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BRUSSELS, LISBON, BERNE, UKMIS NEW YORK, ROME, LUANDA, HAVANA

VISIT BY P W BOTHA TO BONN, 4-6 JUNE

SUMMARY

1. A COOL RECEPTION: CRITICAL DIALOGUE WITH EMPHASIS ON CRITICAL. KOHL UNDERLINED THE CONTINUITY OF FRG POLICY TOWARDS SOUTHERN AFRICA. SOME CREDIT GIVEN FOR INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS. BUT THE BALANCE OF THE GERMAN MESSAGE WAS THAT THESE WERE NOT ENOUGH. NO NEW DEVELOPMENTS EMERGED IN THE OFFICIAL TALKS. BUT BOTHA'S 'OFFER' ON NAMIBIA, MADE AT A PRESS CONFERENCE, HAS BEEN PRESENTED BY THE SOUTH AFRICANS AS A NEW INITIATIVE.

DETAIL

2. THE OFFICIAL PART OF BOTHA'S VISIT CONSISTED OF A CALL ON KOHL (ACCOMPANIED BY PIK BOTHA) FOLLOWED BY A WORKING LUNCH. OTHER CALLS WERE MADE ON GENSCHER, SPD LEADER VOGEL AND BAVARIAN MINISTER-PRESIDENT STRAUSS IN THEIR PARTY CAPACITIES. BOTHA ALSO PAID A COURTESY CALL ON PRESIDENT CARSTENS AND VISITED BERLIN. THE TONE OF THE VISIT, THE CALL ON STRAUSS EXCEPTED, WAS NOT UNFRIENDLY, BUT DECIDEDLY COOL IN PUBLIC. KOHL FOR EXAMPLE DID NOT SHAKE HANDS WITH BOTHA IN FRONT OF THE CAMERAS, ALTHOUGH HE DID SO IN PRIVATE. THERE WERE SEVERAL DEMONSTRATIONS DURING THE VISIT, THE LARGEST OF WHICH CONSISTED OF 500 PEOPLE.

3. DR VERGAU (HEAD OF SOUTHERN AFRICA REFERAT, AUSWAERTIGES AMT) BRIEFED THE TEN AND CONTACT GROUP COUNTRIES SEPARATELY. VERGAU STRESSED THE FACT THAT THE VISIT WAS AT WORKING LEVEL, AND HAD BEEN ARRANGED AT THE INSTIGATION OF THE SOUTH AFRICANS. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE CALL ON PRESIDENT CARSTENS DID NOT SIGNIFY SPECIAL TREATMENT: THIS WAS NORMALLY ACCORDED TO ALL VISITING HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OR STATE FROM 'IMPORTANT' COUNTRIES. THE GERMAN AIM HAD BEEN TO SHOW THE SOUTH AFRICANS, AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, THAT THERE WAS A CONSENSUS OF OPINION IN EUROPE AMONG CONSERVATIVES AND SOCIALISTS ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND THAT THE CHANGE IN THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT IN NO WAY HERALDED A SOFTER LINE IN BONN.

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4. IN THEIR TALKS WITH BOTHA, KOHL AND GENSCHER HAD GREETED THE MODERATE SIGNS OF PROGRESS IN THE INTERNAL POLICIES OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. BUT THEY HAD DRAWN A NEGATIVE BALANCE, CONDEMNING THE LACK OF A POLITICAL ROLE FOR THE BLACKS, THE COMPULSORY RESETTLEMENT POLICY, THE ARREST WITHOUT TRIAL OF OPPONENTS OF THE REGIME, THE REFUSAL OF ENTRY VISAS TO PROMINENT OPPONENTS AND THE REFUSAL TO LET CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS JOURNEY ABROAD. THEY HAD ALSO GREETED THE IMPROVEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA'S RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES BUT WARNED THAT SUCH DEVELOPMENTS COULD ONLY BE SUSTAINED ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF INDEPENDENCE, FREE FROM ECONOMIC OR MILITARY PRESSURE. ON NAMIBIA THEY HAD MADE CLEAR THEIR REJECTION OF LINKING INDEPENDENCE TO CUBAN WITHDRAWAL, HAD REPEATED THEIR COMMITMENT TO UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 435, AND HAD CALLED FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION WITHOUT DELAY. (COPY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S PRESS RELEASE BY BAG.)

