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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 618 OF 21 FEBRUARY 1985

INFO PRETORIA, LUANDA, MAPUTO, NAIROBI, LUSAKA, HARARE, EC POSTS,
LISBON.

FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH MR SHULTZ ON 21 FEBRUARY: SOUTHERN
AFRICA

MOZAMBIQUE

1. SHULTZ ASKED CROCKER TO SUMMARISE THE PRESENT STATE OF NEGOTIATIONS ON MOZAMBIQUE. CROCKER SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WAS VERY CONCERNED OVER THE MOZAMBIQUE SITUATION. IF THE NKOMATI PROCESS DID NOT PRODUCE RESULTS SOON, THERE WAS A RISK OF BACK-SLIDING. THE US WAS WORKING TO ENCOURAGE PROGRESS TOWARDS A CEASEFIRE. HE HAD JUST BEEN IN SOUTH AFRICA. HE HAD TRIED TO PERSUADE THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO GET OFF THE FENCE AND TO BE MORE HELPFUL TO MACHEL. MOST RECENTLY THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD PUT FORWARD A SET OF NEW PROPOSALS, BUT MACHEL HAD NOT SO FAR REACTED.

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE TOOK THE SAME VIEW OF NKOMATI. WE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT TO GIVE IT EFFECTIVE LIFE. THERE WAS SOME UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE COMPONENT ELEMENTS OF SUPPORT FOR RENAMO. THERE WAS SPECULATION THAT THIS WAS BASED UPON PRIVATE SUPPORT FROM SOUTH AFRICAN AND PORTUGUESE SOURCES, WITH SOME AID COMING IN FROM THE COMOROS ISLANDS. CROCKER SAID THAT A GOOD DEAL OF IT WAS PRIVATE MONEY, BUT SOMEBODY WAS ORGANISING THE SUPPLY LINES AND THERE WAS TACIT COLLABORATION WITH SOME OF THE NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES. ONE OF THE PROBLEMS WAS THAT MACHEL'S ARMY WAS PRETTY INEFFECTIVE AND BADLY NEEDED SHORING UP.

NAMIBIA

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT DURING HIS VISIT TO AFRICA THERE HAD BEEN PUBLIC CRITICISM OF THE US DIPLOMATIC EFFORT, BUT WHEN GOVERNMENTS WERE SOUNDED OUT PRIVATELY THEY SWIFTLY SAID THAT THEY DID NOT WANT THE PROCESS TO STOP. ON THE CONTRARY, THEY WANTED THE US EFFORT TO GO FORWARD BUT MORE QUICKLY. IN HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD REPUDIATED FORMAL LINKAGE BETWEEN CUBAN WITHDRAWALS AND SETTLEMENT, BUT HAD SAID THAT IN PRACTICE THERE WAS A CONNECTION. WE AGREED WITH THE US APPROACH OF PUTTING FORWARD ITS OWN IDEAS TO FIND A WAY OF MOVING ON TO THE NEXT STAGE. THERE WOULD BE INCREASED PRESSURE ON US AT CHOGM.

4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE HAD WONDERED ABOUT A REVIVED ROLE FOR THE CONTACT GROUP COUNTRIES. THE CONTACT GROUP WAS JUDGED INEFFECTIVE BY THE AFRICAN COUNTRIES SO THAT FORMAL REACTIVATION DID NOT OFFER MUCH PROMISE. BUT MAYBE THE FOUR COUNTRIES MIGHT BE ABLE TO DO SOMETHING IN A LESS FORMAL WAY. WE WERE DISCUSSING THIS WITH CONTACT GROUP PARTNERS.

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5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE THOUGHT THE US POLICY OF CONSTRUCTIVE ENCOURAGEMENT WAS BASICALLY RIGHT. SHULTZ'S TESTIMONY TO CONGRESS HAD INCLUDED AN EXCELLENT PASSAGE ON POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA, MAKING CLEAR THAT THE US ABHORRED APARTHEID, WANTED TO SEE CHANGE, BUT PEACEFUL AND STABLE CHANGE. P.W. BOTHA'S RECENT SPEECH HAD SHOWN SOME MOVEMENT IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. THIS OUGHT TO BE ENCOURAGED. BOTH US AND UK RISKED GREATER EXPOSURE IN THE FUTURE OVER OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP WITH SOUTH AFRICA. THIS WOULD INTENSIFY AT CHOGM. HENCE WE NEEDED TO BE MORE VISIBLY ENGAGED IN PRESSING FOR MOVEMENT FROM THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT, BOTH FOR ITS OWN SAKE AND IN ORDER TO RESIST PRESSURE FOR ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. NEVERTHELESS, WE DID NOT WANT TO ADD TO INSTABILITY.

6. SHULTZ COMMENTED THAT NOT EVEN BLACK GROUPS IN SOUTH AFRICA SUPPORTED DISINVESTMENT. CROCKER SAID THAT A PROCESS REASSESSMENT HAD BEEN TAKING PLACE WITHIN THE AFRIKAANS. THE BOTHA SPEECH WAS A CLEAR SIGNAL THAT SOME FUNDAMENTAL AFRIKAANS IDEAS WERE BEING QUESTIONED AND REJECTED (EG ON THE HOMELANDS). BUT THE US GOVERNMENT HAD FACED A STEADY STREAM OF UNHELPFUL PRESS HEADLINES, AND GROWING PRESSURE OVER DISINVESTMENT, WHICH MADE THEIR POSITION MORE DIFFICULT. NEVERTHELESS, US WERE STANDING FIRM.

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