

CYPRUS

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PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
MR JENKINS

PS/No.10 DOWNING STREET

D I O CABINET OFFICE

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 112 OF 16 APRIL
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO PRIORITY ATHENS ANKARA WASHINGTON
INFO ROUTINE PARIS BONN ROME UKREP BRUSSELS UKDEL NATO
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UKMIS NEW YORK TEL 292: CYPRUS

SUMMARY

DENKTASH'S NEGATIVE RESPONSE TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S APPROACH THROUGH HOLGER.

1. HOLGER CALLED ON DENKTASH THIS MORNING (16 APRIL) ON INSTRUCTIONS TO HAND OVER A LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY GENERAL ENCLOSING THE TEXT OF THE REVISED DRAFT AGREEMENT. THE LETTER WAS DRAFTED TACTFULLY TO AVOID DIRECT REFERENDE TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM AND ELECTIONS AND SO AS NOT TO APPEAR TO IMPOSE DEADLINES. ON PROCEDURE HT SUGGESTED THAT IF THE TWO SIDES NOW ACCEPTED THE DOCUMENTATION - HT MADE CLEAR THAT THE GREEK SHIDE HAD DONE SO - WORKING GROUPS COULD BE ESTABLISHED IN ADVANCE OF A HIGH LEVEL MEETING. THE WORKING GROUPS WOULD REPORT TO A HIGH LEVEL MEETING IN DUE COURSE AND REGULAR SUCH MEETINGS COULD FOLLOW AS REQUIRED. THE SECRETARY GENERAL MEANWHILE HOPED THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD AVOID MEASURES THAT MIGHT PREJUDICE THE CHANCES OF PROGRESS.

OF PROGRESS.

2. AFTER READING THE PAPERS THROUGH HIS SILENCE, DENKTASH'S FIRST RESPONSE WAS THAT "HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND HOW HIS FRIEND THE SECRETARY GENERAL COULD TREAT HIM IN THIS WAY". IT WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION FOR HIM TO HAVE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL OR HIS AIDES BEFORE HIS OWN ELECTIONS (HOLGER HAD MENTIONED THAT FEHSEL AND PICCO WERE READY TO COME TO CYPRUS FOR FURTHER TALKS WITH THE TWO SIDES). HE WOULD NOT INSULT THE SECRETARY GENERAL BY REJECTING THE PAPERS AND SO WOULD "PUT THEM IN HIS DRAWER" AND RECONSIDER THEM AFTER THE ELECTIONS. MEANWHILE, HOWEVER, IF THE GREEK CYPRIOTS LEAKED THE TEXT OF THE NEW DOCUMENTATION OR ANNOUNCED THEIR OWN ACCEPTANCE OF IT, HE WOULD REJECT IT PUBLICLY.

3. HOLGER WAS NOT AUTHORISED TO RAISE WITH DENKTASH THE DRAFT STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL. BUT HE WAS INSTRUCTED TO SAY THAT IN ADDITION TO PUBLISHING THE AGREEMENT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL INTENDED TO CLARIFY CERTAIN POINTS, INCLUDING THAT:-

- (A) THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS DID NOT A PRIORI EXCLUDE ANY TIME-TABLE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF NON-CYPRIOT TROOPS AND THE GREEK CYPRIOTS DID NOT EXCLUDE ANY COUNTRY AS GUARANTOR
- (B) ATTRIBUTES OF INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY WOULD LIE WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
- (C) RESIDUAL POWERS WOULD LIE WITH THE PROVINCES
- (D) THE QUALITY OF TERRITORY TO BE RETURNED WAS FOR NEGOTIATION.

DENKTASH HOWEVER, HAVING GIVEN HIS INITIAL RESPONSE TO THE LETTER, DID NOT ALLOW HOLGER TO GO ON TO RAISE THESE POINTS.

COMMENT

4. THERE IS NO DOUBT AN ELEMENT OF POSTURING IN DENKTASH'S REACTION AND HOLGER DETECTED NO INDICATION THAT HE WAS SPEAKING WITH THE AUTHORITY OF ANKARA CONSEQUENT ON TURKISH REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S APPROACH TO HIM. BUT IT IS NOW CLEAR THAT DENKTASH WILL TAKE AS HARD A LINE AS HE CAN GET AWAY WITH AND IS DETERMINED TO AVOID RISK OF POLITICAL EMBARRASSMENT AMONG HIS OWN ELECTORATE FROM APPEARING TO BE FORCED INTO WHAT CAN BE REPRESENTED BY OPPONENTS AS NEW CONCESSIONS. HE MAY HAVE REAL CONCERNS (WITH WHICH ANKARA MAY SYMPATHISE) THAT, IF HE IS PUSHED TOO FAR, IT COULD DAMAGE HIS STANDING WITH THE RIGHT. BUT, EVEN IF IT IS ACCEPTED THAT DENKTASH IS NOT IN A POSITION TO COMMIT HIMSELF FURTHER ON MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE BEFORE ELECTIONS, IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO RIDE HIM OFF REFUSING CONTACT WITH UN EMISSARIES BEFORE THEN, THOUGH SUCH CONTACTS WOULD HAVE TO BE CAREFULLY ARRANGED AND DISCREETLY PRESENTED. ONE OPPORTUNITY MAY LIE IN AN EARLY ORIENTATION VISIT BY FEHSEL, WHICH WE UNDERSTAND FROM HOLGER HAS BEEN ENVISAGED FOR SOME TIME.

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