

UMELCO

Office of Unofficial Members of Executive and Legislative Councils
行政立法兩局非官守議員辦事處

9th July 1984

Mr. A.J. Coles,
Prime Minister's Office,
10 Downing Street,
London SW1,
England.

Dear Mr Coles,

You may be aware of my recent visit to Peking with my UMELCO colleagues Miss Lydia DUNN and Mr. Q.W. LEE when we met Chairman DENG Xiaoping and Mr. JI Pengfei; a translation of our Speaking Note for the meeting is attached.


In the course of the visit we made three major proposals which we believe would enhance the confidence of the people of Hong Kong in their future. They are recorded at page 3 onwards in the Speaking Note and a copy of the Note was passed to Chairman DENG and Mr. JI. The Chinese leaders appeared to accept the first proposal and showed a willingness to consider the other two.

The South China Morning Post of 6th July 1984 published the results of a further opinion survey conducted by an independent firm SRH (Survey Research Hong Kong Limited). According to the SCMP, the opinion poll this time consulted by telephone a random sample of 1,010 local people from a wide cross-section of ages (19 & above), income-levels and backgrounds. The survey shows 74% expressed agreement with proposal (1) and 78% and 61% with proposals (2) and (3) respectively. A photo copy of the SCMP report on the survey is also attached.

I believe the Prime Minister will be interested in this result and I should be grateful if you would kindly submit the report for her information.

With personal regards,

Yours sincerely,



S.Y. Chung
Senior Unofficial Member

Enclosures

UMELCO

Office of Unofficial Members of Executive and Legislative Councils
行政立法兩局非官守議員辦事處

Translation of the Full Text of a Chinese Speaking Note
made by Sir S Y CHUNG, Miss Lydia DUNN & Mr Q W LEE
During their Meetings with Chairman Deng Xiaoping and
Mr Ji Pengfei in Beijing on 23rd June 1984

We are honoured to have the opportunity during our visit to Beijing to meet with Chairman Deng Xiaoping and other Chinese leaders to have an exchange of views about the future of Hong Kong.

Being Chinese, we support the recovery of the sovereignty of Hong Kong and China's reunification plan, especially since China has formally announced that after 1997, Hong Kong will become a Special Administrative Region having a high degree of autonomy and administered by local people; and that the existing systems will remain unchanged for fifty years.

The British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe announced on 20th April 1984 that Britain will return the sovereignty of Hong Kong to China in 1997. This has helped to clarify the future of Hong Kong. However, it has not helped to boost the confidence of the people of Hong Kong. People remain anxious and worried and they are filled with uncertainties. This anxiety is not limited to those with money. They affect workers and ordinary citizens alike. This is a fact and we feel it our duty to reflect this situation honestly.

The current worries of the people of Hong Kong concern the periods before 1997 and that after 1997.

As regards the period before 1997, most people believe that only if prosperity and stability are maintained in the next thirteen years can there be any hope that prosperity and stability would continue for fifty years after 1997. People are worried that in order to reach an early accord, the Governments of China and Britain may come to an Agreement which will be lacking in detail and meaningless. This would lead to a loss of confidence, an exodus of professional and talented people, an outflow of capital, a lack of investment; resulting in economic recession in Hong Kong. Furthermore, people are worried that the jostling for power in the next 13 years may threaten the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong, forcing China to interfere or take over Hong Kong before 1997.

As regards the period after 1997, most people similarly believe that if there is no confidence in the arrangements after 1997, it would not be possible to maintain prosperity and stability in the 13 years before 1997. In particular, there are three main worries about post-1997 arrangements:

First, people are worried that instead of genuinely being administered by the people of Hong Kong, the future Government of Hong Kong would actually be administered from Beijing. Although China may not send any cadres to Hong Kong, the people administering Hong Kong in the future Government of Hong Kong may in fact be controlled by Beijing.

Second, people fear that the middle and lower level cadres who are responsible for the implementation of China's policy over Hong Kong may not be able to accept the capitalist systems and lifestyle of Hong Kong. They may not implement the policy of the central Government of China and they may interfere in the local administration.

Third, whilst people have faith in Chairman Deng and the present leadership, people are concerned that the future policy of China may change and that future leaders may revert to "extreme left" policies. They may not recognise the "one-country-two-systems" policy and renege on the promise that the existing systems in Hong Kong will remain unchanged for fifty years.

