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FROM WASHINGTON 170045Z APR 85

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NO 1282 OF 16 APRIL

INFO PRIORITY CAPE TOWN ROUTINE LUANDA MAPUTO HARARE GABORONE

LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM

INFO SAVING: UKMIS NEW YORK BONN OTTAWA PARIS MOSCOW TOKYO ROME

US/SOUTH AFRICA

SUMMARY

1. MAJOR RESTATEMENT BY SHULTZ OF US POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA. NO HINT OF ANY CHANGE IN CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT. CROCKER'S STRATEGY COMPREHENSIVELY ENDORSED, BUT APPEAL FOR CONSENSUS SUPPORT UNLIKELY TO CONVINCE THE CRITICS.

DETAIL

2. IN A MAJOR POLICY SPEECH AT THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB ON 16 APRIL (COPY BY BAG) SHULTZ PRESENTED A CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS RESTATEMENT OF US POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA, COUPLED WITH A STRONG PITCH FOR A DOMESTIC CONSENSUS IN ORDER TO MAKE THE MOST OF US INFLUENCE.
3. APARTHEID, SHULTZ SAID, WAS NOT ONLY MORALLY INDEFENSIBLE BUT IN THE LONG RUN UNSUSTAINABLE. CHANGE WAS INEVITABLE, BUT BLOODSHED AND DESTRUCTION WOULD BE A TRAGEDY FOR ALL SOUTHERN AFRICANS. ANY POLICY WHICH IGNORED SOUTH AFRICA'S REGIONAL ROLE WAS OUT OF TOUCH WITH REALITY. HITHERTO, INSTABILITY HAD PLAYED INTO SOVIET HANDS, BUT MORE AND MORE AFRICANS NOW LOOKED TO THE US AND THE WEST FOR HELP IN ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES OF REGIONAL PEACE AND ECONOMIC SURVIVAL. BUT THE US COULD NOT RESPOND WITHOUT A WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH ALL THE PARTIES.
4. SHULTZ ARGUED THAT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAD ALREADY HAD MUCH SUCCESS IN ACCELERATING PEACEFUL EVOLUTION IN SOUTH AFRICA AND REDUCING REGIONAL INSTABILITY, DESPITE THE DAUNTING COMPLEXITIES. THERE HAD BEEN MORE REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA IN THE PAST FOUR YEARS THAN IN THE PREVIOUS THIRTY. THERE WAS LESS CROSS BORDER-VIOLENCE NOW THAN THERE HAD BEEN IN ELEVEN YEARS. THROUGH PAINSTAKING DIPLOMACY, A POINT HAD BEEN REACHED WHERE THE REGIONAL AGENDA THAT THE US HAD PROPOSED WAS ACCEPTED BY ALL PARTICIPANTS: AND WHERE THE US, NOT THE SOVIET UNION, HAD A MAJOR SAY IN HELPING TO SHAPE THE REGION'S POLITICAL FUTURE. BUT THE GAINS WERE FRAGILE.
5. SOUTH AFRICA WAS NOT A CLOSED, TOTALITARIAN SOCIETY. THERE WERE GROUNDS FOR HOPING FOR PEACEFUL CHANGE, AND THE US HAD CHOSEN TO FOCUS ON GETTING RESULTS. THE US COULD NOT INFLUENCE PEOPLE IF IT TREATED THEM AS MORAL LEPERS. SOUTH AFRICA'S NEIGHBOURS RECOGNISED THIS: AMERICANS SHOULD RECOGNISE IT AS WELL.

