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19.11.84

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 88 OF 31 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA, ATHENS, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON AND  
MODUK (SEC (O) (C)).

INFO ROUTINE UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS, ROME, PARIS AND BONN

MY TELNO 065: CYPRUS

SUMMARY

1. THE TURKISH POSITION IS PRETTY UNYIELDING. IN SUMMARY  
ULUCEVIK HAS SAID THAT THEY ENDORSE THE HOLDING OF ELECTIONS IN  
JUNE, DENKTASH'S WITHDRAWAL OF THE 'CONCESSIONS' IN THE DRAFT  
AGREEMENT AND HIS REFUSAL TO RESUME FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS UNTIL  
AFTER THE ELECTIONS.

DETAIL

2. AS FOLLOW UP TO MY CALL ON HALEFOGLU ON 25 JANUARY MY  
COUNSELLOR CALLED YESTERDAY ON ULUCEVIK FOR AN INFORMAL BUT  
FULL (75 MINUTES) DISCUSSION ON HOW THE TURKS SEE NEXT STEPS.

3. ULUCEVIK, WHO WAS CLEARLY DEEPLY COMMITTED TO THE NEGOTIATIONS  
AND DISAPPOINTED AT THE OUTCOME, WAS VERY BITTER AT WHAT HE TERMED  
KYPRIANOU'S OBVIOUS LACK OF POLITICAL WILL TO REACH A SETTLEMENT.  
HE DESCRIBED THE GREEK CYPRIOT TACTICS AS BEING TO ACHIEVE ONE SET  
OF CONCESSIONS FROM DENKTASH AND THEN TO USE THESE AS A  
SPRING-BOARD FROM WHICH TO NEGOTIATE YET FURTHER ADVANTAGES.  
THIS WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE TURKISH SIDE WHO HAD TAKEN SERIOUSLY  
THE EARLIER ADVICE OF WESTERN GOVERNMENTS THAT THEY SHOULD ASSEMBLE  
A REASONABLE AND FINAL NEGOTIATING POSITION WHICH WOULD EITHER BE  
SUFFICIENT TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT OR, IF THIS WAS NOT FORTHCOMING,  
A DEFENSIBLE DEMONSTRATION OF THEIR GOODWILL.

4. ULUCEVIK ADMITTED THAT DENKTASH HAD HIMSELF DECIDED TO CALL  
ELECTIONS BEFORE INFORMING ANKARA. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF BOTH THE  
NEED FOR DENKTASH TO SECURE A NEW MANDATE FOR FRESH NEGOTIATIONS  
AND OF THE STRONG CRITICISMS BOTH IN NORTHERN CYPRUS AND IN TURKEY  
OF THE CONCESSIONS ALREADY GRANTED, THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT COULD

NEED FOR DENKTASH TO SECURE A NEW MANDATE FOR FRESH NEGOTIATIONS AND OF THE STRONG CRITICISMS BOTH IN NORTHERN CYPRUS AND IN TURKEY OF THE CONCESSIONS ALREADY GRANTED, THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT COULD ONLY ENDORSE HIS DECISION. IT HAD NOT BEEN EASY TO CONVINCE DENKTASH TO GO AS FAR AS HE HAD: HE FELT HIS OWN SCEPTICISM OF GREEK CYPRIOT INTENTIONS HAD BEEN JUSTIFIED AND IN ANY CASE THERE WAS NO DISPOSITION IN ANKARA TO PUSH HIM FURTHER NOW. VARCOE REFERRED TO THE NEED TO AVOID ANY ACTION WHICH MIGHT CUT ACROSS THE RESUMPTION OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE, BUT ULUCEVIK BRUSHED THIS ASIDE SAYING THAT EARLIER CONSTITUTIONAL MOVES HAD NOT IN PRACTICE PREVENTED THE SECRETARY GENERAL FROM MOUNTING HIS GOOD OFFICES OPERATION AND THAT THE STATEHOOD PROCESS COULD BE HALTED AT ANY TIME IF THERE WERE A SERIOUS PROSPECT OF ESTABLISHING A BI-ZONAL BI-COMUNAL FEDERATION. THE JUNE ELECTIONS COULD NOT BE HELD UNDER THE 1975 CONSTITUTION AS IT STOOD AND ULUCEVIK THOUGHT IT QUITE PROBABLE THAT EITHER AMENDMENTS WOULD BE MADE TO ACCOMMODATE THE 1983 CHANGES (HE OVER THE PRESIDENCY) OR A NEW CONSTITUTION MIGHT BE BROUGHT INTO EFFECT BEFORE THE ELECTIONS.

5. AT THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON 26 JANUARY CYPRUS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IN THE CONTEXT OF TURCO-GREEK RELATIONS. THE MEETING HAD IN EFFECT ENDORSED DECISIONS TAKEN EARLIER "AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL" WHICH WAS FULLY TO SUPPORT DENKTASH IN WITHDRAWING THE CONCESSIONS INCORPORATED INTO THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S SUMMIT DOCUMENTATION. ANKARA ALSO SUPPORTED DENKTASH'S REFUSAL TO HOLD ANY FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS UNTIL AFTER THE ELECTION THOUGH THIS DID NOT RULE OUT INFORMAL CONTACTS, DIRECT OR THROUGH THE UN, WITH THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE (CF PARA 3 OF NICOSIA TELNO 27).

6. WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE TURKISH POSITION ON TROOP WITHDRAWALS, ULUCEVIK WAS VAGUE. HE SAID THAT THIS, LIKE ALL THE OTHER ISSUES, COULD NOT BE DEALT WITH IN ISOLATION BUT WERE RELATED TO AN OVERALL PACKAGE. IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO DISCUSS A TIMETABLE FOR WITHDRAWAL, OR FIGURES, UNTIL IT WAS CLEAR AS TO PRECISELY THE SITUATION WHICH WOULD BE REACHED WHEN TROOPS HAD TO BE WITHDRAWN. SIMILARLY HE REJECTED THE IDEA THAT LIMITED MEASURES FOR DE-CONFRONTATION (SUCH AS THE DRAWING BACK OF MILITARY POSTS WHICH VARCOE SAID DENKTASH HAD MENTIONED TO MR WILBERFORCE DURING THEIR LAST MEETING) COULD BE PURSUED IN ADVANCE AND INDEPENDENTLY OF WIDER NEGOTIATIONS AS A MEANS OF MAINTAINING MOMENTUM DURING THE PRE-ELECTION PERIOD.

7. ULUCEVIK REITERATED THAT IT WAS NOW UP TO THE WEST TO PUT PRESSURE ON KYPRIANOU TO DEMONSTRATE WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE REALISTICALLY. BUT HIS GOVERNMENT REMAINED COMMITTED TO WORK FOR A SETTLEMENT AND THEREFORE HOPED THAT HIGH LEVEL NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE RESUMED ONCE ELECTIONS WERE OVER.

8. ULUCEVIK SAID THAT OZAL'S REPLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE (FCO TELNO 33) HAD BEEN PREPARED AND WOULD SOON BE CONVEYED TO US.

9. FOR COMMENT SEE MIFT.

RUSSELL  
BT