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15

CYPRUS

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

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UKMIS GENEVA TEL 118: CYPRUS

SUMMARY

ACCOUNT FROM MAVROMMATIS OF THE GENEVA MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND OF GREEK CYPRIOT OBJECTIVES. GLOSSES ON THIS BY HOLGER (UN9, INCLUDING THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S UNREALISTIC PLAN FOR A STOPOVER IN CYPRUS ON 28/29 MARCH TO ANNOUNCE AGREEMENT, AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WILL ACCEPT THAT THE POST OF FOREIGN MINISTER SHOULD BE HELD BY A TURKISH CYPRIOT. HOLGER STILL NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT KYPRIANOU HAS YET BEEN BROUGHT TO FACE REALITIES.

1. AT HIS MEETING WITH JENKINS ON THE EVENING OF 13 MARCH MAVROMMATIS EXPLAINED THAT LARGELY BECAUSE OF KYPRIANOU'S ILLNESS (WHICH MEANS ALSO THAT JENKINS WILL NOT NOW BE ABLE TO SEE HIM ON 15 MARCH) THE DISCUSSIONS IN GENEVA HAD NOT GONE INTO THE DEGREE OF SUBSTANCE EXPECTED AND HE HAD NOT HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO CONSIDER IN DEPTH WITH THE PRESIDENT THE WAY AHEAD. SO HE WAS FOR THE MOST PART ONLY GIVING HIS PERSONAL VIEWS ON THE PROSPECTS. WHAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE NOW AIMING TO DO WAS AGREE WITH PEREZ DE QUELLAR THE DOCUMENTATION, IN A FORM THEY COULD ACCEPT, TOGETHER WITH "SIDE AGREEMENTS" ON PROCEDURE. THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD THEN AIM TO SELL THE PACKAGE TO DENKTASH AND THE TURKS WITH THE HELP, HE HAD SAID, OF OUTSIDE PERSUADERS. MAVROMMATIS EXPECTED TO GO TO NEW YORK ABOUT 23 MARCH FOR HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE BUSINESS AND CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE UN SECRETARIAT THEN (HE COULD NOT GO EARLIER, BUT IF NECESSARY SOMEONE ELSE COULD). THIS WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT EXERCISE IN CLEARING THE GROUND. UNLIKE THE JANUARY EPISODE THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD NOT GO TO ANOTHER HIGH LEVEL

EPISODE THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD NOT GO TO ANOTHER HIGH LEVEL MEETING WITHOUT ASSURANCE OF SUCCESS.

2. MAVROMMATHIS RECOGNISED THE NEED TO GET AN AGREEMENT IN PLACE EARLY, AS THE ONLY WAY OF RESTRAINING DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NORTH. BUT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S OBJECTIVE OF A HIGH LEVEL MEETING IN MARCH WAS NOW UNREAL. APRIL MIGHT JUST BE PRACTICABLE, THOUGH, IF THE TWO SIDES COULD AGREE ON THE TRIPTYCH OF DOCUMENTATION, PROCEDURE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF WORKING GROUPS, THE LAST COULD GET UNDER WAY WITHOUT DELAY AND THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS THUS BE STARTED IN ADVANCE OF A NEW HIGH LEVEL MEETING. SUCH A MEETING COULD FOLLOW LATER WHEN THE WORKING GROUPS HAD SHOWN SOME PROGRESS.

3. MAVROMMATHIS SAID THAT OF THE FOUR MAIN OUTSTANDING ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN NEW YORK IN JANUARY, ON WHICH THERE HAD BEEN NO DISCUSSION AND ON WHICH THE GREEK CYPRIOTS STILL NEEDED CLARIFICATION, TERRITORY SEEMED TO HIM THE MOST IMMEDIATELY IMPORTANT PROBLEM. THE PRESIDENT REGARDED IT AS TOO RISKY TO ACCEPT A PERCENTAGE FIGURE WITHOUT ASSURANCES ON THE QUALITY OF LAND TO BE RETURNED AND NUMBERS OF REFUGEES SETTLED. IT WAS VITAL FOR THE GREEK CYPRIOTS TO PRESERVE "NEGOTIATING FLEXIBILITY" AND THE ABILITY IF NECESSARY TO TRADE OFF QUANTITY FOR QUALITY AND ALSO TO CONSTRUCT BRIDGES BETWEEN SUBJECTS COVERED BY DIFFERENT WORKING GROUPS, WHICH SHOULD ACCORDINGLY NOT BE SEEN AS WATER-TIGHT COMPARTMENTS. AT ONE STAGE MAVROMMATHIS SEEMED TO SUGGEST GETTING AWAY FROM THE FIGURE OF 29 PERCENT IN FAVOUR OF A BRACKET OF "27-30 PERCENT". WE TOLD HIM THAT REOPENING ISSUES IN THIS WAY WAS PRECISELY WHAT HAD CONTRIBUTED TO THE FAILURE OF THE NEW YORK MEETING. OUR VIEW REMAINED THAT THE BEST WAY OF PROCEEDING WAS TO GIVE EARLY ENDORSEMENT TO THE DOCUMENTATION ON THE CLEAR UNDERSTANDING THAT ANYTHING AGREED AT THIS STAGE REMAINED SUBJECT TO A FINAL SETTLEMENT, AND TO LOOK TO NEGOTIATIONS IN THE WORKING GROUPS AND AT FUTURE HIGH LEVEL MEETINGS TO OBTAIN IMPROVEMENTS REGARDED AS ESSENTIAL BY THE GREEK CYPRIOTS. NO OTHER APPROACH WAS LIKELY TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO DENKTASH.