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BUT THIS APPROACH HAD NOT STOPPED THE US FROM SPEAKING OUT AGAINST APARTHEID AND REPRESSION, WHILE ENCOURAGING DIALOGUE AND POSITIVE CHANGE, OR FROM TELLING THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT THAT A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WAS ONLY POSSIBLE IF THERE WERE A SUSTAINED COMMITMENT TO MOVEMENT TOWARDS A MORE JUST SOCIETY. IN THE PAST THREE YEARS THE WHITE GOVERNMENT HAD CROSSED A HISTORICAL DIVIDE. THE CHANGES ALREADY MADE WERE NOT SUFFICIENT, AND MUCH MORE REMAINED TO BE DONE, BUT THE PROCESS HAD BEGUN. IT WAS THE JOB OF THE US TO CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE IT, DESPITE THE CLEAR SETBACK OF THE RECENT DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, WHICH THE US HAD CONSISTENTLY DEPLORED: THERE WAS NO EXCUSE FOR OFFICIAL VIOLENCE AGAINST PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATIONS.

6. SUMMARISING REGIONAL PROGRESS ENCOURAGED BY THE US, SHULTZ POINTED TO THE NKOMATI ACCORD, PEACE BETWEEN ANGOLA AND SOUTH AFRICA, UNDERSTANDINGS BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND LESOTHO AND BOTSWANA, AND THE FACT THAT US DIPLOMACY, IN CONCERT WITH KEY WESTERN ALLIES, HAD BROUGHT NAMIBIA CLOSER TO INDEPENDENCE THAN EVER BEFORE (BUT STILL ON THE BASIS OF SCR 435). THE US HAD ALSO HELPED TO MOVE MOZAMBIQUE AWAY FROM DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIET CAMP: US/MOZAMBIQUE RELATIONS WERE DEVELOPING POSITIVELY AND NEEDED FURTHER ENCOURAGEMENT.

7. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, SHULTZ MAINTAINED THAT SOUTHERN AFRICA WAS UNMISTAKABLY UNDERGOING TRANSFORMATION. US POLICY WAS NOT SIMPLY REINFORCING THE STATUS QUO. THE US WAS ENGAGED AS A FORCE FOR PEACE AND FOR CONSTRUCTIVE CHANGE AND WOULD NOT BE DE- FLECTED. TO ARGUE, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE US SHOULD HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH MARXIST REGIMES IGNORED REALITY. IN ANGOLA, THE US CONGRESS HAD ALL BUT ENACTED THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE INTO AMERICAN LAW BY BARRING US SUPPORT FOR ANGOLANS OPPOSED TO SOVIET/CUBAN INTERVENTION. UNITA HAD SINCE STEADILY GROWN IN STRENGTH AND TERRITOR

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IAL CONTROL, BUT THE US DID NOT BELIEVE THAT ANGOLA'S AGONY COULD BE RESOLVED MILITARILY. US DIPLOMACY HAD THEREFORE SOUGHT CONSTRUCTIVE ALTERNATIVES, FOCUSING ON THE RELATED QUESTIONS OF NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE AND CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL: THE PRINCIPLE OF A REGIONAL SETTLEMENT HAD BEEN ACCEPTED AND THE NEXT STEP WAS TO AGREE ON SPECIFICS. THE INDEPENDENCE OF NAMIBIA, AND THE REMOVAL OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION FROM THE ANGOLAN EQUATION, COULD SET THE STAGE FOR ALL ANGOLANS TO WORK OUT THEIR OWN FUTURE AND ACHIEVE RECONCILIATION. MOZAMBIQUE, MEANWHILE, HAD MOVED TOWARDS CO-EXISTENCE WITH SOUTH AFRICA IN ITS OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS: THIS IN TURN OFFERED AN OPENING FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH THE WEST, WHICH THE US HAD SEIZED. THOSE WHO BELIEVED THAT THE US SHOULD REFUSE TO DEAL WITH ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE WERE AS MISTAKEN AS THOSE WHO BELIEVED THE US SHOULD CUT ALL TIES WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA BECAUSE OF ITS RACIAL POLICIES. US ABILITY TO INFLUENCE CHANGE IN THE REGION WOULD NOT BE ENHANCED IF THE US ELIMINATED ITSELF AS AN ACTOR.

