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FROM HARARE 080330Z JAN 85
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 11 OF 8 JANUARY
INFO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA, NAIROBI
PRIORITY WASHINGTON. UKMIS NEW
YORK, ATHENS, BONN EEC BRUSSELS,
BRITISH EMBASSY BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, DUBLIN, LUXEMBOURG, PARIS,
ROME, THE HAGUE, MAPUTO, LUANDA AND PRETORIA.

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

MIBQ: SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH MUGABE:

INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

SUMMARY

MUGABE EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE SUSPICION ABOUT US MOTIVES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. THE US HAD PERSUADED SOUTH AFRICA TO INSIST ON CUBAN WITHDRAWAL. MUGABE ASKED BRITAIN TO USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH THE US AND SOUTH AFRICA. DISCUSSIONS ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND (BRIEFLY) FALKLANDS. MUGABE REVEALED HE HAD RECEIVED A LETTER FROM FRENCH AMBASSADOR CRITICISING BRITISH ATTITUDE ON LOME.

DETAIL

SOUTHERN AFRICA

2. MUGABE BEGAN THE DISCUSSION ON SOUTH AFRICA BY EXPRESSING CONCERN ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES WHICH WAS MORE OF A HINDRANCE THAN A HELP. HE HAD HOPED AFTER PRESIDENT REAGAN'S RECENT STATEMENT ON APARTHEID THIS WOULD MARK THE TURNING POINT FOR US POLICY. BUT, TO PUT IT MILDLY, HE HAD NOT BEEN IMPRESSED WITH US POLICY THEN OR NOW.

3. MUGABE SAID THAT HE SAW US POLICY ESSENTIALLY AS ENCOURAGING SOUTH AFRICA, THOUGH THE AMERICANS CALLED IT CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT. THE SOUTH AFRICANS WERE ENCOURAGED TO PERPETRATE DESTABILISING ACTIONS IN ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE. SOUTH AFRICA HAD TRIED TO MOUNT ACTIONS AGAINST ZIMBABWE BUT THESE HAD BEEN DEALT WITH. THE 'SUPER ZIPRA' DISSIDENTS WERE STILL BEING FUNDED FROM AND TRAINED IN SOUTH AFRICA. FORMER MEMBERS OF THE SELOUS SCOUTS HAD BEEN USED BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE FORCE IN NAMIBIA, ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE.

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4. MUGABE SAID THAT SOUTH AFRICANS WERE TRYING TO UNDERMINE ZIMBABWE'S ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE. IN PARTICULAR THEY WERE TRYING TO THROTTLE ZIMBABWE'S LINKS WITH SEA PORTS. ZIMBABWE HAD THREE BATTALIONS IN MOZAMBIQUE DEFENDING THEIR PIPELINE AND THE ROAD AND RAIL LINKS TO BEIRA, AND TO MALAWI. ZIMBABWE'S USE OF TRANSPORT ROUTES THROUGH SOUTH AFRICA HAD BEEN FORCED TO INCREASE. AFTER UDI AS MUCH AS 84% OF RHODESIA GOODS HAD GONE THROUGH MOZAMBIQUE. NOW IT WAS NOT MORE THAN 40%.

5. MUGABE SAID THAT ZIMBABWE HAD NOT OFFENDED AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. HE HAD DECIDED THAT IT WAS NOT IN ZIMBABWE'S INTEREST TO SPONSOR OPERATIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA FROM ZIMBABWE. THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD NOT RECIPROCATED.

6. TURNING TO NAMIBIA, MUGABE SAID THAT SOUTH AFRICA WAS NOW DEMANDING CUBAN WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA BUT THIS WAS REALLY AN RESPONSE TO PRESSURE FROM THE UNITED STATES WHICH WAS NOT GENUINELY INTERESTED IN NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE BUT IN ITS GLOBAL POLICY TO GET THE CUBANS OUT OF AFRICA AND TO DEAL A BLOW AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. MUGABE WAS DISMAYED THAT THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES STILL TENDED TO GO ALONG WITH THE UNITED STATES. BRITAIN WAS BETTER PLACED THAN ANY COUNTRY TO INFLUENCE US THINKING. HE PERSONALLY VERY MUCH HOPED THAT BRITAIN WOULD USE ITS FULL INFLUENCE TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE UNITED STATES AND UPON SOUTH AFRICA. IF SOUTH AFRICA WAS TOLD IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS BY BRITAIN THAT IT MUST CHANGE ITS PRESENT POLICY IT WOULD HAVE TO PAY ATTENTION. MUGABE CONCLUDED WITH A RESUME OF ZIMBABWE'S HISTORY SINCE UDI.

7. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE AGREED WITH ZIMBABWE ON THE FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVES OF POLICY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, NAMELY POLITICAL STABILITY, INDEPENDENCE AND ECONOMIC PROSPERITY. THE QUESTION WAS HOW BEST TO DELIVER THESE OBJECTIVES IN PRACTICE. WE WERE IN FAVOUR OF NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE, WITHOUT QUALIFICATION. WE CONSIDERED APARTHEID WAS BASED UPON UNACCEPTABLE CONCEPTS WHICH WERE NOT IN ANY CASE IN THE LONG TERM INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE. WE WANTED TO SEE THE NKOMATI ACCORD IMPLEMENTED AND WE WANTED TO SEE THE RAILROADS KEPT OPEN.

8. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT ON NAMIBIA, IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO IDENTIFY THE FACTORS WHICH IN PRACTICE WOULD LEAD TO AGREEMENT. SOUTH AFRICA HAD AN INTEREST IN NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE IN VIEW OF THE GROWING BURDEN ON ITS ECONOMY. IT WAS AN OBJECTIVE FACT THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE CUBAN FORCES WAS NOW THE CHIEF POINT OF NEGOTIATION BETWEEN ANGOLA AND SOUTH AFRICA. PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS HAD PUT FORWARD A TIMETABLE FOR CUBAN WITHDRAWAL WHICH WAS NOW UNDER DISCUSSION. THE CROCKER NEGOTIATIONS WERE MAKING SOME HEADWAY. IT WOULD NOT BE RIGHT TO PUSH OUT THE UNITED STATES AT THIS STAGE. MUGABE INTERVENED TO SAY THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO PUSH OUT THE US. HE SIMPLY WANTED THEM TO CHANGE DIRECTION A BIT AND TO 'TALK TOUGH' WITH SOUTH AFRICA.

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9. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WHEN THEY HAD SEEN THE TWO BOTHAS THE PRIME MINISTER AND HE HAD STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF IMPLEMENTING THE NKOMATI ACCORD AND THE NEED FOR STABILITY IN THE REGION. WE HAD ALSO DISCUSSED THESE ISSUES WITH PORTUGAL. MUGABE RESPONDED BY SAYING HE HOPED WE WOULD CONTINUE TO USE OUR INFLUENCE TO PERSUADE SOUTH AFRICA TO STOP DESTABILISING ITS NEIGHBOURS.

EAST/WEST RELATIONS

10. MUGABE ASKED THE SECRETARY OF STATE HOW WE SAW THE PROSPECTS FOR THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS. HE HAD NOTED THE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE PRIME MINISTER BEFORE AND DURING HER VISIT TO WASHINGTON IN WHICH SHE HAD EMPHASISED HER SOLIDARITY WITH THE UNITED STATES. HE WONDERED WHETHER THE ARMS NEGOTIATIONS STOOD ANY REAL CHANCE IF THE US WAS INSISTING THAT THERE COULD BE NO DISCUSSION ON SDI.

11. THE SECRETARY OF STATE GAVE A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE MEETINGS IN LONDON WITH GORBACHEV AND THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON, DRAWING UPON THE FOUR POINTS. HE SAID THAT WE WERE CONVINCED OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SINCERITY IN SEEKING GENUINE ARMS REDUCTION. ON SDI IT WAS CLEAR THAT BOTH SIDES WERE ENGAGED IN RESEARCH WHICH WOULD OBVIOUSLY CONTINUE. NONETHELESS OUR HOPE WAS THAT BEFORE DEPLOYMENT TOOK PLACE, SDI WOULD BE INCLUDED IN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. THIS HAD BEEN ONE OF THE FOUR POINTS.