As we are Unofficial Members of the Hong Kong Executive and Legislative councils, the people of Hong Kong have high expectations about our meetings with Chairman Deng and other Chinese leaders in Beijing. We are conscious of our responsibility. We are concerned with the overall interest of Hong Kong so that it would continue to remain prosperous and stable. We will not, therefore, raise for discussion on this occasion, individual sectional issues such as land ownership and dual nationality, vital though they are. Our proposals are also not made for our own personal interests. We have carefully studied the views expressed by all classes of Hong Kong society in the last 10 months. We have thought through what would be necessary to maintain the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong before and after 1997, under the principle of the sovereignty of Hong Kong being returned to China in 1997. We will express our views frankly and honestly. We have three main recommendations:-

- (1) To maintain prosperity, confidence must be maintained. In order to maintain confidence, the Agreement between the two Governments of China and Britain must be found acceptable by the people of Hong Kong (especially by investors and professionals). The reaction to, and the success or failure of, the

Agreement really depends on its acceptability to the people of Hong Kong. For the people to accept the Agreement, the Agreement:

- must be very detailed; it must provide clear and precise definitions of all aspects of Hong Kong's existing systems.
- must be mutually binding as between the two signing countries of China and Britain.
- must contain a provision stipulating that the Basic Law of the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong will be based on the terms in the Agreement. This would prevent unnecessary arguments among the people of Hong Kong in future when the Basic Law is drafted. In addition, such a provision in the Agreement would help to give confidence throughout the period when the Basic Law is being drafted.

It is said that such a provision would be an interference into the internal affairs of China. We do not think that this argument has any validity. China has already made clear publicly its policies for Hong

Kong after 1997. Such policies will also be stated in the Agreement. A provision stating that the Basic Law would reflect the terms of the Agreement is merely an extension of these stated policies.

- (2) In order to enhance confidence, we believe that the Basic Law should be drafted in Hong Kong. It should be included in the Constitution of China after the approval by the Standing Committee of the Chinese National People's Congress (NPC). It is appreciated that normally the drafting and approval of Basic Law of Special Administrative Regions should be the responsibility of the Standing Committee of NPC because Special Administrative Regions are established, where necessary, under Article 31 of the Constitution of China. However, in view of the special circumstances of Hong Kong, the drafting of the Basic Law in Hong Kong would help to enhance confidence, and at the same time the expertise and talents of the Hong Kong people can be made use of. We believe, therefore, that the Basic Law should be drafted in Hong Kong by the people of Hong Kong together with representatives from Beijing for the approval of the Standing Committee of NPC. The Standing Committee can, of course, make amendments to the draft. The authority

of the NPC would not, therefore, be violated by this proposal. In addition, to give confidence even further that there would be no changes in the 50 years after 1997, it should be stipulated in the Basic Law that, following the precedent of Macau's Basic Law under Portugal, any future amendments to the Basic Law can only be initiated by Hong Kong.

- (3) Perhaps, we can best illustrate the worry of the Hong Kong people by an analogy. A small town is about to be resettled in a place where flooding has occurred about once every ten years in the last thirty years. In order to give confidence to the people being resettled there that their livelihood would not be threatened by flooding in the new place of residence the residents ask that a flood-protection dam should be built. If the Chinese leaders understand the anxiety of the people of Hong Kong and would agree to the establishment of an insulating mechanism, like a dam, between Hong Kong and China, confidence in Hong Kong would be greatly increased. We, therefore, propose the establishment of a Committee consisting of Chinese people of international standing and reputation. This Committee will be appointed by the Government of China. Their responsibility would be to monitor or advise the drafting, and implementation of, and subsequent amendments, if any, to the Basic Law.

The above recommendations, if accepted and adopted by the Government of China, will, in our opinion, greatly help to give confidence to the people of Hong Kong, upon which the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong depend. We hope that they would be seriously considered by Chairman Deng Xiaoping and other Chinese leaders.

According to the opinion poll, conducted by SRH (Survey Research Hongkong Ltd), an independent research firm, 49 per cent of the 1,010 people surveyed said the mission had not changed their level of confidence in Hongkong's future.

