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
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19.11.84

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DESKBY 150930Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 150245Z DEC 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1579 OF 14 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA, ATHENS, ANKARA, WASHINGTON

ROUTINE BONN, PARIS, ROME, UKDEL NATO, VIENNA, COPENHAGEN,

STOCKHOLM, MODUK (DSC, DS11), CBFC

INFO SAVING UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL STRASBOURG

MY TELNO 1566: CYPRUS: SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

1. UNFICYP MANDATE RENEWED SAFELY THIS AFTERNOON (14 DECEMBER). BUT SUBSEQUENT UNCOMPROMISING STATEMENTS BY TURKISH SIDE ARE A SERIOUS SETBACK TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S EFFORTS. BOTH DENKTASH AND TURKS INSIST THAT KYPRIANOU MUST ACCEPT DRAFT HIGH LEVEL AGREEMENT WITH NO FURTHER CHANGES. RESULTING GLOOM IN THE GREEK CYPRIOT CAMP.

DETAIL

2. I SAW THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT DINNER LAST NIGHT (13 DECEMBER). PEREZ DE CUELLAR CONFIRMED WHAT PICCO HAD TOLD US (MY TUR) ABOUT DENKTASH'S REPRESENTATIONS. HE WAS VERY CONCERNED THAT THINGS MIGHT START GOING WRONG. WE AGREED BETWEEN THE THREE OF US THAT THE BEST THING WOULD BE TO TRY TO PERSUADE DENKTASH AND THE TURKS NOT TO SPEAK AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING BUT TO CIRCULATE THEIR CUSTOMARY RESERVATIONS ON THE RESOLUTION BY LETTER. KHALIL, AS PRESIDENT, WOULD OPEN THE PROCEEDINGS WITH A BRIEF POSITIVE STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE COUNCIL AND WE WOULD THEN ADOPT THE RESOLUTION WITH NO FURTHER SPEECHES.

3. LATER THAT EVENING I HAD A WORRIED TELEPHONE CALL FROM MAVROMMATIS URGING ME TO INTERVENE TO PREVENT AN ALTERCATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES IN THE COUNCIL. HE ACCEPTED THAT THE TURKS MIGHT HAVE TO MAKE THEIR RESERVATIONS ON THE RESOLUTION ORALLY, BUT SAID THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD NOT OBJECT AS LONG AS THIS WAS DONE REASONABLY.

4. I SAW THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR THIS MORNING TO PRESS THESE POINTS ON HIM. KIRCA REPLIED THAT HE HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO SPEAK AND THAT DENKTASH WOULD DO SO ALSO. THERE WAS NO WAY THIS COULD BE AVOIDED. IN ADDITION TO MAKING THE USUAL RESERVATIONS ON THE RESOLUTION THEY WOULD MAKE THREE EMPHATIC POINTS. THESE WERE THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S DRAFT HIGH LEVEL AGREEMENT WAS NON-NEGOTIABLE; THAT THERE COULD BE NO AMENDMENTS TO IT; AND THAT THERE COULD BE NO LEGALLY BINDING RESERVATIONS TO IT. HE ADDED AS A SMALL CONCESSION THAT THERE COULD PERHAPS BE RESERVATIONS IN A CONVERSATIONAL SENSE BUT THIS WOULD NOT CHANGE ITS SUBSTANCE. MY EFFORTS TO GET HIM TO CHANGE

WOULD NOT CHANGE ITS SUBSTANCE. MY EFFORTS TO GET HIM TO CHANGE THIS POSITION WERE UNAVAILING. HE SAID THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL KNEW WHAT HE AND DENKTASH INTENDED. THEY WERE NOT HOWEVER INTENDING TO "BUST" THE AGREEMENT. I SUGGESTED THAT THEY SHOULD AT LEAST FOREWARN THE GREEK CYPRIOTS. HE DECLINED BUT INDICATED THAT I COULD.

5. IT WAS TOO LATE TO SPEAK TO MAVROMMATIS WHO HAD ALREADY LEFT WITH KYPRIANOU BY CONCORDE EN ROUTE TO CYPRUS. I SPOKE TO THE CYPRIOT AMBASSADOR WHO SAID THAT HE WAS IN TOUCH WITH KYPRIANOU BY TELEPHONE. I EXPLAINED THAT I HAD TRIED BUT FAILED TO RESTRAIN THE TURKS FROM MAKING MORE THAN THEIR CUSTOMARY RESERVATIONS. I AGREED THAT HE SHOULD CONVEY TO KYPRIANOU THE GIST OF WHAT KIRCA HAD TOLD ME ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THIS WAS IN STRICT CONFIDENCE AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO LEAKS IN NICOSIA.

