

DSG

File



cc: Sir P. Cadock.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

3 January 1985

CYPRUS

Thank you for your letter of 2 January enclosing a draft reply from the Prime Minister to the message from the Turkish Prime Minister about Cyprus.

The Prime Minister agrees to the draft message enclosed with your letter and also that we should first discuss it with the Americans and with Mr. Perez de Cuellar.

Charles Powell

CP

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

① GSC



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Prime Minister

London SW1A 2AH

Agree:

(i) The rather bland but probably wise reply to Ozal; 2 January, 1985

(ii) That we should check with the Americans before sending it, whether they have had a similar message and how they propose to reply? - Yes - with John Hammond.

CDP 2/1

Dear Charles,

As you know, the Turkish Prime Minister, Mr Ozal has sent a message to the Prime Minister (copy attached). This purports to be an assessment of the prospects for a lasting Cyprus settlement prior to the meeting between President Kyprianou and Mr Denktash which is due to begin under the chairmanship of the UN Secretary-General in New York on 17 January. In fact, the message contains total support for the Turkish Cypriot case, a request for pressure on the Greek Cypriots, and a complaint about a "new" defence doctrine announced by Papandreou which has been the subject of a Turkish approach to the FCO.

I attach a draft telegram to Ankara containing a proposed reply from the Prime Minister.

The announcement by the UN Secretary-General on 10 December (at the end of a third round of "proximity talks") that agreement had been secured to a "high-level meeting" represented a considerable diplomatic achievement for Perez de Cuellar, and offers some (albeit limited) hope that a settlement of the Cyprus issue may be attainable.

There is little doubt that the Turks impressed upon Denktash the need to adopt a positive attitude in the proximity talks. Denktash duly made the concessions sought by the Secretary-General (most notably on the percentage of territory to remain under Turkish Cypriot control). Seizing the political advantage Denktash also announced his acceptance in toto of the Secretary-General's draft agreement. President Kyprianou was disconcerted by this tactic and returned to Nicosia for consultations before indicating his agreement. However it is clear that Kyprianou considers that the high level meeting will involve further discussion of questions of substance, including those covered by the existing texts (this seems also to be the Secretary-General's view). Denktash and the Turks are trying to press home their advantage by insisting that Kyprianou accepts the agreement without further ado. Ozal's message must be seen as part of this process. The Turkish aim will be to transfer to the Greek Cypriots any odium for failure at the summit.

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In our view the Prime Minister should avoid being drawn into this dispute in her reply to Mr Ozal. It would be in keeping with our support for the Secretary-General for her to continue to urge both sides to adopt a positive attitude, thus maximising the chance, which may be unique, to make real progress towards a settlement. The Prime Minister could take a similar line if she agrees to meet President Kyprianou on 14 January, immediately before the high-level talks begin.

✓ It is probable that Mr Ozal has sent a similar message to President Reagan. It would be helpful to our close consultations with the Americans on Cyprus if the Prime Minister would agree to our discussing Ozal's message and the proposed reply with the State Department before any reply is sent. It would also be useful to Mr Perez de Cuellar in his role of mediator if Sir J Thomson were authorised to discuss the messages on the same basis with him.

Yours ever,
Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

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<<<< 1 >>>>

2 must continue to show courage, patience and flexibility if

3 success is to crown their and the Secretary-General's

4 efforts. There can be no doubt about Mr Perez de Cuellar's

5 personal commitment to a successful resolution of the problem.

6 He knows that he has the continued confidence of the British

7 Government. We shall take every opportunity to support his

8 efforts with all the parties. The opportunity is too great

9 to miss.

10 ENDS

11 2. (For Washington). You may discuss Ozal's message and the

12 Prime Minister's reply in confidence with the Americans. You

13 should ask if they have received a similar approach. If they

14 have what reply will they be sending?

15 3. (For UKMIS New York). You may also discuss the exchange

16 with the UN Secretary-General in confidence.

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NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
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TURKISH EMBASSY

LONDON

274-84

The Turkish Chargé d'Affaires a.i. presents his compliments to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and has the honour to request him to be so kind as to forward to its high destination the enclosed message by His Excellency Mr. Turgut Özal, Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey, to the Rt. Honourable Margaret Thatcher M.P., Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

The Turkish Chargé d'Affaires a.i. avails himself of this opportunity to renew to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs the assurances of his highest consideration.

London, 26 November 1984



Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
S W 1.

Text of the message of His Excellency
Mr. Turgut ÖZAL, Prime Minister of the
Republic of Turkey, to the Rt. Honourable
Margaret THATCHER M.P., Prime Minister
of the United Kingdom.

"The Rt. Honourable Margaret Thatcher M.P.
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
London

A Dear Madame Prime Minister,

I deem it opportune to share with you our assessment
of the newly-created prospects for a lasting Cyprus
settlement.

We are happy to note that the proximity talks ended
with a decision to hold a high-level meeting in January.
As you know by now, this promising state of affairs has
been mostly the fruit of the conciliatory and flexible
attitude of the Turkish Cypriot side throughout the
proximity talks and their constructive cooperation with
the Secretary General. President Denktaş once again
proved his commitment to a negotiated settlement by being
fully responsive to the Secretary General's efforts at
every turn, often at the cost of taking considerable
risks as a political leader. The Turkish Cypriots, though
not satisfied with it in every instance and had in fact
many difficulties, accepted all the elements put forward
by the Secretary General as a draft agreement and look
forward to its signature at the forthcoming high-level
meeting.

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The Turkish Cypriots have told us and we agree with them that they have done all that is possible for them to do and that anything more on their part would be tantamount to outright surrender.

We believe there is today a new and unprecedented opportunity for the two sides to resolve the Cyprus problem. The basis already exists. What is needed now is for the Greek Cypriot side to come to the high-level meeting in good faith.

If the high-level meeting is turned into still another round of open-ended negotiations, this major opportunity would be lost and might, we are afraid, lead to reconsideration of established positions.

It is of vital importance, therefore, to impress on the Greek side the crucial meaning of obtaining full agreement at the high-level meeting on the draft as presented by the Secretary General after his extensive contacts with both sides during the past five months. The Greek side must be urged to match the demonstrated goodwill of the Turkish Cypriots and to allow the next step toward a mutual settlement. Whereas success would remove this source of friction with beneficial effects, failure will surely have negative consequences and repercussions.

I would also like to make a few related observations on the subject. The attempt by the Greek side to present to world public opinion the Cyprus breakthrough as the product of outside "pressure", is no doubt designed to subvert the Secretary General's initiative. Furthermore, the haste with which the Greek Government announced a new defense "doctrine" based on the imaginary Turkish threat at a time when a promising threshold has just been reached on Cyprus can not be viewed purely accidental. The

perpetuation of the Cyprus question unresolved except on exclusively Greek terms is part of the present Greek strategy against Turkey.

We expect that Greece will not be allowed to indulge in this dangerous game to the detriment of the interests of the western alliance.

With best regards.

Turgut Özal" 2