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TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO.40 OF 21 JANUARY 1985

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, NICOSIA,ATHENS, ANKARA,VIENNA (FOR P/S
TO LADY YOUNG)ROUTINE PARIS,BONN,ROME,UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS, MODUK(SEC(O)(C))
SAVING TO UKDEL STRASBOURG.

MY TELS NOS 35-37 : CYPRUS : HIGH LEVEL MEETING.

1. YOU WILL WISH TO HAVE, IN TIME FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON 23 JANUARY, MY IMPRESSIONS OF WHY THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING FAILED:

2. ITS FAILURE IS UNDOUBTEDLY A GREAT DISAPPOINTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL. HE GENUINELY BELIEVED THAT HE COULD OBTAIN AGREEMENT FROM THE TWO SIDES. HE HAD REASON TO BE HOPEFUL. THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FACTORS SEEMED MORE FAVOURABLE THAN EVER BEFORE. UDI HAD BROKEN THE MOULD AND THE GREEK CYPRIOTS APPEARED AT LAST TO HAVE REALISED THAT TIME WAS WORKING AGAINST THEM. ANKARA HAD GIVEN ITS SUPPORT AND HAD INDUCED DENKTASH TO MAKE SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSIONS. THE GREEK ATTITUDE TOO SEEMED TO HAVE CHANGED WITH AN ENCOURAGING STATEMENT BY PAPANDREOU. THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WERE IN FULL SUPPORT OF HIS EFFORTS. HE COULD REASONABLY FEEL THAT THIS WAS THE BEST OPPORTUNITY SINCE 1974 TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR A SOLUTION.

3. THE BREAKTHROUGH CAME AT THE BEGINNING OF THE THIRD ROUND OF PROXIMITY TALKS AT THE END OF NOVEMBER. UNDER PRESSURE FROM ANKARA, DENKTASH MADE SOME SURPRISINGLY HELPFUL CONCESSIONS, PARTICULARLY ON TERRITORY. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE CAUGHT BY SURPRISE AND LEFT THE RUNNING TO DENKTASH AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SAW HIS OPPORTUNITY AND PRESSED DENKTASH FOR FURTHER CONCESSIONS WHICH HE EVENTUALLY GAVE BUT ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD PRESENT THEM AS PART OF HIS OWN PROPOSAL FOR A DRAFT AGREEMENT. THIS SET THE DIE. THE TURKS AND DENKTASH FELT THEY HAD REACHED THE LIMIT OF THEIR CONCESSIONS AND HAD A DEAL WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL. BUT HE STILL HAD TO SELL IT TO THE GREEK CYPRIOTS.

4. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS, WHO HAD STOOD BACK FROM THESE NEGOTIATIONS REGARDED THE DRAFT AGREEMENT WHICH EMERGED AS INSUFFICIENT. BUT THEY DID NOT FEEL THEY COULD REJECT IT, INSOFAR AS IT WAS PUT TO THEM AS THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S OWN PROPOSAL - THE SO-CALLED 'PRESENTATION' OF 27 NOVEMBER. AT THE SAME TIME THE SECRETARY GENERAL COULD NOT GET KYPRIANOU TO ACCEPT THE DRAFT. THUS THE

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/ SECRETARY

SECRETARY GENERAL WAS, I BELIEVE, ONLY ABLE TO SAVE THE THIRD ROUND OF PROXIMITY TALKS AND GET AGREEMENT TO A HIGH LEVEL MEETING BY DELIBERATELY LEAVING IT AMBIGUOUS WHETHER THE TWO SIDES WERE, AS DENKTASH MAINTAINED, COMING TO SIGN AN ALREADY PREPARED DRAFT AGREEMENT OR, AS THE GREEK CYPRIOTS MAINTAINED, TO ENTER INTO FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS. THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS WAVERED BETWEEN THE TWO INTERPRETATIONS. PRIVATELY HIS STAFF RECOGNISED THAT IT WAS A CALCULATED GAMBLE. HE AND THEY PINNED THEIR HOPES ON THE TWO SIDES RISING TO THE OCCASION AND BEING PREPARED TO MAKE MUTUAL CONCESSIONS RATHER THAN RISK PUBLIC BLAME FOR A FAILURE.

