



PM/84/142

PRIME MINISTER

Future of Hong Kong: Undertakings by HMG to Hong Kong People

1. At OD(K) on 17 July, we had before us a paper setting out proposals that HMG should give undertakings on entry to the UK to specific categories of people in Hong Kong. The Home Secretary and I were instructed to continue our discussions with a view to reaching a joint view, which we could recommend to the Sub-Committee.

2. I attach a paper and two annexes which have been drafted with the assistance of the Home Office and the Ministry of Defence (in view of MOD responsibilities for personnel in Hong Kong). They also incorporate the views of the Governor of Hong Kong who has consulted the Executive Council. I have discussed them in detail with the Home Secretary. We are proposing:

(a)

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(b) that undertakings should be given to 4,300 Unofficial members of the Executive and Legislative Councils, judges and magistrates, administrative officers, senior policemen, MOD employees and other civil servants (Group Two) that they and their families would be allowed entry to the UK when they reached normal pensionable age, or earlier if they became vulnerable;

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H.A. direct in FCO.
Prime Minister
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(c) that it should be accepted in principle that some other individuals outside these two groups will exceptionally need to be allowed entry to the UK with their families if they become vulnerable.

3. The maximum number of undertakings that would be given with regard to Group One and Group Two above would be 6,400. It is not known how many dependants these people will have. On the basis of the average family size in Hong Kong, these undertakings would represent an estimated immigration commitment of approximately 25,000 between now and 2029. In addition there will be a limited commitment under (c). In practice, it is likely that by no means all of these will take up the offer and come to the UK. In recent years Hong Kong emigrants have largely chosen the United States, Canada and Australia as their new homes.

4. There are three important points on which the Government's responsibilities for making satisfactory arrangements for the future of Hong Kong conflict with our policy of maintaining a tight control on immigration. These are:

- (a) ceilings on the number of undertakings to be given;
- (b) a ceiling on the number of annual admissions to the United Kingdom;
- (c) a definition of dependants.

If the Hong Kong Government are to complete the administrative arrangements for giving the undertakings before the expected date for initialling the Agreement, we must reach agreement on these points at OD(K) on 4 September. The paragraphs below set out the points which the Home Secretary and I would like colleagues to consider.



5. Ceiling on number of undertakings: the Home Secretary wishes to set a ceiling on the total number of undertakings. I can accept a ceiling on the number of undertakings to be given to people in Groups One and Two, subject to a caveat that, should there be a need to increase the rate of recruitment into these groups beyond the level now allowed for, HMG would consider giving undertakings to the additional personnel concerned. The only area in which I can at present see a possible need is the recruitment of additional police for internal security purposes, if we are unable to persuade the Chinese to agree to the formation of a local internal security force. A rough estimate for planning purposes of the numbers that might be required for this contingency would be 3,000. How many of these would fall within Group Two would depend on the role which the force was called upon to perform. I propose that if the requirement proves necessary between now and 1997, a fresh submission should be put to Ministers to decide whether additional undertakings should be given over and above the ceiling of 6,400 proposed.

6. Ceiling on the number of annual admissions: the Home Secretary and I have agreed that there is no immediate need to place a ceiling on the total number of admissions to the United Kingdom each year for Groups One and Two. However, it may become necessary to consider imposing a ceiling at a future date, if the flow of Chinese into the UK becomes unacceptable to the Home Secretary. This would need careful handling. We would need to ensure that those who were highly vulnerable at the time were not as a result of an imposed ceiling forced to remain at risk in Hong Kong.



7. Dependants: The Home Secretary thinks that, quite apart from the increase in the number of people admitted from Hong Kong as a result of our proposals, there would be undesirable repercussions for policy regarding other groups of immigrants if we were to make any more general provision for the entry of dependants in the case of Hong Kong than those covered by the criteria set out in the Immigration Rules. The Rules allow for the general admission of spouses and unmarried dependant children under 18. They also allow for the admission of widowed mothers of any age, widowed fathers aged 65 or over and parents of whom at least one is aged 65 or over, if they are wholly or mainly dependent on children coming to or settled in this country and have no other close relatives to turn to. There is provision for exceptional treatment of compassionate cases outside these criteria. The assurances to be given to those in Groups One and Two (paragraph 4 of Annex 4) bring these points out clearly.