6. I SUBSEQUENTLY SPOKE AGAIN TO KHALIL WHO SAW ALL FOUR PARTIES THIS MORNING TO SHOW THEM THE DRAFT RESOLUTION. KHALIL MADE FURTHER EFFORTS OF HIS OWN TO TRY TO STOP THE TURKISH SIDE FROM CARRYING OUT THEIR STATED INTENTION, THESE TOO PROVED UNSUCCESSFUL.

7. THE SECURITY COUNCIL MET BRIEFLY IN THE AFTERNOON FOR INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS AND AGREED THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION, WHICH WAS EXACTLY THE SAME AS FOR THE PREVIOUS MANDATE RENEWAL (SCR 553). KHALIL SAID THAT HE HAD EMPHASISED TO THE PARTIES HIS HOPE AS PRESIDENT THAT THEY WOULD MAKE NO STATEMENT WHICH MIGHT DETRACT FROM THE EXPECTATIONS FOR THE FORTHCOMING HIGH LEVEL MEETING. THE COUNCIL AGREED THAT HE SHOULD MAKE A SHORT STATEMENT AS PRESIDENT AT THE BEGINNING OF THE FORMAL MEETING.

8. THE COUNCIL THEN PROCEEDED TO A FORMAL MEETING WHERE KHALIL MADE HIS STATEMENT AND THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WAS UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED RENEWING UNFICYP'S MANDATE FOR A FURTHER SIX MONTHS. PAKISTAN, PERU AND CANADA MADE STATEMENTS.

9. MOUSHOUTAS (CYPRUS) SPOKE FIRST FOR THE PARTIES AND MADE A RESTRAINED AND GENERALLY CONSTRUCTIVE STATEMENT. DOUNTAS (GREECE) FOLLOWED WITH AN EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT FOR THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING AND FOR THE "CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM" THAT HAD BEEN VOICED BY KYPRIANOU.

10. DENKTASH THEN SPOKE TERSELY AND IN UNCOMPROMISING TERMS. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT KYPRIANOU WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT THE DRAFT HIGH LEVEL AGREEMENT AS IT STOOD AND THAT THERE COULD BE NO RESERVATIONS OF ANY KIND ON IT. IT WAS A STEELY PERFORMANCE WHICH HIS EXPRESSIONS OF TRUST IN THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND HOPE FOR A SETTLEMENT DID LITTLE TO OFFSET.

11. KIRCA REITERATED THE SAME MESSAGE WITH EQUAL CLARITY. HE EMPHASISED THAT THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT WAS IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT WITH DENKTASH ON THE MATTER. THE OTHER SIDE HAD NOW UNEQUIVOCALLY TO ACCEPT THE DRAFT AGREEMENT. AT THE SAME TIME HE UNDERLINED TURKISH GOVERNMENT'S SUPPORT FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF SETTLEMENT.

12. MOUSHOUTAS AND DOUNTAS RESPONDED IN RIGHT OF REPLY. MOUSHOUTAS DID SO IN AN ADMIRABLY DIGNIFIED AND RESTRAINED WAY. DOUNTAS SHOWED NO SUCH RESERVE. HE UNDERLINED THAT KYPRIANOU WAS BEING ASKED TO GO TO A HIGH LEVEL MEETING ON A "TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT" BASIS. KIRCA AND DENKTASH REPLIED SHARPLY.

13. IT WAS A MOST DEPRESSING OCCASION. I HAD PASSED ON TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL DURING THE DEBATE THE CONGRATULATIONS THAT YOU HAD SENT HIM IN YOUR TEL 779. BUT HIS HEAD HUNG LOWER AS THE SPEECHES WENT ON. AFTERWARDS THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE IN A STATE OF MIXED SHOCK AND GLOOM, ALL TOO CONSCIOUS OF THE LIKELY REPERCUSSIONS IN CYPRUS. DOUNTAS WAS BUSY BRIEFING GREEK CORRESPONDENTS WITH RELISH.

WENT ON. AFTERWARDS THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE IN A STATE OF MIXED SHOCK AND GLOOM, ALL TOO CONSCIOUS OF THE LIKELY REPERCUSSIONS IN CYPRUS. DOUTAS WAS BUSY BRIEFING GREEK CORRESPONDENTS WITH RELISH.

14. RIFT CONTAINS A FULL ACCOUNT OF THE DEBATE AND MY SECOND IFT (NOT TO ALL) THE TEXT OF RESOLUTION 559.

15. I SHALL SEND YOU MY COMMENTS AND FURTHER BACKGROUND OVER THE WEEKEND.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING

THOMSON

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GRS 1200

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DESKBY 131000Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 130215Z DEC 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1557 OF 12 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA, ATHENS, ANKARA, PRIORITY WASHINGTON.

