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FM UKRIS NEW YORK 192335Z OCT 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1192 OF 19 OCTOBER 1984

INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA, ATHENS, ANKARA, WASHINGTON,
PRIORITY BORN, ROME, UKDEL NATO, CEF CYPRUS

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NY TELNO 1182: CYPRUS: SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

1. THE SECRETARY GENERAL IS WORKING PRIVATELY ON KYPRIANOU AND DENKTASH TO TRY TO EXTRACT SOME MOVEMENT. HE WILL SEE THEM AGAIN ON MONDAY (22 OCTOBER)

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAW KYPRIANOU AND DENKTASH SEPARATELY ON THEIR OWN THIS AFTERNOON (19 OCTOBER).
3. I SPOKE TO HIM AFTERWARDS AND HE TOLD ME THAT HE HAD TRIED TO EXTRACT FROM THE TWO LEADERS THEIR REAL POSITIONS. HE HAD TOLD THEM THAT HE WANTED THIS INFORMATION FROM THEM IN CONFIDENCE IN ORDER TO SEE WHETHER IT WAS WORTHWHILE PROCEEDING ANY FURTHER. IF THINGS WENT ON AS THEY WERE THE WHOLE PROCESS WOULD BE ENDLESS. BOTH OF THEM PROMISED TO COME TO SEE HIM AGAIN PRIVATELY ON MONDAY TO GIVE CONCRETE ANSWERS. (THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAID TO ME THAT THE ANSWERS NEEDED TO BE ON CONSTITUTION AND TERRITORY).
4. HE HAD TOLD THEM THAT HE WAS "RATHER FED-UP" AND THEY HAD BOTH UNDERSTOOD. DENKTASH VERY MUCH WANTED A SUMMIT MEETING BUT HE HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE COULD NOT HAVE IT UNLESS HE GAVE HIM SOMETHING WHICH WOULD ALLOW SUCH A MEETING TO BE SUCCESSFUL. THE PRESTIGE OF HIS OFFICE WAS AT STAKE.
5. THE SECRETARY GENERAL ADDED CONFIDENTIALLY THAT DENKTASH HAD BEEN A LITTLE MORE FLEXIBLE THAN FORMERLY BUT NOT TREMENDOUSLY SO. HE HAD BEEN "NOT TO BAD".
6. I ASKED THE SECRETARY GENERAL IF THERE WAS ANYTHING WHICH HE WANTED ME TO DO WITH THE TWO SIDES. I WAS NOT SEEKING TO BECOME INVOLVED UNLESS HE REALLY WANTED IT. HE SAID THAT WE WERE HIS ONLY "REAL, REAL SUPPORTERS". THERE WAS NOTHING THAT HE WANTED NOW. BUT IT WAS POSSIBLE HE MIGHT WISH TO GET IN TOUCH WITH ME ON MONDAY AFTER HE HAD SEEN THE TWO LEADERS AGAIN.

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 182359Z OCT 84
TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1182 OF 18 OCTOBER
INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA, ATHENS, ANKARA, WASHINGTON
INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, ROME, UKDEL NATO, CBF CYPRUS.

NY TELNO 1175: CYPRUS: SECRETARY-GENERAL'S INITIATIVE.

SUMMARY

1. MAVROMMATIS SAYS THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS CAN GO NO FURTHER UNTIL DENKTASH GIVES SOME CONCRETE INDICATION OF NEW TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS. DENKTASH MEANWHILE HAS APPARENTLY SOUGHT TO MAKE WIDE-RANGING AMENDMENTS TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S PAPER.

DETAIL

2. KYPRIANOU AND DENKTASH SAW THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THIS MORNING AND THIS AFTERNOON (18 OCTOBER) RESPECTIVELY. I ARRANGED TO SEE MAVROMMATIS AFTER THE MEETING WITH KYPRIANOU AND ASKED HIM HOW THE GREEK CYPRIOTS SAW THINGS. I SAID THAT WE BELIEVED THE PRESENT ROUND OF TALKS WERE VERY IMPORTANT AND HAD THEREFORE MADE HIGH LEVEL REPRESENTATIONS IN ADVANCE TO BOTH SIDES.