Only 29 per cent became more confident and 22 per cent said they were even less confident about the future.

The high degree of public support for the Umelco trio's recent trip to Peking was con-

sistent with the findings of an earlier SCM Post survey.

The first opinion survey, which focused on the controversial Umelco manifesto issued before the Unofficials went to London, showed that they had won the approval of a large body of opinion.

Support in that survey came from 82 per cent of the 605 people interviewed, with half that number giving it their full support and the rest their partial support.

In this second survey, the respondents were asked seven main questions, including whether they agreed or dis-

agreed with the Umelco trio's visit to Peking.

The results showed that 79 per cent agreed with the visit, 15 per cent had no opinion and only six per cent disagreed.

On the specific recommendations and worries raised by Umelco with China's

top leader, Mr Deng Xiaoping, the director of the Hongkong and Macau Affairs Office, Mr Ji Pengfei, and other Chinese leaders, support ranged from a high of 78 per cent on one point to a low of 46 per cent on another.

Respondents were told

that the three Unofficials had made a statement in Peking in which they supported China recovering sovereignty over Hongkong in 1997.

They were then asked if they agreed or disagreed with the three recommendations made by the Unofficials.

The findings showed that the recommendation which drew the greatest support was Umelco's call for the basic law to be drafted in Hongkong by local representatives and representatives from Peking.

This drew a positive response from 78 per cent of the respondents, while eight per cent said they disagreed with the proposal, 14 per cent had no opinion and only one per cent indicated they did not understand the proposal.

In order of support, the second most highly rated recommendation was the suggestion that the Sino-British agreement must be detailed and binding and contain a provision that the basic law will be based on the terms of the agreement.

Of those questioned, 74 per cent said they agreed, four per cent disagreed and 21 per cent had no opinion.

The third recommendation was that a committee of Chinese people of international standing and reputation should be appointed by China to monitor, draft and implement any subsequent changes to the basic law.

A total of 61 per cent of the respondents agreed with the idea, 19 per cent were against it, and 20 per cent had no opinion.

The Umelco three, who had repeatedly said they went to Peking to reflect the views and anxieties of the people of Hongkong, highlighted three major worries during their talks with Chinese leaders.

The respondents' views on these three areas of worry were more sharply divided.

First, they were asked they were worried that future Chinese leaders might revert to extreme left policies.

More than half (53 per cent) of them agreed that they were worried, while 47 per cent were not worried by that at all.

A second area of concern expressed by the Unofficials was the fear that middle and lower level cadres might not implement the policy of the central Government of China and that they might interfere in the local administration.

Again more than half (59 per cent) of those questioned said they were worried and the rest (41 per cent) were not.

On the concern that Hongkong people administering Hongkong will actually become administration from Peking, 46 per cent said they agreed that this worried them but 54 per cent said the opposite.

There was a wide range of views on whether the idea of "one-country-two-systems" would work in post-1997 Hongkong.

The outright optimists were in the minority as only 18 per cent said it was "most likely" that it would work, 2 per cent said it might "possibly" work, 33 per cent thought it "unlikely" to work and 24 per cent said they did not know.

Asked if they thought there was a problem of confidence in Hongkong, 67 per cent thought there was, 19 per cent said there was not, and the remaining 14 per cent said they did not know.



The chart shows respondents' views on the Umelco trio's visit to Peking.



Mr Deng



Sir Sze-yuen



Miss Dunn



Mr Lee

Eight in 10 back Umelco

By HALIMA GUTERRES

The Umelco three carried massive support on their recent mission to Peking, according to a special SCM Post survey.

As many as eight in 10 of those questioned gave their backing to the Unofficials' visit.

And two out of three agreed with the three Executive Councillors, Sir Sze-yuen Chung, Miss Lydia Dunn and Mr Q.W. Lee, that Hongkong is experiencing a confidence problem.

But half of those polled felt that the Umelco visit to Peking had made no difference.

Still, 71 per cent of the respondents believed Umelco members should go back to Peking later this year to meet Chinese leaders again.