MIPT: CYPRUS : SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

1. IACOVOU SAYS THAT KYPRIANOU HAD DECIDED TO TAKE THE CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL RISK OF GOING TO A HIGH LEVEL MEETING WITHOUT PRIOR AGREEMENT ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. HE WILL TRY TO NEGOTIATE CHANGES TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S PROPOSALS DIRECTLY WITH DENKTASH.

DETAIL

2. THE CYPRIOT FOREIGN MINISTER GAVE ME A READOUT THIS EVENING JUST BEFORE HE LEFT FOR THE AIRPORT. IACOVOU SAID THAT IT HAD NOT BEEN EASY DURING THE LAST COUPLE OF DAYS. THE OUTCOME WAS NOT WHAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS HAD ORIGINALLY AIMED FOR. KYPRIANOU HAD REACHED AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE POLITICAL PARTIES IN CYPRUS THAT HE WOULD ONLY AGREE TO A HIGH LEVEL MEETING IF HE HAD OBTAINED SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT ON THE ISSUES. THIS HAD NOT HAPPENED BUT THE PRESIDENT HAD DECIDED TO TAKE AN ENORMOUS POLITICAL RISK WHICH IACOVOU THOUGHT SHOWED CONSIDERABLE COURAGE.

3. IT HAD NOT BEEN POSSIBLE IN THE TIME AVAILABLE TO AGREE THE TEXT OF A DRAFT HIGH LEVEL AGREEMENT. INSTEAD THE PARTIES NOW HAD TWO DOCUMENTS. THE FIRST WAS THE AGENDA WHICH AFTER A LITTLE 'FINE POLISHING' COULD BE RETITLED A DRAFT AGREEMENT. THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS HAD WANTED TO INTRODUCE INTO IT THE QUESTION OF GUARANTEES. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS HELD THAT THIS WAS AN INTERNATIONAL MATTER NOT A BICOMMUNAL ONE. THE PROBLEM WAS HOW TO DEAL WITH DEFENCE AND SECURITY IN THE LIST OF FEDERAL SUBJECTS. THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WANTED TO LINK DEFENCE WITH A TREATY OF GUARANTEE. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE THINKING OF THE POSSIBILITY OF TAKING DEFENCE OFF THE LIST AND HAVING INSTEAD A 'MINISTRY OF DEMILITARISATION'. WITH MORE TIME AND INGENUITY A SUITABLE FORMULA MIGHT BE FOUND. THE SECOND PAPER (HUMFREYS TELELETTER OF 29 NOVEMBER TO NEILSON) CONTAINED IDEAS FOR FILLING IN THE BLANKS IN THE AGENDA.

THE SECRETARY GENERAL DESCRIBED THE PAPER AS BEING NOT HIS IDEAS OR THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS' IDEAS BUT THE BEST COMPILATION OF WHAT HE THOUGHT WAS POSSIBLE. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS HAD PRESSED HIM PARTICULARLY ON THE SUBJECTS OF VAROSHA AND OF VETOES. IF THEY COULD HAVE GOT CONCESSIONS ON THIS IT WOULD HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE TO FILL IN THE BLANKS. THERE WAS AN ADDENDUM TO THE SECOND PAPER IN WHICH DENKTASH SAID THAT HE WOULD CONSIDER THE QUESTION OF VETOES IF THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS COULD HAVE THE POST OF FOREIGN MINISTER.

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4. THE POSITION NOW WAS THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD DEPOSIT THESE PAPERS AND THE RESERVATION ON THEM AT THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING WHERE THEY WOULD FORM THE BASIC DOCUMENTATION. THE TWO SIDES WOULD THEN START FROM THERE. BUT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS HAD RESERVED THEIR POSITION.