3. MAVROMMATIS SAID THAT KYPRIANOU WAS 'EXTREMELY PLEASED' WITH THE UK FOR TAKING THIS ACTION. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE CONSCIOUS THAT WE HAD DONE MORE THAN OTHERS SUCH AS THE U.S.

4. HE SAID THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PAPER HAD BEEN ESSENTIALLY AN ELABORATION OF THE WORKING POINTS BUT IT HAD BEEN 'GROSSLY DISAPPOINTING' ON TERRITORY WHERE NO TURKISH CYPRIOT CONCESSIONS HAD BEEN INDICATED. THE PAPER HAD ALSO APPEARED TO SUGGEST THAT THE OBJECTIVE OF A HIGH LEVEL MEETING WAS MERELY TO ESTABLISH A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD EXPLAINED TO KYPRIANOU THIS MORNING THAT HIS OBJECTIVE REMAINED A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT AND THAT A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT WOULD BE JUST A STAGE OF SHORT DURATION TOWARDS THIS. HE HAD ALSO EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD DELIBERATELY LEFT A BLANK ON TERRITORY IN ORDER TO ELICIT A CONCRETE REPLY FROM DENKTASH PRIVATELY.

5. MAVROMMATIS SAID THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS UNDERSTOOD THIS PLOY, BUT THAT SO FAR THERE HAD BEEN NO SIGNAL FROM THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO INDICATE ANYTHING FURTHER ON TERRITORY. THERE WAS A SUGGESTION THAT THE TURKS HAD GIVEN SOME SIGNAL THROUGH HALEFOGLU'S PEOPLE BUT THIS REMAINED VAGUE (THE SECRETARY GENERAL MAY HAVE GIVEN A HINT ABOUT ULUCEVIK'S TALK WITH SHERRY - HUMFREY'S TELELETTER OF 2 OCTOBER). IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH A TURKISH CYPRIOT INDICATION THE SITUATION WAS 'ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE' AND THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE NOT PREPARED TO GIVE MORE THAN A VAGUE INDICATION OF THEIR OWN HAND. THEY WERE NOT (NOT) GOING TO REPEAT PAST MISTAKES OF MAKING UNRECIPROCATED CONCESSIONS.

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6. KYPRIANOU HAD HOWEVER TOLD THE SECRETARY GENERAL THAT ONCE THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS HAD GIVEN THE NECESSARY INDICATION, HE WOULD PRIVATELY GIVE HIM AN INDICATION OF POSSIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL CONCESSIONS BY THE GREEK CYPRIOTS. HE HAD HINTED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT FURTHER GREEK-CYPRIOT CONCESSIONS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR EXAMPLE IN RELATION TO THE UPPER HOUSE AND THE PRESIDENCY. BUT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD PUT NOTHING DOWN IN BALCK AND WHITE UNTIL THEY KNEW THE TURKISH CYPRIOT POSITION.