Umelco's three recommendations with the extent of agreement from respondents are as follows:	
The basic law should be drafted in Hongkong by local representatives and representatives from Peking.	78%
The Sino-British agreement must be detailed and binding and contain a provision that the basic law will be based on the terms of the agreement.	74%
A committee of Chinese people of international standing and reputation should be appointed by China to monitor, draft and implement any subsequent changes to the basic law.	61%
Views on the three main worries mentioned in the Umelco statement:	
Future Chinese leaders may revert to extreme left policies.	53%
Middle and lower level cadres may not implement the policy of the central Government of China and interfere in the local administration.	52%
Hongkong people administering Hongkong will actually become administration from Peking.	46%

FUTURE OF HONG KONG

ADVANCE COPIES

11

10

PS

PS/PUS

PS/MR LUCE

~~MR WILSON~~

ED/ED

ED/PED

PS | LADY YOUNG

SIR W HARDING

RESIDENT CLERK

COPIES TO:

^{POWELL}
MR COLES, NO. 10 DOWNING ST

MR ROBERTS, NEWS DEPT

SIR PERCY CRADOCK

SECRET

DESKBY 090930Z

FM HONG KONG 090905Z JUL 84

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1866 OF 9 JULY

INFO IMMEDIATE PEKING

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

FUTURE OF HONG KONG: THE WAY AHEAD

1. I REPORTED THIS MORNING TO THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL ON THE DISCUSSIONS IN LONDON LAST WEEK ON FUTURE STRATEGY.
2. MEMBERS NOTED THE STRATEGY WHICH IT WAS NOW PROPOSED TO ADOPT. THEY CONTINUED TO EXPRESS STRONG CONCERN ABOUT THE JOINT GROUP AND IN PARTICULAR ABOUT LOCATING IT IN HONG KONG, IN THE LIGHT OF THE PURPOSES WHICH THE CHINESE INTENDED IT TO SERVE. THEY NOTED THE TACTICAL DEVICE OF POSTPONING DISCUSSION OF THE LOCATION OF THE GROUP AND LEAVING THE BRITISH POSITION ON ALL ASPECTS OF THE GROUP TO BE DETERMINED IN THE LIGHT OF THE OVERALL PACKAGE WHICH EMERGED FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS.
3. SIR S Y CHUNG, WITH SUPPORT FROM OTHER UNOFFICIALS EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD HAVE A FURTHER OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE (AMONG OTHERS) FURTHER WITH MR LUCE DURING HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT.

YOUDE

Hong Kong.. Future P. S.

With COP 13/7/84

504



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

13 July, 1984

Hong Kong: Letter from Sir S. Y. Chung

BF | I enclose a copy of a letter addressed to my predecessor from Sir S. Y. Chung. I should be grateful for advice and a draft reply.

C. D. POWELL

R. B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

ECL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 July 1984

Dear Charles,

Hong Kong: Letter from Sir S Y Chung

Thank you for your letter of 13 July enclosing a letter from Sir S Y Chung. I enclose a draft reply from yourself to Sir S Y.

Sir S Y Chung has also written identical letters to the Secretary of State and Mr Luce. Ministers decided not to reply to these since Mr Luce has just met Sir S Y in Hong Kong and the Secretary of State will be seeing him during his current visit to the territory.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM

Reference

Mr Powell

DEPARTMENT:

TEL NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Sir S Y Chung
 Senior Unofficial Member
 Office of UMELCO
 Swire House, 12th Floor
 9-25 Chater Road
 HONG KONG

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

Thank you for your letter of 9 July to my predecessor, John Coles. I have read with interest the three proposals you made during the visit which you undertook to Peking with Miss Dunn and Mr Lee. I have also noted the results of the SRH poll in the South China Morning Post.

CAVEAT.....

Enclosures—flag(s).....

HK: Future: PHS

27 JUL 1984

11 12 1
10 2 2
9 3
8 4
7 6 5

ea

27 July 1984

Thank you for your letter of 9 July to my predecessor, John Coles. I have read with interest the three proposals you made during the visit which you undertook to Peking with Miss Dunn and Mr Lee. I have also noted the results of the SRH poll in the South China Morning Post.

Charles Powell

Sir S Y Chung

ea

Public Response to the Statement issued by the Unofficial Members of the Hong Kong Executive and Legislative Councils on 9th May 1984:

THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG

On the 9th of May 1984 the Unofficial Members of the Hong Kong Executive and Legislative Councils issued a statement titled "The Future of Hong Kong" which reflected the fears and wishes of the 5.3 million residents, and which also included a number of suggestions as to how those anxieties might be allayed.