5. DESCRIBING THE DISCUSSIONS DURING THE LAST TWO DAYS IACOVOU SAID THAT WHENEVER A QUESTION SUCH AS VETOES HAD COME UP IT HAD BEEN LIKE DEALING WITH A BALLOON. IF YOU SQUEEZED IT IN ONE PLACE IT BULGED IN ANOTHER. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS HAD REALISED THAT IF THEY HAD TRIED TO SQUEEZE TOO HARD THE BALLOON MIGHT HAVE BURST. THEY CONSIDERED THAT ON THE MATTERS THAT STILL WORRIED THEM IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO MAKE THE CAKE BIGGER OR TO SUGGEST TRADE OFFS. AS HE HAD TOLD ME BEFORE, THEY HOPED THAT AN ATTRACTIVE ECONOMIC PACKAGE MIGHT GET AT LEAST A MARGINAL IMPROVEMENT ON TERRITORY FROM DENKTASH. SINCE DENKTASH HAD NOT BEEN PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE ANY CHANGES AT THIS STAGE THE GREEK CYPRIOTS HAD CONCLUDED THAT THE ONLY THING TO DO WAS TO NEGOTIATE WITH HIM FACE TO FACE TO SEE IF HE COULD BE PERSUADED. THEY WOULD EXPLAIN TO HIM THEIR REAL CONCERNS. IACOVOU FELT THAT THERE WOULD BE PLENTY OF SCOPE FOR ALL CONCERNED INCLUDING OURSELVS TO HELP WITH WISE COUNSEL. HE REALISED THE DIFFICULTIES FOR US IN GOING INTO DETAILS WITH THE PARTIES BUT HE THOUGHT WE COULD GIVE ENCOURAGEMENT TO 'ANY REASONABLE PROPOSALS'.

6. IACOVOU ASKED RHETORICALLY, WHETHER DENKTASH HIMSELF REALLY WANTED TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY. PERSONALLY IACOVOU DOUBTED IT. BUT THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING WOULD REVEAL THE ANSWER. HE HOPED THE MEETING WOULD NOT BE A CONFRONTATION. THERE WOULD BE NO TIME TO INVOLVE OTHERS IN WHAT PASSED. IT WOULD MEAN DEALING DIRECTLY WITH DENKTASH.

7. I CONGRATULATED IACOVOU WARMLY ON THE DECISION TO GO TO A HIGH LEVEL MEETING. WE WELCOMED AND APPRECIATED THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP WHICH IT SHOWED. WE BELIEVED THAT A DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN IN ANKARA TO TRY AND ACHIEVE A SOLUTION. THIS WOULD NOT BE A SOLUTION AT ANY PRICE BUT WE THOUGHT THE WISH WAS SINCERE. I ALSO THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD PERSIST UNTIL THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING.

8. I SAID THAT I FELT SURE THAT WE WOULD GIVE SYMPATHETIC CONSIDERATION TO WHATEVER THE GREEK CYPRIOTS MIGHT WISH TO SAY TO US. IT WAS ABOUT THE BEST THING THAT HAD HAPPENED SINCE I HAD BEEN AT THE UN. I WAS VERY PLEASED ALSO FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL. WE MUST BRING THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.

9. IACOVOU SAID THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS HAD DECIDED NOT TO DISCUSS CERTAIN THINGS AT THIS STAGE IN CASE IT DERAILED THE TALKS. THEY WERE GREATLY CONCERNED FOR EXAMPLE ABOUT TURKISH TROOP WITHDRAWAL. THEY WOULD BE MUCH MORE INCLINED TO ACCEPT WIDE-RANGING SAFEGUARDS ON THE CONSTITUTION IF THE TURKS SHOWED THEMSELVES WILLING TO WITHDRAW THEIR TROOPS QUICKLY. THERE WAS ALSO THE SENSITIVE MATTER OF THE THREE FREEDOMS. THESE MATTERS COULD BE DISCUSSED IN THE WORKING GROUPS AFTER THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING,

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FOR WHICH THREE DAYS OUGHT TO BE ENOUGH. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS INTENDED TO GO TO THE MEETING 'VERY READY TO NEGOTIATE'. I REPEATED THAT WE WOULD DO WHAT WE COULD TO SUPPORT A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME. I AGREED THAT SOME THINGS WOULD HAVE TO BE REMITTED TO TE WORKING GROUPS. BUT I THOUGHT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS SHOULD NOT BE PUT OFF BY THEIR CONCERNS ABOUT DENKTASH. IT WAS THE POSITION OF ANKARA WHICH WAS OVERRIDING.

10. IACOVOU SAID THAT DENKTASH HAD ALREADY MADE DIFFICULTIES OVER THE VENUE. WHEN THE GREEK CYPRIOT PRESS HAD ANNOUNCED THAT THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING WOULD TAKE PLACE IN NEW YORK HE HAD DELIBERATELY WITHHELD HIS AGREEMENT INSISTING ON GENEVA INSTEAD.

11. DESPITE THIS LAST COMMENT IACOVOU SAID THAT HE WAS ALREADY TURNING HIS THOUGHTS TOWARDS PREPARING CONSTRUCTIVELY FOR THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING.

12. WE UNDERSTAND THAT KYPRIANOU TOLD THE PRESS THIS EVENING THAT 'CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM WAS JUSTIFIED FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE 1974'.

