

CYPRUS

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19.11.8

GRS 375

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 280930Z FCO

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 272359Z MAR 85

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 243 OF 27 MARCH 1985

INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA, LISBON (FOR S OF S'S PARTY)

PRIORITY ATHENS, ANKARA, WASHINGTON

ROUTINE ROME, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS,  
MODUK (SEC(OC)).

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

MY TELNO 237 AND NICOSIA TELNO 063 (NEITHER TO LISBON): CYPRUS

## SUMMARY

1. THE SECRETARY GENERAL MAKES CLEAR THAT HE IS EXASPERATED BY PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU'S BARGAINING TACTICS AND CONFIRMS THAT HE HAS WRITTEN TO HIM TO SAY THAT HE WILL NOW REPORT FAILURE.

## DETAIL

2. I TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S SUMMONS TO ME THIS AFTERNOON ON THE FALKLANDS (REPORTED SEPARATELY) TO ASK HIM ABOUT THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS ON CYPRUS. WITH A SHRUG OF HIS SHOULDERS THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAID THAT THANKS TO KYPRIANOU'S INDECISION HE HAD LOST A MARVELLOUS OPPORTUNITY. INSTEAD OF BEING IN A POSITION TO TELL THE TURKISH PRIME MINISTER (WHOM HE WAS SEEING IMMEDIATELY AFTER ME) THAT THERE WAS A BASIS FOR A DEAL HE WOULD BE EMPTY HANDED. ALL HE WOULD BE ABLE TO DO WOULD BE TO TRY TO PERSUADE OZAL TO MAINTAIN THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT'S SUPPORT FOR THE 17 JANUARY DOCUMENTATION. HE HAD TOLD KYPRIANOU THAT HE WOULD NEED SOMETHING BEFORE HE SAW OZAL BUT KYPRIANOU WANTED TO BARGAIN UNTIL THE LAST MOMENT OR EVEN BEYOND. THE END

TO TRY TO PERSUADE OZAL TO MAINTAIN THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT'S SUPPORT FOR THE 17 JANUARY DOCUMENTATION. HE HAD TOLD KYPRIANOU THAT HE WOULD NEED SOMETHING BEFORE HE SAW OZAL BUT KYPRIANOU WANTED TO BARGAIN UNTIL THE LAST MOMENT OR EVEN BEYOND. THE END RESULT WAS THAT HE WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO ASK EITHER OURSELVES OR THE AMERICANS FOR HELP.

3. THE SECRETARY GENERAL CONFIRMED THAT HE HAD TOLD MAVROMMATIS THAT HE CONSIDERED THIS EXERCISE CLOSED AND THAT HE HAD WRITTEN TO KYPRIANOU. THE WORLD WOULD HAVE TO BE TOLD THAT THE MISSION HAD FAILED. IT ALL SOUNDED "RATHER TRAGIC" SINCE KYPRIANOU MUST BE IN DEEP POLITICAL TROUBLE AT HOME. THE WHOLE THING WAS "SO DISCOURAGING".

4. WHEN HE REPEATED THAT HE CONSIDERED THE EXERCISE CONCLUDED, I ASKED HIM WHAT HE THOUGHT WOULD COME NEXT. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAID THAT HEADS WOULD HAVE TO BE PUT TOGETHER TO DEVISE "A FRESH NEW APPROACH". HE COULD NOT OF COURSE WASH HIS HANDS OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM MUCH THOUGH HE WOULD LIKE TO. I SAID THAT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO COME UP WITH SUCH AN APPROACH. THE SECRETARY GENERAL AGREED THAT HIS BEST TACTIC FOR THE MOMENT WOULD BE TO TRY TO KEEP THE 17 JANUARY DOCUMENTATION IN HIS POCKET AND PREVENT TURKISH ENDORSEMENT OF A MOVE BY DENKTASH TO WITHDRAW HIS AGREEMENT TO IT.

5. FROM AN ACCOUNT GIVEN TO US BY THE U.S. MISSION OF THE HAAS TALKS WITH THE SECRETARIAT, IT SEEMS THAT HE GOT RATHER LESS OUT OF PICCO AND FEISSEL THAN I GOT OUT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL. BUT WE UNDERSTAND THAT:

(A) THE U.S. AMBASSADOR IN NICOSIA WILL BE SEEING KYPRIANOU TOMORROW IN A LAST DITCH EFFORT TO PERSUADE HIM TO ACCEPT THE REVISED DOCUMENTATION.

(B) THE AMERICANS HAVE AGREED TO STRESS TO OZAL IN WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK THE IMPORTANCE THEY ATTACH TO KEEPING DENKTASH ON BOARD.

THOMSON

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