4. HE WENT OVER ALL THIS WITH HOLGER THIS MORNING (WHOM JENKINS WILL SEE TOMORROW). HE ADDED SOME GLOSSES. SO FAR FROM KYPRIANOU APPEARING READY TO ACCEPT THE SUBSTANCE AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S DOCUMENTATION, HIS MAIN INTEREST HAD SEEMED TO LIE IN BUYING TIME WHILE HE RESCUED HIMSELF FROM HIS PRESENT POLITICAL PREDICAMENT THROUGH KEEPING UP THE APPEARANCE OF ACTIVITY. THE GREEK CYPRIOTS HAD RESISTED STRONGLY THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S WISH TO MAKE PUBLIC THE TWO WEEK DEADLINE FOR KYPRIANOU'S RESPONSE. IT HAD TAKEN 45 MINUTES TO NEGOTIATE THE FORMULA IN PARASIO OF THE TUR. HOLGER ADVISED THAT WE SHOULD NOT COMPROMISE THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE DEADLINE BY MENTIONING IT TO THE TURKISH SIDE.

5. HOLGER EXPLAINED THAT MAVROMMATHIS'S REFERENCE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S OBJECTIVE OF A HIGH LEVEL MEETING IN MARCH COULD BE MISLEADING. WHAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD IN MIND WAS NOT A STRUCTURED HIGH LEVEL MEETING FOR SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATION. IN LINE WITH HIS VERY STRONG URGING OF THE NEED NOT TO LOSE TIME, HE HAD PUT TO KYPRIANOU THAT IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH OZAL IN NEW YORK ON 27 MARCH HE MIGHT HIMSELF STOP OVER IN CYPRUS ON 28/29 MARCH WITH A VIEW TO HOLDING A LUNCHEON OF THE TWO LEADERS WHICH WOULD SIMPLY BE THE OCCASION FOR ANNOUNCING AGREEMENT ON HIS DOCUMENTATION AND ON HIS INTERPRETATIVE SIDE AGREEMENT, INCLUDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF WORKING GROUPS. HOLGER SAID THAT HE HAD WARNED PEREZ DE CUELLAR THAT IT SEEMED TO HIM QUITE UNREALISTIC TO SUPPOSE THAT THE AGREEMENT OF THE TURKISH SIDE TO THE REVISED DOCUMENTS COULD BE OBTAINED

SEEMED TO HIM QUITE UNREALISTIC TO SUPPOSE THAT THE AGREEMENT OF THE TURKISH SIDE TO THE REVISED DOCUMENTS COULD BE OBTAINED IN SUCH A TIMESCALE.

6. ALTHOUGH THE GREEK CYPRIOTS IN GENEVA HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NORTH THERE HAD BEEN NO SUGGESTION OF RECOURSE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THAT ACCOUNT. KYPRIANOU WARNED HOWEVER THAT IN THE EVENT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S EFFORTS BREAKING DOWN HE WOULD HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO GO TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS A LAST RESORT.

7. AN INTERESTING DETAIL WAS THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR APPARENTLY SUCCEEDED IN GETTING KYPRIANOU TO CONFIRM (WITH GREAT RELUCTANCE) THAT, IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT HAD PASSED AT THE NEW YORK HIGH LEVEL MEETING, HE HAD A "MORAL COMMITMENT" TO THE PROPOSAL BY DENKTASH THAT THE POST OF FOREIGN MINISTER SHOULD ALWAYS BE HELD BY A TURKISH CYPRIOT. THIS WAS HOWEVER STILL QUALIFIED BY THE STATEMENT THAT THE MATTER WOULD HAVE TO BE VERY CAREFULLY STUDIED.

8. IN GENERAL, HOLGER WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC. ALTHOUGH HE ADMIRERD THE FORTHRIGHT LINE TAKEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER, HE STILL DID NOT BELIEVE THAT KYPRIANOU HAD BEEN BROUGHT (OR PERHAPS COULD EVER BE BROUGHT) TO FACE UP TO THE REALITIES. INSTEAD, AND TYPICALLY, HE WAS TRYING TO WRIGGLE HIS WAY THROUGH AND AVOID COMMITMENT TO A SET OF PROPOSALS WHICH RAN COUNTER TO HIS OWN LONGSTANDING POSITIONS ON THE CYPRUS PROBLEM.

9. HE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL OF CARE COULD BE TAKEN IN NEW YORK TO RESPECT HOLGER'S CONFIDENCE SINCE HE SEEMS TO HAVE GONE SOME WAY BEYOND THE ACCOUNT GIVEN THERE BY FEHSEL (REPORTED IN HUMFREY'S TELELETTER OF 13 MARCH, WHICH WE HAVE ONLY JUST SEEN).

10. FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

WILBERFORCE

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