7. WHEN I PROBED MAVROMMATIS ON THIS, HE SAID THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS COULD ONLY GO BEYOND THE 1960 CONSTITUTION IN SO FAR AS THE MATTERS CONCERNED WERE NATURALLY IMPLICIT IN A FEDERATION FOR EXAMPLE AMENDMENT OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. A FEDERAL STRUCTURE WOULD HOWEVER MEAN THAT 80 PER CENT OF THE POWERS WHICH UNDER THE 1960 CONSTITUTION HAD BELONGED TO A UNITARY STATE WOULD NOW BE DEVOLVED TO THE PROVINCES. ON THE EXECUTIVE, HE STRESSED THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE NOT (NOT) PREPARED TO ACCEPT A ROTATING PRESIDENCY OR SOME TRANSPLANTATION OF THE SWISS FEDERAL SYSTEM. THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD SUGGESTED THAT THE EXECUTIVE BE EITHER A SYSTEM DERIVED FROM PART III OF THE 1960 CONSTITUTION OR A SYSTEM OF PARLIAMENTARY RESPONSIBILITY (IE A SYMBOLIC ROTATING PRESIDENT WITH POWER IN THE HANDS OF A PRIME MINISTER AND VICE PRIME MINISTER). THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE LATTER ALTERNATIVE. THEY WOULD ACCEPT HOWEVER THAT A TURKISH CYPRIOT VICE-PRESIDENT COULD ACT FOR THE PRESIDENT IN HIS ABSENCE AND HAVE SEPARATE VETO POWERS. THEY WERE ALSO OPEN TO OTHER SUGGESTIONS PROVIDING THESE PRESERVED A PROPER PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE SYSTEM. ON THE LEGISLATURE, THE GREEK CYPRIOTS HAD SAID THAT IF THERE WAS AGREEMENT ON POWERS AND ON A DEADLOCK RESOLUTION MACHINERY, THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER TURKISH CYPRIOT REPRESENTATION IN THE UPPER HOUSE GREATER THAN 30 PER CENT (THE IMPLICATION WAS THAT THIS WOULD IN FACT MEAN 50:50 AS THE SECRETARY GENERAL WAS PROPOSING) IN GENERAL, THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE UN IDEAS OF 6 JUNE 1975 ON THE MATTER OF POLITICAL EQUALITY IN THE CONSTITUTION.

8. SUMMING UP MAVROMMATIS SAID THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE PESSIMISTIC AND HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL HIMSELF WAS NOT HOPEFUL OF MOVING THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS. I SAID THAT NOW WAS THE TIME THAT SIGNIFICANT MOVEMENT WAS NEEDED IF MATTERS WERE NOT TO GO BACKWARD. I ACCEPTED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS TO MAKE A CONCESSION ON TERRITORY IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THIS. I WOULD CONSULT THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND BE PREPARED IF HE SO ADVISED TO SPEAK TO DENKTASH IN ORDER TO EMPHASISE THE GREAT IMPORTANCE WHICH THE UK ATTACHED TO THE PRESENT ROUND OF TALKS AND THE NECESSITY FOR TURKISH CYPRIOT TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS. I AGREED WITH MAVBOMMATIS THAT WE WOULD KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH.

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9. SHERRY TOLD US THIS EVENING THAT DENKTASH, IN HIS MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL, HAD COME UP WITH HIS OWN REVISED VERSION OF THE SECRETARY GENERALS PAPER WHICH INTRODUCED 'EVERY CONCEIVABLE ELEMENT OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOT POSITION RELEVANT OR OTHERWISE'. THE MEETING HAD LEFT THE SECRETARIAT DEPRESSED. BUT THERE WERE SOME HINTS ON TERRITORY WHICH SHERRY WAS NOT AT LIBERTY YET TO DISCUSS.

10. SHERRY SAID THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD HAVE PRIVATE MEETINGS TOMORROW WITH THE TWO LEADERS IN WHICH HE WOULD BE AS 'THREATENING AND DISAGREEABLE AS POSSIBLE' TO SEE IF HE COULD GET PAST THE STAGE OF THE TWO SIDES ETERNALLY RESTATING THEIR EXISTING POSITIONS.

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TO IMMEDIATE. FCO

TEL NO 1175 OF 17 OCTOBER 1984

INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA ATHENS ANKARA WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY BONN PARIS ROME UKDEL NATO CBFC

MY TELNO 1161 (NOT TO ALL): CYPRUS: SECRETARY GENERALS INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

1. THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAS GIVEN THE TWO SIDES A DRAFT HIGH LEVEL AGREEMENT BASED ON HIS WORKING POINTS. THEY WILL GIVE HIM THEIR INITIAL REACTIONS ON 18 OCTOBER. SOME GREEK AND TURKISH COMMENTS.