5. WHAT HAPPENED ESSENTIALLY AT THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING FROM 17 - 20 JANUARY WAS THAT NEITHER SIDE BUDGED FROM ITS STATED POSITION. KYPRIANOU MADE MATTERS AS BAD AS THEY COULD BE BY HIS OPENING STATEMENT IN WHICH HE TRIED TO RESERVE HIS POSITION ON A WHOLE RANGE OF ISSUES IN THE DRAFT AGREEMENT INCLUDING THE CONCEPTS OF BIZONALITY AND POLITICAL EQUALITY WHICH THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS THOUGHT HE HAD ACCEPTED. HE REFUSED TO ENDORSE THE DRAFT AGREEMENT AS ANYTHING MORE THAN A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS AND MAINTAINED THIS POSITION UNTIL THE LAST AFTERNOON. FOR 3 DAYS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TRIED OUT A SERIES OF DIFFERENT FORMULAS WITHOUT SUCCESS. WHEN KYPRIANOU FINALLY AGREED TO ONE ON THE LAST AFTERNOON IT WAS TOO LATE TO PIN DENKTASH DOWN.

6. DENKTASH FOR HIS PART STUCK TO HIS POSITION THAT THE AGREEMENT MUST FIRST BE SIGNED AND WORKING GROUPS ESTABLISHED BEFORE THERE COULD BE FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS AND HIGH LEVEL MEETINGS. AS LONG AS KYPRIANOU REFUSED TO ENDORSE THE DRAFT AGREEMENT OR TO REDUCE THE SCOPE OF HIS DEMANDS THERE WAS NO NEED FOR DENKTASH TO LIFT A FINGER. HE WAS POLITE BUT UNYIELDING. KYPRIANOU, HE ARGUED, WAS SEEKING A FURTHER HIGH LEVEL MEETING SIMPLY TO RENEGOTIATE THE DRAFT AGREEMENT. HE DID NOT INTEND TO AGREE TO THIS.

7. WHEN HIS FINAL EFFORT ON THE LAST AFTERNOON FAILED, THE SECRETARY GENERAL SOUGHT TO SECURE AGREEMENT ON A DATE FOR A FURTHER HIGH-LEVEL MEETING BUT DENKTASH HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF AGREEMENT TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S DOCUMENT HE WOULD NOT SET A DATE FOR A FURTHER HIGH LEVEL MEETING. ALL THE SECRETARY GENERAL COULD DO IN HIS CLOSING STATEMENT WAS TO EMPHASISE THE NEED TO PERSEVERE AND SAY THAT HE WOULD TRY TO CONVENE A FURTHER HIGH LEVEL MEETING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HIS STAFF PROFESS TO BE OPTIMISTIC ON THIS SCORE, THOUGH THEY SAY FEBRUARY MAY BE TOO EARLY. DENKTASH HOWEVER MADE IT BRUTALLY CLEAR TO THE PRESS THAT HE HAD MADE NO COMMITMENT AND THAT THERE WAS NOW A "NEW POLITICAL SITUATION" IN WHICH THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WOULD HAVE TO REVIEW THEIR OPTIONS. THE CHANCES OF THE BALL OF STRING UNRAVELLING MUST BE GREAT.