8. I believe that the circumstances in which people would enter the UK under the proposals in this paper are not comparable with cases of normal immigration. They arise directly from our giving up sovereignty over a colony to a Communist State. Apart from the anguish of leaving aged parents or other relations behind, the possibility of retribution against those remaining in Hong Kong will weigh heavily on the minds of those to whom undertakings are given. We must avoid placing them in the impossible position of having to choose between their own safety and their family responsibilities. This could and should in my view be avoided by a readiness to give a flexible interpretation to "compassionate" in the case of Hong Kong to cover, for example, parents falling outside the criteria in the Immigration Rules where they could be in real danger of retribution if they were to remain in Hong Kong. Individual cases would have to be looked at on this basis by Home Office Ministers.



9. Parliamentary and public interest will require statements on undertakings to be made in Parliament and in Hong Kong.

I propose that a Ministerial statement should be made in December during the debate on the future of Hong Kong.

The Governor will need to make a statement in Hong Kong in September and it may be necessary to reply to Parliamentary Questions before the test of acceptability is complete. This requirement is considered further in paragraphs 7 and 8 of Annex 2.

10. One last point. In the course of our negotiations, I have had to ask the Executive Council in Hong Kong to accept some unpalatable decisions, for example the establishment of the Joint Liaison Group, because of the need to meet Chinese demands. There are no such constraints as far as Undertakings are concerned: they are in HMG's gift. It will be difficult to carry the Executive Council with us over other crucial and unpalatable decisions which will have to be faced in the final weeks of negotiations if we give the impression of being niggardly over undertakings.

11. I am copying this minute to our colleagues on OD(K) and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

3 September 1984

FUTURE OF HONG KONG : UNDERTAKINGS BY HMG TO HONG KONG PEOPLE
THE ARGUMENTS FOR GIVING UNDERTAKINGS

1. HMG will remain responsible for Hong Kong until 1997. There will in any circumstances be great difficulties in ensuring stable administration during the run up to that date. Our ability to do this will depend on our being able to retain the loyalty of the public service (including the police) and of members of the public who are willing to serve a "British" administration before 1997 and to take the risk of continuing in the service of the SAR thereafter. There is a genuine concern that the Chinese will be noting who is loyal to the Hong Kong Government and that such people will be vulnerable to pressure before 1997 and to retribution afterwards. Such pressure is already being applied. The Chinese Government has instructed the Communist Party in Hong Kong to try and penetrate the Hong Kong Government, particularly the police and administrative officers, and their united front activities are being stepped up accordingly. Assurances that people with the most to fear from China's resumption of sovereignty would if necessary be looked after could remove an important cause of potential unrest, especially within the public service. People are more likely to stay in Hong Kong if they know that in the last resort they would be able to leave. If they are not given assurances they will leave Hong Kong well before 1997.

2. The Prime Minister alluded to Britain's "moral responsibility" when she visited Hong Kong in September 1982. This moral argument takes as its basis HMG's position as its colonial power and as employer for the past 140 years: it is therefore considered to be particularly relevant to Crown servants and Unofficial members of EXCO and LEGCO. Many people in Hong Kong, not only the Unofficial members of EXCO, believe strongly that HMG has an obligation in this area and see it as a yardstick by which to measure HMG's commitment to Hong Kong. Assurances to those who may be at risk after 1997 would go some way to fulfilling this obligation.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST GIVING UNDERTAKINGS

3. The giving of undertakings at this time could be interpreted in Hong Kong and elsewhere as indicating lack of confidence in the settlement. It may be said that if the settlement is intended to secure the future of all those in Hong Kong, the giving of assurances to anyone there should be unnecessary. Moreover, any undertaking, particularly one which was tightly drawn, could have a divisive effect in Hong Kong which would damage rather than raise morale. Those who fell outside the category to which an undertaking applied would be likely to resent their exclusion and to press for the extension of undertakings to themselves.

4. More generally, any large-scale immigration from Hong Kong would run counter to HMG's policies in this field, and would be politically unpopular. The precedents of the inflow of East African Asians in the 1960's and of the later exodus from Uganda in 1972, are not happy ones in domestic political terms. Although arrivals of people given undertakings could be phased, nevertheless the total number of people covered by any undertakings, when it became known, would have a sharp political impact.

