

CCP



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 January 1985

Dear Charles,
Cyprus

NBPR
 (This adds nothing to
 the telegrams which
 she has seen).

Thank you for your letter of 21 January, and for your account of the line which you, in concert with the FCO, put across over the weekend to the Cypriot High Commission.

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As you know, the high-level meeting between Kyprianou and Denktash appears, despite the Secretary-General's resolute confidence, to have ended on Sunday evening pretty much in failure. Whilst there remains a chance that further direct contact between the two leaders will take place, there will almost certainly need to be some active diplomacy to achieve this.

During the meeting, Denktash as expected sat tight on the acceptance of the Secretary-General's documentation in toto. Kyprianou went to the other extreme in for a long time appearing to want to re-open every issue. The UN Secretariat were critical of his performance which they saw as pressing for too much for too long, and as a result putting at risk all that had been achieved. It was only at the last moment that Kyprianou edged towards the more limited objectives which the Prime Minister had advised him to adopt on 14 January. He was apparently prepared at that stage to accept the Secretary-General's documentation (if only as a basis for negotiation) and establish a working group on the Constitution, but only in return for a fixed date for the next high-level meeting and an agenda of items limited to points of prime importance to the Greek Cypriots. The proposal, not altogether surprisingly in our eyes, was rejected by Denktash. The UN Secretariat considered the proposal to have 'real merit', but said it simply came too late.

In fairness to both parties, it may be that the Secretary-General over-estimated the degree of understanding and willingness to cooperate between the two sides at the end of the third round of proximity talks in December, and that the high-level meeting was in consequence doomed to at the most very limited success.

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During the weekend, as you say, we consistently made clear to the Secretary-General our willingness to assist him if he thought an intervention might be useful. Although he felt such help was not called for, our Mission in New York nevertheless kept close with both sides, urging the Greek Cypriots to follow the Prime Minister's advice given to Kyprianou on 14 January and encouraging the Turkish Cypriots and Turks to seize any openings offered by Kyprianou. We told both sides and the Secretariat of the importance British Ministers attached to a successful outcome to the high-level meeting. All appeared grateful for our activity. Interestingly, the Americans, despite regular requests from the Greek Cypriots, refused to intervene. They indicated to us that they wanted to keep their powder dry for the period ahead.

The outlook is uncertain. We shall need to give Perez de Cuellar every encouragement to keep the negotiating process going when he meets the Prime Minister and Secretary of State on Wednesday. But our first need is to listen to his own assessment and, in the light of that, consider what other steps might be appropriate. The briefing will reflect this. Publicly he has done his best to salvage what he can, saying that the gap between the two sides has never been so narrow and that he will try to achieve another high-level meeting if possible before the end of February (UKMIS New York telegram No 37). Privately, he will be very disappointed. His reputation may have taken a knock.

G. James


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CYPRUS: Internal situation: Pt 2



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