (7) 23% said they would emigrate; 41.3% said they would stay in HK; and 35.7% were undecided; and
- (8) 46% hoped HK would be completely ruled by HK people after 1997, while 42.1% hoped British people would be allowed to take part in the administration after 1997.

#### Northern DB

Northern District Board held a special meeting on May 7 to discuss HK's future. Most unofficials felt the authorities should start promoting an acceptable administrative framework for HK. The British Government should fulfil its obligation to resettle HK people, who do not wish to live under the future administration, as citizens of its dependent territories.

The points they made are:

It was important to maintain the territory's prosperity and stability in the transition period. The issues of civil servants and law and order in the pre-1997 period should be handled cautiously;

The present seven years residency requirement for candidates of election is too general and would give rise to the situation that China would send people to run HK in the next 13 years.

There should be arrangements to enable British-HK passport holders to continue their present lifestyle beyond 1997; and

Candidates for the future administrators should either be HK born or people who had lived here for more than 15 years.





Prime Minister.

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UMELCO put out their own  
statement.

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PRESS RELEASE

UMELCO Mission meets PM

The delegation representing the Unofficial Members of the Executive and Legislative Councils of Hong Kong led by Sir S Y CHUNG spent over an hour with the Prime Minister this morning. They explained the wishes, views, fears and feelings of Hong Kong people on Hong Kong's future as reflected in their statement published on 9th May 1984. The Prime Minister listened with great care and expressed her understanding of the UMELCO statement.

The Unofficials stressed the important difference between the return of territory as opposed to the transfer of people, and they emphasised that the ultimate decision on the arrangements for the future of Hong Kong must be decided by the people of Hong Kong themselves.

They impressed on the Prime Minister that Hong Kong people want a good agreement which will command their confidence, so that Hong Kong's prosperity, stability and the freedoms they at present enjoy will continue up to and beyond 1997. They related to her that confidence must be built on truth and no one should promote false confidence which will not endure for truth will come out at the end.

They have reported to the Prime Minister the results of the various meetings held and surveys conducted by District Boards, professional, commercial and industrial organisations. All these results show there would be a large number of people wishing to leave Hong Kong. They also informed her of the rapidly growing support from Hong Kong people to the UMELCO statement as evidenced by the increasing number of telex messages and letters they have received in London, as well as by the open support published in various independent newspapers in Hong Kong. In addition, they reported to the Prime Minister that four District Boards on Hong Kong Island representing over one million people have notified the Unofficials this morning that they had published a statement today to indicate their whole-hearted support of the UMELCO statement.

The Unofficials underlined to the Prime Minister that the people of Hong Kong look upon the option of being able to settle elsewhere as a very important assurance of their future and drew attention to the other equally important elements which must be present in any agreement on Hong Kong's future, as set out in the UMELCO statement.

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

15 May 1984

HONG KONG: UMELCO DELEGATION

I enclose the record of a discussion which took place when a UMELCO delegation called on the Prime Minister this morning.

I also enclose copies of various documents which were handed over by the delegation during the course of the meeting.

A J COLES

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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DRAFT PRESS STATEMENT

A delegation representing the Unofficial members of the Executive and Legislative Councils of Hong Kong, led by Sir S.Y. Chung, spent over an hour with the Prime Minister this morning. They explained to her the wishes and anxieties of the Hong Kong people as reflected in the statement issued by the Unofficial members on 9 May.

The Prime Minister welcomed the opportunity to talk with the delegation and made it clear that she fully understood the anxieties and wishes expressed to her. Both sides reaffirmed the necessity of maintaining stability and prosperity in Hong Kong. The Prime Minister stressed the importance to that end of reaching a detailed agreement which would be acceptable to the Government and Parliament of the United Kingdom, to the Government of the People's Republic of China and to the people of Hong Kong.



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# UMELCO

Prime Minister.

Office of Unofficial Members of Executive and Legislative Councils  
行政立法兩局非官守議員辦事處

M 17/5

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher, MP  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1A 0AA

16th May 1984

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Dear Prime Minister,


Subject : The Future of Hong Kong

Thank you so much for making time to meet our delegation yesterday. It was helpful to have the opportunity to elaborate further on our position paper and to be able to exchange views with you on this issue of such vital importance to us.

We are most appreciative of your continuing interest and support.

Should you wish to see us again or require any further information, we shall be at the Portman Inter-Continental Hotel, Portman Square, until 22nd May, tel : 01-486 5844.

Yours sincerely



S Y CHUNG  
Senior Unofficial Member

1) Copy to F.I.C.O. (Mr. Roberts)

2) p.a.

A.F.C. 2/5.