PROPOSALS

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6. A second group consists of those who would be vulnerable to retribution as a consequence of their service to the British administration in Hong Kong, but whose services it will be essential to retain both in the run up to 1997 and after the change to a SAR, if effective government, continuity and confidence are to be preserved. These are people who would be able to leave Hong Kong and settle abroad. They will be tempted to do so if they are not given an undertaking that they will be allowed entry into the UK if things went wrong. This group would include Unofficial members of the Executive and Legislative Councils, judges and magistrates, administrative officers, police gazetted officers and inspectors, officers of the Hong Kong Military Service Corps and some civilian employees of the Hong Kong Garrison, and certain other individuals who deal directly with the communists. These people are vulnerable because of the "political" nature of their work, which causes them to be the most visible representatives of the "British" administration. There is already evidence of the Chinese trying to cultivate them, creating precisely the sort of unease that our proposals are designed to help to alleviate.

7. For this second group the aim would be to ensure continuity by providing reassurances that such people will be looked after provided they serve their normal term until retirement. It is proposed that public servants in this group and their immediate families should be granted entry into the UK when they reach normal pensionable age (at present 50 for police and 55 for other civil servants) unless their position becomes vulnerable before then, in which case provision would have to be made for them at an earlier date. Unofficial members of EXCO and LEGCO would become eligible after they had left the Councils or before that if they became vulnerable.

8. There will also inevitably be other individuals who do not fall into these two groups, but who may become vulnerable during the coming years because of their service to the Hong Kong Government and the community. This will depend on the attitude of the Chinese Government to such people between now and 1997, the circumstances at the time of transition and beyond and the extent to which HMG and the Hong Kong Government have to take action unpopular with the

communists. Examples of people who might be affected are members of certain public bodies, particularly those dealing with immigration, deportation, or labour matters; members of the public service, such as certain units of the police force who may have to take firm action in case of social disorder or action unpopular with communist sympathisers in order to maintain law and order; members of the Armed Forces and supporting staff, and of the Royal Hong Kong Auxiliary Police, in similar circumstances; members of the public, such as journalists, those standing for election and other public figures who may be singled out as targets for resisting communist influence; and retired civil servants and members of the community who were actively engaged against the communists in 1967. It is not proposed that assurances should be given to these people, but it would be open to the Governor to recommend to the Home Secretary that individuals should exceptionally be admitted because they were personally at risk. It is not possible to estimate how many people may need assistance in this way. But the kind of figure under this head that the Foreign Secretary and Home Secretary have in mind at this stage is of the order of 25 plus dependants.

9. There will be very strong pressure from civil servants as a whole and even from BDTCs outside the civil service for more wide-ranging undertakings to be given than are proposed above. This pressure will be even more intense if no agreement is reached or if the agreement does not command widespread support in Hong Kong. We will have to take careful account of the need to maintain morale in the public service over the period up to 1997. But the best we can do for the rest of the public service, apart from the groups described above, is to rely on assurances in the agreement in respect of pensions, continuity of service and the barrier against political intervention against individuals which will be provided by the establishment of an executive Public Service Commission in Hong Kong.

SUMMARY

10. The proposals outlined above would mean that individual assurances would be given to not more than 6,400 people from Hong Kong that they and their dependants would be allowed entry to the UK over a period from now until well into the next century. Details of the numbers involved in each category, when they might be expected to come to the UK and the form of assurance that they would be given, are set out in the attached annexes.

11. It should be noted that not everyone to whom an assurance was given would actually wish to settle in the UK, if given a choice in the matter. Hong Kong people contemplating emigration tend to look towards Canada, Australia and the US rather than Britain. Many people, particularly among the professional classes, have already made contingency plans that permit them legally to take up residence in one or other of the preferred destinations.

12. These proposals, if accepted, would go further than any assurances so far given to people in Hong Kong. Whether they would be sufficient to maintain confidence and to prevent an exodus is difficult to predict and will depend to a large extent on the acceptability of the agreement reached with the Chinese. But the Governor believes that it is unlikely that HMG would be able in practice to hold a tighter line for long. Political pressure in the UK for more sympathetic discharge of our moral obligation and disaffection among the Hong Kong public service would be strong. It would be better to show some limited flexibility, within the existing law, in order to stave off even wider demands.

13. If we were unable to reach agreement with the Chinese, or if the agreement did not hold up for any reason either before or after 1997, there would be a major crisis. In such circumstances, there would be an obligation on HMG to take at once all those to whom it had made a commitment. But the political pressures on HMG to help these people would in any case be intense whether or not they had earlier been given any assurances. Moreover, the undertakings that



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are proposed above are designed to minimise the risk of a break down in Hong Kong, by helping to maintain confidence in the territory and thus making it more useful to the Chinese as an autonomous unit.

