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FM WASHINGTON 300235Z MAY, 1984
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1670 OF 29 MAY
INFO BAGHDAD, JEDDA, KUWAIT, TEHRAN, TOKYO, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL
NATO AND MODUK (DS II).

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH SECRETARY WEINBERGER: GULF

1. THE SITUATION IN THE GULF WAS THE FIRST SUBJECT DISCUSSED AT THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH WEINBERGER AT 0930 ON 29 MAY.

2. WEINBERGER REFERRED TO THE US SUPPLY OF STINGER MISSILES TO SAUDI ARABIA. WITH THEIR AIR DEFENCE CAPABILITY ENHANCED, THE SAUDIS BELIEVED THAT THEY COULD HOLD THEIR OWN. CONTAINING THE SPREAD OF THE WAR WAS IMPORTANT. BUT THE US ADMINISTRATION SAW LITTLE CHANCE OF ITS ENDING SOON. WITH THEIR OVERWHELMING NUMBERS, AND UNCONCERN ABOUT CASUALTIES, THE IRANIANS MIGHT BE PREPARED TO PLOUGH ON FOR SOME CONSIDERABLE TIME, AND INDEED PERHAPS UNTIL THERE WAS A CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN TEHRAN. FOR STRATEGIC, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REASONS THE US WOULD LIKE TO GET ALONGSIDE THE GOVERNMENT IN TEHRAN, BUT JUDGED THAT OVERTURES TO KHOMEINI WOULD BE POINTLESS.

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE TOO SAW LITTLE HOPE OF AN EARLY END TO THE WAR: AND DISADVANTAGES FOR THE WEST IN A WIN FOR EITHER SIDE: THE BEST OUTCOME WOULD BE A DRAW. CONCEIVABLY, OF COURSE, THE FAILURE OF ANOTHER OFFENSIVE ON THE GROUND MIGHT CAUSE TEHRAN TO CHANGE ITS TUNE, BUT THE ODDS WERE AGAINST THIS.

4. WEINBERGER STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF DRYING UP ARMS SUPPLIES TO IRAN. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE HAD CLOSED DOWN UK SUPPLIES LONG SINCE: THERE HAD BEEN LESS THAN POUNDS STERLING 20 MILLION OF SALES OF UK-MANUFACTURED EQUIPMENT IN THE LAST FOUR YEARS, AND THAT INCLUDED CIVIL AERO-ENGINES. ARAB LEAGUE SPOKESMEN, HOWEVER, ALLEGED THAT SOME US-MANUFACTURED KIT WAS STILL GETTING THROUGH. WEINBERGER SAID THAT THIS MUST BE EX-VIETNAM SUPPLIES, COMING THROUGH THIRD PARTIES, AND ENQUIRED ABOUT UK-BUILT NAVAL VESSELS FOR IRAN. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT BOTH THE KHARG AND THE TWO SMALLER SUPPORT CRAFT WERE VERY LONGSTANDING ORDERS, ON WHICH WE HAD HELD BACK FOR A CONSIDERABLE TIME: THEY HAD NO MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE.

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5. WEINBERGER THEN REFERRED TO US/UK CONTINGENCY PLANNING. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO GET IN A POSITION WHERE WE COULD BOTH RESPOND POSITIVELY, IF WE SO WISHED, TO A PUBLIC REQUEST, WERE ONE EVENTUALLY FORTHCOMING, FROM THE SAUDIS FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION. NATO SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER THE IMPACT ON THE ALLIANCE IF GULF OIL SUPPLIES WERE TO DRY UP. AND THE PRESENT JAPANESE GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE PREPARED TO PLAN MORE ACTIVELY HOW BEST TO RESPOND TO AN INTERRUPTION OF OIL SUPPLIES.

6. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED THAT THE JAPANESE HAD A GREATER INTEREST IN THE QUESTION THAN DID MOST COUNTRIES. AS FOR THE UK/US TALKS, HE STRESSED THAT THEY HAD BEEN CONDUCTED ENTIRELY WITHOUT COMMITMENT ON OUR SIDE. WEINBERGER SAID THAT THIS WAS UNDERSTOOD. THE TALKS HAD NEVERTHELESS BEEN VALUABLE.

7. FOR DISCUSSION ON NON-GULF SUBJECTS, SEE MIFT: NOT TO ALL.

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