The position paper received wide coverage in Hong Kong as well as in the United Kingdom and other overseas countries.

A 10-member UMELCO delegation visited London at that time to exchange views with the Prime Minister, Senior Ministers, Members of the House of Commons and House of Lords and other interested parties, including the media.

During their visit the delegation in London received hundreds of telexes of support from District Boards, organisations, and individuals in Hong Kong. At the same time, the UMELCO Office in Hong Kong also received hundreds of messages of support from the local population.

Since the delegation's return there has been considerable comment on the UMELCO position paper, much of it supportive, some of it critical and a small portion non-committal.

Following is a summary of the response received by the UMELCO Office since the statement was issued more than two months ago:—

- District Boards* — The Unofficial Members of 14 of the 18 District Boards expressed full support.
- One District Board approved of the statement in part, and three offered no opinion.
- No District Board totally disapproved of the statement.
- Organisations* — A total of 1,509 organisations expressed their views. 1,504 fully approved of the statement.
- Another four organisations approved of the statement in part, and one organisation said it disapproved.
- Individuals* — Altogether 8,400 individual messages of total support were received, against 17 which disapproved of the position paper. Another 10 approved of part of the paper.

In addition to this response the influential English-language newspaper the South China Morning Post commissioned an independent survey carried out by Survey Research Hong Kong Limited.

The survey was conducted by telephone in Chinese, contacted a random sample of 605 people a little more than a week after the statement was issued.

Results showed:	<i>Full Approval</i>	<i>Part Approval</i>	<i>Disapprove</i>	<i>No Opinion</i>
	41 per cent	41 per cent	3 per cent	15 per cent

The UMELCO position paper listed the six main worries of the people of Hong Kong and the two questions most often and most urgently asked. It then went on to offer four suggestions which could help to allay the anxieties of residents.

The Six Worries:

- Will the essential elements of the Basic Law be enshrined in the Sino-British Agreement? If not, would not the British Government run the risk of signing an agreement which the Chinese side may later unilaterally alter on the grounds that it is in conflict with the Basic Law?
- If the Agreement is to be signed before the Basic Law is promulgated, should not Parliament withhold ratification until the details of the Basic Law are known?
- Should not the British Government insist on a mechanism which will ensure that the agreement is faithfully implemented?
- Should not Britain insist on retaining some residual status in Hong Kong beyond 1977 to provide re-assurance that the terms of the Agreement will be kept?
- Given the possibility that the Chinese authorities will seek to anticipate 1997 and start interfering with the administration of Hong Kong between now and then, will the British Government insist that it must retain effective control as the sovereign power, during the next 13 years?
- About half of Hong Kong's present population of 5.3 millions came to Hong Kong from China to seek a better life here. They do not relish the thought of a return to Chinese Communist rule. But what of the rest of the population? They are British nationals by birth (a small number by naturalisation) holding British passports with a right of abode in the British Dependent Territory of Hong Kong. What then will be the fate of Hong Kong's BDTCs? How will their rights and status be preserved? How will BDTCs continue to enjoy British protection? Will they, and other Hong Kong belongers who cannot accept the idea of living under Communist authority, have a right to settlement in the United Kingdom and should not the British Government negotiate settlement places for them?

The Two Questions:

- How is it proposed that acceptability is put to the test?
- What will be HMG's reaction if Hong Kong people do not accept the Agreement or parts of it?

The Four Suggestions:

Acceptability will depend on the Agreement now being negotiated:

- containing full details of the proposed administrative, legal, social and economic systems applicable after 1977;
- providing adequate and workable assurances that the terms of the Agreement will be honoured;
- stating that the provisions of the Basic Law will incorporate the provisions of the Agreement;
- guaranteeing that the rights of British nationals will be safeguarded.