FALKLANDS

12. IN A BRIEF EXCHANGE ON THE FALKLANDS MUGABE SAID, HALF JOKINGLY, THAT BRITAIN WAS STILL INTRANSIGENT EVEN THOUGH WE HAD WON THE WAR. THE SECRETARY OF STATE EXPLAINED THE BACKGROUND TO THE BERNE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE STEPS WHICH WE HAD TAKEN TO TRY TO NORMALISE RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA WHILE LEAVING ASIDE THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY WHICH WAS NOT FOR DISCUSSION. MUGABE ASKED WHETHER SOVEREIGNTY COULD BE DISCUSSED LATER OR WHETHER IT COULD NEVER BE DISCUSSED. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE MAIN THING WAS TO MOVE TOWARDS A NORMALISATION OF RELATIONS THROUGH DISCUSSION OF OTHER ISSUES. IT WAS UNFORTUNATE THAT THE ARGENTINES HAD LINKED DISCUSSION OF THESE QUESTIONS WITH SOVEREIGNTY, WHICH WAS NOT FOR NEGOTIATION.

LOME

13. MUGABE SAID THAT HE HAD HAD A LETTER FROM THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN NOVEMBER 1984 WHICH HAD ARGUED THAT BRITAIN WAS THE ONE COUNTRY WHICH WAS STANDING OUT AGAINST AGREEMENT ON LOME. ALTHOUGH WEST GERMANY WAS RELUCTANT TO AGREE ON A FIGURE, THE LETTER HAD SAID, THE FRENCH WERE SURE THAT THEY WOULD GIVE WAY IF BRITAIN WERE NOT SO INTRANSIGENT. THE LETTER HAD IMPLIED THAT WHILE FRANCE WAS FULFILLING HER OBLIGATIONS TO HER FORMER COLONIES, BRITAIN WAS NOT DOING SO. IT HAD SUGGESTED THAT MUGABE

This is intolerable behaviour by the French

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WRITE TO THE PRIME MINISTER TO ASK HER TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE. THE LETTER HAD ALLEGED THAT, IN TAKING THIS POSITION, BRITAIN WAS SIMPLY FOLLOWING PRESIDENT REAGAN. MUGABE SAID HE HAD BEEN TEMPTED TO SEND A "HUMOROUS" LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER BUT AFTER DISCUSSING THIS WITH PRESIDENT KAUNDA RECENTLY HE DECIDED TO AWAIT THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH SHOWED THAT AT THE END OF THE DAY THE AMOUNT AVAILABLE HAD BEEN INCREASED. MUGABE SAID WITH A GRIN THAT HE HOPED IN REVEALING THIS HE WAS NOT STARTING ANOTHER ANGLO-FRENCH WAR.

14. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE ANGLO-FRENCH COMPETITIVE RELATIONSHIP WOULD NO DOUBT ENDURE FOR SOME TIME. HE EXPLAINED THE PROBLEMS OF ALLOCATING RESOURCES FROM PUBLIC EXPENDITURE IN PARTICULAR BALANCING DEMANDS ON BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL AID. WE PREFERRED TO CONCENTRATE OUR BILATERAL AID ON COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES TO WHICH TWO-THIRDS OF OUR AID WAS ALLOCATED. WE WERE ALSO KEEN TO SEE GREATER ACCESS TO COMMUNITY MARKETS FOR COMMONWEALTH PRODUCERS. WE SAW NO SENSE IN PREVENTING THEM FROM EARNING EXPORTS WHILE COMPENSATING THEM WITH SOME CASH. WE HAD ALSO BEEN PARTICULARLY ASSIDUOUS IN FIGHTING ZIMBABWE'S CORNER ON SUGAR.

15. MUGABE AGREED THAT IT WAS BETTER TO REDUCE TRADE BARRIERS INSTEAD OF SIMPLY PROVIDING AID. ON SUGAR HE SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN VERY ADVERSE DEVELOPMENTS WITH THE NEGOTIATING FIGURE REDUCED TO 70,000 TONNES. BUT HE RECOGNISED BRITAIN'S EFFORTS ON ZIMBABWE'S BEHALF.

EWANS

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