Hong Kong Department

August 1984

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UNDERTAKINGS BY HMG TO HONG KONG PEOPLE
ANNEX ONE: GROUPS AND NUMBERS INVOLVED

A: GROUP ONE

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B: GROUP TWO

4. This covers those who would be vulnerable to retribution as a consequence of their service to the British Administration in Hong Kong, but whose services it will be essential to retain both in the run up to 1997 and after the change to a SAR if effective government, continuity and confidence are to be preserved. It comprises:-

(a) Past and present Unofficial members of the Executive and Legislative Councils who do not already have the right of abode outside Hong Kong (estimated 38).

(b) Serving Members of the Administrative Service of the Hong Kong Government (214).

(c) Serving Gazetted officers and inspectors in the Royal Hong Kong Police Force (1,451).

(d) Serving Judges and Magistrates (13).

(e) Certain other serving individual staff of the Hong Kong government who deal directly with the Communists (220).

(f) Local civilian and military staff currently employed by the Ministry of Defence (48).

(g) Staff who will be recruited into the above categories between now and 1997 (2,300 - 350 for (b), 1820 for (c), 14 for (f) and 116 for the other categories).

The total is therefore a maximum of 4,300.

5. On the basis of the same estimated average family size of 3.9 as used in category one, the total including dependants would be approximately 16,700.

6. Those in this category to whom assurances are given would enter the United Kingdom over the period between now and 2029. But if things were to go wrong in Hong Kong before 1997 or if individuals in this category became vulnerable before retirement age, it would be necessary to allow them into the UK then.

PHASING AND CEILINGS

7. The total number of people in groups one and two to whom assurances would be given would not exceed 6,400. The estimated commitment, assuming an average family size of 3.9, would therefore be approximately 25,000. If things went well, their arrival would be spread over 13 years in the case of the first category, and over 45 years in the case of the second. Those people who are already over retirement age (approximately 600) could be expected to arrive in the next few years, with their families. Of those now serving who are under that age (and those to be recruited in future) no more than 200 would reach retirement age in any one year. Allowing for dependants, the maximum number of people to whom assurances would be given in any year in both categories would therefore not normally exceed 1,000. However, there will be some 700 people in group one who will not have reached retirement age in 1997. These and their dependants would probably be admitted over a short period before that date.

8. It should be noted, however, that there is no guarantee that everyone will take up the assurance immediately they are entitled to. Many people may prefer to stay in Hong Kong for as long as possible. To insist on them leaving Hong Kong before it becomes necessary for them to do so could alarm them and create unnecessary anxiety in the community. Moreover, the more people that choose to stay in Hong Kong, the smaller the immigration commitment that will fall on HMG.

9. It is not envisaged that any reception arrangements would be needed for those who entered the UK under these proposals. Virtually all of them would speak English and would have regular incomes, either from private sources or Government pensions. They would therefore be unlikely to be any special burden on public funds.

UNDERTAKINGS BY HMG TO HONG KONG PEOPLE

ANNEX TWO: FORM OF ASSURANCES AND PROCEDURES FOR GIVING THEM

1. An assurance would need to satisfy the person concerned that he would definitely be able to come to the United Kingdom and remain here. It is not necessary or desirable to give individuals any precise indication of the means by which such an assurance would be given effect. It is not possible, for example, to offer groups of people or individuals a guarantee in advance that they would be given British citizenship or would enter this country as citizens. Under the British Nationality Act 1981 citizenship may be acquired only on application and subject to the exercise of the Secretary of State's discretion, which must be based on consideration of the applicant's circumstances. These provisions are not compatible with the giving of assurances in advance (and without individual consideration) that any particular person or groups will be given British citizenship.

2. This does not rule out the possibility that people at risk may wish to apply under section 4(5) of the Act on their own initiative and at a time of their own choosing, but it does mean that they will do so without a guarantee of success. Moreover, Ministers have made it plain that applications under this section will be scrutinised very carefully and that the provision will be used sparingly. The enquiries which would necessarily precede any decision will take too long for this route to be effective at short notice, particularly if for any reason it became desirable to consider large numbers of applications simultaneously.