The detailed breakdown of the response to this position paper is:

District Boards (elected and appointed non-government members)

	<i>District Population figures</i>	<i>% of Total</i>
<i>(a) Full approval</i>		
Central & Western (All members)	276,000	
Eastern (All members)	489,000	
Wan Chai (All members)	228,000	
Southern (All members)	232,000	
Mong Kok (8 of 12 members)	241,000	
Yau Ma Tei (All members)	179,000	
Wong Tai Sin (17 of 28 members)	490,000	
Sham Shui Po (15 of 22 members)	456,000	
North (All members)	130,000	
Sha Tin (All members)	250,000	
Tai Po (All members)	93,000	
Tsuen Wan (10 of 26 members)	665,000	
Tuen Mun (14 of 17 members)	192,000	
Yuen Long (17 of 19 members)	215,000	
	<hr/> 4,136,000	77.6
<i>(b) Approval in part</i>		
Kwun Tong (15 of 28 members)	658,000	12.3
<i>(c) Disapprove</i>		
	Nil	
<i>(d) No opinion</i>		
Kowloon City	450,000	
Islands	52,000	
Sai Kung	35,000	
	<hr/> 537,000	10.1
Total	<hr/> 5,331,000	100.0

Organisations

	<i>Membership</i>	
	<i>Constituent bodies</i>	<i>Persons</i>
<i>(a) Full approval</i>		
19 professional and academic groups	—	54,900
16 Trade and industrial associations	3,252	3,500
41 Civic organisations	6,436	44,800
11 Trade unions	20,080	156,700
13 Alumni associations and student unions	16	18,700
4 Civil service unions	11	21,700
1,322 Right-wing organisations and associations	—	500,000
78 Others	—	—
	<hr/> 30,095	<hr/> 1,031,500
1,504		

continued on p. 4

Organisations

	<i>Membership</i>	
	<i>Constituent bodies</i>	<i>Persons</i>
(b) <i>Approval in part</i>		
1 professional and academic group	—	9
3 Trade and industrial associations	7,000	—
(c) <i>Disapprove</i>		
1 Student organisation	9	—

Individuals

	<i>Number</i>
(a) Full approval	8,400
(b) Approval in part	10
(c) Disapprove	17

This fact sheet is intended to show the response obtained so far (18th July 1984) to the statement issued by UMELCO on the 9th May 1984.

The Unofficial Members of the Executive and Legislative Councils stress, however, that it should not be regarded as a definitive statement on the current views, wishes, fears and feelings of the people of Hong Kong.

The response data should only be regarded as indicative of views as expressed publicly by the community.

18th July 1984

UMELCO

Office of Unofficial Members of Executive and Legislative Councils
Swire House, 12th floor, 9-25 Chater Road, Hong Kong. Tel. 5-264027
TELEX NO. 62553 UMELC HX

South China Morning Post

Vol. XL No. 143

HONGKONG, FRIDAY, MAY 25, 1984

Price \$2.00

A solid 'Yes' vote for Umelco 80pc of quizzed approve

By HALIMA GUTERRES

The people of Hongkong have given Umelco's document of doubt a firm thumbs up, according to a special survey commissioned by the SCM Post.

The study conducted by SRH (Survey Research Hongkong Ltd), an independent research firm, found that eight out of 10 people interviewed said they approved, at least to a certain extent, the statement issued on the eve of Umelco's London mission.

The statement has sparked a major controversy in both London and Peking, with members of parliament as well as Chinese leaders condemning it as unrepresentative of the views of Hongkong people.

The survey, however, paints a totally different picture and appears to be a clear vindication of the Umelco line.

And as a further vote of confidence in Umelco, the survey found that four out of 10 people interviewed believed the statement would have a positive effect and that it would result in a more favourable agreement for Hongkong after 1997.

The high degree of support for the Umelco statement is significant, particularly in the light of attacks from British members of parliament — notably Mr Edward Heath — who claim that Umelco does

Where views came from

The survey was conducted by telephone among a random sample of 605 people from a wide cross-section of the community.

Of the total, 336 were men and 269 women.

White collar workers accounted for 135, blue collar workers 281, and the rest were either retired, housewives, students or unemployed.

The respondents, aged 19 and above, were interviewed between last Friday and Sunday — nine days after the Umelco statement was issued — and the findings were tabulated by computer.

not represent the views of Hongkong people.

And the results are clearly at variance with the belief of some MPs that Umelco represents the views of only a minority of people here.

When asked if they approved or disapproved of the statement, 41 per cent of the respondents indicated full approval, another 41 per cent said they approved in part and only a tiny three per cent disapproved of the statement.