DETAIL

2. SHERRY SHOWED US AND THE AMERICANS THIS AFTERNOON, 17 OCTOBER, A COPY OF THE DRAFT HIGH LEVEL AGREEMENT WHICH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD GIVEN YESTERDAY TO KYPRIANOU AND DENKTASH. (WE HAD ALREADY RECEIVED A CONFIDENTIAL COPY FROM THE AMERICANS WHO GOT IT FROM THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS - COPY BY TELELETTER TO THE DEPARTMENT). THE DRAFT AGREEMENT, AS EXPECTED, FOLLOWS THE FORMAT AND SUBSTANCE OF THE WORKING POINTS. IT CONTAINS HOWEVER A NUMBER OF BLANKS. THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THESE IS FOR THE NUMBER OF GREEK CYPRIOTS WHO WILL HAVE TO BE RESETTLED IN TERRITORY WHICH THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS SHOULD HAND OVER IN ADDITION TO THE AREAS DELINEATED IN THEIR 1981 PROPOSALS. OTHER BLANKS ARE FOR THE TIME TABLES FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES.

3. SHERRY SAID THAT IT WAS INTENDED THAT THESE BLANKS SHOULD BE FILLED IN BEFORE THE DOCUMENT BECAME A HIGH LEVEL AGREEMENT. THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD DELIBERATELY LEFT BLANK THE FIGURE FOR THE NUMBER OF GREEK CYPRIOTS TO BE RESETTLED SO THAT HE COULD DISCUSS THE FIGURE PRIVATELY WITH DENKTASH BEFORE HE COMMITTED IT TO PAPER. WHAT HE WANTED FROM DENKTASH ON 18 OCTOBER WAS AGREEMENT TO DISCUSS SUCH A FIGURE.

4. SHERRY SAID THAT APART FROM HANDING OVER THE DOCUMENT THERE HAD BEEN LITTLE SUBSTANCE TO THE MEETINGS ON 15 AND 16 OCTOBER. KYPRIANOU HAD STRESSED THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS FELT THAT UP UNTIL NOW THEY HAD MADE ALL THE CONCESSIONS AND THAT IT WAS NOW TIME FOR DENKTASH TO RECIPROCATE. DENKTASH BEGAN HIS MEETINGS BY EXPRESSING STRONG CONCERN ABOUT THE FRENCH ARMS SALES TO THE GREEK CYPRIOTS.

5. ON THE DRAFT ITSELF, NEITHER SIDE HAD SAID MUCH SO FAR. BUT THE INITIAL GREEK CYPRIOT REACTION WAS ONE OF CONCERN THAT THE PAPER WAS EXPLICIT ON QUESTIONS OF CONSTITUTION BUT HAD LEFT BLANK THE SPACES FOR THE CORRESPONDING TURKISH CYPRIOT CONCESSIONS ON TERRITORY. THEY FEARED THAT THIS WOULD PLACE KYPRIANOU IN A DIFFICULT POSITION IF THE PAPER LEAKED.

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6. SHERRY SAID THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO FORECAST HOW LONG THIS ROUND OF TALKS WOULD CONTINUE. BUT THE DOOR IS OPEN FOR THEM TO CONTINUE INTO THE BEGINNING OF NEXT WEEK.

7. THE GREEK PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE HAS TOLD THE AMERICANS THAT HE FELT THAT KYPRIANOU WOULD BE OBLIGED TO REJECT THE SECRETARY GENERALS PAPER COMPLETELY SINCE THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE BEING CALLED ON TO MAKE ALL THE CONCESSIONS. HE WAS NOT SPECIFIC ABOUT DETAILS BUT APPEARED CONSIDERABLY WORKED UP. GIVEN DOUNTAS'S WELL KNOWN AND UNHELPFUL VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT THIS IS PERHAPS ONLY TO BE EXPECTED.