3. Accordingly no reliance may be placed on nationality provisions either as a basis for prior assurances or as a means to effect entry to this country at short notice or in relatively large numbers. Immigration procedures, however, are not subject to the same difficulties, given the scope for exceptional action, if necessary outside the Rules. Once through immigration control into this country, given settlement, and residentially qualified, people from Hong Kong could then apply for British citizenship under section 6(1) of the Act - the usual naturalisation route.

4. In the light of this, it is proposed that the form of words for any assurance given to those involved in group one (intelligence operations) would be:

"You may be assured that at an appropriate time you, your spouse at that time, and unmarried and dependent children then aged under 18, will be allowed to enter and remain in the United Kingdom, provided that each is personally acceptable.

The decision on when will be an appropriate time will be taken by the Home Secretary after taking advice from the Governor of Hong Kong, but it will be before 1997. This assurance also allows, under the Immigration Rules, for the admission of widowed mothers of any age, widowed fathers then aged 65 and over, and parents of whom at least one is then aged 65 and over if they are wholly or mainly dependent on children going to settle in Britain and if they have no other relatives to turn to. Exceptionally, an application outside these criteria would be considered on compassionate grounds."

For those in the second group the assurance would be in similar terms, except that the second sentence would be replaced by - "The decision on when will be an appropriate time will be taken by the Home Secretary after taking advice from the Governor of Hong Kong before 1997, and HMG's representative in Hong Kong thereafter. This would not be before you reach normal pensionable age, unless circumstances became such that HMG judged it appropriate to admit you earlier".

5. The Governor of Hong Kong has advised that these assurances should be given no later than the publication of the Sino-British agreement on the future of Hong Kong. This is likely to be around the end of September. They would be given orally by a senior officer, either to individuals or groups of staff as appropriate. To avoid future doubts about whether an assurance had been given, a written copy of it, signed by the individual and the person who had conveyed the assurance, would be placed on the personal file of the person concerned. Copies would not be given to individuals, because

of the risk of forgery and other abuse. A list of all those who had been given assurances would be held by the Home Office as a further safeguard. This list would need to be updated regularly to take account of new recruits. Delegated authority could be given to the Governor of Hong Kong to decide which of the individuals in group one should be allowed to come at a particular time, subject to an overall ceiling in each year agreed by the Home Secretary.


6. These procedures would not be appropriate in the case of anyone in Hong Kong who fell outside these two groups and who might ask about his position if he became vulnerable. The form of words proposed for use in answering enquiries in such cases would be: "If at any time you consider yourself to be at risk and wish to come to the UK you may apply to do so. If special circumstances affecting any individual were to arise the Home Secretary may take these into account. I can of course give no guarantee on what decision he would take". No written record would be kept of this response and no central list compiled of those to whom it had been given.

7. There would inevitably be Parliamentary interest in these arrangements. It is proposed that a Ministerial statement should be made in December during the Debate on the future of Hong Kong. Such a statement could be on the following lines:-

"Assurances have been given by HMG to some 3,700 people in Hong Kong that if they wish to apply they will be permitted to enter the UK and remain here. To these 3,700 will be added approximately a further 2,700 as a result of further recruitment between now and 1997. These assurances have been and will be given in the light of each individual's service to the Crown. They extend to the spouse and dependent children under 18 of those concerned. It is intended that the arrival of these people will be phased over a number of years. It may also be necessary to consider exceptionally admitting to the UK a small number of other individuals from Hong Kong."

It would not be appropriate to give details of the groups to whom assurances had been given, although this would be likely to become public knowledge.

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8. It will be necessary also to make some kind of statement in Hong Kong in September and possibly subsequently in London in response to questions in Parliament. Any statements at this time ie before the end of the period of the test of acceptability should avoid giving any details of the number and type of assurances given.

Hong Kong Department
August 1984

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PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

OD(K): Future of Hong Kong: Undertakings by
Her Majesty's Government to Hong Kong People

BACKGROUND

At their last meeting, the Sub-Committee had a brief exchange on the question of undertakings to certain Hong Kong people that they be admitted to the United Kingdom following the relinquishment of British sovereignty over the territory in 1997. OD(K) agreed that substantive discussion should be deferred and invited the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Home Secretary to continue their discussions with a view to reaching a joint view which they could recommend to the Sub-Committee (OD(K)(84) 8th Meeting, Item 2). The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute of 3 September to you attaches a paper and two annexes that have been drafted with the assistance of the Home Office and Ministry of Defence. They also incorporate the views of the Governor of Hong Kong, who has consulted the Executive Council.