The remaining 15 per cent had no opinion, a figure which our researchers said was not high and which indicated wide public interest in the statement.

While the timing of Umelco's visit has come under fire from the former Governor of Hongkong, Lord MacLehose, opinions in Hongkong were split down the middle on this question.

About four out of 10 peo-

What the people think

An SCM Post special survey

The following are the questions posed to the 605 respondents in the survey:

Question 1.

Awareness of Umelco Statement

	Of all respondents
Have seen or heard reports of the Umelco Statement	73%
Never heard of it	27%
	100%

	Of all respondents
In full	2%

	Of all respondents
From TV	57%
From newspaper summary	38%
From radio	28%
From conversation	17%

• Respondents can check more than one answer each, hence total is more than 100 per cent.

Question 2.

Degree of approval or disapproval of statement

	Of all respondents
Full approval	41%
Approve in part	41%
Disapprove of it	3%
No opinion	15%

ple (39 per cent) felt the statement was made at the right time but roughly the same number (42 per cent) disagreed.

Of those who disagreed with the timing, 22 per cent said the statement came too late and 20 per cent thought it was too early.

Almost half of those interviewed (45 per cent) endorsed the views expressed in the statement.

Interestingly the next largest group of respondents (23 per cent) felt the manifesto was too cautious, even though it has already sparked an uproar in both London and Peking.

Only 13 per cent felt the statement was too strong and the remaining 19 per cent held no views on the subject.

Questioned about their views on the effect of the statement on the Peking talks,

the largest group, 39 per cent, said they believed it would result in a more favourable agreement for Hongkong.

The next largest group, 24 per cent, believed it would have no effect, 20 per cent had no opinion and 17 per cent feared it would result in a less favourable agreement for Hongkong.

Awareness of the Umelco statement was also high, with 73 per cent of the respondents indicating that they had either seen or heard reports of it, against 27 per cent who knew nothing of the statement.

The great majority of the respondents, not surprisingly, had learnt of the statement through the mass media, but only two per cent said they had seen or heard it in full.

Another interesting point was that 17 per cent of those interviewed said that they had heard about it in conver-

Question 3.

Views on timing of statement

	Of all respondents
Right time	39%
Too late	22%
Too soon	20%
No opinion	19%

Question 4.

Views on expression of statement

	Of all respondents
Just right	45%
Too cautious	23%
Too strongly expressed	13%
No opinion	19%

Question 5.

Views on effect of statement on Peking talks

	Of all respondents
Result in a more favourable agreement for Hongkong	39%
No effect	24%
Result in a less favourable agreement for Hongkong	17%
No opinion	20%

sation, which would support the view that Umelco was a great talking point among Hongkong people.

Five questions were posed to the respondents and after the first one, which dealt with awareness of the statement, the interviewers read out a 250-word summary of the Umelco statement to the respondents.

The purpose of this was to refresh the memories of respondents.

The summary outlined the Umelco statement and drew attention to the fact that it "stresses the concerns and fears felt by many organisations and individuals who have made representations to it (Umelco) in recent months on the question of Hongkong's future as a special administrative zone under Chinese sovereignty after 1997.

"Specifically it asks whether the UK Government could retain 'some residual status' in Hongkong after that date and it seeks guarantees that the rights of British nationality will be safeguarded after British withdrawal.

"It advocates that the essential elements of the Basic Law be stated in the Sino-British agreement and likewise the provisions of the Basic Law will incorporate the provisions of the agreement.

"The statement reflects concern over the way negotiations over Hongkong's future have been progressing and a distrust of Chinese authorities to honour the terms of the agreement on Hongkong's future.

"It sets out the unanimous views of the Unofficial members of the Executive and Legislative Councils."

With the Compliments

Mr Powell

of the

297

Unofficial Members of the Hong Kong

Executive & Legislative Councils

UMELCO

Office of the Unofficial
Members of the Executive
and Legislative Councils
12/F, Swire House,
Hong Kong

Sir P. Gaborok or
PM will have seen
this in the
some no
TEL.: 5-264027
TELEX NO. 62553 UMELC HX
C.D.D. -

香港
行政
立法
兩局
非官
守議員

致
意

香港太古大廈十三樓
行政立法兩局非官守議員辦事處
電話：五——二六四〇二七
專用電報號碼：62553 UMELC HX