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8. SHULTZ EXPLICITLY REJECTED SANCTIONS: THEY WOULD BE INEFFECTUAL, AND MORE LIKELY TO STRENGTHEN RESISTANCE TO CHANGE THAN TO PROMOTE REFORM. THEY WOULD HARM THE BLACK MAJORITY. WHY WAS IT RIGHT FOR US INVESTORS TO CREATE JOBS, ENCOURAGE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A BLACK MIDDLE-CLASS OR PROMOTE THE SOCIAL AND EDUCATIONAL ADVANCEMENT OF BLACK WORKERS ELSEWHERE IN AFRICA, BUT NOT IN SOUTH AFRICA? EVEN THE LESS STRINGENT OF THE MEASURES PRESENTLY BEFORE CONGRESS WOULD ENCOURAGE US FIRMS TO WITHDRAW FROM SOUTH AFRICA. THE RESULT WOULD BE REDUCED US INFLUENCE.

9. SHULTZ CONCLUDED THAT THE ONLY COURSE CONSISTENT WITH US VALUES WAS TO REMAIN ENGAGED. IT WAS NOT FOR THE US TO ENCOURAGE POLARISATION OR EXACERBATE HARDSHIP. BUT A CLEAR BI-PARTISAN AMERICAN VOICE THAT REJECTED APARTHEID WAS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT. THE US SHOULD INDEED BE INDIGNANT ABOUT INJUSTICE AND BLOODSHED, BUT INDIGNATION ALONE WAS NOT A STRATEGY. AMERICANS SHOULD THEREFORE AGREE THAT SOUTHERN AFRICA REQUIRED US ATTENTION: THAT THE PACE OF CHANGE THROUGHOUT THE REGIONAL DEPENDED UPON PEACE AND STABILITY: THAT APARTHEID MUST GO: THAT PROMOTING REAL PROGRESS WAS BETTER THAN POSTURING: THAT ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ADVANCEMENT RESULTED FROM A PRODUCTIVE PRIVATE SECTOR: AND THAT THE US SHOULD ALWAYS BE ON THE SIDE OF THOSE SEEKING PEACEFUL CHANGE.

COMMENT

10. THIS WAS A FULL-SCALE DEFENCE OF CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT, WITH NO CONCESSIONS TO THE POLICY'S CRITICS, AND NO SUGGESTION OF A CHANGE, ON DEVELOPMENT, OF THE POLICY EVEN HINTED AT. CROCKER WILL WELCOME SUCH EXPLICIT BACKING: BUT, DESPITE THE APPEAL FOR CONSENSUS SUPPORT, THE SPEECH IS UNLIKELY TO CHANGE THE MINDS EITHER OF THOSE WHO ARE CRITICISING THE POLICY FOR BEING INSUFFICIENTLY TOUGH ON THE SOUTH AFRICANS OR OF THOSE WHO CRITICISE IT FOR BEING TOO FRIENDLY TO MARXIST REGIMES. BUT IT SHOULD PROVIDE A RALLYING CRY AND A QUARRY FOR ARGUMENTS FOR THOSE WHO WISH TO RESIST ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND SUPPORT THE MIDDLE COURSE ADVOCATED BY THE ADMINISTRATION.

11. THE SOUTH AFRICANS WILL FIND MUCH OF THE RHETORIC DISAGREEABLE: BUT THE SUBSTANCE WAS VERY HELPFUL TO THEM. THE REFERENCES TO UNITA WERE WARM BUT SHULTZ WAS CAREFUL TO MAKE RECONCILIATION WITH THE MPLA NOT A CONDITION FOR A REGIONAL SETTLEMENT BUT MERELY SOMETHING THE US HOPED WOULD FOLLOW FROM IT, AND WHICH HAD TO BE ACHIEVED BY THE ANGOLANS THEMSELVES. THE PLUG FOR SUPPORTING MACHEL WAS VERY FIRM.

FCO PASS SAVING TO: BONN OTTAWA PARIS MOSCOW TOKYO ROME
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