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CONFIDENTIAL

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Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Case for a message to Upper Volta seems minimal & risks devaluing the medium. Agree

Angola and Zaire only?

15 June 1984

Law Center,

C.D.P. 15/6

We must reply to those who have sent messages (i.e. Upper Volta) but

Visit of the South African Prime Minister: Messages to Presidents Dos Santos and Mobutu, and to Captain Sankara of Upper Volta

The Prime Minister sent messages to a few selected Heads of African governments in advance of Mr Botha's visit. This was part of our effort to present the visit positively and to minimise adverse African and especially Commonwealth reactions. The Prime Minister has since sent messages giving her impressions of Mr Botha's visit to these same Heads of governments, and in addition to President Masire of Botswana and President Moi of Kenya. The Foreign Secretary now recommends that the Prime Minister should send messages also to President Dos Santos of Angola, President Mobutu of Zaire, and Captain Sankara, the Head of State of Upper Volta.

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The Prime Minister's messages to African leaders have been particularly well received. They have formed the major vehicle for presenting our views of Mr Botha's visit at the top level in African governments, doing much to dispel apprehension and suspicion, and countering Soviet and other efforts to present the visit as condoning apartheid and marking a change in British policy. The messages have also had an important bilateral impact.

Namibia
Open
Zaire
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Although our relations with Angola, Zaire, and especially Upper Volta, are not of the same order as those with, for example, Zimbabwe and even Mozambique, the Foreign Secretary nonetheless considers that messages from the Prime Minister to the Heads of these governments would be timely and useful. They would fulfil the same general purpose as those already sent to other African leaders. There are, moreover, particular arguments in each of the three cases:

ANGOLA: Namibia and Angola were discussed extensively during Mr Botha's visit and although our Ambassador has briefed the Foreign Minister there on the basis of our general guidance President Dos Santos would undoubtedly value a firsthand account from the Prime Minister. It is, in any case, a delicate moment in Angola's discussions with the US over Cubans, and a message would help to encourage the Angolans to have confidence in the West and to carry on with their negotiations. Bilaterally, the message could help to restore

/Angolan

CONFIDENTIAL



Angolan confidence in the UK, following the UNITA hostages affair.

ZAIRE: Although not a Front Line State, Zaire is a major player in central Africa, with a close interest in the Namibia/Angola problem. President Mobutu's personal links with Dr Savimbi could enable him to contribute constructively to a process of reconciliation between the MPLA and UNITA. The Foreign Secretary believes that generally we should pay Zaire closer attention. A message to Mobutu would be an important step in this process.

UPPER VOLTA: Captain Sankara, the Head of State of Upper Volta, sent a telex message to the Prime Minister (copy enclosed) protesting at Mr Botha's visit. Our relations with Upper Volta and with Sankara himself are admittedly minimal. Sankara is of little standing in Africa (though he has close links with the present leadership in Ghana) and has no role or knowledge of Southern African issues. He is radical. But if the Prime Minister did not reply Sankara might see this as a gratuitous offence, confirming his view that we take little notice of African opinion, while his ignorance of the Botha visit and the reasoning behind it would remain total. This could be reflected in his behaviour in the OAU or South African gatherings. A message from the Prime Minister might moderate Sankara's stance a little and would probably be well received.

I enclose a draft message from the Prime Minister to Presidents Dos Santos and Mobutu (the same message will, with slight modifications, do for both); I also enclose a slightly different message for Sankara.

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats

CONFIDENTIAL

Precedence/Deskby

IMMEDIATE

ZCZC	1	ZCZC
GRS	2	GRS
CLASS	3	CONFIDENTIAL
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	
FM FCO	6	FM FCO
PRE/ADD	7	TO IMMEDIATE LUANDA
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9	AND TO IMMEDIATE KINSHASA
	10	YOUR TELNO 71: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT
	11	1. Please deliver the following message from the Prime Minister
	12	to President Dos Santos as soon as possible: Kinshasa should
	13	deliver the message to President Mobutu.
	14	BEGINS: FOR DOS SANTOS: I know that our Ambassador has briefed
	15	your Foreign Minister on the outcome of my recent talks with the
	16	South African Prime Minister.
	17	FOR MOBUTU: You will be aware that the South African Prime
	18	Minister visited the UK on 2 June.
	19	I am now writing personally to give you my impressions of this
	20	meeting. I made clear at the outset that I wanted a frank and
///	21	wide-ranging discussion. Indeed, the meeting lasted for over
//	22	five hours and covered the full range of regional problems. We
/	23	focused particularly on Namibia and the internal situation in
	24	South Africa. Mr Botha gave me the impression of being personally
	25	committed to Namibian independence as soon as possible. But he

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File number	Dept	Distribution Southern Africa
Drafted by (Block capitals)		
Telephone number		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Page 2
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2 also stressed the importance to South Africa of an acceptable
3 arrangement on the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola, since
4 he did not believe that fair and free elections could take place
5 in Namibia while they were still there. I explained that, while
6 I believed foreign forces should be withdrawn from the countries
7 of Southern Africa (including South African forces from Angola
8 and Namibia, and Cuban forces from Angola) we could not accept
9 any formal link between the withdrawal of Cuban forces and a
10 Namibia settlement, for which SCR 435 provides the internationally
11 acceptable basis. [FOR MOBUTU: For his part Mr Botha said he
12 could see no prospect of Cuban withdrawal until there was
13 reconciliation in Angola. I should be interested to know how you
14 see this.]
15 We had a long discussion on the internal situation in South
16 Africa. I made it very clear that I condemned apartheid and
17 would continue to do so. I laid particular stress on the need to
18 find ways of satisfying the political aspirations of the black
19 population. I referred to Nelson Mandela's continued detention
20 and said that I hoped there would be progress on this soon. I
21 spoke too, about the appalling practice of forced removals of
22 black peoples in South Africa. We also discussed South Africa's
23 relations with neighbouring countries. Mr Botha should now be
24 well aware of our view that the only agreements that are likely
25 to have lasting value are those which are entered into freely
26 and without a sense of duress.
27 [FOR MOBUTU: As you know I am anxious to push back communist
28 influence in Southern Africa, but believe some South African
29 policies run counter to this.] I have no doubt that it was right
30 to try to influence Mr Botha's perceptions at first hand. I do
31 not expect quick results, but I see this meeting as part of a
32 process through which we must all continue to push for the sort
33 of changes we all want to see in South African policies.
34 [FOR DOS SANTOS: I know that your Government has also been in

