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~~SECRETARY GENERAL~~

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 242315Z OCT 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1213 OF 24 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA, ATHENS, ANKARA, WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, ROME, UKDEL NATO, CBF CYPRUS

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IMMEDIATE

MY TELNO 1199: CYPRUS: SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

1. THE SECRETARY GENERAL IS TRYING TO INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON THE TWO SIDES BUT SO FAR WITHOUT SUCCESS. ACCORDING TO SHERRY, DENKTASH IN HIS MEETING THIS AFTERNOON (24 OCTOBER) WAS QUITE INTRANSIGENT.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAW DENKTASH AND KYPRIANOU SEPARATELY AND PRIVATELY ON 22 OCTOBER AND GAVE THEM A REVISED VERSION OF HIS DRAFT HIGH LEVEL AGREEMENT. (ACCORDING TO HOLGER THE REVISIONS WERE NOT EXTENSIVE). HE WAS TO SEE THEM AGAIN ON 23 OCTOBER BUT CANCELLED THE MEETINGS. HE SAW BOTH SIDES AGAIN SEPARATELY THIS AFTERNOON, FIRST THE LEADERS ON THEIR OWN AND THEN WITH THEIR OFFICIALS.

3. I SPOKE TWICE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL THIS MORNING. THE FIRST TIME HE TOLD ME THAT NEITHER LEADER WAS GIVING HIM ENOUGH ON SUBSTANCE TO JUSTIFY HIS HOLDING A FURTHER ROUND OR PROXIMITY TALKS. IN ORDER TO "DRAMATISE" HIS CONCERN HE HAD CANCELLED YESTERDAY'S MEETINGS. HE WANTED TO SEND A SIGNAL ESPECIALLY TO THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WHO WERE BEING COURTEOUS BUT OFFERING HIM NO MORE THAN A "MOUSE" IN THE WAY OF CONCESSIONS. HE HAD NOW PREPARED A THIRD REVISION OF HIS PAPER IN ORDER TO AVOID ANY SUGGESTION OF



"MOUSE" IN THE WAY OF CONCESSIONS. HE HAD NOW PREPARED A THIRD REVISION OF HIS PAPER IN ORDER TO AVOID ANY SUGGESTION OF INFLEXIBILITY. HE HAD TO DECIDE WHAT TO DO AND WHETHER TO SEND BOTH LEADERS BACK TO THEIR CAPITALS. THIS MIGHT HAVE A USEFUL EFFECT ON KYPRIANOU WHO WOULD BE PUT UNDER PRESSURE BY THE AKEL AND CLERIDES. IT WOULD HAVE LESS EFFECT ON DENKTASH WHO WAS NOT UNDER SIMILAR DOMESTIC POLITICAL PRESSURE, BUT IT MIGHT GIVE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE TURKS TO PUT MORE PRESSURE ON HIM.

4. THE SECOND TIME I SPOKE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL HE SAID THAT HE WAS WONDERING HOW FAR TO PUSH HIS THREAT THAT IF THEIR RESPONSES WERE UNSATISFACTORY HE WOULD MAKE A FULL REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE TURKS AND THE AMERICANS WERE AGAINST HIS DOING THIS. I SAID THAT I DID NOT THINK HE SHOULD DROP THE THREAT BUT IT DID NOT SEEM TO ME THAT THE POSSIBILITIES FOR PROGRESS HAD AS YET BEEN EXHAUSTED. I TOLD HIM IN CONFIDENCE WHAT KIRCA (THE TURKISH PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE) HAD TOLD ME ABOUT FURTHER FLEXIBILITY ON DENKTASH'S PART (MY TUR). HE FOUND THIS INTERESTING AND AGREED THAT IT OFFERED FURTHER POSSIBILITIES. I EXPLAINED THAT I DID NOT KNOW WITH WHAT AUTHORITY KIRCA WAS SPEAKING.

5. SHERRY TOLD US THIS EVENING THAT THIS AFTERNOON'S MEETINGS HAD NOT GONE WELL. THE MEETING WITH KYPRIANOU HAD BEEN RUSHED AND HE HAD ONLY BEEN ABLE TO BEGIN HIS COMMENTS ON THE REVISED DRAFT PAPER. DENKTASH FOR HIS PART HAD BEEN AT HIS 'ARROGANT WORST'. HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE BELIEVED THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WERE GOING TO GET WHAT THEY WANTED AND NOBODY COULD PRESSURE THEM TO DO OTHERWISE. KIRCA HAD ALSO BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE SECRETARIAT AND TAKE A TOUGH LINE. THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD COMPLETE HIS MEETING WITH THE GREEK-CYPRIOTS TOMORROW (25 OCTOBER), POSSIBLY AT A LOWER LEVEL AND GIVE BOTH SIDES SOMETHING TO PONDER. SHERRY SOUNDED VERY FED UP.

THOMSON

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