5. IN REPLY BOTHA HAD ASKED FOR PATIENCE ON INTERNAL QUESTIONS. HE HAD QUOTED THE EXAMPLE OF SWITZERLAND AS A CASE WHERE IT HAD TAKEN MANY CENTURIES FOR MINORITIES TO BE ACCEPTED IN A CONFEDERATION. (THE GERMAN SIDE HAD REFUSED TO ACCEPT THIS LINE OF ARGUMENT AND HAD QUOTED BACK THE SWISS GOVERNMENT'S OWN REJECTION OF ANY PARALLEL BETWEEN SWISS AND SOUTH AFRICAN EXPERIENCE.) ON RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES, BOTHA HAD APPEALED FOR MORE WESTERN AID, ESPECIALLY FOR MOZAMBIQUE. HE HAD SUGGESTED THAT, AS WESTERN AID PROJECTS HAD NOT BEEN VERY EFFECTIVE, A DEVELOPMENT BANK SHOULD BE SET UP TO CHANNEL SUCH FUNDS. THE SOUTH AFRICANS WOULD BE THE BEST PEOPLE TO RUN SUCH A BANK SINCE THEY UNDERSTOOD THE AREA BETTER. (NOT SURPRISINGLY THIS IDEA LEFT THE GERMANS SOMEWHAT BREATHLESS.)

6. ON NAMIBIA, BOTHA HAD REFERRED TO THE DELAY IN IMPLEMENTING 435 IN TERMS OF THE NECESSITY FOR RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE MPLA AND UNITA PRIOR TO CUBAN WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA. HE HAD THEN MENTIONED THE ADMINISTRATIVE COST OF NAMIBIA TO THE SAG AND SUGGESTED THAT THE CONTACT GROUP SHOULD TAKE THIS OVER. THE FIVE COULD THEN WORK NAMIBIA'S INDEPENDENCE THROUGH THEMSELVES. VERGAU SAID THAT THIS HAD BEEN TOSSED OUT BY BOTHA AS AN OFF-THE-CUFF REMARK. IT HAD NOT BEEN PRESENTED AS A SERIOUS PROPOSAL, NOR WAS ANY DETAIL GIVEN. THE GERMANS HAD NOT BEEN ASKED TO REACT AND HAD THEREFORE IGNORED THE REMARK. THEY WERE IN CONSEQUENCE ANGRY THAT BOTHA, AT A LATER PRESS CONFERENCE, HAD PRESENTED THIS AS A NEW INITIATIVE PUT FORWARD BY HIM TO KOHL. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ARE TAKING THE LINE THAT THIS PROPOSAL WAS NOT MADE SERIOUSLY DURING THE TALKS AND THAT IF THE SOUTH AFRICANS WISH TO PURSUE

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IT THEY SHOULD GIVE FURTHER DETAILS THROUGH OFFICIAL CHANNELS AND NOT THROUGH THE MEDIA. ON THE SUBSTANCE, VERGAU'S INITIAL REACTION WAS THAT BOTHA'S PROPOSAL WAS SUCH AN OBVIOUS NON-STARTER THAT IT COULD ONLY BE A PROPAGANDA PLOY. DID THE SOUTH AFRICANS REALLY BELIEVE THAT THE CONTACT GROUP COULD TAKE OVER THEIR COLONIAL ROLE WHILE WAITING FOR THE MPLA AND UNITA TO PATCH UP THEIR DIFFERENCES?

7. FURTHER DETAILS OF THE VISIT FOLLOW BY BAG.

TAYLOR

SOUTHERN AFRICA

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