8. SO WHO WAS TO BLAME? KYPRIANOU, WHO HAD MOST AT STAKE IN THE MEETING, MUST TAKE A LARGE SHARE. AS IN THE SECOND ROUND OF

2
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PROXIMITY TALKS HE FAILED TO RISE TO THE OCCASION. HE HAS BEEN DESCRIBED TO US BY THE SECRETARIAT AS "THE PRISONER OF HIS MANNER AND HIS BRIEF" HIS ATTEMPT TO RESERVE HIS POSITION ON AS MANY POINTS AS POSSIBLE AND LEAVE THEM OPEN FOR SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATION, PLAYED INTO DENKTASH'S HANDS. PRESUMABLY HE THOUGHT THAT IF HE KEPT THE PROCESS GOING HE COULD, WITH THE HELP OF INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE, EVENTUALLY RE-NEGOTIATE THE DRAFT AGREEMENT INTO SOMETHING WHICH BETTER REFLECTED TRADITIONAL GREEK CYPRIOT ASPIRATIONS. BY DOING SO HE LOST THE CHANCE TO PIN DENKTASH DOWN TO AN IMMEDIATE AGREEMENT. HIS CONSTANT MANOEUVRING GAVE DENKTASH AMPLE REASON TO DISTRUST HIS INTENTIONS AND AMPLE JUSTIFICATION FOR STANDING FIRM.

9. DENKTASH HIMSELF APPEARED QUITE CONTENT TO DO NOTHING. THE SECRETARIAT ARE CONVINCED THAT HE FELT HE HAD BEEN FORCED BY ANKARA INTO MAKING THE CONCESSIONS WHICH OPENED THE WAY TO THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING AND THAT HE HIMSELF WAS NOT PREPARED TO DO ANYTHING FURTHER TO PROMOTE AN AGREEMENT. AND BY THE SAME TOKEN ANKARA SAW NO REASON TO PRESS HIM, TO MAKE CONCESSIONS. BECAUSE OF KYRPIANOU'S TACTICAL INEPTITUDE THE TURKISH SIDE'S INTENTIONS WERE NOT REALLY TESTED.

10. FOR ALL HIS UNTIRING EFFORTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL MUST BE FAULTED FOR RELYING TOO MUCH ON CONSTRUCTIVE AMBIGUITY. BOTH SIDES COULD POINT TO PUBLIC STATEMENTS WHICH HE HAD MADE AND PRIVATE ASSURANCES WHICH HE HAD GIVEN THEM IN SUPPORT OF THEIR OWN INTERPRETATION OF THE BASIS ON WHICH THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING WAS BEING HELD. HIS OPTIMISM THAT WITH THE SPOTLIGHT OF WORLD ATTENTION ON THEM HE COULD PREVAIL ON THE TWO LEADERS TO COME TO TERMS WAS MISPLACED.

11. AMBIGUITY IS ONLY CONSTRUCTIVE IF YOU SUCCEED. PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S FAILURE WILL INEVITABLY DAMAGE HIS PRESTIGE HERE. WE MUST WAIT TO SEE WHAT EFFECT IT HAS ON HIS STANDING WITH THE TWO SIDES BUT ALREADY THEIR PUBLIC EXPRESSIONS OF CONTINUED TRUST ARE BEING UNDERMINED BY PRIVATE CRITICISM. HE HIMSELF IS SAID BY HIS STAFF TO BE "DISAPPOINTED BUT PHILOSOPHICAL".

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12. IN THE LAST ANALYSIS HOWEVER WE MUST ASK OURSELVES IF A GENUINE AND DURABLE AGREEMENT WAS EVER POSSIBLE - AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES, THAT IS TO SAY, TO SUBMERGE THEIR DIFFERENCES AND TO LIVE TOGETHER IN A FEDERATION. I MUST CONFESS THAT I DO NOT THINK THE NECESSARY DEGREE OF POLITICAL WILL WAS THERE. THE BASIC ASPIRATIONS OF THE GREEK CYPRIOTS AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS REMAIN TOO FAR APART. MORE ADROIT DIPLOMACY MIGHT JUST HAVE SECURED AN AGREEMENT ON PAPER. BUT THE DIFFERENCES WE HAVE SEEN WOULD NO DOUBT HAVE EMERGED SUBSEQUENTLY ONCE THE WORKING GROUPS WENT INTO THE DETAILS. THE CYPRUS PROBLEM REMAINS, I FEAR, AS INTRACTABLE AS EVER.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO UKDEL STRASBOURG.

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