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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats
CONFIDENTIAL

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2 negotiation with the South African Government over issues vital to
3 Angolan security. I hope that at this important juncture those
4 discussions, and indeed my own with Mr Botha, can contribute to
5 progress towards an early Namibia settlement.] ENDS.
6 2. In delivering this message you should stress orally that
7 this meeting with Mr Botha should certainly not be regarded,
8 least of all by the South Afircans, as condoning apartheid; nor
9 as representing any change in British policy.

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OUT TELEGRAM

	↓	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Precedence/Deskby IMMEDIATE
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ZCZC	1	ZCZC
GRS	2	GRS
CLASS	3	CONFIDENTIAL
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	
FM FCO	6	FM FCO
PRE/ADD	7	TO IMMEDIATE ABIDJAN
TEL NO.	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9	RFI ROUTINE CAPE TOWN
	10	VISIT OF SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER: MESSAGE FROM UPPER VOLTA
	11	HEAD OF STATE
	12	1. MIFT contains the translated text of a message to the Prime
	13	Minister from Captain Sankara protesting at the visit here of the
	14	South African Prime Minister.
	15	2. Second MIFT gives the text of the Prime Minister's reply
	16	which you should please transmit by the most convenient means.
	17	3. We have no reason to be apologetic to Sankara and the reply
	18	is, accordingly, couched in suitably firm tone; at the same time
	19	we have sought to be constructive.
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Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats
UNCLASSIFIED

Precedence/Deskby
IMMEDIATE

ZCZC	1	ZCZC
GRS	2	GRS
CLASS	3	UNCLASSIFIED
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	
FM FCO	6	FM FCO
PRE/ADD	7	TO IMMEDIATE ABIDJAN
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9	RFI ROUTINE CAPE TOWN
	10	MIPT: MESSAGE FROM UPPER VOLTA HEAD OF STATE
	11	Message is as follows:
	12	BEGINS: Following the announcement of the journey by the South
	13	African Prime Minister to various European countries, including
	14	yours, we have the honour to convey to you our deep concern and
	15	protest most vigorously at the prospect [of this visit]. The
	16	timid initiatives taken by the South African Government with
	17	respect to Angola and Mozambique give no grounds for rejoicing
	18	that there is a desire for change on the part of the racist
	19	regime in Pretoria. We venture to hope that the British
	20	Government is weighing up all the political implications that such
	21	a project, if it should come about, might have for its relations
///	22	with the OAU. We feel that your wisdom and political foresight
//	23	will prevail.
/	24	Captain Thomas Sankara, President of the National Council of the
	25	Revolution, Head of State of Upper Volta, Ouagadougou. ENDS

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File number	Dept	Distribution
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Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

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OUT TELEGRAM

		Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Precedence/Deskby IMMEDIATE
ZCZC	1	ZCZC	
GRS	2	GRS	
CLASS	3	CONFIDENTIAL	
CAVEATS	4		
DESKBY	5		
FM FCO	6	FM FCO	
PRE/ADD	7	TO IMMEDIATE ABIDJAN	
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER	
	9	RFI ROUTINE CAPE TOWN	
	10	MY 2ND PT: MESSAGE TO UPPER VOLTA HEAD OF STATE FROM PRIME	
	11	MINISTER.	
	12	The text of the message is as follows:	
	13	BEGINS: Thank you for your message about the visit to Britain	
	14	by the South African Prime Minsiter, Mr P W Botha. I am	
	15	concerned to dispel any misunderstanding about this.	
	16	Our invitation was issued after the most careful consideration	
	17	and signals no alteration in our policy towards South Africa.	
	18	Like you, we wish to see change in South Africa and have	
	19	consistently and firmly opposed the racial policies there. We	
	20	have made equally clear our condemnation of the use of violence in	
	21	the region from any quarter.	
///	22	Mr Botha's visit was an occasion for candid and wide-ranging	
//	23	talks which provided a major opportunity to explain to the South	
/	24	African Government at this high level our views and perceptions	
	25	on the major issues concerning Southern Africa. The discussions	
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		Comcen reference	Time of despatch

OUT. TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats
 CONFIDENTIAL

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 2 covered the problems of Namibia as well as other regional issues
 3 and many aspects of apartheid and the internal situation in South
 4 Africa. On Namibia we are anxious to see early independence and
 5 will continue to press for the implementation of the United
 6 Nations plan for Namibian independence.
 7 I believe that it is only through dialogue that we can hope
 8 to influence South African policies. We see our discussions with
 9 Mr Botha as part of the process through which we and other
 10 Western and African countries must continue to press for the sort
 11 of change we all want to see in Southern Africa. ENDS.
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 13 HOWE
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15 JUN 1984

