

Prime Minister  
Agree attached 64<sup>①</sup>  
messages to President



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Reagan & Mr. Hawke?

London SW1A 2AH

Now very well  
dictated - indeed  
no one to  
President Reagan  
is really had - that  
need to amend  
to improve  
and

C.D.P.  
21/9

21 September 1984

Dear Charles,

Yes as amended  
mt

Future of Hong Kong: Briefing for the Australians and Americans

In your letter of 14 September you said that the Prime Minister would be ready to send messages to President Reagan and Mr Hawke.

We should like the American Government (perhaps Mr Shultz), and Mr Hawke to make statements in support of the Agreement as soon as possible after publication of the Agreement. Since there will only be a few hours between initialling and publication, our Missions will need to deliver the messages to their recipients in advance of initialling. We would therefore propose to despatch messages, if the Prime Minister is content, in the course of Monday 24 September.

I enclose draft messages for Mr Reagan and Mr Hawke. In the time available I have not been able to show these to Sir Geoffrey Howe. I will be showing him a copy overnight.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street



DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM

Reference

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

President Reagan

Top Secret

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

*DSG ABV.*

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

After two years of tough and detailed negotiations with the Chinese, which started with my visit to Peking in September 1982, we are set to initial an agreement on 26 September.

CAVEAT.....

I believe that in this Agreement we have achieved the major points we set out to secure. In particular, it <sup>will be</sup> ~~is unequivocally~~ a binding international agreement; it <sup>incorporates</sup> ~~contains~~ in our view sufficient detail and clarity about the arrangements in Hong Kong <sup>for a period of 50 years</sup> after 1997 to command the confidence of the people of Hong Kong; and it contains a provision that its terms will be stipulated in the Basic Law to be passed by the National People's Congress of China which will, in effect, form the Constitution of Hong Kong after 1997. We have ~~also~~ managed to secure a high degree of autonomy for Hong Kong in all fields, especially in the financial and economic fields and in aviation and shipping.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

I do not pretend that the Agreement is ideal in every respect, but I am convinced that it is a ~~very~~ <sup>shall</sup> good one, and I ~~feel able to~~ commend it strongly as a whole to the people of Hong Kong and to Parliament.



I believe that this Agreement has an importance that stretches beyond HONG Kong itself. It will help to heal some of the historical scars which still make relations between China and the West difficult at times. It will also play a stabilising role in the area. But to do this, the Agreement must work. If it does not work, this could only have a <sup>bad</sup> ~~strongly negative~~ effect on China's relations with the West generally. It is therefore in the interests of the West as a whole that it should ~~not fail~~ <sup>succeed</sup>.

That is why I wanted to write to you personally ~~at this time about the importance of the Agreement~~. As you know well, Hong Kong's prosperity and security depend critically on international confidence. Without that ~~confidence~~, its prosperity will evaporate. Hong Kong is heavily dependent on ~~its~~ commercial links with the United States. It would therefore be most valuable if <sup>you</sup> felt able to authorise a personal statement from a senior member of your Administration once the Agreement is published. ~~I hope that the statement could express~~ <sup>the</sup> confidence of the United States in Hong Kong's future prosperity. That would ~~be of great importance in giving~~ <sup>e powerful</sup> a lead to international reactions. It would be a major contribution to ensuring the survival of Hong Kong as a flourishing capitalist society.



DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM  
PRIME MINISTER

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

The Honourable R J L Hawke AC MP

Copies to:

*DSSABU*

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

As you know, we have been engaged in tough and detailed negotiations with the Chinese over the future of Hong Kong, ~~Since~~ my visit to Peking in 1982, ~~we~~ have kept your people regularly briefed. We have now agreed the text of a draft agreement which will be initialled on 26 September. I am arranging for our High Commissioner to let you have a copy of the Agreement.

Our aim has been to secure the best possible framework within which Hong Kong's unique and highly developed social, legal and economic systems can be maintained and developed. The Agreement meets our essential requirements. It ~~is unequivocally~~ <sup>will be</sup> a binding international agreement; it ~~describes with sufficient~~ <sup>incorporates sufficient</sup> detail and clarity the high degree of autonomy which Hong Kong will continue to enjoy after 1997 and the specific arrangements which will prevail there for 50 years thereafter; and it states that its terms will be stipulated in a Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, which will be passed by the National People's Congress, and will, in effect, form the constitution

Enclosures—flag(s).....



of Hong Kong after 1-97.

The Agreement is one which I <sup>shall</sup> ~~feel able to~~ commend strongly to the people of Hong Kong and to Parliament.

I wanted to write to you personally to let you know what has been achieved, in view of Australia's particularly close interest in Hong Kong. The Australian contribution to the territory in terms of capital, expertise, technology and skilled and professional manpower has been considerable. I very much hope that you will feel able to make a personal statement on the agreement ~~reached~~, commending the results of the efforts of both sides, and expressing your confidence in Hong Kong's future stability and prosperity.

There is a great deal at stake. A successful settlement would have a beneficial effect stretching beyond Hong Kong itself. By healing one of the historical scars which have affected Chinese perceptions of the West, it should benefit relations between China and the Western world generally. Should it fail, the economic and strategic damage would be grave. I feel, therefore, that we must all do what we can to am sure that I can count on, ensure the Agreement works well. I ~~look forward to~~ your help.





file

65 (w)

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary


24 September, 1984

Dear Peter,

FUTURE OF HONG KONG: BRIEFING FOR THE AUSTRALIANS AND  
AMERICANS

Thank you for your letter of 21 September enclosing draft messages from the Prime Minister to President Reagan and Mr. Hawke.

ok // The Prime Minister was not impressed with the drafting of these messages particularly that to President Reagan. I enclose amended versions which I should be grateful if you would despatch telegraphically today.

Yours sincerely,  


(C.D. Powell)

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,  
 Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

mg.



SECRET

file

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bc: Sir P.C.

14 September 1984

FUTURE OF HONG KONG: BRIEFING THE AUSTRALIANS  
AND AMERICANS

Thank you for your letter of 13 September asking whether the Prime Minister would be ready to send personal messages to President Reagan and Mr. Hawke once the agreement with the Chinese on Hong Kong is initialled.

I feel sure that the Prime Minister would be ready to send messages to both of them. I should be grateful for drafts in due course.

Charles Powell

Len Appleyard, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET



cc PG  
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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

Agree in principle to  
send a

13 September 1984

message to Mr. Hawke as soon  
as the agreement with China  
is initialled? CDP 18/9 Yes

Dear Charles,

Future of Hong Kong: Briefing the Australians and Americans *ms*

We have been intensifying the briefing of our allies on the talks on the future of Hong Kong over the last few weeks, with the aim of eliciting positive statements by Governments on the agreement on its initialling in late September.

In the case of the Americans and Australians we had planned to send messages from Sir Geoffrey Howe to Mr Hayden and Mr Shultz shortly before initialling, asking them to make supportive statements. Canberra has now advised that in view of Mr Hayden's rather unhelpful statements on Hong Kong in the past it would be better to seek a supportive statement from Mr Hawke. The best way to secure this would be by a message from the Prime Minister. Washington have also advised that the Prime Minister should send a message to President Reagan, since a decision whether to make such a statement on Hong Kong will be taken at that level.

If the Prime Minister agrees to send such messages we would forward drafts nearer to the date of initialling.

Yours ever,

Len Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street