



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 January 1985

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bcPCCYPRUS

The Cypriot High Commissioner telephoned me at 8.45 pm this evening on President Kyprianou's instructions. Matters were not developing at all well in New York, and the meeting with Mr. Denktash under the Secretary-General's auspices had virtually reached an impasse. Kyprianou had subsequently met very privately with Denktash alone. The purpose had been to find out whether Denktash was ready to discuss even some of the items in the Secretary-General's paper with which the Greek Cypriots had problems. The answer had been that he had been unwilling to add one comma or full-stop. There was to be a further meeting this afternoon under the Secretary-General's auspices. But President Kyprianou was not optimistic at all. All that seemed possible was to find a formula for adjourning the talks. The situation was critical.

I said that our own reports from New York had revealed that difficulties had arisen but had not cast them in quite such a serious light. It seemed that President Kyprianou himself had raised a very large number of points on the draft agreement. This might have provoked Denktash to be even more unreasonable. Panayides said that President Kyprianou had done this for the record: it did not mean that he wished to re-open all the points. I said that it seemed to me that there was a risk that adjournment of the talks might be treated by the Turkish Cypriots as definitive and as an excuse for no further effort. Could not the Greek Cypriots find some way to keep the talks going? Panayides was dubious. I urged him to advise President Kyprianou to speak to Sir J. Thomson who might be able to influence developments on the spot. Panayides said that unfortunately he was absent from New York. He hoped that HMG would consider what they could do to help retrieve the situation.

You will no doubt want to find out how far Panayides' account tallies with the information available to our mission in New York; also how the Secretary-General and the Americans see things. If Panayides is right, and given the time-scale, any action with the Turks and Turkish Cypriots would presumably have to be in New York and might best be coordinated with the Americans. But if it is thought that a message from the Prime Minister could be useful, please let me know. I am sure that she would wish us to take any action we can to avoid a breakdown.

(C.D. POWELL)

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