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2. There is now a large measure of agreement on the nature and extent of the undertakings which should be given to Hong Kong people. Nevertheless, as explained in the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute of 3 September, three important points remain to be settled. Sir Geoffrey Howe would like these points settled at this meeting of OD(K) so that the Hong Kong Government can complete the administrative arrangements for giving the undertakings before the expected date of initialling the Joint Declaration (i.e. 24/25 September).

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3. The Chancellor of the Exchequer is unable to attend the meeting and will ~~not~~ be represented. ^{by Mr. Stewart} The Lord Privy Seal and the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr Luce) are also unable to attend.

HANDLING

4. You should invite the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to introduce the discussion and the Home Secretary to reply. It would be appropriate to handle the discussion under the following main headings -

a. Extent of undertakings

Does the Sub-Committee agree that undertakings be given as follows:

(i)

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(ii) to 4,300 unofficial members of the Executive and Legislative Council, judges and magistrates, administrative officers, senior policemen, Ministry of Defence employees and other civil servants (Group Two) that they and their families would be allowed entry to the United Kingdom when they reach normal pensionable age, or earlier if they become vulnerable;

(iii) in principle to some other individuals outside these Groups if they become vulnerable?

b. Ceiling on number of undertakings

On the basis of the average family size in Hong Kong, the undertakings to the 6,400 people in Groups One and Two represent an estimated immigration commitment of approximately 25,000 between now and ²⁰²⁹ ~~2059~~. Is this an acceptable commitment? Does the Sub-Committee



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further agree that if the requirement arises (e.g. through additional police recruitment) between now and 1997, a fresh submission should be put to Ministers to decide whether additional undertakings should be given, over and above the ceiling of 6,400?

c. Ceiling on the number of annual admissions

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Home Secretary agree that there is no immediate need to place a ceiling on the total number of admissions to the United Kingdom each year for Groups One and Two: is this accepted by the Sub-Committee? Is it also agreed that the position should remain under review and that the Home Secretary should have discretion to propose the imposition of an annual ceiling if the flow of Chinese in the future creates difficulties?

d. Dependants

The Home Secretary sees undesirable implications for general immigration policy if the provisions for the entry of the dependants of the 6,400 are more generous than the criteria of the Immigration Rules (i.e. limitations to spouses, unmarried dependent children under 18 and, in certain strictly defined circumstances, aged parents). The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary argues that Hong Kong is a special case because of the particular risks arising from the transfer of sovereignty to a Communist regime, e.g. the possible danger of retribution against aged parents or other relatives falling outside the Immigration Rules. He proposes that such cases be dealt with by a flexible interpretation of "compassionate" under the Rules. Does the Sub-Committee agree?



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e. Publicity for undertakings

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary proposes that the Governor of Hong Kong should make a statement about undertakings in Hong Kong in September and that a Ministerial statement should be made in December during the debate on the future of the Territory. Is publicity necessary? Or might it be interpreted in Hong Kong and elsewhere as indicating lack of confidence in the settlement? What would be the political impact of such statements in Peking?

CONCLUSIONS

5. Subject to the points made in discussion, you could guide the Sub-Committee to the following conclusions -

- i. agree that personal undertakings be given to the 6,400 Hong Kong people in Groups One and Two that they and their dependants will be allowed entry to the United Kingdom before 1997;
- ii. agree in principle that personal undertakings should be given to some other individuals outside Groups One and Two, if they become vulnerable;
- iii. agree that if the requirement arises for further undertakings under Groups One and Two over and above the 6,400, a fresh submission will be made to Ministers;
- iv. agree that there is no immediate need for a ceiling on the total number of admissions to the United Kingdom each year under Groups One and Two but that the Home Secretary should have discretion to propose such a ceiling if the consequential flow of immigrants in the future creates difficulties;



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v. agree that the circumstances surrounding the relinquishment of British sovereignty over Hong Kong constitute a special case and accordingly invite the Home Secretary to adopt a flexible interpretation of the Immigration Rules in cases where there is a risk of retribution against aged parents or other relatives falling outside the Immigration Rules;

vi. agree that a statement about the undertakings should be made by the Governor of Hong Kong in September and by Ministers during the debate on the future of the Territory in December but that in general publicity about the undertakings should be kept to the minimum.

B G Cartledge

3 September 1984