COMMENT

13. IT IS OF COURSE A PITY THAT THE GAPS HAVE NOT BEE FILLED IN ADVANCE OF A HIGH LEVEL MEETING. THE BALL OF STRING MAY YET UNRAVEL. BUT THE ISSUES HAVE BEEN CRAWLED ALL OVER AND I THINK PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S ASSESSMENT THAT THIS IS A SUCCESS IS RIGHT. CERTAINLY MY IMPRESSION WAS THAT DESPITE HIS CARPING REMARKS ABOUT DENKTASH IACOVOU WAS ACTUALLY REALLY PLEASE WITH WHAT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED.

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1556 OF 12 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE ANKARA ATHENS NICOSIA WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY ROME PARIS BONN UKDEL NATO UKREP BRUSSELS

UKDEL STRASBOURG MODUK.

MY TELNO 1551 (NOT TO ALL): CYPRUS: SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

1. THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAS OBTAINED AGREEMENT TO A HIGH LEVEL MEETING BETWEEN KYPRIANOU AND DENKTASH ON 17 JANUARY.

DETAIL.

2. THE SECRETARY GENERAL ANNOUNCED TO THE PRESS THIS AFTERNOON 12 DECEMBER THAT ENOUGH PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE IN HIS CONSULTATIONS WITH THE TWO PARTIES TO JUSTIFY HIS CONVENING A HIGH LEVEL MEETING.

IT WOULD TAKE PLACE ON 17 JANUARY BUT HE COULD NOT SAY WHETHER IN NEW YORK OR EUROPE. IT WAS A 'VERY CONSTRUCTIVE STEP FORWARD'.

THE PARTIES WOULD BE WORKING AT THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING ON THE BASIS OF DOCUMENTS WHICH HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH THEM.

3. THE SECRETARY GENERAL RANG THIS EVENING TO LET ME KNOW PERSONALLY THAT HE HAD ACHIEVED 'SUCCESS'.

4. I ASKED WHAT HAD BEEN DONE ABOUT THE DIFFICULTY OF THE SCENARIO DESCRIBED IN MY TUR. HE REPLIED THAT TEN MINUTES BEFORE THE PRESS CONFERENCE HE HAD WITHDRAWN HIS PAPER DESCRIBING THE SCENARIO FOR THE SUMMIT AND HAD APPEALED TO BOTH SIDES TO ACCEPT THAT HE AS SECRETARY-GENERAL WOULD MANAGE THINGS FAIRLY. THEY HAD AGREED.

5. I ASKED WHETHER THIS MEANT THAT BOTH SIDES HAD ACCEPTED THE ARRANGEMENTS HE HAD PROPOSED FOR TERRITORY AND CONSTITUTION. HE SAID 'THAT IS MY UNDERSTANDING'. HE ADDED 'BUT YOU NEVER KNOW'. HE SAID THAT A 'TOTAL TEXT' HAD BEEN AGREED, THOUGH THE GREEK-CYPRIOTS HAD SOME RESERVATIONS. HE THEN QUALIFIED THIS BY SAYING THAT 'RESERVATION' WAS TOO RIGID A WORD FOR THE GREEK-CYPRriot ATTITUDE.

6. I ASKED WHETHER THE MEETING ON 17 JANUARY WOULD BE IN NEW YORK. HE SAID THAT ALL CONCERNED AT PRESENT THOUGHT IT WOULD. HOWEVER, SPEAKING VERY CONFIDENTIALLY, HE HIMSELF MIGHT ASK FOR IT TO TAKE PLACE IN GENEVA, IN ORDER TO MAKE IT EASIER OR EVEN POSSIBLE FOR HIM TO FULFIL ENGAGEMENTS IN EDINBURGH OR LONDON (THE DETAILS OF WHICH ARE KNOWN TO THE DEPARTMENT). HE ASKED ME NOT TO TELL ANYBODY ABOUT THIS.

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7. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SAID THAT HE WAS RINGING US FIRST FOLLOWING THE AGREEMENT BECAUSE OF THE EXCEPTIONAL AND INVALUABLE ASSISTANCE WE HAD GIVEN. ' ' I MAY NEED YOUR ASSISTANCE TO MAKE SOMETHING OF THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING. ' ' I THANKED PEREZ DE CUELLAR, CONGRATULATED HIM AND SAID THAT ONLY HE COULD HAVE ACHIEVED THIS MUCH.

8. THE CYPRUS FOREIGN MINISTER SUBSEQUENTLY GAVE ME A MORE DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE POSITION, FOR WHICH SEE MIFT (NOT TO ALL).

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