8. THE TURKISH PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT HE THOUGHT THE SECRETARY GENERALS PAPER WAS A GOOD ONE BUT THAT MORE TIME WOULD BE NEEDED IN THIS ROUND AND THAT DENKTASH WOULD AGREE TO STAY ON FOR ANOTHER WEEK IF INVITED. KIRCA ALSO SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD MADE A TACTICAL/CONSTITUTIONAL MISTAKE IN SUGGESTING THAT THERE WERE SOME FEDERAL SUBJECTS FOR WHICH A VOTE IN THE LOWER HOUSE WOULD BE SUFFICIENT. THIS SUGGESTION TENDED TO UNDERCUT HIS OTHERWISE EXCELLENT POSITION ON THE POLITICAL EQUALITY OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES. DENKTASH REGARDED ALL FEDERAL SUBJECTS AS MAJOR ONES. THE POSITION WAS DIFFERENT FROM 1960 WHEN THE CONSTITUTION HAD SPECIFIED MAJOR AND MINOR FEDERAL SUBJECTS. IN FACT THE MINOR SUBJECTS IN THE 1960 CONSTITUTION WOULD SIMPLY NOT FIGURE IN THE NEW CONSTITUTION DUE TO THE CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES.

9. KIRCA SUGGESTED THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL SHOULD PROPOSE INSTEAD THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE THAT ALL FEDERAL SUBJECTS REQUIRED AFFIRMATORY VOTES BY BOTH HOUSES. HE COULD ADD HOWEVER THAT A JOINT WORKING GROUP DISCUSS WHAT SORT OF MAJORITIES WERE REQUIRED FOR CERTAIN SUBJECTS. FOR EXAMPLE, ON SOME SUBJECTS, IT MIGHT BE SPECIFIED THAT 11 OUT OF 20 TURKISH VOTES IN THE UPPER HOUSE WERE REQUIRED. IT WOULD BE BEST FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL NOT TO PUT FORWARD A DETAILED SOLUTION HIMSELF BUT TO GET IT ACCEPTED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE TWO SIDES TO WORK OUT DIFFERING VOTING PROCEDURES FOR DIFFERENT KINDS OF PROBLEMS BUT ALWAYS WITHIN THE OVERALL PROVISION THAT THE CONSENT OF BOTH HOUSES WAS REQUIRED FOR FEDERAL SUBJECTS.

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
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TELEGRAM NUMBER 1161 OF 15 OCTOBER
INFO WASHINGTON, ATHENS, ANKARA, NICOSIA



CYPRUS: SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE

1. THE SECOND ROUND OF PROXIMITY TALKS BEGAN IN NEW YORK TODAY, 15 OCTOBER.
2. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TOLD ME LATER THAT HE FOUND BOTH KYPRIANOU AND DENKTASH 'QUIETER' THAN PREVIOUSLY. THIS MIGHT BETOKEN A SLIGHTLY GREATER READINESS TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY. HE HAD TOLD EACH OF THEM THAT THIS THEY MUST NOW DO OR ELSE THEIR POSITIONS WOULD BE EXPOSED. HE HAD SAID THAT HE WOULD MAKE A REPORT AT THE END OF THIS ROUND TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHICH WOULD SET OUT HIS PROPOSALS AND THEIR RESPONSES. HE FELT THIS HAD HAD SOME EFFECT.
3. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SAID THAT HE WOULD TOMORROW BE PRESENTING EACH SIDE WITH A WRITTEN DOCUMENT. IT CONTAINED THE IDEAS WHICH HE HAD MENTIONED AT THE FIRST ROUND AND WHICH WE HAVE SINCE DISCUSSED WITH THE SECRETARIAT. HE WAS INVITING EACH SIDE TO REPLY ON THURSDAY, 18 OCTOBER.

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